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Abstract 
This thesis explores the practice of sedation in hospice palliative care.  Internationally 
this has been a controversial subject for over 20 years, with the use of sedation 
considered to be on a spectrum between euthanasia and symptom control at the end of 
life.  This is a complex area of study, incorporating not only technical details regarding 
drugs and doses, but also relating to underlying values regarding end of life care.  In the 
UK end of life care has developed from the ‘hospice movement’ of the 1960s, into the 
broad and far reaching approach of palliative care.  Alongside this development, 
palliative care has espoused its own ‘ethos’ and values, evident in much of the literature 
in this area.   
This thesis presents the data from an ethnographic study in a UK hospice.  The aim of 
the study was to develop a normative understanding of the use of sedation in hospice 
palliative care.  The ethnography allowed an in depth understanding of this practice 
through prolonged immersion in the field of study.  This enabled the practice of 
sedation to be understood as a process, or series of decisions, based upon a tacit 
understanding of a patient’s proximity to death.  This was driven by the desire of 
hospice staff to bring about a comfortable and peaceful death, which was in turn 
motivated by the underpinning values, of the individual, the organisation, and of the 
approach of palliative care.   
This thesis has important implications for the future: for the specific use of sedative 
drugs in hospice palliative care, as well as for the broader issues in palliative care 
concerning decision-making at the end of life.  A new definition for sedation at the end 
of life is constructed, relating particularly to, as it is derived from, the practice and 
underpinning values of hospice palliative care in the UK.   Furthermore, as the evolving 
and changing nature of UK palliative care is considered, the capacity for hospice 
palliative care to enable the expression of different values, which manifest as a result of 
the changes in palliative care, represents a challenge to one of the core principles of the 
approach; patient centred care.  This thesis introduces and considers values based 
practice as an approach which may facilitate the identification of values in decision-
making, and reorientate care towards a more ‘patient-values-centred’ approach. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the context for the thesis, based on research conducted in a 
hospice in the UK.  Interpretation of this study requires an understanding of the context 
of palliative care which in turn requires an understanding of its history and 
development.  As this thesis explores both a practice and its underlying philosophy, the 
context provided in this chapter will provide an important reference point as themes 
emerge especially in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  The underlying values of palliative care are 
highlighted particularly, as they are seen in Chapter 7 to have a fundamental influence 
on current clinical practice of sedation at the end of life. 
In this chapter I first consider the historical background to the current practice of 
palliative care, originating in the modern hospice movement of the 1960s.  Second, I 
consider developments in two specific areas which have contributed towards the 
reintegration of care of the dying into mainstream medicine.  These are: the broadening 
scope of palliative care provision and the changes in funding of palliative care services.  
These areas of change have an important bearing on how palliative care is understood 
and how its underpinning ‘philosophy’ is interpreted.  Changes in the conception of 
dying and death, and particularly the nature of a ‘good death’ have been extensively 
discussed in the literature from a range of perspectives: a brief overview, as it relates to 
the study and impacts on palliative care, is provided next.  An important debate took 
place in the early 1990s related to the changes in the relatively new field of ‘palliative 
care’ and to the introduction of the new medical specialty of palliative medicine: the 
routinization of the hospices and the medicalization of death are briefly discussed in 
order to set the context for subsequent developments.  These debates concerned 
primarily the impact of mainstream medicine approaches on the hospice movement and 
dying: in the final section of this chapter I consider the impact of the reintegration of 
dying, and palliative care, into mainstream medicine.  I focus especially on the 
philosophy of palliative care and I suggest that rather than being in a state of opposition 
to mainstream medicine, as commentators have suggested (Randall and Downie, 2006: 
6, ten Have and Clark, 2002: 203), the central features of the palliative care philosophy 
have become integrated into those of mainstream medicine.  In turn the approach of 
mainstream medicine has changed over the past 50 years from that which traditionally 
prized objectivity and a scientific model of care, into a more holistic approach in which 
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patient’s opinions and values are more readily considered (Evans, 2008).  Changes in 
both mainstream medicine and in palliative care have created a more integrated service, 
both in practice and philosophy.  In the context of increasing integration of palliative 
care into mainstream medicine the role of the underpinning philosophies of these 
services on the care of the patient is explored.     Palliative care has forged a remarkable 
transition from an approach to care of the dying patient which was deliberately removed 
from the mainstream medicine of the NHS in the 1960s, to an increasingly integrated set 
of practices and philosophy in 2012.   This chapter will enable an appreciation of the 
context of the thesis, in a UK hospice in the early 21
st
 century.   
1.1 Terminology 
The evolution of the modern hospice movement has been extensively considered: it is 
recognised to have originated with Cicely Saunders in the 1950s, and became embodied 
in the first modern hospice, St Christopher’s hospice, in 1967 (Clark, 1998b).  A 
detailed consideration of this evolution, from the conception of a place of care for the 
dying to modern day palliative care is found in particular in the many books and papers 
authored and edited by David Clark (Clark, 1993a, Clark, 1998a, Clark, 1998b, Clark, 
1999b, Clark, 1999a, Clark, 2002, Clark, 2005, Clark, 2006, Clark et al., 1997, Clark 
and Seymour, 1999).  The historical context of modern palliative care is important to 
understand, in part because its development is so recent but also because palliative care 
is still evolving and changing, especially in its relationship to the NHS.  When 
considering the context of the thesis, therefore, this background and relationship must 
be recognised.  This section will provide an overview of the relevant historical 
background to this study, rather than a comprehensive review which can be found 
elsewhere (Clark, 1993a, Clark, 1993b, Clark, 1998a, Clark, 1998b, Clark, 1999a, 
Clark, 1999b, Clark, 2002, Clark, 2005, Clark and Seymour, 1999, Hockley, 1997).  
First, however, it is important to clarify the terms which will be used in this thesis: a 
brief history of terminology is required.   
Following the opening of St Christopher’s hospice in 1967, interest in the principles it 
espoused developed, and several new hospices opened and adopted a similar approach.  
This developed into what became known as the hospice movement, incorporating the 
principles which had their origins in Saunders’s St Christopher’s Hospice.  The type of 
care which was provided by the hospices was widely referred to as ‘terminal care’ and 
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the majority of patients cared for in the modern hospices were indeed dying and in the 
‘terminal’ phases of life.   In the 1970s Balfour Mount opened the first hospital based 
‘palliative care unit’ in Canada; this was the first use of the term ‘palliative care’ (ten 
Have and Clark, 2002: 30).  Over the following years the term ‘palliative care’ was 
gradually introduced and incorporated into the evolving approach to terminal care in the 
UK.  The term ‘palliative care’ steadily became adopted in preference to ‘hospice care’, 
which seemed incongruous as a term for use in the hospital setting (ibid).  Furthermore, 
as the care being provided was extended to beyond the care for those who were 
imminently dying, use of the term ‘palliative care’ was soon to replace ‘terminal care’.  
This was not without debate and critical evaluation, however, as not only did this 
introduce a change in terms, it also marked a period of transition from hospices 
providing solely terminal care, to the provision of care to patients earlier in their 
illnesses, a move which was not uncontested (Biswas, 1993). This will be discussed in 
later in this chapter.   The move from terminal to palliative care also marked a move 
away from descriptive terminology to more euphemistic terms; this is acknowledged by 
Doyle as he describes the more recent turn towards use of the phrase ‘end of life care’ 
(Doyle, 2010: xxi).  In his foreword to the fourth edition of the Oxford textbook of 
Palliative Medicine (OTPM) Doyle ultimately suggests that:  
palliative care is care for those at the end of life and embraces terminal and 
supportive care (ibid).   
While these terms are not further defined, Doyle suggests that it is the principles which 
underpin the practices contained within palliative care which are of ‘universal 
relevance’ (ibid).  Current ‘palliative care’ may be considered as both a philosophy and 
a series of practices delivered by palliative care specialists (Clark and Seymour, 1999: 
86, Doyle, 2010: xxi).  A full exploration of the definitions and scope of palliative care 
is beyond the remit of this thesis: it is important to recognise, however, that while the 
terms and definitions for palliative and terminal care have evolved over the past sixty 
years a precise definition remains elusive. For the purposes of clarity in this chapter 
where possible I use the terms consistent with the time to which I am referring.  I 
interpret ‘palliative care’ as an umbrella term which incorporates a series of practices 
which form specialist palliative care services, as well as incorporating a set of 
principles, or philosophy, shared by both specialist and non-specialist services. 
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1.2 History  
The term ‘hospice’ dates back to mediaeval times (Clark and Seymour, 1999: 65) and 
was understood to refer to a place of transition for a wide range of different people.  
There was little sense of conformity about these hospices and indeed they were 
described by Saunders as providing rest for an: ‘impossible mix of patients alongside 
travellers and pilgrims, orphans, and the destitute with varying degrees of segregation’ 
(Saunders, 2004a: xviii).  While some trace modern hospices directly back to these 
mediaeval shelters, others extract only the concepts of being places of journeying and 
pilgrimage, as linking the mediaeval and modern hospices (Clark and Seymour, 1999: 
66).  Certainly hospices solely for the dying did not exist before the nineteenth century 
(Saunders, 2004a: xviii).  In the mid to late nineteenth century hospices opened in 
Dublin, Australia and London, from religious and philanthropic origins (Clark and 
Seymour, 1999: 68).  Alongside homes for the dying and nursing homes, there were 
many institutions providing terminal care (Clark and Seymour, 1999, Clark, 1999b).   
These institutions, however, undertook a wide range of different practices and employed 
staff of varying degrees of nursing training.  This was brought to light by Glyn-Hughes 
in a report published in 1960 (Clark, 1999b).  In this he described the paucity of medical 
care for the dying and emphasised that while such institutions were not lacking in care 
and attention for patients, they were significantly lacking in medical input and 
intervention.  Many had few or no trained nurses and relied upon nuns or volunteers to 
provide basic care to dying patients (ibid).  Glyn-Hughes highlighted the need for 
‘skilled terminal care’ and argued that this would require in-patient beds which would 
differ from those in hospitals providing acute care (ibid). An earlier report in 1950, 
conducted by the Joint National Cancer Survey Committee, had been commissioned by 
the recently formed Marie Curie Foundation and the Queens Institute of District 
Nursing. They found conditions for patients dying of cancer in their homes to be poor, 
with uncontrolled symptoms, inadequate living conditions and limited access to 
treatment (ibid).  In a period when the National Health Service (NHS) had recently been 
established and in which there was a focus on acute care and rehabilitation, the care of 
the dying was neglected.  From the eighteenth century age of enlightenment had 
developed a positivist, scientific approach to medicine which was imbued within the 
newly formed NHS (Hodgkin, 1996).  The focus on diagnosis and treatment of diseases 
rather than on the treatment of an individual patient and their symptoms had changed 
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and was embraced in this new, publically funded, NHS (Clark, 1999b).  Charitable 
funding for care, the mainstay of provision for preceding centuries, was rejected in this 
model of care which prized objectivity and focused on specific treatments for diseases 
rather than on symptoms.  This was endorsed by those working within the new NHS 
and supported by the government of the time (ibid).  Indeed a preference for the 
efficiency and objectivity of the scientific method was evident in the statement of the 
health secretary, Aneurin Bevin, to parliament in 1950.  He said he would: 
rather be kept alive in the efficient if cold altruism of a large hospital than 
expire in a gush of warm sympathy in a small one (Saunders, 2003: 263). 
It was in this context that Cicely Saunders, as an almoner, encountered David Tasma, a 
Polish man who was dying on a busy surgical ward.  Appalled by the conditions and the 
lack of attention he received, she discussed with him the idea of creating a place more 
like a home for the dying.  She was later encouraged by a gift of £500 which he left 
after his death to be ‘a window in your home’: thus she began her journey towards the 
opening of the first modern hospice (Clark, 2006: xiv).  During the time in which 
Saunders developed and saw to fruition her plans for St Christopher’s hospice, she 
developed her vision of a place in which the terminally ill could die in a place of 
comfort and peace, with their symptoms controlled.  She was heavily influenced by her 
work at St Joseph’s hospice in London, which was one of few hospices at the time 
providing medical care at the end of life (Clark, 2006: xv).  Skills in caring for the 
terminally ill were developed by Saunders and likeminded pioneers over the following 
years and St Christopher’s hospice opened as the first modern hospice which would 
fulfil the vision for terminal care which Saunders had developed for over a decade 
(Clark, 1998b).  During this period Saunders made important choices about the way in 
which the first hospice would be run.  Initially conceived of as a single place of care for 
the terminally ill, with a strong Christian focus, Saunders changed in her thinking, 
towards a more secular hospice which would have the ability to reach and influence the 
care of more patients as they died.  This was an important decision in the shaping of the 
hospice movement; while the provision of spiritual care would be seen to retain strong 
Christian roots, its lack of exclusivity allowed the initial hospices to be able to care for 
patients with any belief or none (Clark, 2005: 12).  Furthermore, Saunders recognised St 
Christopher’s Hospice to be ‘the beginnings of help towards death’ (Saunders, 2003: 
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265) and embraced and advocated the evolving nature of palliative care in its early years 
and its interpretation and extension into other settings (Saunders, 2003: 266).  Saunders 
had always intended that the principles from which St Christopher’s hospice was 
developed should be interpreted according to the requirements of the setting rather than 
adopted wholesale (Saunders, 1999: 247).  This intention was realised over the 
following decades as hospice day care and community and hospital support teams were 
developed in different parts of the UK (Saunders, 1978b: 153, Saunders, 2004b).   
1.3 Developing palliative care practice: towards reintegration 
1.3.1 Broadening the scope 
While the hospice movement began with the aim of improving end of life care for all 
patients, from early in its development there was a focus on patients dying with cancer 
(Clark, 1999b: 235).  In the 1960s care for the dying gained attention from a number of 
sources; a division was marked, however, between those who concentrated their efforts 
on care of the elderly and those who were more focused on particular diseases such as 
cancer (ibid).  The latter group of patients were those who were readily identified as 
having pain and suffering, and for whom techniques for managing these symptoms 
could be developed.  The 1960s saw an increase in publications based on research 
evidence of the management of the symptoms of malignant disease and it was in this 
area that Saunders and the early hospice pioneers developed particular expertise (ibid). 
Increasing research evidence for the control of symptoms in patients with advanced 
cancer led to marked improvements in services for this group of patients (Riley and 
Ross, 2005).  Charitable organisations with a focus on developing services for patients 
with cancer became increasingly linked to the hospice movement and concern about 
neglected groups grew from relatively early stages in the development of hospice and 
terminal care (Clark and Seymour, 1999: 94).  Saunders was acutely aware of the need 
for the extension of knowledge and expertise for managing symptoms at the end of life 
into wider areas of healthcare.  Indeed in 1983 she stated: 
… terminal care should not be a facet of oncology, but of geriatric medicine, 
neurology, general practice and throughout medicine (Saunders and Baines, 
1983: 2)  
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Several years earlier Saunders had welcomed the development of services for patients 
with many different illnesses in the new hospices which were opening in the 1970s.  
She referred to the ‘mixed group of patients’ in these institutions, with many caring for 
patients with non-malignant disease and conditions of a ‘longer-term nature’, 
emphasising her vision for communities of care as she wrote that ‘a good community is 
usually a mixed one’ (Saunders, 1978b: 153).  Hinton’s early work researching the 
symptoms of patients at the end of life found that both groups of patients experienced 
distressing symptoms in dying (Hinton, 1963): despite this, the emphasis of end of life 
care over the past 60 years has been overwhelmingly on patients with cancer.  The 
perceived inequality of end of life care has been recognised for many years and has 
been increasingly contested (Bosanquet, 1997, Clark and Seymour, 1999: 96, Fallon and 
O'Leary, 2010: 1183, Ward, 2002).  Palliative care has been recognised as an area of 
need in many non-malignant conditions and this is reflected in several National Service 
Frameworks (NSF) from heart failure to renal disease; furthermore it was considered a 
quality requirement for patients nearing the end of life with any long term condition in 
the NSF for long term conditions in 2005 (DH, 2000, DH, 2001, DH, 2005a, DH, 
2005b, Riley and Ross, 2005, Traue and Ross, 2005).  In 2008 the End of Life Care 
Strategy (EoLCS) explicitly stated the need to provide end of life care in an equitable 
manner for all those with a life limiting illness, with care provided on the basis of need, 
rather than diagnosis (DH, 2008: 33).  An increase in published literature on the end of 
life needs of those with non-malignant diseases as well as on service developments from 
within and outwith palliative care has been seen over the past decade (Dharmasena and 
Forbes, 2001).  There are still concerns, however, about developing the resources and 
the ability to provide equitable services for all (Fallon and O'Leary, 2010: 1183).   The 
persistent question for palliative care is whether care for all patients at the end of life 
ought to be provided by palliative care specialists, or whether the principles of palliative 
care ought to be promoted for all non-cancer patients with care provided by the disease-
specialists (ibid).   
Over the past two decades there has been an increase in inter-disciplinary working, with 
service developments for patients with non-malignant conditions developing through 
joint working between palliative care teams and specialist renal, cardiology and 
respiratory teams in particular (Curtis, 2008, Gore et al., 2000, Gunda et al., 2005, 
Jaarsma et al., 2009, Murray et al., 2005).  There has been an increase in integration of 
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palliative care into these mainstream services, driven to a large extent through national 
service frameworks, setting the standards and strategies for implementation and 
improvement of end of life care for all life limiting illnesses.  Palliative care has 
developed and extended its sphere of influence, from an initial focus on cancer, to a 
need-based focus, for anyone with a life limiting illness.  While this was the vision of 
the pioneers of the hospice movement, the focus on cancer allowed a wealth of 
knowledge to be generated concerning the management of symptoms at the end of life. 
In a foreword written for the first edition of Care of the Dying (Ellershaw and 
Wilkinson, 2003) in 2003, and republished in the second edition in 2011 (Ellershaw and 
Wilkinson, 2011), Saunders explicitly stated that: 
much of the now considerable knowledge base has come from the initial 
concentration on death from cancer but the time has now certainly come for its 
wider dissemination (Saunders, 2011: xii). 
As palliative care has become part of the care for patients with non-malignant diseases 
and embedded into national frameworks and targets, further integration of services is 
likely.  Palliative care is becoming more integral to the specialties of mainstream 
medicine as its role beyond care for patients with cancer is developed.   
1.3.2 Funding 
While the original hospices of the 1960s and 1970s were funded almost entirely from 
the charitable sector, gradually NHS funding grew.  This was initially generated for 
specific projects but later NHS funding became more widely available across the 
spectrum of palliative care services (Clark and Seymour, 1999: 128).  There was a rapid 
expansion of charitably-funded hospices and palliative care services across the UK in 
the 1970s, marking significant improvements in care for dying patients.  By the time of 
the Wilkes report in 1980, commissioned to examine the state of service provision for 
patients with cancer, there had been such a growth in service provision that the report 
was able to suggest a more co-ordinated approach was required in subsequent 
developments (Clark and Seymour, 1999: 137, Parkes, 1981).  They recommended the 
co-ordination of services and dissemination of the core principles of the hospice 
movement into other areas such as in hospital and community based teams, 
recommending an: 
9 
 
emphasis on coordination between the primary care sector, the hospital sector 
and the hospice movement (quoted in Clark and Seymour, 1999: 137).   
Furthermore, in a move to reduce the rate of independent, un-coordinated hospice 
expansion, the National Society for Cancer Relief (NSCR, now Macmillan Cancer 
Support) ceased the provision of funding for new hospices built outwith NHS hospital 
grounds (Lawton, 2000: 17).  As the NHS structure and funding changed throughout the 
1980s and especially following the conservative reforms of the 1990s, hospices became 
more closely bound to the NHS and dependent on NHS contracts for funding (Clark and 
Seymour, 1999: 140).  Following the recognition of the speciality of palliative medicine 
in 1987 and the formation of the National Council for Hospice and Palliative Care 
(NCHPC) in 1991, palliative care was in a position of unity and relative strength as it 
negotiated contracts and became thoroughly integrated into the NHS.  Indeed, by 1995 
only an estimated 3 per cent of palliative care services did not receive some funding 
from the NHS (Clark and Seymour, 1999: 142).  An increase in funding for palliative 
care services was anticipated following the publication of the End of Life Care Strategy 
(EoLCS) in 2008 (NCPC, 2011).  Despite the promise of an additional £286 million, 
however, the National Council for Palliative Care (NCPC) found that 35% of Primary 
Care Trusts which responded to their national survey were unable to identify the amount 
they had invested in end of life care between 2009 and 2010 (ibid).  Local funding for 
services has certainly varied widely across the UK, with breadth such that in 2010/2011 
one primary care trust invested £21 million in specialist palliative care services while 
another only £0.2 million (Hughes-Hallett et al., 2011; 20).  An improved strategy for 
palliative care funding has been proposed as a result of an independent review which 
published its findings in 2011 (ibid).  Having reviewed the current provision of care in 
England, the report found funding to be:  
overly complicated, difficult to navigate and not joined-up enough, leading to a 
lack of fairness and transparency for commissioners, providers and patients 
(ibid: 20). 
A new, tariff-based system of funding is to be introduced, based upon a patient’s need 
and determined by the complexity and level of intervention required for the patient 
(ibid).  This will radically change palliative care funding and see it thoroughly 
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embedded within NHS funding streams: this lies in marked contrast to the entirely 
charity-dependent hospices of the 1960s and 1970s.   
1.3.3 Current provision 
Following the opening of St Christopher’s hospice, other, similarly designed and 
operating hospices evolved: by 2011 there were 220 hospice and palliative care 
inpatient units, with 3175 specialist in-patient beds (Help-the-Hospices, 2011).  A home 
care service was developed from St Christopher’s Hospice in 1969; there are now 288 
home care services across the UK, providing a palliative care service for patients in the 
community (ibid).  There are a further 127 Hospice at Home services, providing more 
intensive and multi-disciplinary support for those dying at home.  The first hospital-
based team was developed at St Thomas’s hospital in London in 1976 (Clark and 
Seymour, 1999: 75); since then the provision of hospital based care has expanded 
widely, with 343 hospital palliative care teams across the UK in 2011.  Day care 
services originated in Sheffield at St Luke’s hospice in 1975 (Saunders, 2004b: 281) 
and are now core services for many hospices, with 272 day care centres now in 
existence.  These centres provide access to specialist palliative care services for 
symptom control but perhaps more importantly they aim to help patients to adjust to and 
plan for changes in their condition, as well as engaging in a range of therapeutic 
activities (Lawton, 2000: 23).   
1.4 Good dying and death thesis 
Palliative care developed as a direct response to the neglect of patients who were dying 
in hospitals in the 1950s and 1960s (Clark, 1998b, Clark and Seymour, 1999: 88).  In 
contrast to the neglect of hospital dying and deaths, the hospice movement became 
associated with ‘good dying and death’ (Seymour, 2001: 19).  A change in the societal 
approach to dying and death was recognised, with a move away from death as a 
collective experience shared in the community, to a more isolated death in hospitals 
(Clark and Seymour, 1999 : 89).  In 1973 Aries detailed a history of dying from the 
middle ages to modern day and provided an account of dying which was once ‘tamed’, 
collective, and understood in society.  This was in marked contrast to the ‘dirty’ and 
‘wild’ dying of modern day, as he described: 
11 
 
the old attitude in which death was both familiar and near, evoking no great 
fear or awe, offers too marked a contrast to ours, where death is so frightful 
that we dare not utter its name (Aries, 1974: 13). 
Many authors have similarly lamented the change from a community-based, collective 
and open process of dying and death, to a ‘hidden’, isolated experience which is 
inextricably linked to a medical presence (Illich, 1975, Elias, 1985, Field, 1994, 
Timmermans, 1998).  Indeed since the 1970s there has been a growing concern about 
medical intervention and ‘hospitalized’ dying, characterized by social isolation and fear 
(Elias, 1985, Seymour, 2001: 19).  Illich wrote of the impact of medicalization on the 
whole of society, leading to an inability to cope with loss, suffering and death.  A 
powerful response to these ‘bad’ deaths was found in hospice care and the hospice 
movement.  As previously stated, Cicely Saunders’s focus on establishing the principles 
of care for the dying outwith the NHS was explicit.  She expressed the need to re-
establish attitudes and values in this sphere, and was deliberate in creating a 
‘community’ within, and in the immediate vicinity of, St Christopher’s hospice 
(Saunders, 1978a: 153).  Concern arising from the ‘medicalization’ of dying in hospitals 
was the stimulus for the hospice movement; ironically, as we shall see later in this 
chapter, concern about the medicalization of dying in hospices was to become a later 
debate.   
Beyond the changes in context and nature of dying described above, the good dying and 
death thesis also developed a stronger emphasis on the individual’s experience of dying.  
This focus on the individual has been considered as a postmodern phenomenon, arising 
in contrast to the prevailing modernist approach of mainstream medicine (Philip, 2010: 
104).  Many conceptions of good dying and death have been explored in the literature 
and common themes considered as contributing to these constructs are: awareness, 
acceptance, a peaceful death, dignity in dying, being free from pain and other 
symptoms, dying in sleep, sudden death, and dying with family present (Emanuel and 
Emanuel, 1998, Payne et al., 1996, McNamara et al., 1994, Wiseman, 1979).  In the 
hospice context, understanding dying as a process rather than as a single event has been 
found to be important to the good death construct (McNamara et al., 1994).  The 
concept of transition, or of a journey towards death, was explored initially by Glaser 
and Strauss in the 1960s and has been subsequently incorporated into the hospice 
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understanding of good dying and death (ibid).  McNamara et al conducted an important 
ethnographic study in an Australian hospice in the early 1990s exploring the attitudes of 
hospice nurses in relation to the good death (McNamara et al., 1994, McNamara et al., 
1995).   They highlighted the tensions between the endeavour to achieve the ideals of a 
good death and organisational limitations.   They recognised nurses to be striving to 
uphold the concepts of a good death, while balancing organisational requirements such 
as cost effectiveness and ‘routinization’.  These concepts of routinization and 
medicalization are discussed further in the next section.  Attributes of the good death 
identified in McNamara et al’s study include; awareness, acceptance, preparation for 
death, and a peaceful and dignified process of dying (McNamara et al., 1994).  Nurses 
experienced considerable distress when these were not achieved; such ‘bad’ deaths were 
explained through locating the ‘problem’ as residing with societal denial of death, or 
with particular aspects of the individual or their family which prevented them from 
interacting and participating as actively as required for the good death ideal to be 
fulfilled (McNamara et al., 1995).    McNamara has suggested that in practice hospice 
workers embrace the ‘good enough death’ concept (McNamara, 2004).  While striving 
for the good death, hospice workers accept they can only ‘do their best’ (ibid).  In a later 
paper McNamara quotes two palliative care physicians in providing a definition for the 
‘good enough death’.   This is one which is considered:  
as close to the circumstances the person would have chosen (ibid). 
In recent years the medical literature has focused on drawing together the principle 
attributes of good dying and death.  Studies have sought to account for what constitutes 
good dying and death from different perspectives (Payne et al., 1996, Pierson et al., 
2002, Steinhauser et al., 2000a, Vig and Pearlman, 2004), while others have sought to 
measure the frequency with which these features are present and good dying is achieved 
(Cheng et al., 2008, Leung et al., 2010).  Hales et al conducted a literature review of 
research determining the features of good dying and death (Hales et al., 2008).  Seven 
broad domains were found to be consistent across the literature, with an emphasis, 
however, on the multidimensional and subjective nature of the good death concept.  
Kehl (Kehl, 2006) performed a concept analysis of a ‘good death’ and determined 
attributes from research studies which were most frequently related to the ‘good death’ 
concept.  Considerable overlap is found in the domains and attributes in these papers 
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while a consistent feature is that a good death is conceptualised as being ‘free from pain 
or suffering’ and being ‘comfortable’ in dying.  Contradictions are evident, however, 
once again reflecting the subjective nature of even the concept of being free from 
suffering: for some this means being asleep while for others it involves retaining 
consciousness, or at least ought not to be at the expense of consciousness (Hales et al., 
2010, Pierson et al., 2002, Vig and Pearlman, 2004).   
Dekkers et al considered the good death with particular emphasis on its abstract and 
concrete characteristics (Dekkers et al., 2002).  They grouped attributes relating to a 
good death in the literature on a scale of abstraction; at one end of this scale is being 
peaceful and at the other is dying in one’s sleep.  Callahan’s (Callahan, 1993) concept 
of a ‘peaceful death’ as an attribute for which to strive is considered by Dekkers et al in 
depth.  Callahan’s concept of peacefulness is seen to be concerned with: (i) an 
awareness and acceptance of death; (ii) being conscious and self-aware during dying 
and at the moment of death; (iii) the presence of family and friends (Dekkers et al., 
2002: 117).  Callahan is thus interpreted as considering it to be more peaceful to be 
aware of and accepting of the end of life than to be sedated or unconscious as part of the 
dying process; a presupposition which is contested by Dekkers.  The concept of dying in 
one’s sleep has been found in research studies to be an important characteristic of a 
good death for some, while for others to approach death with full consciousness is 
important (Vig and Pearlman, 2004).  This is, however, still a descriptive characteristic 
and requires further interpretation, as Dekkers et al explore.  They argue that if it is 
good to die in one’s sleep the extent to which consciousness should be reduced, if it is 
to be artificially reduced, must be questioned.  To die in such a way, they assert, may 
deny the ability to say a final goodbye or attend to final considerations of life.  
Ultimately, the authors conclude that any fixation on a particular construct of a good 
death puts at risk the esteemed values of patient choice and autonomy. 
Any goal in the context of palliative care is based on a number of value 
assumptions as well as on scientific facts and experiences about what is 
possible or realistic to do in relation to patients.  If these goals are the focus of 
care without explicating the underlying value assumptions in order to get the 
patient to accept them then they are put to what may be called ‘ideological 
use’.  By ideological use we mean here the attempt to get people to accept 
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certain ideas about death and dying, particularly good death and dying, without 
allowing or giving these people opportunity to examine critically these ideas 
and to take a particular stand in relation to them. (Dekkers et al., 2002: 121) 
A failure to be explicit about underlying values, they argue, may lead to assumptions 
about how an individual may wish to be treated, or the manner in which they wish to 
die.  These normative assumptions of dying well will be seen in Chapter 7 to be crucial 
to an understanding of the motivations for using sedation at the end of life in a hospice.  
It seems that in the postmodern context, characterised by an increase in patient choice 
and self-determination, patients are expected to ‘live well until they die and make their 
own choices in this process’ (McNamara, 2004).  The ability to ‘lead… patients through 
a journey’, McNamara argues, is lessened in this context, yet there are fewer resources 
and reference-points available to patients, as death is more hidden and less 
communitarian than at earlier points in history.  The ‘postmodern death’ is characterised 
by a broad range of responses and influences, with fewer certainties, understood roles or 
scripts to follow (ibid).  This creates a societal tension between the desire for choice and 
autonomy and the demise of the structures and beliefs which enable such choices to be 
made.  Yet Dekkers et al, and other contemporary authors are concerned about the 
restriction of patient’s values through the assumption of shared values at the end of life; 
the breadth of views concerning the attributes of a good death lays testament to there 
being very far from a universal value perspective concerning what constitutes a good 
death.  Rather, perhaps what is sought more accurately remains McNamara’s 
interpretation of a ‘good enough death’, that which is: 
as close to the circumstances the person would have chosen (ibid). 
An understanding of this background and the literature concerning good death and 
dying is important to the reading of subsequent chapters which concern the motivations 
and aims of hospice staff as they use sedation at the end of life.  This arises in Chapter 5 
as I consider the desire to bring about a ‘peaceful’ and ‘comfortable’ death and later in 
Chapter 7 as I consider the value assumptions underlying the practice of sedation in end 
of life care.  This can be seen to have direct relevance to the good death thesis in 
practice in a hospice setting.   
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Notions of good dying and death have changed over time.  McNamara in particular has 
considered the ‘routinization’ of hospices to be an important feature in this process; this 
is discussed in the next section of the chapter.    
1.5 Routinization and Medicalization: changing practices 
The development of services from the first modern hospice in 1967 to the current state 
of provision has not been uncontroversial.  This is most evident in relation to the 
influence of mainstream medicine on hospice and palliative care and the re-integration 
of care of the dying into mainstream medicine.  Saunders stated an explicit decision to 
move the care of the dying out of the NHS ‘so that attitudes and knowledge could move 
back in’ (quoted in Clark, 1993b: 24)  As she later stated, it was always part of the 
vision to re-integrate into mainstream or general medicine.   
Hospice work is a part of general medicine and nursing and unless it is fully 
integrated with smooth continuity of care for each patient between his home, 
his treating hospital and any hospice beds, it will fail in one of its main 
objectives, to feed back attitudes and skills that any patient, anywhere, should 
expect of those caring for him.(Saunders, 1984a: 203)  
As the hospice movement gained momentum and developed into a force for changing 
the care of the dying, terminal care became more recognised and valued within the 
medical sphere.  There developed a growing body of physicians with an interest in 
creating a specialty of palliative medicine; they canvassed the royal colleges of 
physicians and succeeded in 1987.  An independent palliative medical journal for was 
created and the Association for Palliative Medicine was established (Doyle, 2007).  The 
period following the creation of the specialty of palliative medicine was marked 
however by questions about the purpose and nature of the specialty; how palliative care 
and palliative medicine were to be configured and how palliative care would withstand 
the negative effects of  ‘routinization’ and ‘medicalization’ (Clark and Seymour, 1999: 
104, Field, 1994, James and Field, 1992, Johnson et al., 1990, Kearney, 1992, Seale, 
1989).  This important debate took place in the early 1990s, particularly stimulated by 
the publication of a paper by James and Field concerned that there was a trend towards 
‘routinization’ of hospices (James and Field, 1992).  They argued that hospices were 
unintentionally becoming integrated and formed into a bureaucratic organisation.  They 
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were moving away from their original aims, James and Field suggested, towards: ‘the 
more traditional medical conceptions of disease and its treatment, to the possible 
detriment of other ‘softer’ aspects of care’ (ibid).  They used Weber’s framework and 
conceptualised the development of the hospices as a charismatic movement:  according 
to this, history alternates between ‘charisma and routinization through bureaucracy’ 
(ibid).  The emergence of the hospice movement from a ‘charismatic’ into a ‘routinized’ 
movement was cause for concern, they argued.  They focused on four key elements of 
the original movement which reflected its charismatic origins: the role of Cicely 
Saunders as a highly visible leader; the spiritual ‘calling’ which inspired many to 
become involved with hospices; the hospice vision of terminal care with its narrowness 
of focus; and the oppositional stance of the movement to mainstream terminal care.  The 
move away from these core features, they argued, would lead to a potentially harmful 
change in direction for palliative care.  They raised concern for the continued 
development of the hospice movement and argued that the movement would be unable 
to continue to adhere to the original ideals with a continued move towards routinization.  
One of the principle requirements of this thesis, Clark and Seymour later contended, is 
that the changes towards routinization which they consider to be damaging are 
unintentional (Clark and Seymour, 1999: 119).  Clark and Seymour argue, conversely, 
that many of the concerns raised by James and Field were far from unintentional, rather 
were explicitly considered and formed part of the original vision. Thus, even the 
bureaucratic changes required as the hospice movement gathered pace were anticipated 
by the early pioneers (ibid).  The nature of the original aims of the hospice movement is 
considered in particular depth by Clark and Seymour in response to the suggestion that 
there has been a move away from the spiritual calling of those who practice palliative 
care.  Clark and Seymour argue that there was an explicit intention by Saunders, evident 
in her early writing, to avoid ‘any sense of exclusivity… on matters of religion’ (ibid: 
110).  Her intention, rather, was to allow the approach to the care of the dying to be 
widely disseminated.   
A second debate closely followed the routinization argument as concerns about the 
‘medicalization’ of dying were raised.  Following the recent introduction of the 
specialty of palliative medicine there arose concern that an increasing ‘dominance’ of 
doctors in this sphere may lead to an increase in the influence of the medical model of 
care, with its focus on diagnosis and treatment, to the detriment of the ‘wider, holistic 
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approach’ (Biswas, 1993).  In an important essay, Biswas also argued against a change 
in practice (alongside a change in terminology) from ‘terminal’ to ‘palliative care’.  She 
asserted the view that a broader approach would result in a reduced emphasis and 
attention on dying, and direct a move away from the ‘original ideals’ of the movement.  
This was forcefully stated as she concluded:  
the hospice movement put death on the agenda, but palliative care has the 
capacity to relegate it to the sidelines (ibid: 139).   
David Field shared this perspective and raised five principle concerns regarding the 
newly formed specialty of palliative medicine (Field, 1994): a lack of clarity about its 
remit; a potential change in focus away from terminal care; the ‘inappropriate’ use of 
medical technology; the potential threat of an increase in medical involvement on the 
role of other health workers; and finally, the potential consequences of these moves for 
hospice care (ibid).   
In contrast to the views of Biswas and Field, Ahmedzai argued persuasively that the 
changes as the hospice movement developed from terminal to palliative care ought to be 
considered as a positive development and not harmful (Ahmedzai, 1993).  Further, 
Ahmedzai asserted that palliative care ought to be provided earlier in a patient’s life, for 
conditions other than cancer, and even that it ought to embrace development of 
technology and new approaches clinical audit (ibid).  These views were held in marked 
contrast to James and Field who, on the matter of audit, considered that it may; ‘pose a 
threat to hospice ideals of care’ (James and Field, 1992: 1370).   These concerns were 
believed to be a likely result of the ‘medicalization’ of death, promoted through the 
growth and incorporation of palliative medicine into hospices.   
The continued growth and development of palliative care since these debates, in 
becoming more differentiated and diverse, has made systematic examination of the 
differences between ‘conventional’ and ‘palliative’ care difficult.  Clark and Seymour 
conclude their detailed examination of the routinization and medicalization debates on 
this very point (Clark and Seymour, 1999: 123).  While the scope of palliative care 
services is vast, and may be bound to inevitable processes of routinization and 
medicalization, they suggest the interpersonal relationships between ‘conventional’ and 
palliative care healthcare workers ought not to be ignored.  The influence of individuals 
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on the provision of care for the dying, inevitably affected by their own values and by 
those of the organisation, is nonetheless of importance in influencing a ‘co-constructed’ 
approach to care of the dying between individuals engaged in clinical work.  Clark and 
Seymour conclude: 
We see little value then in the polarization of debates on routinization and 
medicalization which are promulgated by revisionist elements within or 
without the palliative care movement. (ibid: 124) 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the feared outcomes of routinization and 
medicalization have not materialised.  Spiritual care remains as one of the principle 
domains of palliative care, alongside attention to physical, psychological and social 
domains of care.  While hospices and palliative care teams may not be led by 
professionals of the same spiritual ‘calling’ as its founders, ‘spirituality’ remains an 
integral part of care, provided by a number of different healthcare professionals (Cobb, 
2001, MCPCIL, Wasner et al., 2005).   
While ‘palliative care’ is now firmly established in healthcare as extending beyond the 
provision of ‘terminal care’, care for the dying remains a principle function of hospices.  
The remit of palliative medicine remains broad and indistinct, and has remained flexible 
to the development of services required at a local level (Doyle, 2010: xxi).  Services, for 
example, for patients with heart failure, or for patients with end stage renal disease, 
have been developed in response to a need and willingness for interdisciplinary working 
(Johnson and Houghton, 2006, Kite et al., 1999, Saini et al., 2006, Selman et al., 2007).  
Technologies have been combined with the provision of holistic care and while 
interventional procedures, for example for pain control, may be provided for patients in 
a hospice, this is combined with a multidisciplinary approach to all aspects of a patient’s 
care (Swarm et al., 2010).   
While the routinization and medicalization debates marked a period of transition and 
integration of palliative medicine into the broadening sphere of palliative care, over the 
past decade the reintegration of care of the dying, as part of palliative care, into 
mainstream medicine has attracted more attention in the literature.  As palliative care 
services have developed alongside mainstream medicine, commentators have suggested 
that the ‘philosophy’ of palliative care has been changed through the course of this 
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development (Randall and Downie, 2006, ten Have and Clark, 2002).  As stated at the 
start of this chapter, palliative care may be considered as both a set of practices carried 
out by specialists as well as a ‘philosophy’, underpinning a particular approach to care.  
While the routinization and medicalization debates were ultimately concerned with the 
effect of changing practices on the underlying philosophy or ‘ideals’ of care, their focus 
was predominately on the changing nature of the practices of palliative care, in bringing 
about this change rather than on the philosophy of the original hospice movement.  The 
changing nature of the practices as palliative care emerged has thus been considered; 
the philosophy will now be examined.   
1.6 Developing palliative care philosophy: towards integration 
1.6.1 Origins 
As Saunders conceived of co-ordinated care for the terminally ill patient, she developed 
a detailed set of concepts of care, focusing on the patient as an individual.  As she 
would later state, the watchwords of St Christopher’s hospice were:  
you matter because you are you and you matter to the last moment of your life.  
We will do all we can, not only to help you die peacefully, but also to live until 
you die (Saunders, 2000: 257).   
Even in the earliest of Saunders’s writings, attention to aspects of physical as well as 
social, psychological and spiritual aspects of care featured strongly.  Indeed, writing in 
1958 for the St Thomas’s Hospital Gazette, Saunders began with 4 case histories, before 
detailing what she considered to be the important issues in caring for the terminally ill 
(Saunders, 1958).  Even in the case studies she provided details of the patient’s 
occupation, dependents, religious beliefs and social situations, alongside a detailed 
medical history and treatment approach.  Embedded in these case histories and in the 
text which followed was the inherent importance of recognising the individual and their 
particular context and beliefs, alongside the treatment of pain and other symptoms with 
drugs and other techniques (ibid).  As Clark comments in his introduction to a collection 
of Saunders’s publications:  
we can view this paper as the ‘manifesto’ for the subsequent hospice and 
palliative care movement, since it sets out almost the entire agenda of issues 
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that now seem so familiar: general management; nursing; the terminal stage; 
pain; mental distress, fear, and resentment; telling the patient and relatives 
about the diagnosis and prognosis; and spiritual care.  It even includes a short 
section on the problems associated with the care of those dying from non-
malignant disease. (Clark, 2006: xviii) 
From this point onwards, the foundation in the literature was set for the development of 
modern palliative care.  Only 6 years later Saunders wrote for the first time of the 
concept of ‘total pain’ (Clark, 1999c, Saunders, 1964).  This was at the heart of the 
ethos of care for a ‘whole’ person, beyond physical symptoms, and was a pivotal 
concept in the development of palliative care.  According to this ‘total pain’ concept, 
patients may be seen to suffer due to concerns of a physical, spiritual, psychological or 
social nature (Clark, 1999c).   Each of these was developed over the following years and 
would later form the basis of the palliative care management of a patient.  Additionally, 
the broader concepts required of a service for the dying were developed.  By the time 
Saunders wrote a chapter entitled ‘The Philosophy of Terminal Care’ (Saunders, 
1978b), the concepts were well established in her own practice.  While the vision and 
values of terminal care were evident in earlier practices, there was an explicit attempt in 
this chapter to delineate the ‘philosophy’ of terminal care.  Saunders combined two 
definitions of the term ‘philosophy’ to form an understanding of the ‘philosophy of 
terminal care’ as relating to both the study of an ‘ultimate reality’ as well as to the 
general principles of  knowledge, experience and activity (ibid).  Terminal care was to 
be considered not only as a set of practices embodying the ‘knowledge’ of care for the 
dying, but was also to be concerned with matters of an ‘ultimate reality’.  Saunders 
wrote consistently about the search for meaning as an essential part of the care for the 
dying patient, and considered the ‘journey’ at the end of life to be vital in providing 
adequate symptom control as she wrote: 
For those who do not wish to share their deepest concerns, care is given in a 
way that can reach the most hidden places.  Feelings of fear and guilt may 
seem inconsolable but many of us have sensed that an inner journey has taken 
place and that a person nearing the end of life has found peace (Saunders, 
2004a: xx).  
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At the heart of Saunders’s ‘philosophy’ was the whole person, whose symptoms were to 
be considered through the model of total pain.  After outlining the dual sense in which 
she proposed the philosophy of terminal care, Saunders outlined the general principles 
of such care.  These can be seen in Table 1:1(Saunders, 1978b).   
Saunders (Saunders, 1978a) 
 
Terminal Care has: 
 As its primary concern the family and patient as a ‘unit of care’ 
 An experienced clinical team; with expertise in symptom control 
 A holistic approach which embodies the ‘total pain’ model of care  
 Skilled and experienced nurses and good inter-professional team working 
 A home care programme 
 Bereavement follow up 
 A methodical approach to recording and analysis and the  development of research 
 A teaching strategy 
 Skilled use of architecture to provide an appropriate environment for care of the dying 
 A mixed group of patients in context and diseases 
 An administration sensitive to the needs of staff in an emotive environment 
 An understanding of the importance of the search for meaning at the end of life 
 
Table 1:1: Saunders's 'Philosophy of Terminal Care' 
Beyond the care of the person and attention to the ‘whole’, followed care for the 
patient’s family as part of their life, extending after death into their bereavement.  In this 
way, while situated out of the medical environment of hospitals, in the charitable and 
volunteer-sector, care which extended beyond that considered as part of healthcare was 
provided.  Bereavement care was just one of the ‘extended’ aspects of care developed as 
part of what Saunders termed the ‘philosophy’ of terminal care.  In moving out of the 
NHS these extended practices, considered so integral to the terminal care in which 
Saunders believed, were allowed to flourish and become part of the philosophy.   
Terminal and hospice care had to move out of the NHS in order for these extended 
aspects of care to be moved ‘back in’, and for the philosophy to be formed.  This was 
summarised by Saunders as she wrote: 
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Here we are concerned with the nature of man, with living and dying, and with 
the whole man and body, mind and spirit – part of some family unit, with 
physical, practical needs for us to tackle with maximum competence (Saunders, 
1978b: 147). 
1.6.2 Critique 
Saunders clearly conceptualised the provision of terminal care as extending beyond the 
provision of medical care for symptom control and believed it to require a holistic 
approach which allowed: ‘the whole man and body, mind and spirit’ to be reached.    
The combination of a rigorous and scientific approach to the management of physical 
symptoms alongside attention to psychological, social and spiritual aspects of care has 
been at the core of the palliative care ‘approach’.  As scientific developments have 
become more integrated into palliative care, and the specialty of palliative medicine has 
developed, the equality of these non-physical aspects of care has been questioned.  
Retaining the distinctive features of palliative care in which all aspects are integrated 
into a ‘whole person’ approach, has become a challenge raised in the literature, as it is 
concerned about how to retain this philosophy within modern, 21
st
 century palliative 
care.  This sense of a dual and sometimes opposing philosophy has been recognised in 
many ways and considered from different historical backgrounds and perspectives.  
While the palliative care literature frequently refers to a palliative care ‘philosophy’ 
(Hockley, 1997: 84), ‘ethos’ (Ellershaw, 2011: xx), or ‘principles’ (Doyle, 2010: xxi) 
these terms have rarely been analysed.  Two detailed considerations of the core concepts 
or philosophy of palliative care were, however, published in 2002 (ten Have and Clark, 
2002) and 2006 (Randall and Downie, 2006).  Taking different approaches, The Ethics 
of Palliative Care and The Philosophy of Palliative Care both argue that palliative care 
has changed from its original conception.  Broadly following the ‘philosophy’ originally 
asserted by Saunders, both groups of authors hold this to be a patient-centred, holistic 
approach which incorporates the care of a patient’s family and extends to provide 
bereavement care.  They argue, however, that the ‘philosophy’ or ‘values’ of palliative 
care have changed following the closer integration of palliative care and mainstream 
medicine.  Indeed ten Have and Clark even consider mainstream medicine and palliative 
care to hold ‘antagonistic’ concepts (ten Have and Clark, 2002: 6). ten Have and Clark 
consider the concepts of original palliative care to have changed as palliative care 
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moved away from providing ‘just’ terminal care for patients with cancer to providing 
care to patients at any stage in disease and with any life limiting illness.  Further, they 
hold that the ‘moral notions’ of palliative care have changed: from the Christian 
traditions of love, sympathy and sanctity of life towards the universal bioethical notions 
of ‘dignity’, ‘total care’ and ‘quality of life’.  Further still, they consider ethical norms 
to have shifted, especially in areas concerned with the doctrine of double effect and 
withholding and withdrawing treatment decisions; that which was regarded as central to 
practice is now an area for debate (ibid).   
In their critique, Randall and Downie consider the WHO definition of palliative care as 
the ‘philosophy’ of palliative care (Randall and Downie, 2006).  Written originally in 
1990, the 2002 WHO definition was developed to incorporate a broader group of 
patients with malignant and non-malignant disease, at any stage of an incurable illness.  
It included the social, psychological and spiritual concerns of the patient as well as 
incorporating the concerns of family and carers; moreover palliative care became an 
‘approach’ rather than the ‘total active care’ of patients (Sepúlveda et al., 2002).  In 
doing so it may be seen to represent a way of providing care which contains a statement 
of what palliative care does, and goes further to offer a statement of the way palliative 
care ought to be provided.  This is the view of Randall and Downie as they offered a 
critique of this palliative care ‘philosophy’ which still held the original features of 
Saunders ‘philosophy’ (Randall and Downie, 2006: 19).  This definition is seen in Table 
1:2 
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WHO (Sepúlveda et al., 2002) 
Palliative care: 
 is an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their families facing the problems associated with life-
threatening illness, through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification,  impeccable 
assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, physical, psychological and spiritual.  
Palliative care: 
 Provides relief from pain and other distressing symptoms 
 Affirms life and regards dying as a normal process 
 Intends neither to hasten nor to postpone death 
 Integrates the psychological and spiritual aspects of patient care 
 Offers a support system to help patients live as actively as possible until death 
 Offers a support system to help the family cope during the patient’s illness and in their own bereavement 
 Uses a team approach to address the needs of patients and their families, including bereavement counselling, if 
indicated 
 Will enhance quality of life, and may also positively influence the course of illness 
 Is applicable early in the course of illness, in conjunction with other therapies that are intended to prolong life, such as 
chemotherapy or radiation therapy, and includes those investigations needed to better understand and manage 
distressing clinical complications. 
Table 1:2: WHO definition of palliative care 
Randall and Downie clarify their use of the term ‘philosophy’ to mean a set of beliefs 
which determines how palliative care as an approach ought to provide symptom control 
and end of life care to patients and their relatives.   
This sense of philosophy is close to the idea of an ideology, since it is a 
statement of assumptions, beliefs, or values held by a group of people, in this 
case by the WHO representing health care professionals who specialize in 
palliative care. (Randall and Downie, 2006: 12) 
They suggest that decisions in palliative care are informed by an individual’s values 
which are themselves influenced by the set of beliefs, or ‘philosophy’ of palliative care, 
expressed in the WHO definition and held by palliative care healthcare professionals.  
Randall and Downie express concern that the development of palliative care has led to a 
move away from the Asklepian tradition towards the Hippocratic.  They state that the 
Asklepian tradition was embodied in the skills of listening and being present, finding a 
sense of ‘healing’ through this, rather than the more traditional medical, or Hippocratic, 
focus on intervention and treatment.  The issues raised by Randall and Downie appear 
similar to the concerns raised in the early 1990s in relation to the medicalization of 
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death.  Randall and Downie are concerned that the increased integration with and 
influence of, mainstream medicine on palliative care, will lead to an increase in medical 
influence, to the detriment of the other, more Asklepian, aspects of care.  The loss of the 
Asklepian traditions in palliative care may be considered to be similar to James and 
Field’s earlier concern about losing the ‘softer’ aspect of care through medicalization of 
dying and death; the latter concerned with the practices of palliative care while the 
former more concerned with a change in the underlying philosophy motivating practice.  
This is stated with concern by Randall and Downie: 
[Palliative care] must resist a total take-over by the over-zealous interpretation 
of that ideal in terms of the Hippocratic tradition, a protocol-driven process 
which risks treating all similar diseases, and all biologically similar patients, in 
the same way.(Randall and Downie, 2006: 203) 
While a similar concern was expressed in the routinization and medicalization debates 
of the 1990s, evidence suggests that the ‘softer’ aspects of healthcare have not been lost, 
rather are incorporated in activities which aim to promote palliative care in the 
mainstream medicine context.  This may be seen through the example of the Liverpool 
Care Pathway (LCP) for the dying patient.  This pathway, developed in Liverpool in the 
1990s as part of a service improvement programme, has undergone eleven subsequent 
revisions as it has been launched nationally but the authors state its original ‘ethos’ 
remains unchanged (Ellershaw, 2011: xix).  In the introduction to Care for the Dying, 
Ellershaw explicitly states the ‘challenge’ of the LCP national programme is the 
extension of the ‘vision’ of the original hospice movement (ibid).  He considers this 
vision to have been conceptualised by the ‘pioneers of the hospice movement’ as 
creating: 
an environment of care where patients could die a dignified death with support 
from their carers.  [The pioneers] embraced multiprofessional working and 
recognized that ‘journeying with’ was sometimes as important as ‘problem 
solving’.  The challenge at the start of the 21st century is to extend the vision of 
the pioneers to all patients in all care settings. (Ellershaw, 2011ibid) 
In this statement, Ellershaw brings ‘problem solving’ alongside the notion of 
‘journeying’.  Journeying conveys the sense of being a parallel presence alongside a 
26 
 
patient as they approach death, as on a ‘journey’ (Saunders, 2004a: xvii).  In this sense, 
journeying may also be considered to convey that which Saunders described as a 
‘wordless presence’ when she wrote: 
a wordless presence may be all that is needed to bring a whole life to a moment 
of dignity beyond physical loss (Saunders, 2011xii).  
The ‘wordless presence’, in doing nothing more than being with a patient, may have a 
therapeutic effect, according to Saunders (Saunders, 1984b: 200).  In contrast, ‘problem 
solving’ appears to be more actively concerned with the ‘impeccable’ control of 
symptoms at the end of life; more closely aligned in practice to interventions and 
treatment.    
Ellershaw brings these models of care together, in contrast to the approaches of ten 
Have and Clark, and Randall and Downie.  While these two groups of authors appear to 
agree that palliative care values have been changed by its increasing integration with 
mainstream medicine, they argue that this generates a ‘tension’, or a ‘paradox’ (Randall 
and Downie, 2006: 20) between opposing, or ‘antagonistic’ (ten Have and Clark, 2002: 
6) values: in contrast Ellershaw appears to draw these together to form the enduring 
‘ethos’ of palliative care.  Randall and Downie appear concerned that the Hippocratic 
tradition is threatening a ‘total take-over’ in palliative care, eliminating the more 
Asklepian ideal of healing through focus on the individual  (Randall and Downie, 2006: 
203).   Ellershaw appears to bring the two concepts together without concern for this 
tension; acknowledging the two notions of care to have existed since Saunders’s 
original vision of palliative care in the 1960s. 
Both ten Have and Clark, and Randall and Downie, argue that palliative care has 
developed in a different vein to the ideals of the original hospice movement, suggesting 
that integration into mainstream medicine is a move contrary to the original ideals of the 
early hospice movement.  While palliative care has broadened care, from solely the care 
of the terminally ill to care for anyone with a life limiting illness, these concepts were 
evident in the early writings of Saunders and other hospice pioneers (Hinton, 1963).  
Palliative care has moved alongside societal changes in perspectives regarding end of 
life decision-making.  From a profoundly paternalistic environment of the 1950s and 
1960s patient involvement in decision-making has led to a broadening of the 
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acceptability of practices in keeping with respect for individual values.  Ethical norms 
may have changed, as ten Have and Clark suggest, or perhaps become more clearly 
defined, in response to an increase in questioning and challenge, especially in response 
to a dominance and demand for autonomy.  Perhaps rather than moving away from the 
original ideals of the hospice movement, palliative care concepts have developed, 
alongside a changing society.   
1.6.3 Integration of palliative care philosophy 
This chapter has considered the way in which care of the dying was taken out of the 
NHS in order to move ‘beliefs and attitudes back in’.  Services have been reintroduced 
and reintegrated into mainstream medicine; a philosophy has been introduced.  This 
philosophy has been considered by some to be in opposition to that of mainstream 
medicine.  Tensions have been identified previously in relation to the medicalization of 
death debate, but there appears to be a current desire to establish and advance the 
palliative care approach within mainstream medicine.  It appears the time for end of life 
care to be provided outside of the NHS has past and as a philosophy of care its place 
within mainstream medicine is becoming established.  This has been seen to be the aim 
of the hospice movement from its conception.  While the practices of palliative care 
have now become established within mainstream medicine, the underpinning 
philosophy is perhaps still under scrutiny.  For some this philosophy is considered to be 
in opposition to that of mainstream medicine: in particular those aspects which promote 
symptom control rather than curative treatment (Randall and Downie, 2006).  While the 
key routinization and medicalization debates of the 1990s focused on the influence of 
mainstream medicine on the hospice approach, the debate of the 21
st
 century is centred 
on the influence of palliative care on mainstream medicine.  The use of the Liverpool 
Care Pathway for the dying patient (LCP) has influenced the care of the dying in 
hospitals and in the community (Ellershaw et al., 2010).  It was conceived of as a 
document to support and drive an improvement in the standards of care for the dying 
outwith the hospice environment.  Ellershaw and colleagues explicitly attempted to take 
palliative care standards and philosophy into the mainstream medicine context.  With 
this transfer of standards of care for the dying has come the integration of a philosophy 
of care: not only does the LCP provide guidance for addressing a patient’s symptoms of 
physical, social, psychological and spiritual origin, it brings a different philosophy of 
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care into the mainstream medicine environment.  Concerns have been expressed 
regarding the use of the LCP: press reports of patients dying as a result of the LCP are 
now not infrequent, including not only concerned relatives but also senior clinicians too 
(Devlin, 2009, Millard et al., 2009, Rawstone, 2012, Stephens, 2012).  Ellershaw and 
colleagues have changed the LCP document significantly through its twelve versions, 
while stating retention of the original ethos (Ellershaw and Wilkinson, 2011: xx).  
Ellershaw, in the introduction to Care of the Dying explicitly states the purpose of the 
guideline and perhaps reflects concerns about inappropriate use of the document.   
As with all clinical guidelines and pathways the LCP aims to support but does 
not replace clinical judgement.  It is important to ensure that patients and 
relatives understand that the focus of care has changed and that the patient is 
deemed to be in the last hours or days of life.  This requires skilled 
communication, including recognition of one’s own limitations and the need to 
involve more specialist support where required.  Using the LCP appropriately 
in any environment requires regular assessment and involves continuous 
reflection, critical decision making, and clinical skill. (ibid) 
Nonetheless, end of life care has been improved through the integration of palliative 
care into mainstream medicine (Ellershaw, 2007).  The LCP is a key document in 
enabling the practices and philosophy of palliative care to be accessible in different 
contexts.  This document was identified as an example of best practice in NICE 
guidelines for supportive and palliative care in 2004, and further government white 
papers have recommended the use of such guidelines across the UK as part of the 
national End of Life Care Strategy (EoLCS).  Palliative care and care of the dying is a 
political priority (ibid: xxi) and improving standards of care for the dying, through 
palliative care integration into mainstream medicine activities is of paramount 
importance.  There are inevitable tensions in periods of transition: from curative 
towards non-curative and a more prominent palliative care approach, before a transition 
into end of life and finally, terminal care.  It is in these areas of transition that most 
tension exists between mainstream medicine and palliative care: it is here that there 
needs to be greatest reciprocal understanding of both approaches.   
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These underlying perspectives may usefully be considered in relation to modern and 
postmodern conceptions.  If mainstream medicine is considered to hold predominately a 
modernist perspective (Charlton, 1993, Hodgkin, 1996) where the principle aim is to 
establish truth and objectivity, palliative care may be considered to hold predominately 
a postmodernist perspective in its desire to incorporate and interpret ‘truth’ in the 
context of the individual patient, their priorities and cultural background (Bottorff et al., 
1998).  While these may be the underlying conceptions of mainstream medicine and 
palliative care, they will both inevitably contain a mixture of both modern and 
postmodern perspectives.  These may be afforded a different weight according to the 
nature of a particular practice or specialty and be considered as lying on a spectrum.  
Considered in this way, while the weight attributed to, for example, attending to aspects 
of psychosocial care, may be greater in palliative care than in other specialties, this need 
not be in opposition to a different specialty affording less weight to psychosocial care 
and more to another aspect of care.  While introducing psychosocial aspects of care into 
mainstream medicine may incorporate more of a postmodernist perspective, it is not 
incongruous with the modernist view; rather they may be considered to sit at different 
points on the same spectrum.  As mainstream medicine has developed it too has evolved 
more of a postmodernist perspective, in particular with regard to the incorporation of 
patient values and choices (Charlton, 1993).  Both palliative care and mainstream 
medicine may be seen to have changed over the past 60 years, moving towards one 
another on this modern-postmodern spectrum.  While some have suggested this to be a 
move away from the original ideals of the hospice movement, I would argue that this is, 
rather, the embodiment of the ‘vision’ for transforming end of life care as palliative care 
is becoming truly integrated.  Indeed, this brings into reality one of Saunders’s ‘main 
objectives: 
Hospice work is a part of general medicine and nursing and unless it is fully 
integrated with smooth continuity of care for each patient between his home, 
his treating hospital and any hospice beds, it will fail in one of its main 
objectives, to feed back attitudes and skills that any patient, anywhere, should 
expect of those caring for him. (Saunders, 1984a: 203). 
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1.7 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has provided a historical perspective of palliative care in the 
UK, providing an overview of its development from the original vision and the hospice 
movement, to the provision of terminal care, the adoption of the term ‘palliative care’, 
and the formation of the specialty of palliative medicine.  The particular focus, however, 
has been on the developments in palliative care practices and the reintegration of these 
into mainstream medicine; of particular influence in this process has been the extension 
of services to non-malignant conditions and changes in palliative care funding with an 
increased reliance on the NHS.  The origins of the philosophy of palliative care have 
been discussed, and the resulting concerns about its future following further integration 
into different contexts, considered in depth.  All of these changes have led to an 
increased integration of palliative care into the NHS and mainstream medicine; that 
which Saunders explicitly felt the need to separate the initial hospice movement from.  
As the philosophy of palliative care developed, its core values have become 
increasingly accepted within mainstream medicine approaches.  Similarly, the values of 
mainstream medicine may be seen to have changed, with the modernist approach, 
initially embraced by those working in the newly formed NHS, making way for more 
postmodern influences, in which the views of patients are increasingly sought (Bakitas 
et al., 2011, Evans, 2008, Frank, 2009).  While some have considered the approaches 
and values of palliative care and mainstream medicine to oppose one another, perhaps 
as they have evolved they may rather be seen to be on a spectrum, with both modern 
and postmodern influences but expressing these with a different weight, or emphasis.  
Thus, the underpinning philosophies, considered in such a way, need not be considered 
in opposition, rather may be coming closer together, permitting the integration of 
palliative care into mainstream medicine.   
This background has been solely considered from the UK perspective; this is the focus 
of the thesis and research study.  International differences do exist, and will be 
considered in Chapter 2 as they become relevant to the different perspectives found in 
the literature, specifically concerning sedation at the end of life.  First, however, the 
structure of the thesis is presented, before the literature is considered in Chapter 2.    
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1.8 Structure of the thesis 
While this chapter has provided the background to situate this research in hospice 
palliative care in the UK, the second chapter provides the background to the literature 
regarding the use of sedation in palliative care.  This considers the specific palliative 
care literature concerned with the use of sedation from the palliative care perspective.  
This provides an understanding of the specific concerns regarding the use of sedation in 
palliative care, considering the international perspective. 
Chapter 3 introduces the research study and details the methodology and methods 
employed.   Particular concerns including research ethics committee approval and issues 
relating to consent in ethnography are addressed.  The research environment is 
introduced and negotiating access and my role as a researcher is considered in detail.  
Finally, my approach to data analysis and theory development is described.   
Chapter 4 introduces the first data chapter.  In this the nature of sedation as a routine 
practice, embedded in hospice end of life care, is introduced.  This is seen to be 
predominately an implicitly understood practice, expected and anticipated in relation to 
the interpretation of a patient’s proximity to death.  A conceptual model of the 
relationship of sedation to dying is presented, allowing an in depth understanding of the 
practice of sedation in a hospice at the end of life. 
The underpinning rationale for using sedation in this routine manner is explored in 
Chapter 5.  The promotion of a comfortable and peaceful death, considered as part of 
the broader good death thesis is discussed and is seen to be the primary motivation for 
staff in using sedation at the end of life.  The potential for sedation to restore a patient to 
a process of good dying and death is considered, alongside the impact of this on hospice 
staff, and patients’ relatives. 
Chapter 6 considers those situations in which sedation was not routinely used, rather in 
which sedation was explicitly discussed and planned.  These reveal in greater depth the 
considerations and motivations of staff in using sedative drugs in a hospice and provide 
an insight into the challenges faced when good dying is threatened.    
The values underpinning this practice of sedation in the hospice are explored in Chapter 
7.  These are recognised as predominately reflecting the original values of palliative 
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care and being shared within the hospice context.  The problems associated with 
divergent values are considered in this chapter through a further case study; this allows 
insight into the nature and role of values in decision-making which is considered further 
through the approach of values-based practice.   
The impact and implications of this study for future practice is discussed in Chapter 8.  
This thesis impacts on practice in 3 ways.  First, understanding the practice of sedation 
at the end of life as intricately bound to an interpretation of dying in a UK hospice 
allows informed ethical debate.  This is of tremendous importance when considering the 
international literature about sedation at the end of life and the close association of 
sedation to physician assisted death.  This links back closely to Chapter 2.  Secondly, 
interpretation of the process of dying leads to important considerations, as it is 
recognised to reflect an expectation of dying which is modelled by those dying with 
cancer.   As palliative care expands and incorporates an increasing number of patients 
with non-malignant diseases, it is important to be aware of embedded and implicit 
processes in end of life care, as misinterpretation at this crucial time could lead to the 
hastening of death.  This presents a challenge for palliative care as it develops and 
integrates further into mainstream medicine.  Finally, understanding the practice of 
sedation as informed and shaped by values, in particular the values of palliative care, 
provides depth to current understanding about end of life decision-making.  This is 
important in current healthcare as an increase in choice, even at the end of life, may 
expose an increase in diversity of values.  This study shows palliative care values to be 
strong and embedded in hospice practice; expansion and integration of these values into 
more mainstream contexts may increase exposure to values-diversity and to potential 
conflicts of values.  Palliative care providers need to be aware of these conflicts in order 
to promote what is indeed found at the core of palliative care values; patient-centred 
care.   
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Sedation in palliative care is a subject which has attracted much attention and 
controversy over the past 20 years (Engström et al., 2007).  Originally termed ‘terminal 
sedation’ (Enck, 1991), the practice involves the use of sedative drugs in palliative care.  
Many different reasons for using sedation in palliative care have been cited (de Graeff 
and Dean, 2007).  These include the use of drugs to treat specific symptoms, as well as 
the continuous use of drugs to render a patient unconscious until death (Morita et al., 
1996, Quill T. E., 1997).  All such practices have been described within the use of 
sedation in palliative care and the wide ranging interpretations of these practices have 
been much discussed in academic literature.  As a result of these interpretations, the use 
of sedation either has been regarded as merely a method of providing symptom control 
in palliative care, or as another form of euthanasia (Sykes, 2008, Battin, 2008, Billings, 
1996).  The debate has revolved around this distinction, with many research studies 
setting out with the aim of investigating whether sedation indeed does hasten death, and 
whether, if it does, death is in fact intended.   
This development of ideas, concepts and research around sedation in palliative care 
takes place within the context of an increased awareness in the medical and in the UK 
populations’ perceptions of end of life issues.  In other parts of Europe, such as in the 
Netherlands and in Belgium, the legalisation of euthanasia has contributed and formed 
the basis of the debate about sedation; primarily concerned with establishing a 
distinction between sedation and euthanasia (Bilsen et al., 2007, van der Heide et al., 
2007).  This has linked the issue of sedation and the ethical positions in relation to it, 
firmly to the context of euthanasia.  Ambiguity and concern about this practice in the 
literature leads to a need for further research.  
While much of the research in this area has focused on either specific aspects of 
sedation, such as how it is administered, or perceptions about this from family and 
professionals, there has been a clear lack of empirical research which has been able to 
address the concept of intent (Fainsinger et al., 2000b).  In part, this has been related to 
the methodologies and methods used in previous research, with many retrospective 
studies looking at case note reviews, or interviews and questionnaires considering 
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retrospective cases (Sykes and Thorns, 2003a, Rietjens et al., 2004b).  Multi-centre 
studies have looked at the way in which sedation has been administered in different 
countries and large scale surveys have (as one aspect of such studies) investigated the 
intent behind the administration of sedation (Miccinesi et al., 2006, van der Heide et al., 
2007).  None has, however, been able to observe what happens in clinical practice 
directly and demonstrate how this relates to the intentions and attitudes towards 
sedation.  This is important if the true ethical nature of the use of sedative drugs at the 
end of life is to be evaluated.   
2.2 Methodology of literature review 
I conducted a systematic review of the literature.  In order to identify the major research 
papers regarding the use of sedation in palliative care, a database search was carried out 
using MEDLINE, EMBASE, PsychInfo, CINAHL and Web of Knowledge.  The 
following Table 2:1 lists the search terms used.  
SUBJECT HEADINGS KEY WORDS 
‘palliative care’ 
‘terminal care’ 
‘terminal illness’ 
‘hospice care’ 
‘sedation’ 
‘conscious sedation’ 
‘terminal sedation’ 
‘palliative sedation’ 
‘hypnotics and sedatives’ 
‘ethics’ 
‘views’ 
‘opinions’ 
‘terminal sedation’ 
‘continuous deep sedation’ 
‘palliative sedation’ 
‘existential distress’ 
‘terminal agitation’ 
‘terminal restlessness’ 
‘refractory symptoms’ 
Table 2:1: Search headings and key words for literature search 
Limiting this search to adults and English language articles revealed a total of 367 
articles of which the abstracts were reviewed.  Additionally, a manual search of journals 
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in which sedation at the end of life was frequently cited was conducted.  These journals 
were: Palliative Medicine; Journal of Pain and Symptom Management; Journal of 
Palliative Medicine and Journal of Medical Ethics.  As this study is centred not only on 
the technical application of sedation in palliative care, but also intentions and attitudes 
towards sedation, the grey literature, including comment articles and letters from 
experts and those working in the field, were also considered for the review.  A table of 
research papers was created and divided into prospective and retrospective studies.   21 
prospective studies and 44 retrospective studies were found and are summarised in 
appendix 1 and 2 respectively. 
2.3 Initial Conceptions: ‘Terminal Sedation’ 
In the early 1990s a discussion took place in the medical literature regarding the use of 
sedation in end of life care.  This was framed in the context of palliative care and it was 
within this specialty that the primary work and debate took place.  This was triggered in 
1990 by the publication of Ventafridda et al’s  prospective study looking at symptom 
prevalence at the end of life in an Italian home care programme (Ventafridda V., 1990).  
In their study, which set out to determine the prevalence of uncontrolled symptoms at 
the end of life, they found that 52.5% of patients had ‘unendurable’ symptoms requiring 
sedation.  This high prevalence caused concern and prompted the first of many studies 
to look at the prevalence of the use of sedation elsewhere (Fainsinger R, 1991).  The 
following year Greene and Davis reported their review of 17 years of practice in a 
community urology clinic. They reported 14 cases in which patients were sedated with 
intravenous barbiturates for uncontrolled symptoms at the end of life (Greene and 
Davis, 1991).  Enck commented on both of these papers in 1991 and described this 
practice as ‘terminal sedation’ (Enck, 1991).   Since this report, ‘terminal sedation’ and 
many other terms to describe the use of sedative drugs in palliative care, have been 
discussed and debated in the medical, nursing, legal and ethical literature (Beel, 2006, 
Claessens et al., 2008, Craig, 2004, Tannsjo, 2004a)  While initial reports related to the 
prevalence of the use of sedation, and concern about variability of practices in palliative 
care, the focus of concern shifted more towards the issue of how sedation was practiced 
and the outcome of this.  Central to this debate was the question of whether sedation 
may hasten death.  The literature demonstrates a development of thought about sedation 
and the accumulating evidence has attempted to clarify the role of sedation in palliative 
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care.  Guidelines (Blanchet, 2002, Braun et al., 2003, Cherny and Portenoy, 1994, 
Hawryluck et al., 2002, Rousseau, 2001, Verkerk et al., 2007), systematic reviews 
(Beel, 2002, Claessens et al., 2008, Cowan and Walsh, 2001, de Graeff and Dean, 2007, 
Engström et al., 2007, Porta Sales, 2001) and recommendations from a panel of experts 
(de Graeff and Dean, 2007, Cherny et al., 2009) have focused and clarified the position; 
however, much ambiguity still exists.  While objectively sedation has not been shown to 
hasten death (Claessens et al., 2008, Sykes, 2008) many reports demonstrate a 
widespread belief amongst physicians that indeed it does (Sykes, 2008).  Furthermore, 
studies have determined that some physicians intend to hasten death through their use of 
sedative drugs (Rietjens et al., 2004b).  The merging of evidence concerning what 
happens when sedation is used in palliative care and what it is intended will happen, has 
proved elusive in research to date.  The difference in perspective highlighted here, 
between demonstrating evidence of clinical practice in the use of sedation, and seeking 
to clarify the intentions behind this practice, will be used in this literature review to 
present the evidence from these different standpoints.  Intention is considered under the 
broader heading of ethical considerations, and considered in practice in studies which 
have focused on end of life decision-making.  Thus the following headings form the 
structure of the chapter: terminology and definition, indications, ethical considerations 
and end of life decision-making. 
2.4 Terminology and Definition 
Since the initial use of the term ‘terminal sedation’ by Enck (Enck, 1991), many 
different suggestions for the appropriate terminology to describe the practice of using 
sedation in palliative care, have been proposed.  The requirements for this terminology 
were determined by differences in how sedation was understood and defined.  For some 
‘terminal sedation’ was akin to a ‘form of slow euthanasia’ (Billings, 1996); for others, 
it was ‘accepted medical practice’ (Portenoy, 1996) and defended strongly in these early 
papers as providing a method of ‘relief from suffering’ (Portenoy, 1996).  The term 
‘terminal sedation’ came under intense scrutiny following the US Supreme Court 
decision against the legalisation of physician assisted suicide (Burt, Orentlicher, 1997, 
Quill T. E., 1997).  The court ruled against physician assisted suicide but advocated an 
increase in the provision of palliative care and was seen to sanction the use of terminal 
sedation.  The court acknowledged the legal acceptability of providing pain and 
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symptom relief, even to the point of hastening death if necessary (Quill T. E., 1997).  
Responses to the ruling by the Supreme Court, in describing and defining terminal 
sedation, understood it to mean that food and fluids were always withheld or withdrawn 
and as such death was considered ‘inevitable’ and;  
the patient dies of dehydration from the withholding of fluids (Quill T. E., 
1997). 
Different positions regarding the nature of sedation, particularly in light of the Supreme 
Court decision, prompted further research into whether physicians did indeed intend to 
hasten death (Morita, 1999), but also prompted a reconsideration of the terminology 
used (Braun et al., 2003, Bilsen et al., 2007, Chater et al., 1998, Morita et al., 2001a, 
Morita et al., 2002b).  Broeckaert (Broeckaert, 2002) described three main areas of 
concern with the term ‘terminal sedation’.  First, the negative implications of the word 
‘terminal’ was felt to be a concern, especially as negative and ambiguous terms were 
being discouraged elsewhere.  For example, use of the term ‘palliative care’ was 
becoming the preferred term, in place of ‘terminal care’; the further implications of this 
were discussed in Chapter 1.  Second,  it was felt that the word ‘terminal’ may be 
interpreted as meaning that patients were ‘terminated’, a suggestion developing in the 
literature (Billings, 1996, Krakauer et al., 2000) from which many wanted to move 
away.  Third, the term gave no indication of what sedation entailed, or what the 
intention behind using sedation truly was (Broeckaert, 2002, Morita et al., 2001a, 
Morita et al., 2002b).  Many have sought to clarify this in the clinical literature and have 
proposed new terms and definitions which will be described below. In addition to the 
term ‘terminal sedation’ (Enck, 1991), ‘total pharmacological sedation’ (Peruselli et al., 
1999),  ‘palliative sedation’ (Broeckaert, 2000), ‘palliative sedation therapy’ (Morita et 
al., 2002b) and ‘palliative sedation to unconsciousness’ (Quill et al., 2009) are some of 
the many other terms attributed to the practice of using sedation in palliative care.  
These terms have arisen predominately from reviewing objective evidence, examining 
clinical practice, and considering the recommendations of expert opinions.  I consider 
this literature first, and then consider where these changing terms and definitions fit in 
with emerging evidence about decisions at the end of life.  In addition, the use of 
artificial nutrition and hydration is an important part of the definition of sedation in 
palliative care and its use is also discussed in this section. 
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2.4.1 Evidence and opinion from clinical practice 
In 1994 Cherny and Portenoy described the use of ‘controlled sedation’ and, while not 
formally providing a definition, they described the situation in which sedation might be 
considered (Cherny and Portenoy, 1994).  They outlined the provision of symptom 
control in palliative care and the point at which symptoms may be considered to have 
become refractory.  The provision of expert care and attention was stressed, and 
exhausting all possibilities to treat a cause of the symptom emphasised.  A symptom, 
they considered, may be called refractory when: 
all other possible treatments have failed, or it is estimated by team consensus, 
based on repeated and careful assessments by skilled experts, that no methods 
are available for alleviation within the time frame and risk-benefit ratio that the 
patient can tolerate. (ibid) 
The authors outlined an algorithm for the assessment of a refractory symptom and 
emphasised the need for review and treatment at all stages before considering sedation 
to be refractory.  This attention to detail was matched in subsequent reviews which have 
clearly sought to mark a distinction between the practice of sedation in palliative care 
and euthanasia. (Cherny, 2009, Morita, 1999, Mount, 1996, Muller-Busch et al., 2003, 
Portenoy, 1996). 
Chater et al (Chater et al., 1998) set out with the purpose of providing a literature review 
of terminal sedation and proposing new terms under which this could be described.  
This was the first of five review papers which have examined systematically the 
definitions and terminology of sedation (Beel, 2002, Chater et al., 1998, de Graeff and 
Dean, 2007, Morita et al., 2002b, Porta Sales, 2001).  Chater et al conducted an 
international survey of palliative care experts with one of the objectives to propose and 
agree a definition for terminal sedation.  The proposed definition for terminal sedation 
was as follows: 
‘Terminal sedation’ is defined as the intention of deliberately inducing and 
maintaining deep sleep, but not deliberately causing death in very specific 
circumstances. These are: 
39 
 
(i) for the relief of one or more intractable symptoms when all other possible 
interventions have failed and the patient is perceived to be close to death. 
(ii) for the relief of profound anguish (possibly spiritual) that is not amenable 
to spiritual, psychological or other intervention and the patient is perceived to 
be close to death . 
This definition does not include the management of delirium or the use of 
anxiolytic/psychotropic drugs for the management of symptoms such as 
hallucinations, paranoia, myoclonus, etc. Nor does it include planned 
temporary sedation that is reversed (Chater et al., 1998). 
While only 40% of respondents agreed with this proposal without amendment, a further 
15% stated they would agree if changes were made.  Rather than ‘close to death’, 
‘imminently dying’ was preferred: others would have preferred the definition to include 
delirium and paranoia, while ‘sedation in a dying patient’ was a phrase preferred by 
some, to ‘terminal sedation’.  Four respondents agreed with the first specific 
circumstance only, while others requested that there was an option to lighten the 
sedation (Chater et al., 1998).   This was an important study which was the first to 
consider in depth the matter of terminology and definition.  Despite the definition only 
being unreservedly accepted by 40% of respondents, this definition has been widely 
used and is still an accepted definition within palliative care (Elsayem et al., 2009, 
Sykes and Thorns, 2003b).  An interesting aspect of this study was that while 77% of 
respondents had used terminal sedation in the prior twelve months, 90% did not support 
the legalisation of ‘voluntary active euthanasia’ and 88% did not support the 
legalisation of physician assisted suicide.  From this and from comments on the 
questionnaires, the authors interpreted that the respondents did not appear to equate 
terminal sedation with euthanasia and viewed it rather as a method of ‘symptom 
control’.  With this in mind they felt terminal sedation was an inappropriate phrase and 
‘sedation for intractable distress in the dying’ was proposed in its place. 
Morita et al carried out a further literature review to consider the definition of terminal 
sedation in 2002 (Morita et al., 2002b).  Here, however, having found only seven 
studies in which the term used for sedation was clearly defined (including ‘sedation’, 
‘terminal sedation’, ‘total pharmacological sedation’ and ‘sedation for intractable 
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distress of a dying patient’) a new term was proposed.  The authors felt that ‘terminal 
sedation’ was an ‘inadequate’ term, and proposed ‘palliative sedation therapy’.  The 
concept of providing intermittent sedation for symptom control was, they felt, addressed 
by this term, and it conveyed more of the intent of the practice – i.e. the alleviation of 
symptoms.  The term ‘palliative sedation’ had been introduced by Broeckaert et al in 
2000 (Broeckaert, 2000)  however the addition of ‘therapy’ was made in 2002 by 
Morita (Morita et al., 2002b).  In addition to proposing a new term for sedation, further 
suggestions were made to the definition and also classification of sedation.  Palliative 
sedation therapy, it was proposed, should be defined as: 
the use of sedative medications to relieve intolerable and refractory distress by 
the reduction of patient consciousness (Morita et al., 2002b) 
‘Refractory’ was defined in keeping with Cherny and Portenoy’s 1994 definition 
(Cherny and Portenoy, 1994).  That a symptom was ‘intolerable’ was held to be that 
described by a patient as intolerable; if they were not able to describe this or the patient 
was not competent, a proxy decision was to be sought (Morita et al., 2002b). 
Morita and colleagues further classified different types of sedation into mild or deep, 
intermittent or continuous and primary or secondary sedation.  These subcategories 
were considered to be ethically important as it was believed they may allow further 
differentiation from euthanasia (Morita et al., 2002b).  Terms such as ‘proportional’ 
(Porta Sales, 2001) or ‘conscious’ (Cherny and Portenoy, 1994), Morita re-classified as 
‘mild’ sedation while ‘total’ (Peruselli et al., 1999), ‘heavy’ (Quill et al., 2000a) or 
‘sudden’ (Porta Sales, 2001) were termed ‘deep’ sedation.  In the same way 
‘intermittent’ sedation included ‘respite’ (Rousseau, 2001, Cherny, 1998), ‘controlled’ 
(Cherny and Portenoy, 1994),  ‘temporary’ (Cherny, 1998) and ‘night’ sedation (Stone, 
1997).  Primary sedation was used to refer to the use of sedatives not believed to be 
efficacious to treat the underlying symptom (i.e. they were primarily used for their 
sedative properties) and secondary sedation was the use of a drug for its efficacy in 
treating an underlying symptom and sedation was a (side) effect of this. 
Morita’s definitions were considered important in the pursuit of improvements in 
research into sedation in palliative care.  Frequently, all categories of sedation were 
included in research and the prevalence of patients requiring sedation can be said to 
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range from 1% to 88% (Turner, 1996).  This wide range incorporates studies in which 
only patients continuously and deeply sedated were included, as well as those in which 
mild and intermittent sedation, and continuous deep sedation were used.  When 
considering the weight of evidence for any particular type of sedation, it became clear it 
was impossible to draw robust conclusions as the data contained too many variables to 
allow any meaningful comparison between studies. 
In 2007, De Graeff and Dean (de Graeff and Dean, 2007) undertook a systematic 
literature review.  De Graeff and Dean’s paper was based on the work of twenty nine 
palliative care experts, of whom Morita and Cherny were two, with an interest in the 
topic of sedation.  In working groups, they produced a systematic literature review to 
address the key issues, and provided recommendations for standards for the practice of 
sedation.  One of the issues considered was definition and terminology.  The term 
chosen by the expert panel was ‘palliative sedation therapy’, defined as: 
The use of specific sedative medications to relieve intolerable suffering from 
refractory symptoms by a reduction in patient consciousness. 
Intolerable suffering is defined by a patient as a symptom or state that he or she 
does not wish to endure.  If the patient cannot communicate, proxy judgement 
from family and caregivers is sought. 
Refractory symptoms are symptoms for which all treatment has failed, or it is 
estimated that no methods are available for palliation with the time frame and 
risk – benefit ratio that the patient can tolerate (ibid). 
These definitions were clearly outlined and had the consensus of the twenty-nine 
palliative care experts.  The evidence for the recommendations was an acknowledged 
limitation of the paper as the vast majority of recommendations were based on expert 
opinion or ‘inconsistent or inconclusive studies of any level’ (ibid).  Subsequent reviews 
and guidelines have not differed significantly from this comprehensive review.  Many 
countries have developed their own national guidelines with the emphasis regarding the 
type of sedation practiced varying according to international differences.  Dutch 
guidelines (and support for Belgian guidelines) focus on continuous deep sedation 
(CDS); while those in the US, Canada and France have continued to develop guidelines 
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for the broader concept of ‘palliative sedation’ (Berger, 2010, Blanchet, 2002, Braun et 
al., 2003, Dean et al., 2012, Verkerk et al., 2007).   
While these studies considered the terminology and definitions, and proposed new 
terms to clarify the position of sedation, how these were interpreted more widely can 
now be considered.  While these definitions and guidelines demonstrated how the 
palliative care specialists believed sedation should be practiced, and evidence was being 
gathered to demonstrate this, the different interpretations of this and the actions of 
physicians were being examined from a different perspective.  This was highlighted 
initially through the work of the Dutch and Belgian authors in their work on end of life 
decision-making.  
2.4.2  End of life decision-making 
In 1991 the first of several Dutch studies was published relating to the frequency of 
medical end of life decisions (van der Maas et al., 1991).  This was commissioned by 
the Dutch government with the aim of addressing the issues being raised in the public 
debate on legalising euthanasia.  The intent was to inform the debate about the 
frequency and type of decisions being made by Dutch physicians.  Medical end of life 
decisions were considered in the following categories: (i) euthanasia and related 
decisions (e.g. physician assisted suicide (PAS)); (ii) non-treatment decisions (where a 
decision to withhold or withdraw potentially life prolonging treatment was made); (iii) 
decisions to use opioids and other drugs in increasing doses to alleviate pain and 
symptoms, with the ‘probable’ effect of shortening life (van der Maas et al., 1991).  
This was the first study to provide national data about medical decisions which were 
made at the end of life.  These studies have laid a framework in which sedation is 
examined within this context.  This has been important not only in examining the 
terminology and demonstrating how it is interpreted in different countries, but also in 
widening the debate about the ethical nature of sedation in palliative care.  These studies 
have provided important insights into the perceived intentions of physicians in using 
sedation and are important in highlighting international differences. 
In 2004 as part of an evaluation of the notification procedure for physician assisted 
deaths, Rietjens et al investigated the use of ‘terminal sedation’ (Rietjens et al., 2004b).  
The aim of this study was to determine the frequency of terminal sedation among Dutch 
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physicians.  They carried out interviews with 410 physicians in the Netherlands; these 
physicians were stratified according to their clinical role in order to be representative of 
the national group of physicians.  Those who had practised terminal sedation were 
asked to recall the last patient they had treated.  Terminal sedation was defined as: 
the administration of drugs to keep the patient in deep sedation or coma until 
death, without giving artificial nutrition or hydration (ibid). 
The definition of terminal sedation can be seen to incorporate the withholding or 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition or hydration (ANH) and this was found to be a 
significant aspect of this study.  The authors found that 52% of physicians had used 
terminal sedation and, if the deaths were nationally representative, they determined that 
10% of deaths in the Netherlands were preceded by this form of terminal sedation.  Of 
the physicians who had used terminal sedation, 47% had partly intended to hasten death 
and 17% explicitly intended to hasten death through terminal sedation.  Of the 17% 
explicitly intending to hasten death, 14% intended this through the withholding of 
ANH, with 2% intending to hasten death through the direct effect of the sedative drug.  
It was estimated that life was shortened by more than a month in 6% of patients 
described by the physicians, however in 73% it was estimated that this would have been 
by less than a week (ibid). 
Miccinesi and colleagues of the EURELD consortium conducted a study in 2001, the 
full details of which were reported in 2003 (van der Heide et al., 2003), with additional 
data relating to sedation reported in 2006 (Miccinesi et al., 2006).  This study involved 
questionnaires being sent to physicians in six European countries.  For this paper 
‘continuous deep sedation’ (CDS) was the term chosen to describe the continuous use of 
deep sedation, and the term ‘terminal sedation’ was described as a ‘special kind of 
sedation’, in situations in which CDS was used without ANH.  This was viewed to be 
different precisely because of the intended or foreseen life shortening effect of the 
withholding or withdrawing of ANH. 
In this 2006 paper by Miccinesi et al, it was found that Italy and Belgium had the 
highest prevalence of CDS, with 8.5% and 8.2% of all deaths being preceded by CDS 
(ibid).  Sweden and Denmark had the lowest rate of CDS prior to death with 2.5% and 
3.2% respectively being preceded by CDS.  In 35% to 65% of instances of CDS being 
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used, ANH was not given.  As the authors note, however, the absolute numbers of those 
given ANH mean little without knowing the intent behind the decision to withhold this 
treatment (ibid).  Some recommend the use of ANH at the end of life, believing it to 
improve symptoms and wellbeing (Craig, 2004).  Others, however, warn against this as 
some evidence has suggested that problems such as ascites may develop (Morita, 1999, 
Morita et al., 2006).  The use and withholding or withdrawing of ANH is discussed in 
more depth in the next section of this chapter.  Miccinesi et al concluded that if life 
expectancy were anticipated to be longer than a week, the use of CDS without ANH 
may be a marker of intent to hasten death (Miccinesi et al., 2006).  In the initial Dutch 
studies the withholding or withdrawal of ANH was seen to be integral to the practice of 
sedation. This perspective developed as the definitions in the medical literature changed 
and were clarified, and the implicit withholding or withdrawal of ANH came to be seen 
as being involved in one small area of sedation – the use of CDS without ANH.  This 
was the evolved definition of ‘terminal sedation’ (ibid).   
2.4.3   Artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) 
In studies looking at the use of ANH in patients who were sedated, there is wide 
variation in practice with between 0% (Fainsinger et al., 1998) and 69% (Morita et al., 
2005c) reported to have received fluids while sedated.  Some studies give details about 
whether patients have received ANH, or have been able to tolerate food or fluids, before 
sedation was commenced:  they have then reported on whether these have been 
continued or withdrawn (Cameron, 2004, Morita et al., 2005c).  In the main, however, 
details about these cases have been scanty, with little information other than in case 
reports about the indications, benefits and side effects experienced specifically in those 
who have been sedated.  Similarly, no evidence about the effect of ANH on survival 
specifically in sedated patients has been demonstrated (Claessens et al., 2008).  The use 
of ANH in palliative care has, however, undergone extensive discussion (Viola, 1997).  
The benefits and risks of its use in end of life care have been debated and there has been 
no evidence to support its use in end of life care as either prolonging life or hastening 
death (Morita et al., 2006, Viola, 1997).  What is clear, however, is that the withdrawal 
of ANH from a patient who is not dying, will hasten death (Craig, 2004, Craig, 2008).  
Many papers considering sedation, particularly those using the term ‘terminal sedation’, 
refer to the withholding or withdrawal of ANH as the way in which terminal sedation 
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hastens death (Tannsjo, 2004a, Billings, 1996, Quill T. E., 1997, Rietjens et al., 2006a).  
Indeed for many this is the crucial argument in questioning the ethical validity of 
sedation and, for some, is important in order to capture the controversial aspects of 
sedation (Tannsjo, 2004a).  Alternatively, others explicitly state that consideration of 
ANH is entirely separate from the decision to use sedation (Broeckaert, 2002, Claessens 
et al., 2012, de Graeff and Dean, 2007, Morita et al., 2005a, Rousseau, 2003).  
Interestingly, those more inclined to use this line of argument (considering sedation and 
ANH as separate decisions) tend to use the terms ‘palliative sedation’ or ‘palliative 
sedation therapy (Broeckaert, 2002, de Graeff and Dean, 2007, Morita et al., 2005a, 
Rousseau, 2001): those who have defined sedation as requiring the withholding or 
withdrawal of ANH have tended to use the term ‘terminal sedation’ (Billings, 1996, 
Quill et al., 2000a, Rietjens et al., 2004a, Tannsjo, 2004a).  If the use of sedation may 
include, where indicated, the administration of fluids and nutrition, arguments about its 
life shortening effect diminish in strength.  Herein lies a divide in the literature between 
those who refer to sedation without it being implicit that ANH is withheld or 
withdrawn, and those who believe it to be integral to the definition.  Some have 
combined both views, to an extent, in considering the withholding or withdrawal of 
ANH to be found in a sub category of sedation.  This was described by Miccinesi et al 
in considering that CDS without ANH is ‘terminal sedation’ (Miccinesi et al., 2006).  It 
can be seen that ‘terminal sedation’, so called, has been transformed and re-categorised 
from the original constructs, to this narrow, controversial area within a wider framework 
of sedation in palliative care.  The wider framework of sedation in palliative care has 
been termed ‘palliative sedation’ or ‘palliative sedation therapy’. From this point in the 
review, ‘palliative sedation’ will be used to describe all practices of using sedation in 
palliative care, while specific situations, such as the use of continuous deep sedation 
will be explicitly described. 
2.5   Indications 
The indications for sedation are once again very diverse and their description in the 
literature far from uniform.  In this section, the main indications for the use of sedation, 
which will incorporate all terms previously outlined, will be described.  These can be 
usefully divided into the physical symptoms which are deemed to be refractory, and the 
more controversial refractory psycho-existential symptoms.  The drugs which have been 
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described in the literature to be used as sedative drugs at the end of life are considered at 
the end of this section. 
2.5.1  Physical symptoms 
In the literature relating to palliative sedation the prevalence of individual symptoms 
which are deemed to be ‘intolerable’ and ‘refractory’ varies significantly.  This is 
unsurprising given the complications surrounding the definitions and terminology 
applied to the practice of using ‘sedation’.  This variability has been routinely referred 
to in the literature as a cause for concern when trying to provide any kind of consensus 
(Beel, 2002, Braun et al., 2003, Cherny and Portenoy, 1994, Cowan and Walsh, 2001).  
That symptoms should be refractory before sedation is considered, is universally held as 
essential (Chater et al., 1998, Cherny and Portenoy, 1994, Claessens et al., 2008, de 
Graeff and Dean, 2007, Morita et al., 2005a, Porta Sales, 2001).  While there have been 
clear definitions (Cherny and Portenoy, 1994, de Graeff and Dean, 2007), the measures 
taken in the studies to determine this prior to administering palliative sedation are 
variably described.  Morita et al, in their development of guidelines for sedation, 
outlined in depth the steps which would be considered acceptable before determining a 
physical symptom to be refractory (Morita et al., 2005a).  Some case reports describe in 
great detail the measures taken before a symptom has been determined refractory 
(Morita, 2004b, Sanft et al., 2009); however this is not universal and acts as a potential 
reason for the variation in reported statistics for the indications for the use of sedation.  
A further reason is that, once again different definitions and classifications are used for 
individual symptoms.  Morita has described this problem, and called for the use of more 
standardised and validated assessment tools in order to ensure that studies can be 
comparable (Morita et al., 2005b).  Claessens et al, in their systematic review in 2008 
(Claessens et al., 2008), found that 68% of the reviewed studies only described physical 
symptoms and of these, delirium, pain and dyspnoea were most prevalent.  27% of 
studies recorded the use of psycho-existential suffering alongside the physical 
symptoms.  The terms used were: ‘anxiety’, ‘mental anguish’ and ‘psychoexistential 
suffering’ (ibid).  In de Graeff and Dean’s (de Graeff and Dean, 2007) literature review 
and recommendations, they found twenty two case series detailing the indications for 
sedation.  Delirium and/or terminal restlessness was most frequent, in 55%, while 
dyspnoea, pain, nausea and vomiting were less common at 27%, 18% and 4% 
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respectively.  Within these frequencies, however, lies again a wide range for each 
symptom considered to be refractory.  Use of sedation for delirium for example, ranges 
from 14% to 91%; pain 3% to 49%; dyspnoea 0% to 63% (ibid).  These wide ranges 
once again reflect the difficulties of interpretation and definitions used, and some terms 
in themselves have become the subject of investigation.  Fainsinger recognised this and 
described the difficulties in defining delirium, terminal restlessness and agitation 
(Fainsinger et al., 2000a).  Some group these together (‘neuropsychological’ (Cowan 
and Walsh, 2001)); others separate them, considering delirium a physical symptom, 
whilst considering agitation a psychological symptom (and excluding them from study 
for this reason) (Claessens et al., 2008, de Graeff and Dean, 2007).  Some feel delirium 
is a more difficult symptom for which to justify the use of sedation (Elsayem et al., 
2009).  Delirium has many underlying causes and many suggest that it requires 
‘aggressive’ attempts in order to determine the refractory nature of this symptom 
(Fainsinger et al., 2000a, Morita et al., 2005a, Leonard et al., 2008).  Combining terms 
such as ‘terminal restlessness’ with delirium has been seen to perpetuate the problem as 
it may be considered  implicit that the delirium is ‘terminal’ and fewer attempts made to 
find the underlying cause (Kehl, 2004). 
Leonard’s expert review of delirium in palliative care revealed a dearth of rigorous 
studies about delirium in palliative care, with ambiguous terminology and a failure to 
use validated tools of assessment (Leonard et al., 2008).  This was found again in the 
systematic review of delirium incidence and prevalence carried out by Hosie et al 
(Hosie et al., 2012): of 8 studies meeting their inclusion criteria they found 8 different 
tools in use, only 3 of which were validated for use in palliative care.  Terminology is a 
perpetual concern as terms frequently applied in the studies concerning sedation for this 
group of patients include the criticised words: ‘restlessness, ‘confusion’ and 
‘agitation’(ibid).  Indeed Cowan and Walsh’s literature review found 14% of those 
sedated were described as being sedated for intractable ‘confusion’ (Cowan and Walsh, 
2001).  Within the indications cited for the use of sedation lies yet more ambiguity 
about what is explicitly involved and further concern about how far investigations are 
taken before a symptom is considered refractory. 
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2.5.2  Psycho-existential distress 
One of the most controversial indications for sedation in the literature is its use for the 
relief of psychological or existential distress.  Concern about the use of sedation in this 
area has been well documented, with some choosing to exclude sedation for psycho-
existential distress from studies and others including them.  This is universally 
considered to be more problematic than sedation for physical symptoms (de Graeff and 
Dean, 2007, Cherny and Portenoy, 1994, Rousseau, 2001, Morita et al., 2000).  There 
have been many case studies, clinical vignettes and reports regarding the use of sedation 
for existential distress (Krakauer et al., 2000, Mount, 1994, Morita et al., 2000, Rosen, 
1998, Shaiova, 1998, Taylor and McCann, 2005); however there is little consensus on 
how existential distress should be managed.   
Existential distress has been described in a number of ways including ‘mental 
anguish’(Stone, 1997), ‘anxiety’ and the term ‘psycho-existential distress’ (without 
clarification) (Morita, 2004b).  ‘Mental anguish’ was first described in  Stone’s review 
of case notes in the UK (Stone, 1997).  In this they found that of thirty patients sedated, 
eight were due to ‘mental anguish’, with the greatest number (eighteen) sedated for 
‘agitated delirium’ (Stone, 1997).  There is no further comment on this; however, the 
term ‘anguish’ is found again in Chater’s survey, in conjunction with the terms 
emotional, psychological and spiritual distress’ (Chater et al., 1998).  In Morita et al’s 
review and retrospective cohort study in 2000, they found only one out of two hundred 
and forty eight patients who required sedation for existential distress (Morita et al., 
2000).  This is in line with the study of Fainsinger in 2000 (Fainsinger et al., 2000b) 
where only one patient in each centre required sedation for existential distress (except 
Spain where the number was five).  While distress, however defined, features highly in 
most studies in which it is included, it is rare that sedation is used solely for this reason, 
existing most often in conjunction with physical symptoms.  Almost invariably, at least 
on this issue, great care and concern is advocated for the management of psycho-
existential distress (Quill T. E., 1997, Braun et al., 2003, Cherny, 1998, Jansen and 
Sulmasy, 2002). 
One cause of great concern, when considering the use of sedation for refractory 
existential or psychological distress, is the use of sedation for patients who are not 
dying.  Muller-Bush found the use of sedation for psycho-existential distress to be 
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increasing and urged caution in this regard (Muller-Busch et al., 2003).  Some authors 
feel that palliative sedation may ethically be used for psycho-existential distress and 
have outlined guidance for this (Fine, 2005, Rietjens et al., 2009a, Rousseau, 2004b, 
Tannsjo, 2004b).  As described by Morita in 2002, the physical symptoms experienced 
at the end of life are frequently associated with end organ failure; psychological or 
spiritual distress, on the other hand, is no marker of disease.  Patients may have a 
prognosis of months, but be suffering ‘intolerably’ – this level of suffering, many 
believe, can only be assessed by the patient themselves (Engström et al., 2007, de 
Graeff and Dean, 2007, Morita, 2004b).  Schuman-Oliver et al (Schuman-Olivier et al., 
2008) considered in depth the issue of existential distress in palliative care.  Here, 
existential distress was categorised as acute (those who have a prognosis of less than 2 
weeks), sub-acute (those with a prognosis of less than 2 weeks, if treatments were 
withheld or withdrawn), and chronic (death not imminent).  This division was described 
in order to consider the potential treatment options which may be available to patients; a 
major determinant of this is time.  In addition, the proximity to death was felt to 
determine different responses, with those in the acute category thought to experience 
more intense feelings of fear, panic and distress owing to loss of control than the sub-
acute and chronic categories.  In particular, those in the sub-acute category were 
considered to be more likely to have a sense of control, through the ability to control to 
some extent the end of life, through the voluntary stopping of eating and drinking, or 
‘palliative sedation’.  Palliative sedation, in this paper, was always considered to take 
place without ANH.  The authors considered the situations in which sedation may be 
used, ethically, for the treatment of intolerable existential distress.  Existential distress 
was defined as: 
a constellation of symptoms manifesting the experience of existential suffering 
in the context of an individual’s confrontation with a specific stage of the dying 
process (Schuman-Olivier et al., 2008). 
The authors wanted to differentiate existential distress from existential suffering, which 
was believed to be experienced by many different groups of people, at any stage of life.  
Their definition of existential distress was to be marked out as particular because of its 
relationship to death.  Schuman-Olivier and colleagues acknowledged previous 
definitions by Morita (Morita, 2004b) and Rousseau (Rousseau, 2001) and incorporated 
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these into their understanding of existential suffering.  Rousseau’s definition of 
existential suffering was quoted: 
various ill-defined psychological symptoms, including a sense of hopelessness, 
disappointment, loss of self-worth, remorse, meaninglessness, and disruption of 
personal identity (Rousseau, 2001). 
The outcome of Schuman-Olivier’s paper was the construction of a mnemonic as an 
aide-memoir for determining the refractory nature of existential suffering.  ‘TIRED’ 
related to the following: 
Time to death less than two weeks 
Imminent death medically verified 
Refractory to treatment 
Etiological alternatives excluded 
Differential diagnosis identified and treated (Schuman-Olivier et al., 2008). 
This paper provided the most extensive consideration of the matter of existential 
distress, and one of the key features found to justify the use of sedation in this group, 
can be seen to be the patient’s proximity to death. 
2.5.3 Drugs 
Many different drugs have been used with the intent of providing sedation (de Graeff 
and Dean, 2007, Porta Sales, 2001).  Midazolam is the most commonly used, its use 
reported in two thirds of all studies (de Graeff and Dean, 2007).  Others include 
levomepromazine (also known as methotrimeprazine), phenobarbitone, propofol, 
chlorpromazine, haloperidol and lorazepam (Chater et al., 1998).  Differences in the use 
of different drugs may be due to legal and organisational restraints; for example in the 
USA difficulties in accessing midazolam have been described, leading to a higher usage 
of chlorpromazine than elsewhere (Elsayem et al., 2009, Hauser and Walsh, 2009).  The 
use of opioids for sedation has also been described in some studies (Chiu et al., 2001, 
Hasselaar et al., 2007, Hasselaar, 2009, Morita et al., 1996, Rietjens et al., 2004b), 
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especially in Japan and the Netherlands.  This has, however, long been discouraged and 
is considered to be inappropriate for use in sedation (Hasselaar et al., 2007, Reuzel et 
al., 2008).  The use of morphine as monotherapy for sedation has become less prevalent 
in the Netherlands over the last 5 years since the introduction of a clinical guideline for 
the use of sedation (Hasselaar et al., 2007, Hasselaar, 2009), however a recent study of 
palliative sedation at home in Israel suggested its use as monotherapy is still prevalent 
in some countries (Rosengarten et al., 2009).  In this study 25% of patients reported to 
have received palliative sedation received morphine alone.   
2.6 Ethical considerations 
Definitions and terminology concerning sedation are not only important in driving 
improvements in practice through guidelines, they form the basis of informed ethical 
debate.  Two cardinal features of sedation appear to determine its moral acceptability: 
first, whether or not it is accepted that sedation may hasten death; second, whether the 
intent in using sedation is to relieve symptoms of distress, to induce unconsciousness 
until death, or in fact to cause death.  Some consider this second feature to be irrelevant 
from a moral perspective, holding the view that if sedation causes death it ought to be 
considered alongside end of life decisions such as euthanasia and physician assisted 
suicide (Kuhse, 1997).  This consequentialist view focuses therefore on the outcome of 
the practice rather than on the intention.  Most, however, involved in the literature 
debate concerning sedation in palliative care, hold the intent in using sedation to be of 
importance in determining its acceptability and moral position.  Thus two important 
questions must be asked before considering the moral status of sedation at the end of 
life.  First, does sedation hasten death?  Second, if it does hasten death, what is the 
intent behind its use?  In the literature debate concerning the use of sedation at the end 
of life these features may be explicitly defined; more frequently, however, the nature of 
these features is assumed or left open to interpretation.  Without an explicit outline of 
these features, there often appears to be an assumption that sedation does, or may, 
hasten death; the moral status of using sedation thus rests upon the nature of the intent 
in using sedation.  This enables some authors to consider sedation to be morally 
equivalent to physician assisted death (either euthanasia or physician assisted suicide) or 
the voluntary stopping of eating and drinking (VSED) (Billings, 1996, Quill T. E., 
1997).  Others consider physician assisted death to be even morally preferable.  They 
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consider death to be hastened by sedation and the slow process of euthanasia to be less 
desirable than ending life quickly through physician assisted death (Kuhse, 1997, Quill, 
1997).   Conversely, for those who consider the use of sedation not to hasten death, 
moral justification is required only on the basis of proportionality in symptom control 
(Morita et al., 2003b, Thorns, 2002).  The principle distinction rests on these two 
features; the hastening of death and the intent of the action.  These form part of the 
requirements for the application of the doctrine of double effect, upon which much of 
the justification and ethical debate for the use of sedation has been based. 
2.6.1 Does sedation hasten death? 
In the literature there is a general presupposition that death is hastened through the use 
of sedatives and opioids (Billings, 1996, Douglas, 2008, Jackson, 2002, Portenoy, 1996, 
Quill T. E., 1997, Quill et al., 2000a, Sykes, 2008).  This is the case not only in medical 
literature but also amongst the general population (Portenoy et al., 2006, Sykes, 2008).  
Initial descriptions of the practice of ‘terminal sedation’ indeed asserted this as a feature 
of its use.  Billings, for example, was clear about the nature of the use of terminal 
sedation as he described: 
In a stuporous state the patient can no longer eat and drink, dehydrates to death, 
if it’s taking too long the morphine drip is increased until there is a quicker 
death (Billings, 1996). 
It was clear to Billings and to others that sedation hastened death.  The available 
evidence, however, does not support this assumption (Chiu et al., 2001, Fainsinger et 
al., 2000a, George and Regnard, 2007, Morita et al., 2001b, Rietjens et al., 2008, Sykes 
and Thorns, 2003a).  Studies which have reported on the survival of patients after 
receiving sedation at the end of life have been carried out.  These have been conducted 
using different methodologies and thus comparison between studies is difficult.  In 
particular, interpretation of the term ‘sedation’ varies with some considering this to 
mean the use of sedative drug to induce unconsciousness, while others mean simply the 
use of sedative drugs, regardless of effect.   Some studies have been retrospective and 
used an estimation of the prognosis of patients (Rietjens et al., 2004a), while others 
have looked at survival from admission in sedated and non-sedated patients (Sykes and 
Thorns, 2003a).  None has demonstrated a significantly shorter survival in sedated 
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patients.  Indeed the only study to demonstrate a statistically significant difference 
showed that patients who were sedated for a period longer than a week survived longer 
than those not sedated, and also longer than those who were only sedated for the last 48 
hours of life (ibid).  There were many variables in this retrospective study, including the 
drugs and doses used, and the condition of patients before having sedative drugs.  While 
there are no studies which provide evidence that sedation hastens death, equally there 
are none which provide clear evidence, which can account for variables, that sedation 
does not hasten death. Nonetheless, some descriptions of practice in the literature do 
suggest that sedation may hasten death (Anquinet et al., 2011, Claessens et al., 2011, 
Rietjens et al., 2004b).  Once again, different practices of using sedation abound, with 
widespread international variation (Fainsinger et al., 2000b, Rietjens et al., 2004a, 
Sykes and Thorns, 2003b).   It appears that certain practices of using sedation, such as 
CDS, may hasten death, while others may not.  The answer to the question of whether 
or not sedation hastens death depends on which practice of sedation is being considered.  
Perhaps the more nuanced question of whether sedation may hasten death allows a more 
useful account of the moral nature of sedation at the end of life.   
Sedation at the end of life may be considered to hasten death when artificial nutrition 
and hydration (ANH) are, as part of the normal practice of sedation, withheld or 
withdrawn.  While there may be a separate decision that this is the appropriate action to 
take, the automatic withholding or withdrawal of ANH may be considered to cause a 
patient to dehydrate or starve to death (Craig, 2004, de Graeff and Dean, 2007).  This 
has been addressed in guidelines advising that the decision to use ANH ought to be 
independent of the decision to use sedation (Cherny et al., 2009, Dean et al., 2012, de 
Graeff and Dean, 2007, Verkerk et al., 2007).  An interesting distinction is found in the 
Dutch national guidelines for the use of palliative sedation.  This suggests that ‘in 
general’ fluids should not be given to a deeply sedated patient (Verkerk et al., 2007).  
This is based upon the expectation that a patient who is deeply sedated should have no 
more than two weeks left of life, and that by the time they are deeply sedated they 
would naturally have stopped drinking; thus they are not considered to have dehydrated 
to death as a direct cause of the withholding or withdrawing of ANH (Verkerk et al., 
2007).  While this forms part of the Dutch national guidelines, international guidelines 
consider the decisions to use sedation and to use ANH at the end of life to be separate 
decisions (Cherny et al., 2009, de Graeff and Dean, 2007). 
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Even when the decision to withhold or withdraw ANH is considered separately to the 
decision to use sedation, there remains a concern about the possibility of hastening 
death through the use of drugs which may remove consciousness.  A distinction is 
established between those who intend to hasten death and those who do not.  Those who 
intend to hasten death through the use of sedation, when voluntary, may be considered 
to practice euthanasia.  Euthanasia may be defined as: 
A doctor intentionally killing a person by the administration of drugs, at that 
person’s voluntary and competent request (Materstvedt et al., 2003). 
When sedation is used with the intention of hastening death in the absence of a patient’s 
‘voluntary and competent request’, the practice is either non-voluntary euthanasia 
(when a patient is unable to consent, and this is recognised to be a valid distinction), or 
murder.  It is not the intention or within the scope of this thesis to consider further the 
question of euthanasia, rather to consider in outline the moral nature of sedation based 
upon definition and exploration of terms.  This is in order to set out the position of the 
practices of sedation when considering the results of the study of sedation in a UK 
hospice.   
2.6.2 What is the intent in using sedation? 
Those who believe sedation may hasten death, but consider the intent not to be to cause 
this directly, frequently appeal to the doctrine of double effect.   Many commentaries 
and discussions about sedation have concentrated solely on a critique of this (Boyle, 
2004, Quill, 1997, Williams, 2001); indeed , this reliance on one moral framework has 
been criticised (Billings and Churchill, 2012).  Some believe it to be a flawed doctrine 
which cannot be applied to sedation in palliative care (Billings, 1996, Billings, 2011, 
Quill, 1993); others believe it is not required as death is not hastened (de Graeff and 
Dean, 2007, George and Regnard, 2007, Sykes and Thorns, 2003a), while others still 
defend its use when considered appropriately (Rousseau, 2004a, Schuman-Olivier et al., 
2008, Sulmasy and Pellegrino, 1999).  In brief, the doctrine states that where an act is 
morally good or at least indifferent, it is permissible that a bad consequence can occur 
as a side effect, provided that what is intended is the good effect and the means to that 
effect is not achieved through the bad (side) effect.   In addition to this the act must be 
proportional in two respects: first, there must be adequate reason to harm and, secondly, 
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the harm must only be required when there is no alternative but to so act (McIntyre, 
2004).  
Much discussion about the applicability of this doctrine to the use of sedation at the end 
of life has taken place in the literature.  In many of these papers death is assumed to be a 
‘bad’ effect.  This has, however, been disputed (Allmark et al., 2010).  Allmark et al 
argue that when a patient is acknowledged to be dying, death may be anticipated and 
desired, rather than fought: a patient may have accepted their death and be ‘ready’ to 
die.  In this situation death is not considered to be a ‘bad’ effect; rather may be sought.  
This does not require death to be hastened for it to be good, merely is not considered a 
‘bad’ outcome.  In this way Allmark et al have argued that the doctrine of double effect 
is not applicable in the situation of using sedation at the end of life, where death is not 
considered to be ‘bad’(ibid).  A further way in which death may not be considered to be 
bad, in the terms of the doctrine of double effect, arises if one considers that death 
ought, in fact, to be hastened when there is no meaningful life left to be lived: if the 
remainder of life is to be ‘lived’ either suffering or unconscious, it is not a life worth 
living and thus the imperative becomes in fact to bring death forward.  This is the 
argument advanced by Kuhse: it is more morally right to hasten death and relieve 
suffering than it is to allow continued suffering when there is no meaningful life left to 
be lived (Kuhse, 1997).  Sedation to unconsciousness in this circumstance is not an 
alternative to relieve suffering until death, it is a less morally acceptable act because 
death is not to be delayed or even allowed to take place ‘naturally’, rather it ought to be 
brought forward to relieve suffering where there is no hope of recovery. 
In the majority of the literature concerning the doctrine of double effect and its 
application to use of sedation at the end of life death, has been considered a ‘bad’ effect.  
A further understanding of what is interpreted as ‘good’ still must be explored.   
If death is to be avoided and is considered to be a ‘bad’ effect, yet is foreseen, for the 
doctrine of double effect to be valid in a particular instance of sedation, sedation must 
be considered ‘good’: or at least the effect of sedation must be considered good.  Once 
again, terminology is important.  If sedation means simply the use of sedative drugs, 
without an implicit requirement for consciousness to be reduced significantly, or even 
completely, it may be that sedation can be used to relieve symptoms without inducing 
complete unconsciousness, or coma.  If sedation is simply the use of sedative drugs 
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used proportionally in relation to symptom severity, consciousness may not be affected.  
Symptoms may, however, be so severe or intense that their relief requires 
unconsciousness or near-unconsciousness: in this context the relief of symptoms may 
still be considered the good effect to be sought.  Alternatively, unconsciousness may be 
the good effect to be sought.  There is an important distinction, subtly recognised in the 
literature, to be delineated here.  Sedative drugs may be used with the intention of 
treating symptoms, proportionally in relation to the intensity of symptoms experienced; 
this may include the use of sedative drugs to treat symptoms even to unconsciousness, if 
this is the only state in which a patient obtains relief from symptoms.  The intent is to 
treat symptoms.  Alternatively, sedative drugs may be used with the intent of causing 
unconsciousness; the good to be sought, in the terms of the doctrine of double effect, is 
unconsciousness.  This, indeed, appears to be the explicit intention behind the use of 
continuous deep sedation, described earlier.   
This distinction is important when considering the final requirement of the doctrine of 
double effect: proportionality.  The use of sedative drugs at the end of life to treat 
symptoms may be considered to be proportional to the symptoms experienced and to the 
imminence of death (Schuman-Olivier et al., 2008).  This requires that the symptoms 
experienced by a patient are sufficiently severe to warrant the response of using sedative 
drugs, and suggests that the imminence of death carries an additional weight, requiring 
action to prevent further suffering.  The use of sedative drugs is described in the 
literature as being used proportionally when sedative drugs are used according to the 
extent demanded by symptoms, including the use of drugs to cause unconsciousness, 
when this is the only way in which to achieve symptom control (Cellarius and Henry, 
2010). The use of sedative drugs to induce unconsciousness, as the primary intention, is 
also described (Miccinesi et al., 2006, Quill et al., 2010, Reid et al., 2010, Rietjens, 
2008).  Some consider this to remain a proportional response (Quill et al., 2010), while 
in other studies this is less clearly defined (Miccinesi et al., 2006, Rietjens, 2008) and 
may indeed be considered disproportionate if death is not imminently expected 
(Verkerk et al., 2007).  If sedative drugs are used in a situation in which death is not 
imminently anticipated, (frequently cited as being anticipated in less than two weeks) 
(Braun et al., 2003, Cowan and Walsh, 2001, de Graeff and Dean, 2007, Quill et al., 
2000a), concern arises that a patient may be sedated without ANH and dehydrate or 
starve to death (Verkerk et al., 2007).  When hastening of death is to be avoided, the 
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anticipated imminence of death is important in contributing to an assessment of the 
proportionate response of using sedative drugs.  Thus for a proportionate response to 
severe symptoms to be justified, both the use of drugs to achieve the relief of symptoms, 
and anticipated imminent death, are required.   
This is mirrored in the many definitions and guidelines for sedation, requiring a patient 
to have a terminal illness before considering sedation.  As described above, the use of 
sedation for existential distress brings this into sharper focus (Morita et al., 2002b, 
Muller-Busch et al., 2003, Schuman-Olivier et al., 2008).  Without exception guidelines 
refer to the use of sedation in patients with a short prognosis (Berger, 2010, Blanchet, 
2002, Braun et al., 2003, Cherny and Portenoy, 1994, de Graeff and Dean, 2007, 
Hawryluck et al., 2002, Rousseau, 2001, Verkerk et al., 2007).  This is described in 
various ways.  Terms such as ‘end stage disease’ (Blanchet, 2002), ‘patient…close to 
death’ (Braun et al., 2003), ‘advanced cancer’ (Cherny and Portenoy, 1994) ‘terminal 
illness’ (Rousseau, 2001) and ‘imminently dying patient’ (Verkerk et al., 2007) are 
typical. This proximity to death is considered important in justifying its use on the basis 
of proportionality. Several authors have indeed highlighted the importance of 
proportionality in the consideration of the practice of sedation, especially in contrast to a 
reliance on the doctrine of double effect (Claessens et al., 2011, Quill et al., 2009, Reid 
et al., 2010, Rady et al., 2011).  In a recent prospective longitudinal study Claessens et 
al indeed considered the principle of proportionality to be of central importance in 
understanding and using sedation (Claessens et al., 2012).  They found for the first time 
evidence that sedation evolved over time, in keeping with the level of a patient’s 
reported distress and suffering.  While 70% of sedated patients received 
benzodiazepines and neuroleptic drugs before palliative sedation was commenced, these 
caused no reduction in consciousness; in contrast palliative sedation, when commenced, 
caused a reduction in consciousness, to somnolence or to coma.  The interpretation of 
the intent of using sedation was thus distinguished in this study, between intent to 
reduce consciousness, or intent to relieve symptoms.  This is an important distinction 
which is explored throughout my research presented in this thesis.  Thus far, the 
application of the DDE to the use of sedation at the end of life has been considered in 
relation to its good and bad effects, and to its proportional nature.  In the literature, 
however, most attention concerning the DDE has rested upon the nature of intention and 
foresight.  Those who consider the doctrine of double effect to be insufficient or flawed 
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comment particularly on two aspects of the doctrine: whether it is possible to know 
one’s intention and, if it is, how far one can distinguish between what is foreseen and 
what is intended (McIntyre, 2004, Quill, 1997).  Whether one can foresee that a patient 
may die as a result of using sedation, but not intend it, has been contested (McIntyre, 
2004, Quill, 1993, Quill, 1997).  A small qualitative study demonstrated that physicians 
were unable, or were reluctant, to make this distinction (Douglas, 2008); yet this 
distinction is required when invoking the doctrine of double effect in justifying clinical 
practice.  Despite this, it is argued that it is indeed possible to foresee and not intend 
death (Boyle, 2004, Forbes and Huxtable, 2006, Sulmasy and Pellegrino, 1999).  Morita 
et al attempted to assess objectively the ethical concerns of palliative sedation in a 
multicentre trial (Morita et al., 2005c).  In this, prospective observational study carried 
out in 21 palliative care institutions, physicians were asked to complete an investigation 
sheet for any patient who received continuous deep sedation.  The authors sought to 
determine the ethical validity by examining objectively how far clinical practice went in 
satisfying the concepts of autonomy, proportionality and the doctrine of double effect.  
Autonomy was assessed by determining the proportion of patients or family who gave 
consent for sedation.  That sedation was proportional was assessed by considering 
whether a patient had expressed intolerable suffering, refractory symptoms, and whether 
the patient’s general condition was poor.  The intent of physicians was acknowledged as 
being difficult to determine, however measures such as the gradual administration of the 
lowest possible dose of sedatives to relieve symptoms, as well as the documentation of 
reasons for not using ANH, were considered.  They found that sedation was 
administered predominately in low doses and gradually increased, according to 
symptoms.  Artificial fluids were not automatically removed, indeed a third continued 
to receive, or were commenced on, artificial fluids once sedated.  The majority of 
patients had expressed the intolerability of symptoms and, relating particularly to 
physical symptoms, they were deemed to be refractory.  They found, however, that over 
half did not receive the required standard of treatment for psychological symptoms prior 
to sedation.  Two thirds of patients and all family members consented to the sedation; 
cognitive impairment was the predominant reason for not gaining consent from patients.  
They concluded that palliative sedation therapy ‘generally’ followed the principles of 
double effect, proportionality and autonomy.   
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While Morita et al and others (George and Regnard, 2007, Sykes and Thorns, 2003a), 
have attempted to objectively assess intent, some consider intent to be beyond even 
one’s own knowledge (Boyle, 2004, Quill, 1993).  Others, however, consider intent to 
be objectively identifiable to some extent; indeed citing this to be well demonstrated in 
law (Boyle, 2004, Gillick, 2004).   
If one accepts that sedation may hasten death, and that it is possible to foresee but not 
intend this, sedation may be justified by the doctrine of double effect:  when death is 
considered undesirable, and relief of symptoms desirable; when causing death is not the 
desired outcome but rather control of symptoms is; and when sedative drugs are used to 
treat symptoms with consciousness reduced only to the degree required to bring about 
the relief of symptoms and when death is imminently anticipated.   
Instances of sedation may not match these requirements, of course.  As described above, 
death must be considered undesirable; if death is considered desirable the DDE cannot 
be invoked.  Intending to induce unconsciousness may not fulfil the requirements of 
proportionality, if symptoms could be sufficiently treated at a lower dose of the sedative 
drug.  Death may be hastened through the use of sedation in a situation in which it was 
not intended, nor foreseen.  For example, if a patient was anticipated to be imminently 
dying, and their symptoms treated proportionally according to this expectation, and to 
the severity of symptoms, death could be hastened with neither intention nor foresight.    
In this situation, where the intent in using sedation may be seen to be proportional both 
to symptoms and to anticipation of imminent death, even if wrong, the hastening of 
death may be considered to be morally acceptable because the intention was to relieve 
symptoms and to act proportionally, yet the DDE would not be applicable.   
In clinical practice, if sedation is used with the acceptance and understanding that it may 
hasten death as an unintended but foreseen effect, where death is a ‘bad’ effect to be 
avoided and relief of suffering (if necessary to unconsciousness) is a good effect, in the 
context in which there are severe and irreversible symptoms causing distress and a 
patient is imminently dying, sedation with the reduction of consciousness may be 
justified using the doctrine of double effect.  I would suggest, however, that in daily 
practice, the requirement of foresight may not be present, and rather than the doctrine of 
double effect, the use of sedation at the end of life may rely upon proportionality when 
used in such a way in which death may, unintentionally be hastened.   
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Intent has been seen to be of central importance in determining the moral nature of 
sedation at the end of life.  A series of studies conducted predominately in the 
Netherlands and Belgium have considered physicians’ intent in end of life decision-
making, including decisions regarding sedation.  These are described in the final section 
of this chapter.  
2.7 End of life decision-making 
In the many studies which have investigated medical decision-making at the end of life, 
the intent behind decision-making has been considered (Bilsen et al., 2007, Deliens et 
al., 2000, Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., 2003, van der Heide et al., 2007, van der Maas et 
al., 1991, van der Maas et al., 1996).  Indeed one of the central questions in the very 
first study to investigate end of life decisions, in 1991, considered whether decisions 
were made not to treat (e.g. by withdrawing or withholding ANH)  or to use high doses 
of drugs with the intent of hastening death (van der Maas et al., 1991).  In addition, 
these studies have considered the possibility of a ‘partial intent’ to hasten death.  These 
have been important concepts in the studies and have influenced the debate about 
sedation, especially when there have been reports of sedation with the intent of 
hastening death (Rietjens et al., 2004b).   Rietjens et al’s 2004 study prompted much 
discussion in scholarly journals for a number of reasons (Gillick, 2004, Glick, 2004, 
Rietjens et al., 2004b, Zylicz, 2004).  The deliberate hastening of death through the use 
of terminal sedation, rather than euthanasia led some to consider that it might be 
considered preferable, or as an alternative to euthanasia (Gillick, 2004, Zylicz, 2004).  
This hypothesis was later strengthened by evidence that in the Netherlands, the rate of 
euthanasia was reduced significantly while the use of terminal sedation increased 
(Rietjens et al., 2008).  Another concern was that patients were not able to give consent 
in 41% of cases, due to incompetency or being in a coma in the majority; however, 
other reasons cited  included:  ‘deep sedation was clearly in the best interest of the 
patient’; ‘patient had dementia’; and ‘discussion would have done more harm than 
good’ (Rietjens et al., 2004a).  While the involvement of surrogates was reported to 
have taken place in 93%, the practice of sedating in the way described above, without 
consent has, appropriately,  been called ‘involuntary euthanasia’ (Gillick, 2004).  In 
addition to this it was suggested that there may have been ‘ethically preferable 
alternatives’ to the use of sedation, implied in Gillick’s editorial by the infrequent 
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referrals to palliative care and the high number of patients sedated for inadequate pain 
control (ibid). 
Rietjens et al concluded that, in the limited number of cases where it occurs, when a 
physician administers terminal sedation with the explicit intent of hastening death by 
withholding or withdrawing ANH, this ‘approximates’ euthanasia (Rietjens et al., 
2004a).  In cases where there was no intent on the behalf of the physician to hasten 
death, the authors considered it not to be a medical end of life decision, as defined in the 
earlier Dutch studies as (i) euthanasia (ii) alleviating pain or other symptoms with the 
probability of hastening death or (iii) a non-treatment decision (e.g. the withholding or 
withdrawal of ANH) (ibid).  It can be assumed, therefore, that if terminal sedation was 
only the use of CDS without ANH, the intended life shortening effect would be viewed 
by Rietjens and colleagues as euthanasia, while the foreseen but not intended life 
shortening effect would not.  Once again the issue of intent was regarded as crucial. 
Further important research studies looking at end of life decision-making have emerged 
from the Netherlands (Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., 2003, van der Heide et al., 2007, van 
der Maas et al., 1991, van der Maas et al., 1996), and Belgium (Bilsen et al., 2007, 
Deliens et al., 2000), and also in a study considering a comparison of six European 
nations (van der Heide et al., 2003).  In addition, the same questionnaire has been used 
in studies in Australia (Kuhse, 1997) and New Zealand (Mitchell and Owens, 2003), 
and also in the UK (Seale, 2006b, Seale, 2009a), however using a slightly different 
methodology as dictated by national differences in the practice of death registration.  In 
the Netherlands, 5 year follow up surveys have allowed a comparison of practices of 
medical end of life decision-making over a period of 15 years.  Major developments and 
changes over this period of time have been found relating to the use of sedation.  
Questions about sedation were first incorporated into the research questionnaires in 
2001 (Bilsen et al., 2007, van der Heide et al., 2007) but were reported later, when 
comparisons could be made to demonstrate changes in practice.  In 2007 van der Heide 
et al published a follow up study from 2005 on end of life decision-making, with the 
same methods of data collection as in 1991, 1995 and 2001 (van der Heide et al., 2007).  
In 2001 a question about the use of sedation had been added which was: 
was the patient continuously and deeply sedated or kept in a coma before 
death? (ibid) 
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They found that 8.2% of respondents reported using this form of ‘continuous deep 
sedation’ (CDS) and in 7.1% this was done in ‘conjunction with decisions that possibly 
hastened death, such as decisions to withhold nutrition and hydration’.  This was 
reported to have increased since first asked in 2001, from 5.6% to 7.1% (ibid).  Rietjens 
et al, later commenting on this increase in 2008 (Rietjens, 2008), considered that the 
other significant change in this time period had been a decrease in reports of euthanasia 
from 2.6% to 1.7%.  The incidence of CDS has continued to rise as follow up studies 
have been published; the incidence of CDS rose from 8.2% in 2005 to 12.3% in 2010 
(Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., 2012).  The relationship of CDS to euthanasia continues to 
cause concern as euthanasia has become less frequent and CDS more frequent.  
Avoidance of the legislative requirements for euthanasia has been a perpetual cause of 
concern, especially as the use of sedation with at least a partial intent to hasten death 
approaches 20% in some studies and higher in a recent small interview study (Anquinet 
et al., 2011, Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., 2012).  Although other studies have considered 
there to be differences between the groups of patients who are treated with CDS and 
those who choose euthanasia (van der Heide et al., 2007), there was the suggestion that 
Dutch physicians may be favouring the use of sedation over euthanasia (Rietjens, 2008).  
Additionally, 9% of deaths preceded by a decision to use CDS followed a request for 
euthanasia; the most common reason for this not being granted was insufficient time.  In 
9% of cases in which euthanasia had initially been requested, the request for euthanasia 
had been withdrawn and CDS was used in its place (ibid).  Considering that most deaths 
from CDS occurred alongside a decision which would ‘possibly’ hasten death, the 
hypothesis that physicians may be favouring the use of CDS perhaps had some 
grounding.  In Belgium, a study using the same methodology found 8.2% of 
respondents reported using CDS prior to death, with 3.2% using it without ANH and in 
3.6% it was undertaken with the intent to hasten death (Bilsen et al., 2007).  In a study 
carried out by the EURELD consortium, a similar questionnaire was disseminated to 
physicians in 6 other European countries (van der Heide et al., 2003).  Concerning the 
question about the use of CDS, as defined above, the countries using this most 
frequently were Italy and Belgium, with 8.5% and 8.2% of deaths, respectively, 
involving a decision to use CDS.  Sweden and Denmark had the lowest frequency of 
use, with 3.2% and 2.5% respectively.  The Netherlands and Switzerland reported a 
decision to use CDS in 5.7% and 4.8% of deaths, respectively.  The decision not to use 
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ANH was most frequently reported in the Netherlands and Denmark with 64% of those 
sedated not receiving ANH while this was true in only 35% of deaths in Italy (ibid). 
In the UK, two similar studies have been undertaken by Seale, published in 2006 and 
2009 (Seale, 2006b, Seale, 2009a).  The study published in 2009 was the first to include 
a question about sedation and the same wording was used as in the Dutch and other 
European studies (Seale, 2009a).  Of UK physicians, when considering the most recent 
person to have died under their care within the previous 12 months, 16.5% reported that 
they used CDS.  This figure was remarkably high in comparison to other European 
countries, almost twice that of the Netherlands at the time.  The intent of the use of 
sedation was not reported in this study.  Considering the alleviation of symptoms with 
the possibility of hastening death, or non-treatment decisions (withholding or 
withdrawing treatment), however, the intent to hasten death was considered a small 
fraction of the total number of decisions made. The majority acknowledged the potential 
to hasten death without direct intent.  Physicians working in hospital specialties reported 
using CDS most frequently, with palliative medicine physicians and GPs reporting the 
next most frequent use (Seale, 2009a).  In the Netherlands a similar pattern has been 
seen, with those in hospital specialties reporting the highest use of CDS and those who 
would most frequently care for patients at the end of life, GPs and nursing home 
physicians, reporting it as a less commonly used practice (van der Heide et al., 2007).  
One of the factors which has been linked to the inappropriate use of palliative sedation 
has been inexperience as well as burnout and fatigue (Maltoni et al., 2009, Morita et al., 
2002a).  A related aspect of this was noted in the ethics committee of the Association 
for Palliative Medicine (APM) response to Seale’s paper (Grogan et al., 2009).  They 
remark on the concerning feature of Seale’s paper relating to those in hospital 
specialties ‘other than palliative medicine’ reporting the highest rate of decisions 
involving the alleviation of symptoms with ‘possible life shortening effect’ (ibid).  This 
they attribute to misconceptions about the use of sedatives and opioids at the end of life. 
These studies have provided important international data regarding the use of sedation 
at the end of life.  They provide large-scale data about physicians’ intentions in using 
sedation at the end of life.  Just as the objective evidence regarding intent could not 
address fully the intent behind physicians’ actions, these studies cannot demonstrate the 
actual outcome of the physicians’ intent.  In other words, that a physician intends to 
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hasten death through the withholding of ANH does not necessarily correlate with the 
hastening of death: in contrast to euthanasia the causal link has not been demonstrated 
(Seale, 2009b).  All of these studies asked physicians to recall cases of up to 12 months 
previously; in the Australian, UK and New Zealand studies this was through asking 
them to recall the last patient who had required sedation.  The tendency to remember 
‘memorable’ cases is acknowledged, and this recall-bias may be responsible in part for 
the high rate of CDS found in the UK study (Seale, 2009a, Seale, 2009b, van der Heide 
et al., 2009).   In addition, criticisms of these studies concern the ‘fallacies’ which are 
thought to exist in the perceptions of physicians regarding decisions which are made at 
the end of life (Ashby, 1997, Forbes and Huxtable, 2006, George and Regnard, 2007).  
These lie, in particular, in the (mis)understanding that death is hastened through drugs 
such as opioids; but fallacious thinking may also emerge in the (mis)understanding and 
(mis)interpretation of phrases such as:  
was the patient continuously and deeply sedated or kept in a coma before death? (Seale, 
2009a) 
Misconceptions about the end of life, especially the life shortening effects of drugs, are 
highly prevalent (Sykes, 2008). This may prove to limit the extent to which these 
studies can be seen to be representative of the way in which deaths actually occur, rather 
than are thought to occur.    
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the literature and research base for the use of sedation in 
palliative care.  While the research is limited in many respects, and the desired 
‘multicentre, prospective, longitudinal, international’ (Claessens et al., 2008) study has 
not been carried out, much progress has been made and studies are indeed underway 
(Seymour et al., 2011).  A clearer sense of terminology and definition has been 
determined, with ‘terminal sedation’ largely being reserved for cases in which 
continuous deep sedation is given without artificial nutrition or hydration.  The broader 
term of ‘palliative sedation’ can be seen to include a range of different uses of sedation, 
from continuous deep sedation, to intermittent light sedation.  This remains a concern if 
palliative sedation is to be used as an umbrella term and not further classified for the 
purposes of research studies.   That all types of sedation are included in research studies 
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is important to emphasise as the context in which these treatments are given provides a 
perspective on the sorts of decisions and practices which take place at the end of life 
(Broeckaert et al., 2009).  Assessing the intention in the use of sedation is the most 
difficult area of the literature to assess.  It is recognised to be one of the most important, 
not only in clinical practice, but from ethical and legal perspectives too.  Problems have 
been demonstrated in both the use of prospective observational studies relying on 
quantitative data to determine intent, as well as the use of large-scale survey data to 
determine the subjective nature of intent although the direct influence has yet to been 
formally examined.   
Few studies have been conducted in the UK, with much of the literature arising from 
European countries where physician assisted dying is legal.  Many studies regarding 
medical end of life decision-making are conducted within a different legislative and 
social context to that of the UK; this may have an impact on the applicability of these 
research studies for UK end of life decision-making.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the UK 
approach to end of life care is directly linked to the hospice movement, as palliative care 
has developed from this.  The principles, or philosophy, of palliative care in the UK are 
considered to underlie its practices (Doyle, 2010), although this direct influence has not 
been formally examined in research.  This is, however, considered in the final chapters 
of this thesis as I consider the influences driving the clinical practice of using sedation 
at the end of life.  Chapter 8 considers the impact of this influence on the clinical 
practice of sedation at the end of life, reflecting on these first two chapters and the data 
presented in chapters 4 to 7. 
The research project described in the following chapters addresses some of the issues 
raised regarding palliative sedation.  Through participant observation and interviews the 
study describes the way in which decisions are made.  It is concerned with how 
decisions about sedation are made, the intentions behind its use, as well as the direct 
observation of the indications and effects of sedation on staff.  This research is able to 
combine the direct observation of practice with observations of discussions taking place 
around this, as well as incorporating interviews with those involved in sedation.  A 
more detailed description of the study is provided in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology and Methods 
This chapter introduces the research study, conducted in an inpatient unit of a hospice in 
England.  The purpose of this chapter is to provide as full a picture as possible of the 
structure of this study.  This includes the underpinning methodological assumptions as 
well as details of the research methods employed.  The aim is to enable a full 
understanding of the research context in order to allow an assessment of the 
‘trustworthiness’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of the study and to facilitate reading of the 
subsequent chapters.   First I introduce the research methodology and underpinning 
assumptions; second I introduce the research methods and key concerns arising from 
these.  Third, I describe the research environment and daily routine at length to allow an 
understanding of the structures within which the research was conducted.  The methods 
of participant observation and in-depth interviews are then discussed before, finally, the 
data analysis strategies are presented.  
3.1 Research Methodology 
The aim of this study is to explore how sedation is used in palliative care and develop a 
normative understanding of this practice. The methods are ethnographic and include 
participant observation and in-depth qualitative interviewing.  These methods are based 
upon some important epistemological and methodological assumptions, some of which 
were explicit from the start of the research; others have been developed through the 
research process.    The four principle objectives of this research study are: 
 to understand and describe how ‘sedation’ is defined in the literature and in 
practice 
 to understand how the practice of sedation reflects thoughts about its indications, 
the intentions behind it and attitudes towards it 
 to develop a normative understanding of the practice of sedation 
 to examine how sedation relates to the broader aims of palliative care 
These are generated from assumptions about how knowledge is created.  This study 
takes a social constructionist approach to the generation of knowledge, considering 
knowledge about this subject as residing not in a single, discoverable form but rather as 
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a construction: created through shared meanings, constantly interpreted and reformed by 
human, or social, interaction (Charmaz, 2006: 127).  This moves beyond the 
epistemological position of constructionism to attend to some theoretical assumptions 
about ways in which this knowledge can be accessed, namely through:  
the culturally derived and historically situated  interpretation of the social life-
world  (Crotty, 2003: 67).   
These approaches are most strongly embedded in the second objective which asks about 
attitudes and intentions.  If we are to understand the normative practice of sedation in 
palliative care through studying attitudes and intentions of participants, we must assume 
the following: first that this knowledge is in fact accessible and, secondly, it is valid as a 
method of forming knowledge.  These assumptions are supported by the theoretical 
perspective of symbolic interactionism, embedded within an interpretivist approach, 
inspired by G. H. Mead and codified by Blumer (Atkinson and Housley, 2003: 3)  .  
Here, the 3 basic principles of Blumer are adopted: 
 Humans act towards things on the basis of the meanings they hold for them 
 The meaning of such things is derived from the social interaction one has with 
others 
 These meanings are modified through an interpretive process (Blumer, 1969 : 2) 
This gives an account of meaning as being central to understanding social action, that 
meaning arises through the process of social interaction and, crucially to symbolic 
interactionism, the use of meanings is formed through an interpretive process (Blumer, 
1969: 2-4).  At the heart of symbolic interactionism is the use of ‘significant symbols’, 
or use of language and other tools of communication through which meaning is 
conveyed.  Indeed Crotty states: 
only through dialogue can one become aware of the perceptions, feelings and 
attitudes of others and interpret their meanings and intent (Crotty, 2003: 75). 
These principles are seen to guide an approach to understanding and framing the 
research methodology and thus the research methods and data collection. They form a 
theoretical perspective whereby, through participant observation, I can observe the 
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‘significant symbols’ of language and gesture in relation to sedation and, through a 
process of interpretation, gain an understanding of their meaning.  Reflexivity is crucial 
in this process.  This can be considered as the act of turning in on oneself: considering 
one’s influence on a social interaction or, in research terms, the researcher’s awareness 
of his or her own relationship to the research situation and effect upon it (Aull Davies, 
2008: 7).  For the symbolic interactionist, failure to recognise one’s influence may lead 
to the setting up of a ‘fictitious world’ (Blumer, 1969 : 51).  Engagement in this process 
is therefore considered to be crucial in order to avoid such a position and underpins the 
research process described below. 
3.2 Research setting 
This study was designed to take place the inpatient unit of a hospice.  Hospices have 
been studied through ethnographic methods previously (Dean and Gregory, 2004, 
Lawton, 2000) however not with the intention of examining the practice and attitudes 
towards sedation.  The hospice selected was local to me and a site where one of my 
supervisors held a senior clinical role.  There were pragmatic reasons for choosing this 
research site in that it was likely that the initial access would be possible and it was a 
site where, at least in theory, research would be supported.  This was known through 
both my previous personal experience and the close links with my supervisor in his 
working relationships with other members of staff.  Additionally, having a supervisor 
on site helped both to negotiate access and to provide safeguards when considering 
potential problems in carrying out research in a sensitive context.  The hospice inpatient 
unit has 22 beds and patients are admitted for a range of different reasons and 
conditions.  While the majority of patients have a malignancy, patients with 
neurological conditions, heart failure or chronic respiratory conditions may also be 
admitted.  Admissions may be for a fixed period of time (short planned admission –
SPA- or ‘respite’) or more open-ended, with the focus on treating symptoms until they 
are controlled.  Some patients are referred for end of life care and will die during their 
admission; others are referred for symptom control and may be effectively treated and 
discharged.  Alternatively those referred for symptom control may deteriorate and die 
during their admission whereas those referred for end of life care may in fact be 
discharged.   
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The hospice was purpose-built with the inpatient unit on one floor.  There are three 
four-bedded rooms and twelve single rooms.  It has a day care unit which runs during 
the week; patients come into the hospice for part of the day, share stories, engage in 
activities, physiotherapy, complementary therapies, or see a doctor if they wish.  Many 
patients admitted to the inpatient unit have attended day care in the past and are known 
to staff through the close links between day care and the inpatient unit.       
The staff in the hospice include: healthcare assistants, staff nurses, nurse practitioners, 
junior doctors on training contracts (rotating through the hospice as part of more general 
training, e.g. in general practice), registrars training in palliative medicine, consultants, 
social workers, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, children’s worker and 
complementary therapists.  All of these groups may be represented on the inpatient unit 
in different numbers – clearly those represented in the greatest number are nurses and 
doctors.  For the purposes of maintaining confidentiality, they have been grouped, in the 
data sections of this thesis, into larger groups of nurses, doctors, and allied health 
professionals.  Seniority of nurses or doctors is indicated where relevant, but the 
overriding concern in the presentation of the data is to protect confidentiality.   
On the inpatient unit, nurses are divided into two different ‘teams’ or ‘sides’; the Don 
and the Dee (fictional names) teams.  On arrival to the hospice patients are allocated to 
a team. This is largely geographical – the ward is arranged in an ‘L’ shape where one 
arm is the Dee side, the other the Don.  Nurses for one side would look after the patients 
on their side and not be involved in the other side unless it was necessary.  Generally, 
nurses would be a ‘Don’ or a ‘Dee’ nurse and would expect to be on this side for every 
shift.  On average there would be two ‘qualified’ nurses and two ‘unqualified’ nurses on 
each side; falling to one of each overnight.  Staffing levels of nurses were problematic 
during the period of observation, with several recent departures and absences due to sick 
leave.  This meant that frequently nurses would switch between the Dee and the Don 
side, depending on where there was greatest need.  In addition, the number of qualified 
nurses was often reduced and this created practical concerns about both care for patients 
and the ability to dispense drugs.  This also led to some bed closures during the period 
of observation.  
There were two consultants with clinical responsibility for patients on a day to day 
basis.  Many other consultants did out of hours ‘on-call’ work, in the evenings and over 
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weekends.  There was considerable restructuring of senior medical cover during the 
study period, with two senior members of staff leaving, some interim cover and a period 
of significant uncertainty.  Registrars training in palliative medicine changed over on 
average every six months, with some staying on for longer periods.  Some would be in 
the hospice on a full time basis but most spent only part of their working week in the 
hospice, with some only spending one morning or afternoon session based in the 
inpatient unit.  Junior doctors training in General Practice would also change over every 
six months, but would change at a different time to the registrars.   They would either be 
part time (spending two to three days in the hospice) or full time.  Thus doctors would 
be present on the ward every day, in varying numbers and levels of seniority.  
Consultants, like nurses, looked after one side of the ward – the Don or the Dee.  They 
were responsible for all of the patients’ care on their side.  Unlike the nurses they did 
not change sides frequently but would be called upon to ‘cover’ in periods of absence.  
Consultant ward rounds occurred once a week, with more regular ‘catch ups’ occurring 
through the week, or if there were patients about whom the junior doctors were 
concerned.   
In addition to the consultant ward rounds, medical ‘handovers’ of patients occurred 
regularly.  Nursing handovers occurred at 0730, from the night shift to the early shift.  
Representatives from the nurses on the morning shift would then handover to the 
doctors, social workers, physiotherapists, occupational therapists and sometimes ward 
or unit manager at 0930.  Planning of admissions would occur at this meeting in 
addition to handing over anything which they felt the assembled group needed to know 
or to action.  Further handovers occurred between nurses from the early shift and those 
on the late shift, and again from the late to the night shift.  In general these handovers 
lasted approximately half an hour.  In addition, once weekly multidisciplinary team 
(MDT) meetings were held with all professions represented.  These ‘MDTs’ were held 
separately for the Dee and Don team, so approximately eleven patients would be 
discussed over the course of an afternoon.  The scope of these meetings was much 
broader and focused more on non-medical aspects of care, the impact of a situation on 
family and on discharge planning. 
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3.3 Research ethics approval 
Having established the nature of the study to be carried out, and considered the methods 
and theoretical perspectives, approval was sought from the regional research ethics 
committee (REC) and the research and development (R&D) department of the NHS 
trust sponsoring the research.  There have been many perceived barriers and ethical 
concerns about undertaking research on palliative care patients (Duke and Bennett, 
2010).  These ethical concerns have been summarised into five broad groups concerned 
with: patient vulnerability; the moral acceptability of carrying out research in this group 
of patients; gaining informed consent; barriers such as gate-keeping and finally; having 
a research structure in place to support research in this context (Duke and Bennett, 
2010).   Ethical issues and methodological concerns have been considered by 
researchers to be inextricably linked (Seymour et al., 2005); it is important to emphasise 
at this stage that I share this view and as such ethical concerns are considered to be an 
integral part of this research methodology.   
Major ethical consideration was given to two particular aspects of this research: 
 consent process for patients 
 access to patients who lacked capacity 
3.3.1 Consent from patients 
This study sought to use the methods of participant observation and qualitative 
interviewing to gain an account of sedation in palliative care.  Participant observation 
involved predominately an observation of clinical staff as they performed their daily 
tasks in caring for patients.  Crucial to this study was that I could gain access to patients, 
to include them in the observation through their interactions with clinical staff.  In this 
way I could witness the discussions taking place with regard to sedation rather than 
receive a second hand account after the event.  One perspective considered was that 
patients were not necessarily the focus of the observation: rather the clinical staff were 
and it was their intentions and interpretations which I sought to access.  In this way I 
could have argued that consent was not required from patients at all.  Indeed Julia 
Lawton, in her study of patients in a hospice, used an ‘opt out’ approach whereby 
patients were given information about the research by staff members and could opt out 
72 
 
if they wished (Lawton, 2000: 31).  She acknowledges however, that this ‘opt out’ may 
not have included all patients as it may have been impossible in an emergency situation 
to ensure that this happened (Lawton, 2001).  I decided, however, that I would take 
more of an overt stance to gain consent from patients.  The environment of the hospice 
was important in this decision; with ten single rooms and three shared bays, many 
patients were in single rooms.  The single room environment is different to that of a 
main bay: it becomes more of the patient’s domain and I considered it more of an 
intrusion to enter than it would be to walk into a bay.  Even within the public space of a 
hospice, great care is taken to make the hospice environment more like a home 
environment. Thus entering into a private space within this, I felt, should be considered 
differently; more of a negotiated act wherein expressed permission is sought.  I decided 
to seek consent from patients prior to undertaking observations for the above reasons.  
In addition, concerns about not doing so were raised by the medical director at the time, 
in one of many pre-study meetings with staff members.   
When approaching patients I wished to be explicit about the nature of the study, 
however recognised that patients may feel uneasy or anxious about being admitted to a 
hospice and did not want to heighten anxieties further by introducing a study about 
sedation in an insensitive manner.  In addition, just prior to starting the fieldwork, the 
concerns of physicians working in palliative care about sedation came to the fore in the 
media.  The headline ‘Sentenced to Death on the NHS’(Devlin, 2009) was particularly 
emotive and I was concerned about some of the associations between sedation and 
hastening death made explicit in the media.   
I decided a staged approach to consent would be appropriate, with the first approach to 
patients coming from a member of staff involved in their care.  Ideally, this would occur 
24-48 hours after their admission but frequently it was later on in their stay, depending 
on the busyness of the unit.  The staff member would ask if I could speak to them about 
a research study which was going on in the hospice.  If they received a positive 
response, I would then go to see the patient to explain the study and address any 
questions they had.  The ethics committee accepted that patients may prefer to give 
consent sooner than is ‘standard’ for research studies, and accepted a negotiated 
approach to the cooling off time.  This was expressed in the following terms in the REC 
form: 
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The ‘agreed time’ referred to above would be agreed between the researcher 
and the patient. Patients admitted to a hospice rely on the flexibility of their 
clinical team and those around them to adjust to their energy levels and fatigue, 
pacing the day to suit their needs. The researcher would wish to be responsive 
to this and be flexible in timing, according to the patient's wish, her visits to 
provide information and gain consent. This may mean that a patient would 
wish the researcher to provide information about the study and come back the 
following day, as would normally be expected in a research study with 24 
hours allowed as a ‘cooling off’ period. Patients in a hospice, however, may 
have a different sense of time and urgency. They may wish to participate in the 
study and yet be aware of a short prognosis or of continued deterioration and 
fatigue. We would want to accommodate these patients in the study to allow 
their participation in a dynamic and changing clinical situation. While a 
cooling off period of 24 hours is ideal, this study aims to adapt to the patient’s 
needs and this would be to allow the patient to have as much time as they 
individually required in making a decision. The researcher would be acutely 
aware of the issues involved in, and guidelines for, gaining informed consent 
and take every step to ensure this consent process is rigorous in adhering to 
these.  
The approach to the study was always centred on being as unobtrusive as possible and 
carrying out this research with as little interruption to patients and their family as 
possible, while giving the opportunity to participate to all.   
All patients admitted to the hospice who were aged 18 years or over were considered to 
be eligible for the study, with the exception of those admitted for a short planned 
admission (SPA).  Those admitted for a SPA would be in the hospice for only a short 
period of time and going through the process of consent for a matter of two or three 
days was felt to be overly burdensome for these patients, with little perceived benefit or 
contribution to the study.  The rationale for including all patients, while being interested 
primarily in those receiving sedation, was to incorporate the changing nature of patients 
admitted to a hospice.  Limiting the scope of the study to just those receiving sedation 
may have captured the views of some of the patients, their significant others and 
healthcare professionals, but would not have been able to capture the decision-making 
74 
 
processes from its origin.  Through the inclusion of all patients, I kept open the potential 
to see decision-making as it happened, rather than simply the outcome of this process.  
In addition, this method potentially allowed more patients to make a decision for 
themselves about their participation in research: those sedated to the point of losing 
capacity required a decision to be made by a ‘consultee’ (Mental Capacity Act, 2005). 
3.3.2 Patient lacking capacity 
Inclusion of patients who lacked capacity was a further area which required negotiation.  
The Mental Capacity Act (2005) required that certain criteria were met prior to the 
inclusion of patients lacking capacity in research.  These were assessed by the REC.  
The inclusion of those who lacked capacity was considered as crucial in a study which 
was investigating sedation.  While patients may be sedated to varying levels, it was 
inevitable that some would be sedated to the point they lacked capacity to consent to 
research. Their inclusion was vital in seeking to understand not only the processes of 
decision-making about starting sedation, but ongoing reviews and attitudes of those 
around a sedated patient.  Thus two patient groups were considered: those who lost 
capacity during the course of observation (for which they had given consent) and those 
who lacked capacity from the onset.  The former were asked to indicate their 
preferences in the situation where they lost capacity: to allow the observations to 
continue or to cease, and for the information previously gathered (when they had 
capacity) to be used or destroyed.  All patients were given a pseudonym so removing 
this data from the data set would have been possible.  All patients involved in the 
observations consented both for the observations to continue should they lose capacity 
and for data previously gathered (when they had capacity) to continue to be used in the 
research study.  Clearly there are concerns about accepting what a patient states at one 
point in time and assuming it holds for the future when they are in an incapacitated 
state.  Lawton shared this concern: 
just because patients had given me their consent to be included in my research 
on their admission to the hospice, such consent could not necessarily be taken 
for granted in my later encounters with them (Lawton, 2000: 32) 
The process of gaining consent for observation of a patient who once had and 
subsequently lost capacity, took into account their statement about future wishes.  In 
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addition I considered any expression which may have indicated that they did not want 
me to continue with the observation in the present.  I also took into account the wishes 
of their significant others and the advice of the medical team; if they felt it inappropriate 
for me to observe an encounter I respected this, while acknowledging that this may have 
limited some of my exposure.  This process of gaining consent may be regarded as a 
form of ‘process consent’ (Usher and Arthur, 1998).  The research process may be 
regarded as a two way process, under constant negotiation.  Thus a patient’s role in the 
research was considered at each point of encounter in that they were asked each time if 
it they were happy for me to stay and observe.    In this interaction there was a reminder 
that I was a researcher and this was my role in the interaction; this was how I was 
introduced on ward rounds or when observing staff with patients.  It is clear that my role 
as a researcher was explicit on a day to day basis.  This may not be the ideal position 
when conducting ethnography, however when conducting research in this field, I felt the 
ongoing disclosure of my role was worth the ‘risk’ of influencing behaviours taking 
place in front of me (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 87-89).  I do not consider these 
disclosures to have undermined my research, however through a reflexive process am 
highly aware of their influences on what I was able to observe.  Clearly I chose a 
position which may well have changed the nature of what was observed but in doing so, 
maintained trust and integrity in the research process.    
The process of gaining consent from patients who lacked capacity from the start of the 
observation was managed differently.  Relatives or significant others of patients who 
lacked capacity were asked by a member of staff if I could speak to them about the 
study.   I would introduce the study to this person and ask if he or she felt it might be 
something which the patient, when they had capacity, would have wanted to participate 
in.  If they felt the patient would have wished to participate, I asked if they would be 
willing to act as a ‘personal consultee’ and provided further written information about 
this.  I explained that a significant other would have to agree to become a personal 
consultee and then agree that they felt participating in the study would be in keeping 
with the patient’s wishes.  They were given a cooling off period to digest this 
information; the duration of which was negotiated between myself and the potential 
consultee.  For those without anyone able to act as a personal consultee the process of 
obtaining a nominated consultee was considered but not required in the data collection 
period.  
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3.4  Gaining access 
Obtaining access into the field can be seen as a process of negotiation (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007: 41).  This began several months before fieldwork ‘proper’ started and 
involved a series of meetings with key stakeholders.  These included the hospice 
manager and medical director, ward manager, senior nurses, senior doctors and social 
workers.  Access to meet these people was undoubtedly influenced by the role of my 
supervisor within the hospice and my own previous experience in working as a doctor 
in this setting.  There was no concern about being able to meet with them, or even about 
carrying out the research.  There were key areas to be negotiated however and these 
meetings were important in setting the groundwork of acceptance as a researcher into 
the unit.  Issues pertaining to confidentiality and gaining consent from patients were the 
two areas which produced the most concern.  Reassurance and tightening of the 
processes of maintaining confidentiality (including combining groups with small 
numbers where professionals worked in isolation) eased many of these concerns.  
Having met these senior members of staff, I originally planned to hold a series of 
meetings to allow nurses and doctors working different shifts on different days to be 
introduced to the study.  Following advice, however, from senior nurses, it was much 
less disruptive and proved easier to come in to the hospice regularly for several days to 
talk to nurses in a more informal manner.  In this way I managed to speak to all nurses 
in an informal atmosphere.  They were able to ask questions in a way, I realised with 
hindsight, they would not necessarily have done if part of a larger and more formalised 
meeting.  I carried out the same process for registrars and junior doctors, often speaking 
to them individually in a more conversational manner.  Specifically, I spoke to both 
doctors and nurses about approaching patients or their significant others on my behalf, 
before I could speak to them about participating.  There were no objections to this and 
most seemed keen, having heard about the study for some time, for me to get on and 
begin the fieldwork.  In addition I spoke to the other members of staff, such as social 
workers, physiotherapists and occupational therapists on a similarly informal basis.  
After each meeting I would give potential participants an information sheet and gain 
consent for observation from them at a later date.  Over time I gained consent from all 
staff who regularly worked on the unit.  An interim consent process was also in place 
for situations where new staff started, to enable me to observe meetings which they 
were part of, for a limited period prior to gaining full consent.   
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The above details the process of gaining access and negotiating consent from members 
of staff, but of course negotiating access is an ongoing process, not only involving 
consent to my being physically present, but  also becoming involved in unit so as to be 
in a position to observe instances of sedation.  This process took longer; while the 
information sheet detailed what would happen, what I would be observing and how, it 
became clear that acting this out was part of an ongoing negotiation.  For instance, when 
I began my fieldwork I had consent for the observation from all current members of 
staff.  I spent time in the nurses’ ‘team office’ and in the ‘MDT room’ where the doctors 
and allied healthcare professionals spent their time.  Initially I was greeted a little 
nervously, and with uncertainty it seemed.  Conversations would be halted, or, if talking 
about sedation, staff would glance at me or smile nervously.  Others asked if they could 
speak to me or not.  I was definitely regarded as ‘different’, but not quite ‘an outsider’.  
This will be discussed in more depth later in this chapter.  Negotiating access to patients 
through the first approach from staff, took some time.  This was partly because of some 
issues of gate-keeping: patients were said to be ‘just settling in’, ‘too poorly’, or their 
significant others were ‘too upset’.  I understood it would take time for staff to become 
used to my presence and to learn what my role was, before stepping out to ask patients 
something about which they were still uncertain themselves.  Thus in the first few 
weeks of fieldwork I did not gain consent from many patients and focused on 
establishing myself with the staff on the unit.  I did feel some concern and tension about 
this and considered different strategies to improve this situation.  The most successful of 
these was to enrol the assistance of the senior nurses, two of whom in particular, were 
extremely helpful in approaching patients and improving the rate of patient consents.  
They would speak to all of the patients or significant others on their ‘team’ who they 
considered would be ‘appropriate’ for the study.  In general, they would approach all 
patients or significant others on the ward.     From the start of the study it was important 
to involve members of staff in the consent process and rely on their judgement 
regarding who it was appropriate or not to approach.  Clearly this may have limited 
access to patients and highlights the issue of gate-keeping.  Reasons given by these 
nurses for not speaking to patients or their significant others tended to be related to 
where a person was geographically (e.g. away for some form of treatment or scan) 
rather than subjective concerns about how a patient might react.  Of course, there were 
patients who the nurses felt would be unable to take in information or whom it would be 
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inappropriate to speak to about the research.  Reasons for this were often related to other 
issues going on for these patients such as recently receiving bad news or having difficult 
discussions about the future.  Clearly the nature of the research topic may lead into 
discussion or trigger thoughts about future issues and what may happen: sensitivity to 
this was important.  I believe, therefore, that this approach was justified in this group of 
patients not only because of their potential vulnerability but also because of the 
sensitive nature of the topic under consideration.  In addition, maintaining the trust and 
cooperation of staff in these early stages could have been undermined by challenging 
their opinions potentially restricting access further.   
3.5  Ethnography in palliative care 
Ethnography has its origins in anthropology and the work of Malinowski (O'Reilly, 
2005: 7) and has been used as a means of understanding a wide range of different 
phenomena.  Its methods have been adopted in many fields beyond the social sciences 
and in more recent years this has occurred especially in educational and medical settings  
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 2).  Indeed ethnography has widely been used to 
illuminate aspects of the medical world; from the adaptation of medical students to fit in 
with their environment (Becker et al., 1961), to the awareness and organisation of dying 
(Sudnow, 1967, Glaser and Strauss, 1965a) and more recently, patients’ experiences of 
hospice care (Lawton, 2000).  Using participant observation in areas of medicine such 
as palliative care has been advocated by researchers as a unique way of accessing 
knowledge, which would otherwise be impossible to obtain (O'Reilly, 2005: 1, Lawton, 
2001).   Alternative methods such as the sole use of formal interviewing would not be 
able to contribute the same depth of knowledge, it is argued, especially around sensitive 
issues such as death and dying (Lawton, 2001).   
As previously stated, the comfort and trust of patients was my utmost concern.  Patients 
were admitted for a variety of reasons but predominately they had significant illnesses 
and many died in the hospice.  I was anxious to be able to conduct this research in a 
manner which was as unobtrusive as possible for not only patients and their relatives, 
but also for staff.  I considered various different roles I could adopt to enable this to be 
the case.  I had previously worked as a palliative medicine registrar for a year in the 
hospice in which I undertook this research.  I had had a period of 18 months away 
before starting the research, but in a small unit with approximately 50 staff it was not 
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unsurprising that I knew a great number of staff from my previous role.  In addition to 
these previous working relationships I had ongoing relationships with many of the 
doctors on both a professional and a social basis.  Thus it was clear that my role was not 
only to be negotiated and constructed as a researcher, but also that work would have to 
been done to renegotiate roles as doctor and friend in the hospice.  I had to be clear 
about where the fieldwork started and finished and who I was in relation to others.  This 
was a constant script in my mind; trying to act reflexively in a dynamic situation where 
I may be required to move from researcher to friend, from observation to discussion 
about a social event.  This may not be so radically different to the relationships which 
have been described in other ethnographic work where participants do become friends 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 95); the crucial difference was the pre-existence of 
my relationships and walking in to start fieldwork with these other roles already playing 
out.   
The work of Goffman in ‘The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life’(Goffman, 1959) is 
helpful to understand the different roles I was required to fulfil.  Goffman states that 
people ask others to treat them in respect of the way in which they present themselves.  
The way in which this presentation is conveyed to others is through one’s ‘personal 
front’, which Goffman separates into appearance and manner.  Appearance may concern 
factors which convey an impression of the individual’s social status, or what they are 
doing.  Manner conveys more of what another person could expect from the individual, 
something of their attitude towards them.  In general, Goffman asserts, we expect 
appearance and manner to be congruent and when they differ, the person to whom the 
individual is addressing his performance, may experience uncertainty and doubt about 
the sincerity of what is being portrayed.  In addition, Goffman refers to ‘front’ and 
‘back’ - stage performances.  The ‘front’ stage, refers to ‘the place where the 
performance is given’ (Goffman, 1959: 32).  Ideas about one’s personal front and 
presentation of this in dramaturgical form can be useful when considering my role as a 
researcher in a familiar environment and also the nature of reflexivity. 
As a participant observer I had to define my role as participant.  I would act as a 
‘participant-as-observer’, using Gold’s classification from ‘complete participant’ to 
‘complete observer’ (Gold, 1958).  Many researchers have taken on different roles as 
participant observer when undertaking fieldwork, and for valid reasons. Indeed Mead 
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himself argued, to be able to ‘take on the attitudes of the community’ we must be able 
to ‘take on the role of others’ (Mead, 1934). 
In order to understand the environment and processes which one is observing, one must 
participate and become familiar with the environment and its actors.  To continue use of 
Goffman’s dramaturgical approach, one can consider a number of different ‘stages’ 
within the hospice, from which I could have chosen to view the nature of sedation.  I 
decided that I would not perform any medical tasks or responsibilities, or be involved in 
any aspect of personal care for patients.  I did not want to cause any uncertainty or 
ambiguity about what I was doing: I recognised, however, that this decision to be very 
overt in my role as a researcher would affect the data I collected.   Lawton, in her 
ethnographic study in a hospice, decided to take on a role as a volunteer and engaged in 
tasks on the ward such as befriending, talking to patients and visitors and serving 
drinks.  These activities gave her an ‘ideal excuse’ to enter the ward area (Lawton, 2000 
p.31) . While she did not take on a medical role, Lawton has referred to some disquiet 
she felt when realising that a patient had clearly considered her in a role other than of 
researcher: 
during our day-to-day interactions it became very apparent that on some 
occasions at least, patients perceived and interacted with me first and foremost 
in my role as a volunteer  (Lawton, 2001). 
While Lawton attended to this concern by being sensitive about the way in which she 
handled information in the writing up process, I wished to avoid this confusion by 
taking a more overt approach which would necessarily put me into more of an ‘outsider’ 
role.  From the research perspective, I was most interested in the attitudes and 
perspectives of those who were involved in using and prescribing sedation.  I may have 
been able to access patients more easily had I acted as a volunteer, however may have 
narrowed my focus to being more of an observer of patient behaviours, rather than 
participant in a group which was involved in decision-making about sedation.  Thus to 
gain access to nurses (both qualified and unqualified) as well as doctors, and not limit 
myself to either of these groups, or appear to be changing sides and fitting into neither, I 
adopted more of a role as an ‘accepted incompetent’,(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 
79), a novice, or student.  Goffman asserts that it is rare to find a new ‘front’ which has 
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not previously been established (Goffman, 1959: 38).  Although this ‘front’ was new to 
me in this setting, this was a role which would be familiar to both groups of staff. While 
it may have been incongruous initially, through interaction and modifications, 
influenced by those around me, I developed in this role and, I believe, became more 
accepted through this.  I was an interested observer, participating insofar as I would 
make tea for the group and participate in conversation about both work and more 
general matters.  For example I would chat about celebrities, Christmas shopping, house 
buying and a number of different subjects. This ‘mundane small talk’ (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007: 70) can be seen to help to establish my identity and role as a reasonable 
or ‘normal’ person, without constant reference or discussion about sedation.  This was 
important in grounding my identity and role in the hospice.  While I did not perform 
role-specific tasks, through which I could be easily identified, I believe this to be 
justified by being able to take more of a global perspective and allowing me to move 
more easily between groups.   I think there may have been significant inconsistency had 
I chosen a different approach, and a cynicism about my ‘performance’ which may have 
undermined the research process.  Through being overt and, as far as possible, sticking 
to the one role as researcher/student, I was as sincere as was possible, while still being 
aware of projecting myself to appear in a certain light.   
When considering this ‘front’ as being similar but not identical to that of a student, it 
can be seen that my previous experience and others’ preconceived ideas about me, may 
make my performance insincere.  Perhaps, however, my personal front may have 
assisted this presentation.  When considering my appearance, I chose to wear smart 
clothes rather than another ‘uniform’.  Hammersley and Atkinson refer to the 
importance of different dress codes ‘in the field’; not only to ‘fit in’ to the field 
environment but also, in other circumstances, to be marked out as not belonging to 
particular categories (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 67-68).   I decided not to wear a 
uniform which was immediately identifiable with a particular group.  I did, however, 
feel it was appropriate to wear clothes in which I was smart and professional enough, as 
a researcher, to encounter patients.  This may have, in itself, put me into an identifiable 
group within the hospice – of the non-uniformed staff.  Various people wear similar 
smart clothes, including administration staff, social workers, doctors and students.  My 
manner may also have contributed to an impression of a student at times.  I was overtly 
an interested observer at times, listening and asking questions, as unobtrusively as 
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possible.  I would be quiet but appear interested when the business of work was going 
on, participating more in the times of informality and discussion, especially when this 
related to matters other than the business of the hospice.   
When considering the hospice as a whole to be a stage, the front and backstage 
performances may illuminate something of my participation.  There may be many 
different ways in which this stage could be constructed: one would be simply to 
consider the patients’ rooms and the ward to be the front, with the private meeting 
rooms as being backstage.  Here, there may have been a clear distinction in what was 
said about or to a patient front of stage and that which was said back stage.  The stage 
does not have to be physically bound however; the morning handover meetings may 
themselves be a front stage performance, while chatting to nurses and reading 
magazines may be more of a backstage activity and insight. Clearly this is taken from 
the perspective of the staff rather than individual patients; indeed this can be seen to be 
the perspective I was predominately able to access in this fieldwork.    In some ways I 
was able to access the back stage – the: 
place, relative to a performance, where the impression fostered by the 
performer is knowingly contradicted (Goffman, 1959: 114).  
I was able to be party to ‘insider secrets’, to observe emotional moments and outbursts 
and, I felt, share a sense of loss at times when a patient died.  This access was, of 
course, managed and structured by the participants, or ‘performers’ and would be 
dictated by them.  This could fluctuate on a moment by moment basis and I considered 
myself as almost in constant motion between front and back stage.  This movement may 
have allowed my observations to be considered from different perspectives; whilst 
moving between front and back stage I was, perhaps, more aware of where I was on 
stage than if I had been perpetually front or back stage.  As an insider, backstage, my 
observations may have been more acute and contextualised, coming in from an 
outsider’s perspective.   
These concerns about my ‘performance’ link in with the concept of reflexivity.  This 
functions on a continuum between ‘going native’ and becoming autobiographical.  In 
the former one ceases to consider one’s role as an influence; the latter one is so 
concerned with one’s influence that the work becomes more concerned with the 
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ethnographer’s relationship with the data than about the phenomenon under 
investigation (Aull Davies, 2008 : 217).  An awareness of self is important and one 
construct of this is Mead’s separation of the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ within ‘Self’.  He situates 
Self as inherently a social being, involved in a constant, dynamic process of 
construction and interaction with the social world, one which is never a completed 
product ((Aull Davies, 2008: 25, Atkinson and Housley, 2003: 6-7) The ‘I’ is the aspect 
of self which is impulsive, while the ‘me’ is aware of culturally and socially accepted 
norms, and adjusts the presentation of ‘I’ accordingly.  This duality, Mead asserted, is 
what enables us to be able to interpret or take on the role of another; we can react to 
another individual with respect to the way in which we expect them to view a situation 
and subsequently act.  The changing and progressive nature of the ‘me’ of Self, Aull 
considers as being informative in developing the reflexive nature of ethnography.   
If the self is continually under construction, then ethnographers’ experiences 
when they participate in social interaction in another society clearly alter their 
own selves in accordance with the cultural expectations of others. (Aull 
Davies, 2008: 26) 
Thus my ‘self’ changed through this process, in order to adapt to the cultural 
expectations of participants; I attempted to fit the model which was required of me, and 
adapt into a role which allowed me to access backstage while maintaining a sincere and 
consistent performance myself.  In being constantly aware of changing between my Self 
as researcher and as friend or colleague I was constantly open to and aware of the 
impact of my actions and words on what was said and done.  While initially I was aware 
of silences or pauses in conversation when doctors or nurses talked about sedation or 
sedative drugs, this changed as the research progressed.  I became more comfortable in 
my researcher role and others perhaps more familiar with my presence, albeit in a 
different role to that which they expected.  For example, initially nurses and doctors 
asked regularly, if there was a pause in conversation or I walked into a room, what I 
wanted to do or see, or if I wanted to ask anything.  Later in the fieldwork, this was 
extremely infrequent and we would engage in small talk rather than default to an overt 
awareness of me being present as a ‘researcher’.   
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3.6  Observing Sedation 
When I commenced fieldwork, initially my focus was on the ward in general and 
getting to know the daily processes and tasks which staff carried out.  I was interested in 
the accounts staff gave of patient symptoms and treatments required.  I spent time in the 
nurses’ office, the doctors’ office and observing nurses and doctors in their daily 
routines.  I attended handover meetings at different times of the day and also the twice 
weekly MDT meetings.  After some time I was able to gain more access to their 
involvement with patients as the process for approaching patients improved.  Thus I 
developed a routine of attending meetings, spending time with members of staff, and 
going with them as they saw patients.  I followed the different working patterns of 
nurses and doctors, from the early morning handover shift to the night shift.  I became 
aware that there were differences in the nature of what I would hear in these different 
settings.  In the handover meetings a formal account was given of what had happened 
on the previous shift; this was regarded as objective, factual information, of what had 
occurred.  In MDT meetings several accounts were given about the same patient and 
while often similar, it would sometimes be openly acknowledged that different 
professionals received different versions of events, or interpreted them differently.  
These discrepancies or differences in interpretation were discussed and provided 
different insights into the dynamics of a situation.   
These formal accounts were substantiated by observations in the ‘backstage’ areas of 
the MDT office (where doctors and some allied healthcare professionals worked) and 
the nursing office.  When handovers were not taking place these were informal meeting 
rooms where staff gathered between jobs, or between seeing patients, pausing to write 
in notes or to discuss what to do next.  In the MDT office doctors often discussed 
patients, both before and after they had been to see them.  They may have discussed 
what had happened or been done in the past, or tried to convey a general impression of 
what was going on.  When they returned after seeing a patient they would often debrief, 
either mulling over or asking one another what to do.   
Nurses, qualified and unqualified, rarely talked in their office about what was going on 
from a medical perspective, or discussed what to do for a patient.  They would talk 
about the emotive nature of a situation, or describe some detail about a family member 
which compounded a tragic situation, or even talk about how difficult a patient was 
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being.   In general they did not talk about what drugs patients were on, or what was 
happening from a clinical perspective.  Instead, conversations in the nurses’ office were 
more often about the personal lives of patients, their own personal lives, or those of 
celebrities.  Occasionally if I walked into the office after being away and asked what 
had been happening in a general way, I would receive an account of the ‘difficult’ 
patients of the time.  These patients were ‘difficult’ because they were demanding in 
some way; I came to realise this may be physical or emotional in nature.  A difficult 
patient may be one who demands a lot of attention, or who has some trait which marks 
them out as being different.  They may have needed attention because of uncontrolled 
physical or psychological symptoms; or it may have been the impact which they had on 
staff which marked them out as being ‘difficult’.  A young patient with children, for 
example, might be ‘difficult’ simply by the nature of their situation – this may be more 
emotionally demanding of staff and thus make them more ‘difficult’ to look after.  This 
marking out as being difficult was a combination, therefore, not only of the patient’s 
traits but also of the impact of the situation on staff.  While the ‘difficult’ patients were 
discussed in the nurses’ office, it became clear that it was hard to access their 
‘backstage’ accounts of other patients by simply being in their office; I had to engage in 
some way with what the nurses were doing.  I found a useful way of doing this on the 
early shift was to go with one of them on their drug round.  Here, whilst staying quiet 
and observing during drug dispensation, nurses would often give more of a personal 
account of what they thought was happening, or why they were giving a particular drug.  
This was especially the case overnight, when they were not only dispensing drugs, but 
anticipating problems overnight.  They would describe this, what they were seeing and 
how they would try to manage this.   
From the start of the observation I wanted to be able to be in a position to observe as 
freely as possible, and change environments throughout the course of a day.  I did not 
stay with one individual for a full shift, which would have been one way to approach 
this.  I felt this may limit my exposure as well as being more likely to directly influence 
decisions which were subsequently taken.  By moving around I felt I was in more of a 
position to observe front and backstage; observing directly what was seen from one 
perspective, then changing to another’s, then hearing the accounts given to other 
members of the team.   
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Consultant ward round were another opportunity to observe ward processes and 
decision-making.  One or more junior doctors, a nurse and sometimes a medical student 
would be present.  Consultants, either before or during their ward rounds, would ask for 
an update of what was happening.  This would normally be given by a junior doctor 
while the nurse present may add further information.  The interaction with the patient, 
in the presence of at least 4 or 5 people, created a different perspective, and the 
subsequent decision or clarification of the decision, was made again outside the 
patient’s room.  
Through all of these processes I became aware of patients who were receiving sedative 
drugs.  I began fieldwork with the intention of gaining an overview of how sedation was 
defined in practice and an account of the attitudes towards and intentions of staff 
regarding sedation.    Therefore I had to be able to take an overall perspective of which 
sedative drugs were used, the reasons stated for giving them, their effects and outcomes.  
I became aware of a number of different ways in which sedation was prescribed and 
reasons given by staff for sedation being administered.    
One of the main distinctions formed early on in fieldwork was between patients who 
were considered to be dying and those who were not.  While continuing to observe in a 
general sense, I focused my observations regarding sedation towards those who were 
considered to be dying, or for whom there was uncertainty about whether or not they 
were dying.  While I was still in a position to observe those who were receiving 
sedation and not considered to be dying, I was able to examine in more depth those 
situations where patients were receiving sedation at the end of life.  In addition, I was 
able to observe the transition into the dying phase and changes in the use of sedation 
from one phase into another.  I came to understand this transition to be of great 
importance as I analysed the data and developed a theoretical understanding of how 
sedation was used; this will be appreciated in the following data chapters.   
I observed situations in which sedation appeared to be unproblematic, as well as those 
in which sedation was considered to be of great concern.  I identified this concern in 
different ways; through observation of discussions, comments in handover meetings, or 
I would be told about an ‘interesting case’ by an ‘informant’.  Reasons for concern or a 
heightened awareness of sedation taking place varied; what was clear however was that 
they were not ‘everyday’ cases of sedation.  It seemed important to access what it was 
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about these cases which marked them out as ‘deviant’ cases, from which I could expect 
to learn more about ‘everyday’ sedation (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007 p.169, 
Silverman, 2010 p. 281).  I followed these cases more purposively; I observed nurses or 
doctors at different times as they interacted with these patients and their significant 
others.  Having been alerted to a more unusual situation in which sedation was being 
used, I selected ways in which I would be able to observe interactions with staff.  This 
may have been to attend nursing drug rounds, consultant ward rounds or junior doctor 
consultations.  In this way I gathered more information about specific cases in which 
sedation was used.   
In total, 45 patients consented to participate in the observation phase of the study.  289 
hours of observations were carried out, over 51 days, spread over a period of 11 months 
from September 2009 to July 2010.  Periods of time away from the field were required 
to fulfil teaching requirements, for analysis or for leave. 
3.7  Interviews 
3.7.1 Patients  
Informal interviews, or ‘unsolicited accounts’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 99) in 
the manner described in ethnographic texts, occurred very infrequently with patients.  
This was due to the design of the study and access.  In the research ethics committee 
form I specifically stated I would observe staff and my contact with patients would be 
limited to observing interactions with staff.  This was in order to minimise any 
disruption to patients and any intrusion on their time.  However, this did mean that my 
direct contact with patients was limited to the contact I made at the time of explaining 
the study and gaining consent for the observation or for a formal interview.  In these 
interactions patients did, however, give ‘unsolicited accounts’.  If they agreed to 
participate in the study I felt able to record these interactions; if they did not wish to 
participate I did not include or record details of these interactions.   
In addition to these informal interviews, I sought initially to formally interview patients 
and/or their significant others.  These were patients whom I had observed as discussing 
or receiving sedation.  The first two patients I approached in this way both agreed, as 
did their significant others.  However, after agreeing to be interviewed and setting a date 
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both of these patients deteriorated and died.  Much thought and discussion has taken 
place in supervisory meetings about this issue and about interviewing both patients and 
significant others.  I conducted one patient interview successfully; this was a patient 
who had received sedation for anxiety and was interviewed in relation to this.  During 
the interview, he also expressed his thoughts about sedation at the end of life.  
Throughout the interview the patient talked in hypothetical terms about sedation and his 
wishes for the future; his experience of sedative drugs were those he had been given for 
anxiety.  By this stage in the fieldwork it had become clear that concern about sedation 
in practice related to sedation of patients who were dying, or about whom there was 
uncertainty about whether they were dying.  Sedation as an end of life practice was only 
considered in those who were dying; this was a theme which developed strongly 
through the observational data and interviews.  Therefore considering a patient’s 
preferences for sedation at the end of life was conceptually a different matter; it asked 
about future wishes rather than being ground in the present.   
I approached a further three patients during the time of the study who had received or 
were receiving sedation; all agreed however two of these deteriorated before I could 
interview them, the other was transferred to hospital for further treatment.  The time 
stipulated in the REC application between inviting patients to take part in interviews 
and carrying them out was to be negotiated between myself and the patient.  I did not 
feel in any of these instances, that the patients wished to participate in the interview 
immediately.  It may, of course, be the case that they did not wish to take part at all and 
wished simply to ‘stall’ for time.  I rather felt, however, that they wanted to have more 
time to speak to others before participating, and this caused a delay which meant they 
were unable to participate.  Accessing patients for whom sedation was a reality, and 
who could give accounts of their understanding and wishes, was not possible because: 
(i) those receiving sedation at the end of their lives lacked capacity; (ii) those who had 
capacity and for whom sedation was required at the end of life deteriorated rapidly after 
initial contact.  
Others have managed to interview dying patients more successfully (Lawton, 2001), 
while acknowledging this as a rare voice to be heard.  The distinctive feature of this 
study which presented difficulties was the requirement that patients be able to talk about 
the issues regarding sedation in the present rather than consider them in hypothetical 
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terms.  Concern for the future and presenting wishes for the future is of course of the 
utmost importance; it does, however, go beyond the scope of this study to consider this 
alongside the practice of sedation in the present.  The present remains the main focus of 
the study. 
3.7.2 Significant others 
I spoke to several significant others over the course of the fieldwork; many were happy 
to chat informally but only one was prepared to be formally interviewed.  Many who 
did talk informally in the corridor were relatives of patients who were not sedated.  The 
one interview conducted with a significant other was an exceptional case, as it took 
place after the death of the patient.  This was discussed extensively with the supervisory 
team and care was taken to ensure this fell within the terms of the research ethics 
committee application.  
3.7.3 Staff 
Informal interviews with staff occurred frequently throughout the fieldwork however I 
also sought to formally interview staff in relation to the observed use of sedation.  As 
previously described, those cases which proved to be more problematic were pursued; 
initially with observation and then followed up with interviews.  I observed the course 
of the use of sedation over time and subsequently interviewed healthcare professionals 
after the event.   All patients whom I observed in this way subsequently died.  
Purposefully, I did not interview or seek to interview those involved in the patient’s care 
while they were still being treated; this may have influenced subsequent decisions.  The 
duration for which I was able to observe, prior to a patient’s deterioration or death, was 
highly variable, from a matter of hours to many days or weeks. In three instances, while 
I had been present in the hospice prior to their deaths, sedation occurred when I was not 
present. Two of these instances occurred at night and the other over a bank holiday 
period.   
Interviews were conducted as closely as possible in time to a patient’s death.  This was 
not always possible due to the nurses’ shift pattern and days off, demands of the ward as 
well as my other commitments.  Interviews were carried out, with two exceptions, 
within the hospice building.  This was to fit around the participants’ wishes and 
accommodate these as far as possible.  The exceptions were consultants who worked 
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both in the hospice and at another site: the interviews were carried out at their 
alternative places of work which was more convenient for them.  Participating in the 
interviews within the hospice may have influenced what was disclosed and the nature of 
this.  Participants may have been more likely to have talked about their personal 
responses or motivations outside of their work environment.  I found that which they 
did disclose, however, surprisingly honest on many occasions.  Only on one occasion 
did I find a direct contradiction between what I had observed and the account given in 
interview.  The interviews were carried out in an iterative manner, reflecting the 
previous observations and interviews and following the iterative-inductive nature of 
ethnography.  The nature of the initial interview questions differed little from the 
original interview topic guide but I allowed the interviews to progress naturally to 
discuss aspects of the case as freely as possible.  I would direct the interview towards 
more specific issues arising from the observational data as the study progressed and 
made use of a variety of different interview techniques.   
Interviews were digitally recorded and sent electronically for transcription.  I initially 
intended to transcribe at least one interview in full, however, while establishing myself 
in the field I felt that the time invested in this was more fruitfully spent in the field 
rather than in transcription.  I recognise that transcription itself can be part of 
familiarising oneself with the data and a stage of analysis.  I did spend time in checking 
transcripts for accuracy, proof reading and note-taking before re-reading the transcript 
in full before coding.  Transcripts were recorded verbatim for analysis.   
3.8  Data Analysis 
Analysis of field notes and interviews has taken place at different stages throughout data 
collection.  From the start of data collection I engaged in an iterative process of 
analysis, in keeping with the ethnographic tradition (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 
158).  This was not a formal process, whereby time was regularly taken in blocks to 
allow for this; rather it was a constant, informal approach, attempting to manage a 
balance between time spent in the field and time for other ongoing commitments.  I was 
anxious to spend as much time as possible in the field in the early stages, familiarising 
myself with the environment and allowing myself to develop relationships.  Field notes 
were written contemporaneously when possible but further notes were added and then 
typed at the end of each day.  Reflective notes were written in addition to this, and after 
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each interview.  These were also typed and stored together in a computer software 
programme, NVivo.  In this way much of the early analytical processes took place ‘in 
the field’ (Oakley, 1994).   Through this process of daily transcription I was constantly 
engaging with the data.  I recorded issues which emerged during fieldwork which 
challenged or raised questions of previously gathered data.  This was a constant process 
whereby I asked questions of myself and the data I was gathering; asking how the 
situation I was observing was similar or different to previous observations, or brought in 
issues or questions raised in interviews.   
The process of analysis held much in common with the principles or methods of 
grounded theory.  While not following classical grounded theory methods, there were 
many similarities in approach.  Many authors have written about the core concerns of 
grounded theory and how these have been understood and interpreted in different ways 
since the publication of Glaser and Strauss’s ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory’ in 
1967 (Charmaz, 2006, Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007).  This original construction has been accused of being overly 
mechanistic, or at least has been interpreted as such: recently authors such as Charmaz, 
have considered it from a different perspective (Charmaz, 2006).  Glaser and Strauss 
themselves subsequently disagreed about the central assumptions of grounded theory: 
Strauss in recognising the role of the researcher (and previous experience and 
influences) in constructing theory; Glaser in advocating that theory should be generated 
more independently from the researcher (Charmaz, 2006: 8, Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007: 167).  Indeed, while my research followed predominately an inductive process in 
seeking to generate theory from the data, my previous knowledge, experience and 
reading made deduction an important aspect in this process as well.   
I adopted the perspective of Charmaz in viewing grounded theory methods as 
‘principles and practices, not as prescriptions or packages’ (Charmaz, 2006: 9).  
Charmaz advocates the use of the tools of grounded theory, while adopting more of the 
approach of Corbin and Strauss than the classical techniques of Glaser and Strauss.   
Supervision meetings were of particular importance during fieldwork, during which I 
would discuss sections of field notes or whole transcripts of interviews with my 
supervisors.  During these meetings I would describe my own impressions and issues 
which I believed to be emerging from the data and discuss these and develop new ideas 
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to challenge and develop back in the field through observations and interviews.  In this 
way these meetings impacted on my fieldwork and the research developed in different 
directions through this process. 
All written field notes and interview transcripts were transcribed and entered into 
NVivo, a qualitative software programme to assist with data management.  This enabled 
me to be able to handle the large volume of data generated.   The ‘constant comparative 
method’ was used informally in the field and more formally through the stages of 
coding to challenge assumptions and ‘taken-for-granted understandings’ (Glaser, 1965, 
Charmaz, 2006).  Following the approach advocated by Charmaz, interview data was 
coded initially in a line by line fashion; field notes were coded ‘incident by incident’.  
Six interviews were coded in their entirety line by line; all field notes were coded 
incident by incident.  Initial coding on a line by line basis was difficult to manage and 
produced an unwieldy coding frame.  Codes were reviewed and compared in 
supervision meetings to ensure inter-rater reliability.  Although I was the only 
researcher these discussions were crucial to challenge assumptions and question what I 
was seeing, throughout the period of fieldwork.  Initial codes were then compressed and 
having generated a coding frame in this way, it was applied to the rest of the interview 
data.  I then engaged in focused coding whereby one codes ‘using the most significant 
and frequent earlier codes to sift through large amounts of data’(Charmaz, 2006).  
Through this process I re-examined the data with a view to bringing to the fore those 
codes which made the most analytical sense.  This was strengthened and developed 
through discussion in supervisory meetings.  I took considerable time over this process, 
being particularly concerned about falling into the pitfalls found at this stage and 
described by Charmaz: 
 Coding at too general a level 
 Identifying topics instead of actions and processes 
 Overlooking how people construct actions and processes 
 Attending to disciplinary or personal concerns rather than participants 
 Coding out of context 
 Using codes to summarise not analyse  (Charmaz, 2006: 69) 
93 
 
I began analysis whilst still ‘in the field’; because of this I was able to understand and 
refine these codes as I engaged in ‘theoretical sampling’.  As I analysed the data and 
subsequently collected further data, I was able to test the analysis in an iterative manner.  
In addition I engaged in memo writing, using various techniques to enhance this such as 
clustering and free writing (Charmaz, 2006).  These memos helped me to consider the 
data from different perspectives, clarify details within codes, generate new ideas and 
also direct me towards more theoretical coding by pointing to relationships between the 
focused codes.   
Time invested in this process enabled me to generate robust categories and feel 
confident as I reached ‘theoretical sufficiency’.  This term, originally used by Dey (Dey, 
2007: 257), is distinct from the term ‘theoretical saturation’ which many grounded 
theorists strive for and attain.  Dey challenges the concept of theoretical saturation as he 
questions the ability to truly ‘saturate’ categories when relying on partial rather than 
complete coding of a data set.  Additionally he argues that saturation relies on the 
researcher’s assumption, or estimation that categories are fully saturated.  Instead he 
argues that categories are suggested by the data, rather than being assumed to be 
products of the data (Charmaz, 2006: 114).  Data are coded and categories populated to 
the extent that there are no new categories emerging but this is acknowledged to be on 
the basis of a partial coding of the data and thus the term ‘theoretical sufficiency’ is a 
more accurate representation of this process.  Data is still comprehensively treated 
(Silverman, 2010: 280) but the product, I believe, is a more accurate interpretation of 
what is represented by the data. 
The major ‘categories’ suggested by the data were developed at a theoretical level into 
drafts which have subsequently been worked into the chapters which form the basis of 
this thesis.  This has been an iterative process, with several changes in direction 
occurring as I analysed the data.  Throughout the research process I kept a record of 
research decisions and thoughts through detailed supervision notes and a research diary.  
This was stored alongside my data in an NVivo software package, allowing easy access 
and a clear trail of information.  This is important to be able to attend to concerns 
regarding ‘trustworthiness’.   
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3.9 Research ‘Trustworthiness’ 
Throughout the design, fieldwork and analysis it was important to ensure the 
‘trustworthiness’ of the study through consideration of four key areas: credibility, 
dependability, confirmability and transferability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  Some have 
considered these to act as equivalents to the quantative measures of internal validity, 
external validity, reliability, and objectivity (ibid).  These are attended to through the 
detailed descriptions of the study methods above, however the way in which the 
methods directly relate to this is found below.   
Credibility is the extent to which the researcher engages with the phenomenon or 
environment and how representative the data is of the range of perspectives and 
contexts under study (Charmaz, 2006).  As ethnography requires a prolonged period of 
time within the research environment the ability to collect data over time from a wide 
range of perspectives enhances credibility.  My own previous work in the hospice as a 
doctor ensured access to discussions and informal interviews in the field as participants 
talked openly; while this enriched the data, simultaneously I had to attend to concerns of 
being too involved to consider different perspectives.  Credibility was enhanced through 
regular meetings with my supervisors who came from a range of different backgrounds 
including medical sociology, psychiatry and palliative medicine.   My assumptions were 
challenged through these meetings, as I considered the different perspectives presented; 
in this way these meetings also acted as a ‘peer debrief’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).    
Dependability relates to the consistency of the data collection and the recording of 
research decisions.  Throughout the research I kept a research diary and charted key 
decisions, incorporating these, as well as notes from supervision meetings, alongside the 
data in an NVivo software package.  This allowed easy access to the data as well as a 
record of the influences apparent to me at the time; in this way I ensured there was a 
clear trail of research decision-making alongside the data.   
Confirmability concerns the extent to which the researcher’s own experiences or views 
influence the data.  This was an important issue in this study as I had previously worked 
in the hospice as a doctor.  My role and how I negotiated this has been discussed within 
the main body of this chapter and is an important area to highlight.  I was acutely aware 
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of the need for reflexivity throughout the research process and found the research diary 
helpful as I considered each day how my role may influence what I saw, or recorded.   
Transferability relates to the degree to which the findings of the research are 
transferrable to the population under study, and the degree to which the results can be 
transferred into other populations.  Throughout my field notes and interviews I 
endeavoured to build a ‘thick, rich description’, as described by Lincoln and Guba, to 
enhance the transferability of the research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  I took extensive 
field notes throughout the period in the field.  Initially these were descriptive, 
delineating how the hospice was set up, what the different rooms consisted of and where 
different people were in relation to one another.  I recorded many verbatim comments, 
especially in handover meetings, to capture what was actually said rather than my 
interpretation of what was said.  This was important to me as a new researcher, 
especially so because much of what was said was familiar to me in my previous work as 
a doctor.  Being able to analyse and consider the precise words which were used 
enabled an insight into both my own underlying assumptions and those of staff.  Had I 
taken a broader approach in these first few weeks of data collection I may have missed 
what became central to my analysis; the detail of the precise use of words and language 
in the hospice which developed into an understanding of the framework within which 
decisions about sedation were made.   This ‘thick data’ set facilitates external 
assessments of transferability and understanding of the results of this study; the impact 
of this is discussed in Chapter 8.     In the next four chapters, however, I present the 
research results with the emergent major categories forming their structure: routine 
sedation; good dying and death; threats to good dying and death and, finally in Chapter 
7, values.
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Chapter 4 Routine Sedation 
This chapter introduces the way in which sedation was used in the hospice.  I explore 
the way in which sedation came to be understood as routine in this fieldwork.  
Subsequently, the process through which the routine use of sedative drugs came to 
include an acceptance of a reduction in a patient’s consciousness will be explored.  This 
is considered in relation to a sequence of dying in the hospice, understood within a 
framework of dying as a ‘non-structured status passage’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1965b).  
The ways in which sedation was prescribed and administered provide further insights 
into the underlying motivations for using sedation and allow decisions about sedation to 
be revealed as taking two forms: prescribing decisions about regular sedation and 
decisions about using sedation on a ‘p.r.n’ basis1.  While these decisions were shared 
and agreed in most situations, disparity between these types of decisions was observed, 
especially in situations of uncertainty about whether or not a patient was dying.  
Situations in which sedation, even to unconsciousness, was driven by p.r.n. decisions 
are shown through further case studies.  Potential concerns about this type of decision-
making, and the importance of these in situations of uncertainty, are explored in the 
final section of this chapter.   
4.1.1 Routine use of sedation 
Through the fieldwork it became apparent that one of the most challenging issues was 
to determine what was meant and interpreted by the term ‘sedation’.  In keeping with 
the literature, this was seen to be a complex issue, filled with individual variations of 
interpretation and meaning.  Applying the terms found in the literature, it was possible 
to sort the different forms of sedation into categories.  Many of these arose from the 
data; for example, the indications for using sedation, the duration for which sedation 
was given and the accounts for giving sedation all formed part of the initial coding 
frame.  It became evident, however, that to look beneath a simple structure or 
organisation of sedation in this way required a different approach.  To be immersed in 
                                                 
1
 ‘p.r.n.’ (pro re nata): as the circumstance arises.  Drugs are prescribed ‘p.r.n.’, to be given by nurses as 
required, for indications which are specified on the drug chart. 
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the culture of the hospice was to become aware of a more complex process of sedation, 
filled with evaluative assessments and decisions, individualised and often so routine as 
to appear to be almost unseen.  Sedation, it appeared, formed more of an integral role 
within the hospice than was initially apparent.  I had anticipated being able to recognise 
when sedation was given; through the course of the fieldwork, however, it appeared that 
my broad interpretation of that which could be considered as sedation was not the way 
in which sedation was considered in the hospice.  Sedation, it seemed, was not simply 
recognised as the administration of sedative drugs as I had anticipated.  Rather, the term 
‘sedation’ was regarded as an explicit, overt decision to use sedative drugs in a way 
which was unusual, or out of the ordinary pattern of the hospice.   There was a 
difference it seemed, between an implicit, daily use of sedative drugs which I came to 
observe over time, and that which was regarded as ‘sedation’ by staff in the hospice.  In 
time, just ‘being there’ enabled me to see daily instances of sedation, enacted so easily 
and without fuss or discussion, they appeared to be a matter of routine.  Indeed, it 
appeared sedation used in this way, as the treatment of symptoms with sedative drugs, 
was considered in no way different to other forms of symptom control.  Sedation which 
occurred in this ‘routine’ way, it appeared, was not considered by the staff to be 
‘sedation’; rather it was considered to be simply part of the practice of symptom control, 
treated in the same way as the management of pain or nausea.  Developing an 
understanding of this routine form of sedation revealed a form of sedation which was, it 
appeared, accepted within the hospice as normal practice.  Further, it appeared to 
change in nature; that which was routinely accepted for some patients was unacceptable 
for others.  This was closely linked to a developing understanding of the processes of 
dying.  First, an understanding of the nature of symptom control in the hospice will be 
formed.  Subsequently, the changing nature of sedation in relation to the process of 
dying will be considered.   
4.1.2 Routine symptom control 
‘Symptom control’ forms one of the principle functions of palliative care (Doyle, 2003: 
xx).  Routine symptom control occurred in the hospice in a relatively structured way, it 
appeared.  In response to a patient describing a symptom, a doctor or nurse would assess 
that symptom and its likely cause, before providing a treatment, if possible.  The 
assessments and treatments were numerous and varied according to the symptom, from 
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a bedside test and giving a drug, to blood tests and a blood transfusion: the overall 
process of ‘symptom control’, however, was the same.  The most commonly observed 
symptom in the hospice was pain and often its immediate treatment appeared to be 
straightforward.  For example, I observed one of the staff nurses, Carol, as she gave a 
patient her regular medication on the drug round at the start of a night shift.  The 
following extract from field notes shows her response. 
4:1  As we went in, Paula was sitting in her chair with her head slumped 
forwards.  She woke up as Carol [staff nurse] spoke but still appeared a bit 
drowsy.  She said she’d had a good day and was feeling OK but had some pain in 
her back. Carol asked if she’d like some Oramorph2 for it and she said she would. 
Carol then poured it out into a medicine pot and gave it to her with her other 
medications.  Carol asked if she’d manage to take the medications herself and she 
said she would.  On the way out Carol said she would go back to check the 
Oramorph had worked and that she’d managed all of her drugs after she’d 
finished the drug round.   
        [FN 07/12/09 line 85] 
This extract recorded a very routine interaction, repeated several times during the course 
of the night and was observed as forming part of the everyday work of the nurses in the 
hospice.  Carol knew the patient and, having looked at her drug chart, offered her what 
she thought was the appropriate treatment, the drug which was prescribed for her to give 
‘if required’, or on a ‘p.r.n’ basis.  In the same way other symptoms were assessed and 
treated, with varying success, but following a ‘routine’ pattern of symptom control.   
4.1.3  Routine use of sedation for symptom control 
Sedative drugs were used to treat a variety of symptoms in the hospice, from 
breathlessness to seizures.  The process of symptom control using sedative drugs 
appeared to be similar to that described above for pain.  For example, Simon was a 44 
year old man with an aggressive lung cancer.  He was very breathless, and became 
anxious as a result of his breathlessness.  He was given a variety of different treatments 
                                                 
2
 Oramorph: oral morphine immediate release liquid 
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to help his symptoms, including benzodiazepines
3
.  A typical night for him was 
described during a nursing handover as this extract from field notes shows. 
4:2  Simon was 44 and had a pulmonary adenocarcinoma.  He had been admitted 
because of panic attacks and anxiety, with increasing breathlessness.  He had a 
‘usual night’, and had required Oramorph and midazolam4, lorazepam5 and 
paracetamol, at different stages through the night, for anxiety, headaches and 
breathlessness.  
[FN 16/02/10 line 39] 
I observed one of the nurses, Jane, as she went in to see him after he had pressed his 
buzzer.  I stood just inside the doorway as she went in.   
4:3  He was sitting up in a wheelchair with an oxygen mask on, breathing very 
quickly.  He couldn’t speak in sentences, only managing to get one or two words 
out at a time between each breath.  He said he couldn’t breathe.  Jane crouched 
beside him and asked if he had any pain or if anything else was going on.  Simon 
shook his head and said no, he just couldn’t breathe. Jane said she’d get him 
‘something’ and be back soon.  Simon looked straight ahead the whole time and 
didn’t turn at all to look at Jane.  He looked very anxious and frightened with his 
eyes wide open and just staring ahead.   Jane looked at his chart as we walked 
back up the corridor – she said it was horrible, wasn’t it?  She said she would try 
some lorazepam - the girls
6
 at handover had said it worked better than the 
Oramorph.   
[FN 17/02/10 line 23] 
The lorazepam which Jane was planning to give to Simon for agitation was considered 
in a similar way to the use of oramorph for Paula’s pain in the first extract.  Indeed, it 
appeared that having first tried oramorph to treat Simon’s breathlessness, the lorazepam 
was considered to be more effective.   These symptoms were assessed on the basis of 
                                                 
3
 Sedative group of drugs 
4
 Injectable benzodiazepine 
5
 Oral benzodiazepine 
6
 ‘the girls’ was a term used by the nurses to refer to other nurses collectively 
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what the patient volunteered to the nurse.  A further ‘routine’ use of sedation for 
symptom control was the use of sedation for behaviours which appeared to be indictors 
of distress.  Staff in the hospice regularly used the terms ‘unsettled’, ‘restless’ or 
‘agitated’ to describe a patient’s behaviour in situations in which a patient was unable to 
communicate their symptoms.  These behaviours conveyed a sense that a patient was in 
some way distressed, and these behaviours were manifestations of this distress.  The 
treatment of these behaviours could also be regarded as a form of routine symptom 
control, it appeared.  On a daily basis in the nursing handover meetings a description of 
which drugs a patient had ‘needed’ during the previous shift was provided.  Almost 
invariably this included a patient who had received a sedative drug for one of these 
‘distress-behaviours’.  For example, during a handover meeting one of the nurses 
described giving some midazolam to a patient: 
4:4  He was a bit agitated so I gave him some midazolam and it settled him lovely  
        [FN 16/10/09 line 12] 
Similarly, another nurse, in the same meeting described a different patient who had been 
restless and had ‘needed a couple of extras but settled in the end’ [FN 16/10/09 line 20].  
The ‘extras’ were injections of midazolam, I realised later, after going with one of the 
nurses to give out the regular drugs later in the day.  The fact that the sedative drugs 
were simply referred to as ‘extras’, enhanced an impression that this form of sedation 
was routine and a formed a normal part of work in the hospice.  Handovers of this 
nature occurred every day without question or challenge.   
Assessments of these distress-behaviours were carried out by both doctors and nurses.  
A further example of the routine use of sedation to treat distress behaviour was for 
Charlie.  He was a patient who was 76 years old and had a form of lung cancer.  He had 
been admitted to the hospice for symptom control of pain.  He had rapidly deteriorated 
and was described in the handover as being very ‘agitated’ overnight.  One of the 
registrars, Gillian, had been to review him and came to talk to one of the senior doctors, 
Julia, about him in the MDT office.  She told Julia about the change in his condition and 
her assessment of him.   
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4:5  Overnight he had had nearly 20 mg of extra midazolam and so they had 
increased the syringe driver
7
 this morning to 20 mg of midazolam over 24 hours.  
She had been back in to see him and he was still not settled.  He had been moving 
about the bed and looked ‘unsettled’.  His arms were constantly moving and 
fidgeting, she said.  He was on some levomepromazine
8
 6.25 mg for nausea but 
she had just asked Lisa [staff nurse] to give him 12.5 mg for his agitation.   She 
was wondering about adding levomepromazine into the syringe driver now for 
agitation.           
        [FN 11/02/10 line 43] 
Gillian’s description of the patient’s agitation was typical of this type of ‘distress-
behaviour’ which I observed in the fieldwork.  The use of sedative drugs to cause 
cessation of the behaviour described was part of everyday practice.  If a patient was 
breathless, a nurse would make an assessment, look at what had worked before and treat 
with whatever had been given before or was prescribed to be given as a ‘first line’ 
treatment.  In the same way if a patient looked restless, the nurse made an assessment, 
looked at what had been given before and treated the restlessness with whatever had 
worked in the past or was prescribed as first line.  These were described as part of 
normal practice in the handover meetings as simply the ‘extras’ which had been 
required overnight or since the previous shift.  Thus sedation used in this way, it 
appeared, was considered as simply a matter of symptom control.  A difference 
however, emerged when observing the treatment of breathlessness with lorazepam and 
the treatment of distress with midazolam; a difference which did not appear to be 
explicitly acknowledged by staff in the hospice.  It appeared that a reduction in 
consciousness was acceptable when restlessness and other distress-behaviours were 
treated, but this was not acceptable at the point at which lorazepam was given for 
breathlessness.  The patients were at different stages, it seemed, in their dying 
processes. Lisa, one of the staff nurses, expressly stated the staff’s aims of avoiding 
drowsiness with Simon’s use of lorazepam in an MDT meeting.    
                                                 
7
 A small machine frequently used in palliative care to deliver a set dose of an injectable drug, normally 
over 24 hours, into the subcutaneous tissue 
8
An antipsychotic drug used for control of nausea in low doses and agitation in higher doses as its 
sedative properties increase 
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4:6  Lisa said, as a positive statement, he was having less lorazepam and 
Oramorph now that he was on MST
9
, and he was managing his panic attacks a bit 
better.  The lorazepam had been making him a bit drowsy so they were avoiding it 
as far as they could and trying to engage him with complementary therapies.  
[FN 17/02/10 line 96] 
An alternative to the lorazepam was sought in order to reduce his drowsiness, it seemed.  
In contrast, the doctors who discussed the use of sedation for Charlie appeared to accept 
that it would make him sleep, although were still concerned they didn’t give ‘too much’. 
4:7  Julia [senior doctor] then asked what Gillian [registrar] was worried about in 
adding the levomepromazine into the driver now.  Gillian wasn’t sure what she 
meant.  Julia then asked whether part of the reason she was hesitating was that 
she was worried that if the levomepromazine which he had just had worked, and 
made him more relaxed and made him sleep, that in adding 50 mg to the driver, it 
would perhaps be more than he needed.  In other words, was it that she wanted to 
give him the lowest dose possible of a drug which was effective, and not give too 
much and over sedate him? Gillian agreed that that was what she wanted. 
        [FN 11/02/10 line 84] 
It seemed that both Julia and Gillian accepted that they wanted to give the drugs to 
make Charlie ‘more relaxed’ and ‘sleep’; this would be the measure of whether or not 
the drugs had ‘worked’.  Simon was not acknowledged to be dying; from the hospice 
perspective he was still expected to improve and be discharged.  Charlie was thought to 
be dying; as Gillian said later in the conversation to Julia, she didn’t think; ‘it would be 
long’ [FN 11/02/10 line 61].  Both practices of giving sedation, for breathlessness and 
for agitation, appeared to be routine, but were very different in consequence.   The 
routine nature of giving sedation for agitation, with a reduction in consciousness, 
appeared to occur as a patient progressed towards imminent dying.  That which was 
acceptable as a patient was dying was unacceptable, it seemed, when they were not 
thought to be actively dying.  This relied implicitly upon the interpretation of the dying 
process; this process has been explored and delineated perhaps most clearly by Glaser 
and Strauss in their original work on the ‘transitional statuses of dying’.  An 
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understanding of the changing nature of sedation in relation to the ‘transitional statuses 
of dying’ is explored next, relying, I suggest, upon an acceptance of a reduction in 
consciousness as a patient comes closer to death.    
4.2 Transitional Statuses of Dying 
The recognition of temporal aspects of organisational dying was first observed by 
Glaser and Strauss in the 1960s (Glaser and Strauss, 1965a).  Their ethnographic work 
in a number of different healthcare settings in the United States of America provided an 
understanding of the transition from living into dying as a ‘non-scheduled status 
passage’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1965b). They recognised the uncertain nature of the non-
scheduled passage: the difficulties of recognising when a patient was in transition 
between one status and the next and that the patient and those around him or her may 
have different perceptions about where in passage the patient was.  They found through 
their studies that patients and those around them formed ‘death expectations’; a certain 
or uncertain understanding, after recognition of a potentially terminal diagnosis, of 
when their death would occur.  In forming these expectations Glaser and Strauss 
recognised two important features; certainty and time.  They conceived the expectations 
of a patient’s death (from all perspectives, including the patient) as forming 4 different 
groups:   
 Certain death at a known time 
 Certain death at an unknown time 
 Uncertain death but at a known time when the question will be resolved 
 Uncertain death and unknown time when the question will be resolved  
(Glaser and Strauss, 1965a: 18-19). 
Glaser and Strauss conceived these ‘transitional statuses of dying’ as non-scheduled 
passages through which patients were expected to pass between living and dying.  The 
transition between these statuses was fluid and recognised through the accumulation of 
‘cues’.   These cues were provided by the patient’s physical condition and by the 
recognition of changes over time; the ‘physical’ and ‘temporal’ cues.   A patient’s 
physical condition could be determined by the doctors, and their assessments were used 
to provide cues about the progression of the disease.  The rate of change in a patient’s 
condition was measured through the relationship between the expected progression of a 
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disease and the patient’s actual progression through this.  The accumulation of cues 
provided increasing evidence of the timing of a patient’s death and of their transition 
from a status of ‘certain death at unknown time’ to ‘certain death at known time’ 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1965a: 21).  Recognition of dying as a transitional status passage is 
relevant when considering the process through which the use of sedative drugs, with the 
acceptance of a reduction in consciousness, can be seen to become routine.  A process 
through which the reduction of a patient’s consciousness became acceptable occurred as 
a patient came to be recognised to be imminently dying.   
4.2.1 Organisation of dying in the hospice 
Patients were admitted to the hospice for one of three reasons; respite care, symptom 
control, or end of life care. A respite admission was an admission for a set period of 
time, normally for one week, after which the patient returned home.  An admission for 
symptom control was more open-ended; it was an admission to the hospice for an 
indefinite period, until symptoms were under control, with the expectation that the 
patient would return home.  This group included those who were admitted for the 
treatment of psychological symptoms and those who had difficulty in coping at home 
due to a lack, or difficulty in providing, social support.  Some of those admitted for 
symptom control changed during the course of their admission and stayed for end of life 
care.  When a patient was admitted for end of life care it appeared to be expected that 
they would stay in the hospice until they died. These reasons for admission were stated 
regularly at handover and MDT meetings and amended according to the initial 
assessments carried out by nursing and medical staff.  In this way a patient admitted for 
end of life care whom the staff subsequently assessed as not dying, would then be 
referred to as staying for a period of symptom control; those admitted for symptom 
control who were subsequently thought to be dying would be referred to as ‘staying for 
end of life care’.  These labels were applied to the patients on a frequent basis.  In MDT 
meetings, for example, the reason for a patient’s admission was announced and a 
decision was made about the future status of the patient; either to plan to discharge the 
patient, or for them to stay for end of life care.  It appeared to provide staff with a way 
of recognising what was required of them, a form of shorthand to guide what patients 
may need in terms of different levels of care or intervention.   
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4.2.2 Status of dying in the hospice 
In the hospice the majority of patients had a diagnosis of a progressive incurable illness.  
In this sense, that they were dying was recognised, and death was expected with 
certainty.  The expected timing of their deaths, however, varied markedly.  Some 
patients were undergoing ‘disease modifying’ treatment with the aim of prolonging life.  
The timing of their death was often considered unpredictable, dependent as it was, upon 
their responses to treatment.  Many, however, had progressive incurable illnesses for 
which there were no expectations of further disease modifying drugs.  The certainty of 
their death was known and the timing of their death too, in the ‘expected’ sense, was 
known.  In the absence of treatments which would alter the ‘disease trajectory’, the 
timing of death was an expected, known, entity and as such patients could be considered 
as being in the final transitional status of ‘certain death at known time’.  This status of 
‘certain death at known time’ was seen through the observations to be further defined in 
practice; it appeared an expected ‘sequence’ of passing through the status was observed.   
This, I suggest, created an implicitly recognised temporal structure of dying, of passing 
through this final status.  This was not institutionally prescribed, rather was 
institutionally recognised and anticipated.  This recognition enabled those working in 
the organisation to identify where the patient was within the status and how they ought 
to be treated.  Furthermore, where a patient was in this sequence was vital in 
determining how sedation was used; the influence of this on the acceptance of a 
reduction in consciousness is crucial.   
Dying in the hospice, it appeared, was shaped by temporal requirements of the 
organisation.  The organisational expectations of the length of a patient’s admission (for 
symptom control or for dying) and the nature of the work of the hospice could be seen 
to frame the expectation of the duration of dying in the hospice.  There was, for 
example, an expectation of the average length of a patient’s admission.  When patients 
were anticipated as likely to stay in the hospice for a longer period, it appeared that 
some justification for their continued admission was required.  During an MDT, for 
example, one of the consultants agreed with the rest of the team that a patient, Harry, 
should stay for end of life care.   Harry was a 42 year old man with a brain tumour who 
was admitted to the hospice for symptom control of seizures and because he had been 
‘deteriorating’ at home. He was bedbound and unable to eat and drink by himself.  His 
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communication also fluctuated on a regular basis; he was unable to communicate due to 
unconsciousness at times but he was said to be lucid at other times too.  His family had 
decided they would not be able to manage to have Harry at home again as he was so 
dependent and the consultant in charge of his care, Michael, agreed that he should stay 
in the hospice.  The following extract was from field notes at the time of the MDT.  
4:8  Michael [consultant] commented that it didn’t help the figures but there 
really wasn’t any option for him to go anywhere else.  He was still unstable and 
fluctuating so they agreed he should stay at the hospice for end of life care – 
which is what his family wanted.  
[FN 19/05/10 line 219] 
Michael referred to ‘the figures’; this was a reference to the length of Harry’s admission 
and appeared to convey an expectation that he would not die quickly.  Indeed, 2 weeks 
later, the MDT had a similar discussion about Harry’s ongoing admission, once again 
concluding that he should stay in the hospice until he died.   
4:9  Eve [social worker] said she hated it when they got patients with brain 
tumours because you always knew you’d end up with decisions like this to make, 
they go on for so long and it’s so hard on their families.  Izzy [staff nurse] agreed 
and said that they were all young and no-one else wanted them, but they couldn’t 
all stay indefinitely otherwise they would have no beds for anyone else. 
        [FN 02/06/10 line 217] 
Harry’s ongoing admission for end of life care created problems, it seemed, for the 
organisational structure of dying as he took longer to die than was expected and planned 
for within the hospice context.  Harry’s case was not unusual but illustrates that the 
dying process in the hospice was framed within the temporal structure of the 
organisation.  A further requirement of dying in the hospice was that it be an active 
process.  Dying in the hospice, it seemed, required the patient’s physical condition to be 
changing and progressing towards death within a certain timeframe.  Patients who were 
‘stable’ were not considered to be actively dying and, where possible, they were 
discharged.  Patients who were able to stay in the hospice until they died had entered a 
phase whereby they were thought to be ‘actively dying’, and were changing daily.  This 
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was represented by the acknowledgement that a patient was to stay in the hospice for 
‘end of life care’.    
4.2.3  Announcing the transition 
The hospice structure of dying was framed by an expectation of the overall duration of 
dying and by an active state of change in a patient’s condition.  The acceptance of a 
patient as staying for ‘end of life care’ could be seen to be the point at which the status 
of certain death at known time was explicitly announced.  This decision was often taken 
at MDT meetings, on ward rounds or during handover meetings but frequently involved 
both nurses and doctors.  The sequence through which patients were expected to pass 
before death was recognised through similar ‘announcements’ of transition.  These 
announcements did not mark the actual point at which patients were thought to have 
made a transition, rather the point at which this was made explicit, in the familiar 
language of the hospice.  These words were used in everyday handover meetings and 
their interpretation appeared to be shared by staff.  The sequence was marked by the 
announcements of the transition from; ‘aiming for home’, to ‘deteriorating’, to ‘heading 
for the LCP’ and finally being ‘on the LCP’.  This is seen in Figure 4:1, and will be 
demonstrated in subsequent chapters to be important, indeed fundamental, to the 
hospice understanding of the way in which sedative drugs ought to be used.  These 
‘announcements’ were heralded by ‘cues’ which accumulated prior to the recognition of 
transition; this announcement of transition appeared to create a form of shorthand which 
was recognised by all staff.  The change in ‘routine sedation’, or the way in which 
sedative drugs were given on a daily basis, as a patient passed through the expected 
sequence of the status passage is considered below. 
 
 
Figure 4:1: Understanding of the process of dying 
D
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4.3 ‘Aiming for home’: treating symptoms, avoiding reduced 
consciousness 
Patients in the hospice who were admitted for a period of respite or for symptom control 
were not necessarily considered to be dying in the hospice.  They received sedative 
drugs, however, for symptoms they described.  For example Emma was a patient who 
had been admitted to the hospice for a period of respite care.  She had metastatic
10
 lung 
cancer, chronic obstructive airways disease (COPD) and suffered from breathlessness.  I 
observed the morning handover as her problems were described by Helen, one of the 
nurses.    
4:10  She [Emma] had been to day-care yesterday but had a ‘panic attack’.  She 
had been given lorazepam for this while in day-care and told Helen [staff nurse] 
that she wasn’t if sure she was still panicking but she found she could talk much 
more easily afterwards.  She told Helen that she hadn’t been able to talk as easily 
in quite a while and had asked her what it was that she had been given and if she 
could have it again.  Helen said that ‘they’ had encouraged her in the hospital to 
try lorazepam to help her breathing but she had refused it and hadn’t wanted to 
be drowsy.  She felt that, having tried it and found that she could talk more easily, 
she would want to try it again.  Helen said that her breathlessness made her panic 
rather than panic made her breathless. 
        [FN 27/11/09 line 36] 
Emma was expected to be discharged and had been given sedation as a way of treating 
her symptom of breathlessness.  In the extract above it was clear that she had not 
wanted to become drowsy and had avoided this drug in the past; having taken it she 
found that it had helped her breathlessness without the anticipated side effect.  The use 
of sedation had been ‘encouraged’, Helen said; it appeared to be a standard way to treat 
this symptom.  In this situation, it appeared that the sedative drug had been given to 
treat a specific symptom without causing a reduction in consciousness.   
In a similar way, sedative drugs were frequently given at night to help patients to sleep.  
This form of sedation was not expected to cause any reduction in consciousness during 
                                                 
10
 Spread of cancer from its primary to source to non-adjacent organs or tissues 
109 
 
the day.  For example, James was a 60 year old man who had metastatic oesophageal 
cancer.  He had been admitted for symptom control as he had been vomiting and unable 
to swallow.  His symptoms had been treated, recurred and been treated again during his 
admission.  I observed a morning handover meeting where his treatment of insomnia 
with sedation was discussed.   
4:11  He had got into a new habit, Izzy [staff nurse] said, of having midazolam at 
11 o clock.  It started a few days ago when he couldn’t swallow his night 
medication.  Instead of the temazepam
11
 he was on, he had been given midazolam 
in its place to help him sleep.  He was now able to swallow (as steroids had 
helped with this) but, in addition to the temazepam which he was now able to take 
again, he wanted to have the midazolam too (2.5 mg).  He had been having an 
extra dose through the night as well, which had made him drowsy in the morning.  
Izzy said they had refused to give him any extra though last night and he had been 
unhappy with them. 
        [FN 13/01/10 line 53] 
James was a patient who was considered to be ready for discharge.  This was not 
straightforward, however, as he had nowhere to go and did not want to go into a nursing 
home.  He had begun to ask for sedative drugs which then made him drowsy in the 
morning; the nurses felt uneasy with this and appeared to be trying to limit his use. Over 
a week later this tension still existed. 
4:12  He was still asking for subcutaneous medication and extra lorazepam 
although the plan was to give everything by mouth now, and discourage the use of 
extras and injections, in preparation for transfer to a nursing home.   
    
[FN 22/01/10 line 37] 
While the use of injectable medication may have been influenced by practical 
considerations of not being able to provide them in a nursing home, it appeared that 
there was also an attempt to reduce his need for extra medication such as lorazepam 
through the night.  This approach, to limit or reduce a patient’s use of sedative drugs 
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can be seen to be characteristic of this group of patients who were expected to be 
discharged.  Indeed, the aim of discharge appeared at times to motivate a reduction in 
sedative drug use.  For example, Paula was a 63 year old lady who had a small cell lung 
cancer
12
 with extensive disease at her initial presentation. She had been given 
chemotherapy to treat the cancer but it hadn’t responded to treatment and she was 
admitted to the hospice for control of her symptoms.  She had become used to taking 
sedative drugs to treat her anxiety and requested these frequently, appearing at times to 
become very drowsy after taking them.  The following excerpt from field notes was 
from an MDT meeting which took place six days after her admission to the hospice.  In 
this discourse between Susan (a senior nurse) and Julia (a senior doctor) the aim of 
discharge can be seen to focus treatment: 
4:13  She [Paula] had improved over the weekend….  She had needed a lot of 
lorazepam, however – she had had 6 mg of lorazepam yesterday and was really 
quite sleepy; Susan said she ‘couldn’t keep her eyes open’.  Julia [senior doctor] 
said that on the ward round it was discussed and agreed that they would try to use 
less lorazepam and instead try to use alternatives such as relaxation therapy or 
breathing exercises.  The fact that she wanted to go home at some point seemed to 
be important in this too – if aiming for home then it would be much better and 
safer for her not to be requiring so much lorazepam, Julia said.  The team agreed 
that they should begin to make plans for her to go home – she was as stable as she 
could be – to have this time at home would be important before she deteriorated 
again. 
[FN 24/11/09 line 20] 
Paula’s desire to go home appeared to be adversely affected by her requests for sedative 
drugs; the aim, however, of the MDT was to enable her to go home if she could.  It 
appeared that despite having a terminal illness and a poor prognosis, they didn’t expect 
her to die imminently, and expected to be able to discharge her, even if they anticipated 
that she would ‘deteriorate’ soon after.  For Paula too, it seemed, the drowsiness, or 
reduction in consciousness she experienced with the sedative drugs, was considered as a 
side effect at this stage of dying.   
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The effect of sedation was seen to be important in this group.  Paula became drowsy 
after taking the extra lorazepam; Simon, described earlier, was also found to be drowsy 
after having a sedative drug for insomnia at night.  Mollie, one of the staff nurses, told 
me how Simon was after his first night of having a syringe driver with midazolam at 
night as we chatted in the nursing office. 
4:14  he was much better last night with the midazolam overnight, but he had 
woken up a bit groggy, so the timings of the syringe drivers were going to be 
changed from tonight.   
       [FN 17/02/10 line 18] 
Drowsiness, or feeling ‘groggy’, as a result of sedative drugs, in this group of patients 
who were expected to be discharged, was considered as an adverse effect.  This was 
similar to the experience of patients who became drowsy after taking analgesic drugs; it 
was considered as a side effect and the drug was reduced, or stopped.   
Thus for those who were not actively dying sedative drugs were used to treat specific 
symptoms but a reduction in consciousness was not intended and was actively avoided.  
This is seen diagrammatically in Figure 4:2. 
 
Figure 4:2: Use of sedative drugs in patients not dying 
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4.4 Deteriorating: reversing the reversible, treating symptoms 
Patients in the hospice were either admitted for ‘end of life care’ or went through a 
process of change through which they became recognised as dying and were said to be 
‘staying for end of life care’.  It became apparent that something changed between a 
period either of indecision about whether a patient would be discharged or not, or a 
reversal of a decision to discharge a patient.  There was a change in the patient’s 
condition which prompted staff members to consider the patient as, now, dying.  This 
was a frequent discussion point in MDT meetings and a decision appeared to be formed 
in relation to observations of change in the patient’s condition.  These changes may be 
regarded as ‘cues’, originally described by Glaser and Strauss (Glaser and Strauss, 
1968: 9).  For staff, cues at this stage were most often related to a patient’s physical 
condition.  Patients who were ambulant began to have difficulties walking and getting 
out of bed; others were observed to simply be more tired, more fatigued than they had 
been.  Often after a few days of this being observed, they would be described as 
‘deteriorating’.  Frequently this was observed after a member of staff had been away for 
a few days; they would return to work and observe ‘a change’.  The terms ‘changing’, or 
‘deteriorating’ appeared to announce the transition into the status of ‘certain death at 
known time’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1968: 8). Indeed the term ‘deteriorating’ appeared to 
herald a different type of care for a patient, geared towards an expectation of a known 
sequence of dying.   
The word ‘deteriorating’ was used frequently in the hospice to convey an impression of 
change, of a worsening in a patient’s condition as well as going further, it seemed, to 
indicate that they were dying.  It was used on almost a daily basis in handover meetings 
and informally amongst staff.  The term ‘he’s really deteriorated’ was a very common 
phrase to be used in the course of handover or MDT meetings, and in informal 
discussions between staff in the nursing or MDT office.  It was almost invariably used 
in the context of a patient who was thought to be dying.  For example, Keith was a 56 
year old man who had metastatic prostate cancer and was due to be transferred to 
another centre for a specialist form treatment for lymphoedema
13
.  He had become less 
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 Lymphoedema; swelling in a limb caused by impaired lymphatic drainage.  In palliative care often this 
is secondary to lymphatic obstruction due to cancer or its treatments.  
113 
 
mobile and on the morning he was due to be transferred in the handover meeting some 
of the phrases in the conversation between the doctor and nurses looking after him were 
transcribed verbatim.  He was said to be ‘very very drowsy’; one of the nurses said it 
would be a ‘shame to transfer him if he was dying’.   Rachel, a registrar, said he 
‘probably is deteriorating’; she added further; ‘I think he’s changing’ [FN 17/11/09 line 
30]. 
It appeared during the course of this discussion that being very drowsy was an indicator 
of a change in his condition while the word ‘deteriorating’ was an agreement with the 
previous statement that he was ‘dying’.   Indeed, over the course of the fieldwork this 
was a very common discussion to observe.  At times the word ‘deteriorating’ was used 
on its own, at other times qualifying statements followed, indicating whether there was 
thought to be any reversible cause for the patient’s deterioration.  It appeared that ‘even’ 
when a patient was thought to be dying, if a reversible cause for a more rapid change in 
their condition was identified, it may be treated.   
As the term ‘deteriorating’ was introduced, the physical changes, or cues, which 
prompted the recognition of the transitional stage of dying, were observed.  For 
example, Claire was a 49 year old patient with breast cancer.  She was noticed to be 
‘deteriorating’ as she became more easily fatigued, less able to mobilise and finally 
ceased to be able to wash herself.  As a fiercely independent woman, this was regarded 
by the nursing staff as significant.  In a morning handover meeting these specific 
changes were reported on 2 successive days, as the following field notes extracts show: 
4:15  Anne [staff nurse], turning to me, said: ‘she’s really not well’.  She looked 
sad as she said it, with some emphasis.  She went on, after a long pause to say: 
‘she let me wash her today, that’s not Claire’. 
       [FN 16/11/09 line 72] 
The following day: 
4:16  Claire was thought to be ‘really deteriorating’ and was ‘not so well’.  Jo 
[staff nurse] said that she was so drowsy that she accepted a bed bath from staff 
this morning... She had also been assessed by the physiotherapist that morning 
and told not to get out of bed by herself as she wasn’t safe. 
        [FN 17/11/09 line 41] 
114 
 
These physical changes, it seemed, provided cues for the staff to base their assessment 
of her ‘changing’ condition.   
When a patient was said to be deteriorating and physical changes corresponding to this 
were observed, such as increased fatigue, reduced ability to mobilise or a worsening of 
symptoms, they were observed to go through a period of ‘testing’.  Staff, when 
recognising that a patient was ‘less well’ attempted to determine if they were less well 
because of a ‘reversible’ cause or if they were less well because they were dying.  If 
they were thought to be dying without any reversible cause this was often said to be due 
to ‘disease progression’.  The most common causes attributed to a deterioration in a 
patient’s condition, it seemed, were drugs, dehydration or an infection.  Indeed, as 
Claire deteriorated and became drowsier, that it was thought to be most likely to be due 
to the fact that she was dying, rather than because of the drugs she was taking was made 
explicit. Claire was clear that being drowsy was something she definitely did not want.  
I observed Julia, one of the senior doctors, explaining that she thought Claire was so 
drowsy because of ‘the disease’ and not because of any drugs she was on.  She went on, 
however, to ask if Claire would want the drugs to be reduced ‘just in case’.  Claire had 
been having a syringe driver overnight to help her sleep for several weeks and this was 
the only drug which Julia could identify as potentially causing her drowsiness.  As I 
observed the consultation Claire’s husband and son were in the room, sitting on the far 
side of her bed, with Julia sitting the near side while I was sat towards the back of the 
room. 
4:17   She [Julia] asked if Claire was still having midazolam at night.  Her son 
said that she was, and she’d had an extra overnight.  Julia asked whether, as she 
was sleeping a lot during the day, and still sleeping at night, she would like to 
reduce the midazolam overnight.  She said she’d like to try.  Her husband checked 
with Julia that the midazolam was stopped in the morning – Julia confirmed it 
was, but that as the body changes, the drugs may ‘hang around’ for longer during 
the day and it would be worth trying to reduce the midazolam just to see if it had 
any effect.  She said she didn’t think it would, and that it was most likely that this 
sleepiness was just related to ‘the disease’, but was worth trying.   She also asked 
if another drug had had any effect on her sweats – as it hadn’t, and could 
sometimes cause drowsiness, she stopped it.  [FN 18/11/09 line 158] 
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While expecting that the change in Claire’s condition was due to the process of dying, 
the possibility that the drugs may cause her to be more drowsy and appear to have 
deteriorated was considered and the drugs duly reduced and stopped. 
In a similar way, Olivia was a patient who had lung cancer, angina and COPD.  She had 
been admitted for symptom control as she had had an increase in chest pain and 
vomiting at home.  Her pain had increased but she had become very fatigued and was 
thought to be ‘deteriorating’ and staying for end of life care.  She was disturbed by her 
profound fatigue and her drugs had been altered to see if they were responsible: like 
Claire, however, it was expected that her fatigue was due to progression of her 
underlying disease rather than the drugs.  Field notes were recorded from an MDT 
discussion; 
4:18  The vomiting ‘frightened’ her, Eve [social worker] said.  She was sleepy and 
this bothered her a lot.    She had been started on levomepromazine for nausea 
and vomiting but as she had become even more sleepy – and concerned about it – 
this had been stopped.  On stopping it her drowsiness did not seem to improve but 
she did start vomiting again.  John explained he had restarted the 
levomepromazine because of the recurrence of the vomiting… George 
[consultant] said he had had a conversation with her yesterday about the 
drowsiness – and the fact that it seemed unrelated to the drugs – but was probably 
more to do with the fact that her disease was more active and she was 
deteriorating.  It was agreed that she was staying for end of life care ‘but she’s 
not LCP yet’, George said. 
        [FN 16/02/11 line 107] 
The ‘testing’ of reversible drug causes for an apparent deterioration was a frequent 
process, it seemed, when patients were recognised as becoming more unwell and, in 
particular, when they became more fatigued.  In addition to reducing drugs, ‘testing’ 
also appeared to involve treating infections and dehydration when these were suspected 
to be causes of a patient’s deterioration.  For example, Susan was a 76 year old patient 
who had metastatic lung cancer and had been admitted for symptom control of 
breathlessness.  She had developed a chest infection while in the hospice and had 
become more unwell overnight, I gathered as I observed the nursing handover in the 
morning.  She was said to look ‘awful’; she had been ‘chesty’ overnight and had been 
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given hyoscine
14
 and midazolam for her chest and agitation.  After this, she had a 
catheter inserted which seemed to ‘settle her’, the nurses reported.  Later that morning I 
went on the ward round as the doctors and Sophie, one of the nurses, went to see her.  
The field notes extract shows the decisions which were made, in this ‘testing’ stage; it 
was apparent that there was an expectation that she would not respond to antibiotics but 
they would give them ‘just in case’ they did.      
4:19  George [consultant] asked how she was, to which she responded by saying 
she felt unwell and wanted a drip.  George acknowledged this and said he wanted 
to ask her a bit more about how she was feeling before they discussed 
management.  She said she felt tired and not well.  George paused for a while but 
she wasn’t able to be more specific. …  George said that he thought she looked 
more tired than when he last saw her.  She kept closing her eyes during the 
consultation. … She repeated her wish to have her medication intravenously, and 
George agreed that this would be necessary if they were to be able to get on top of 
the infection. 
        [FN 11/01/10 line 108] 
It appeared that Susan, while very unwell, was clear that she wanted to be treated with 
intravenous medication; this seemed to be in keeping with her previous wishes, as the 
ward round discussed later outside the room. 
4:20  …everyone agreed that Susan was looking more unwell.  She had previously 
been clear that she would want to be treated aggressively for an infection and 
George said because of this he felt they should treat her with the intravenous 
antibiotics and see how she gets on. … they all agreed she was more unwell would 
stay in the hospice now but they’d just have to wait and see what happened with 
the antibiotics.    
[FN 11/01/10 line 117] 
Occasionally, having considered potentially reversible causes for a patient’s 
deterioration, a decision would be made not to give further treatment.  For example, 
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 Anticholinergic drug used to treat excessive secretions, especially in the dying patient. There are 2 
forms: hyoscine hydrobromide which is sedative and hyoscine butylbromide which is not.  Hyoscine 
butylbromide is normally referred to as ‘Buscopan’. 
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Janice was a patient who had a metastatic renal cell carcinoma.  She had been 
increasingly drowsy and spent most of time in bed.  As I sat in an MDT meeting the 
group considered what they thought was happening to Janice and how they would treat 
her.  The following extract from my field notes recorded one of the senior nurses in the 
hospice, Linda, checking that they had considered the potential causes of her 
deterioration and setting the limits of treatment.   Many verbatim statements were 
recorded, in keeping with the style of my early field notes. 
4:21  [Linda said] ‘this lady is deteriorating really’ and that she was ‘spending 
long periods on the bed’.  Izzy [staff nurse] said that she was not mobilising and 
was nursed in bed.  Linda asked if there was ‘anything we can get our teeth into 
that is reversible?’  Sally, a registrar, said ‘having not seen her since the weekend 
I think she’s more sleepy’.  She went on to say ‘I think she’s deteriorating’ 
[probably]...  short weeks … [I think she is] ‘entering the terminal phase’.  Linda 
asked if they would treat an infection again if a urine test was to suggest an 
infection again - to which Sally said that they wouldn’t ‘unless she was really 
symptomatic’.  [Sally] said that ‘she had quite severe renal failure’ (a few weeks 
ago) and ‘we didn’t feel at that point, you know, she’s performance status 415 and 
we didn’t feel there’d be any urological interventions’.  Linda asked if everyone 
agreed that she should stay in the hospice for end of life care, at which point 
everyone nodded.    Linda added that ‘she wasn’t ‘quite LCP yet’.  In rounding up 
Linda said ‘so we’ve dotted the ‘i’s’ and crossed the ‘t’s’, she’ll stay here for end 
of life care. 
         [18/11/09 line 240] 
Having acknowledged that Janice would stay in the hospice for end of life care and was 
dying, they discussed their approach to managing her as she progressed to dying more 
imminently and decided they would not treat an infection.  A discussion about 
withholding treatments at the end of life is outwith the scope of this thesis; of 
importance, however, is the process of identifying the reversible, the ‘testing’ process 
within this sequence of dying.   While death appeared to be expected, the outcome of 
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 European Cooperative Oncology Group (ECOG) performance status: a scale which measures a 
patient’s activities of daily living.  A performance status of 4 indicates the inability to carry out any self-
care and being bedbound.   
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‘testing’ was anticipated as being a patient’s continued deterioration; it seemed to be 
important, however, to have ‘dotted the i’s and crossed the t’s’ ‘just in case’ there was a 
reversible cause.  It seemed to be important that sedative drugs did not cause a reduction 
in consciousness, or further fatigue.  When they did, this was considered as a side effect 
and the effect was minimised.  This changing, fluctuating and uncertain stage in the 
sequence of dying is seen in relation to the way in which sedation was used in Figure 
4:3. 
 
Figure 4:3: Reversing the reversible; avoiding reduction in patient consciousness 
4.5 Heading for LCP: accepting dying, accepting reduced 
consciousness    
Patients who were said to be deteriorating and who were staying in the hospice for end 
of life care were seen to pass through a further two sequences in their transition to 
death. The cues which heralded this passage appeared to be related to a patient’s 
continued physical decline, towards becoming bedbound and drowsier.  Patients at this 
point in the sequence of dying were said to be ‘deteriorating daily’ in handover 
meetings, without, it seemed, the need for qualification or explanation of what was 
meant.  It appeared that this was the next expected part of the sequence of normal dying.  
Over time, the continued deterioration, it seemed, accumulated towards there being a 
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discussion of whether or not the patient was ‘ready for the LCP’.  For example, as 
Paula, described earlier, became more drowsy over time, a discussion took place about 
whether or not she was ‘LCP’.  Indeed this conversation took place on several occasions 
between different members of staff.  Initially I was in the nurses’ office as 3 nurses 
discussed informally how she was: 
4:22  Lisa, Anne and Gemma [staff nurses] talked about how much more unwell 
she’d been and that she was heading for the LCP     
        [FN 07/12/09 line 15] 
 Later in the morning handover meeting one of these nurses reported to the doctors. 
4:23   It was said that it was remarkable that she was hanging on so long, and it 
was hard to know if she was ready for the LCP yet or not – she would be very 
sleepy one minute and then the next would be quite alert.  She wouldn’t be far off, 
however          
        [FN 07/12/09 line 113] 
 Later still:  
4:24  Miranda [registrar] said she wasn’t sure she was quite ready for the LCP yet 
and Anne [staff nurse] agreed.  She said it was hard to tell as she changed so 
much on a daily basis.  Miranda said ‘yes, she was quite alert this morning 
 [FN 07/12/09 line 198] 
It appeared that the recognition that a patient was ‘heading for the LCP’ occurred after a 
period of ‘deterioration’, through which patients’ physical condition worsened as well 
as there being a change in their alertness and communication.  This appeared to be an 
important aspect of the recognition of a further decline in a patient’s condition and was 
also marked by a change in the way in which symptoms were recognised. 
4.5.1 ‘Natural’ sedation 
As patients were said to be ‘deteriorating’ and their physical condition worsened, with 
an increasing inability to mobilise, their levels of fatigue and drowsiness appeared to 
increase.  Through the stage of testing for reversible causes, reasons for this drowsiness 
were sought and often drugs were reduced to see if they were the cause, rather than ‘just 
the disease’.  It appeared that becoming more drowsy was acknowledged to be part of 
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the process of dying.  The discussions about whether the increasing drowsiness was 
‘simply’ because they were dying were so frequent as to appear to be a matter of 
routine; if the drowsiness was not found to be due to a reversible cause, the cause was 
said to be ‘just the disease progression’. Indeed, it seemed to be expected that patients 
became more drowsy, or sedated in a ‘natural’ sense, as they came closer to death.  The 
routine way in which this was acknowledged was highlighted by discussions with 
patients and relatives about what was likely to occur as patients deteriorated further.  
For example, I went to see Claire, the patient described earlier, with Julia, a senior 
doctor.  Claire was in a single room and she and Julia had a long discussion about what 
was happening to her, especially in relation to her becoming so sleepy.  They discussed 
what Claire would want to happen as she became ‘more unwell’.  Claire asked Julia 
what would happen to her ‘from now’: 
4:25  Claire then asked Julia what would happen.  Julia paused and asked her 
what she meant.  Claire said: ‘from now?’  Julia said it was likely that she would 
become ‘more sleepy for more of the time’, that she would probably need to start 
to conserve her energy for more important times in the day, like seeing family.  
She said it was likely that she would just become more sleepy and at some point 
would just not wake up. Claire then asked about pain: ‘would I be in pain, or be 
suffering?’  Julia responded that they would continue treating the pain with drugs 
and though sometimes, especially with difficult pain like hers, the drugs may be 
used in doses that could make her more sleepy, they would still use them if she 
needed them.   
[FN11/11/09 line 131] 
Claire was very clear that she would want to be given sedation if she was ‘suffering’ 
when she responded to what Julia had said.   
4:26  Claire said that she would want to be sedated, she said that she would not 
want to be ‘aware’, that she would want to be ‘out of it’ and that she did not want 
to suffer.     
[FN11/11/09 line 145] 
Julia seemed to distinguish between a natural sleepiness which she had described 
earlier, of becoming more unwell, from the drowsiness caused by the use of drugs to try 
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to treat other symptoms like pain.  While in many situations the use of drugs was 
observed as contributing to sedation, this form of naturally occurring sedation during 
dying appeared to be recognised as an expected part of the dying process.  Indeed, 
during a ward round I observed another doctor, Miranda, using the same phrase when 
Paula’s daughter asked what was likely to happen as Paula became increasingly more 
unwell. 
4:27  Miranda said it was hard to know exactly what would happen but it was 
likely that, as the periods of being drowsy were becoming longer, and her periods 
of being awake were much shorter, she would continue to just become more 
sleepy for more of the time and at some point she just wouldn’t wake up. 
        [FN 07/01/10 line 177] 
It appeared that these expected changes in consciousness marked part of the transition 
through the sequence of dying, in which patients became more easily fatigued and less 
able to actively communicate for sustained periods of time.  Consultations became 
shorter as patients tired more easily; this was recognised as being part of the normal 
process of dying.   
4.5.2 Delirium 
As well as this ‘natural’ sedation occurring as a patient neared death, patients were also 
recognised to be more likely to become confused, or develop a delirium. Patients who 
had shown signs of a ‘deterioration’ prior to becoming confused were considered at 
times to have developed a ‘terminal agitation’; those who were confused in the absence 
of a prior physical deterioration were not, however, considered in this group.  Rather, in 
the absence of physical deterioration delirium was investigated and treated as at an 
earlier stage in the sequence of dying and a reversible cause sought.  For example, Rick 
was a 71 year old man who had a form of lung cancer and had been admitted for 
symptom control of pain.  He had become confused during his admission as his drugs 
had been adjusted and he had had several doses of different benzodiazepines to help him 
to sleep at night instead of ‘wandering’.  An MDT discussion was observed. 
4:28  Since admission, he'd been started on Ketamine but was wandering a lot 
overnight. Annie (S/N) said he’d had a lot of pain - for which he'd been having 
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hydromorphone
16
 - and had needed 5 extras. He had been sleeping during the day 
- switching his days and nights around. They'd tried a midazolam syringe driver 
which he'd pulled out at 3 am and gone wandering around the garden.  He’d 
‘come-to’ around 5 am and hadn’t remembered being out in the garden at all. 
Lorazepam hadn't worked last night and he’d tried temazepam and zopiclone17 
previously too. He had Parkinson’s disease as well, and had been started on 
quetiepine
18
.  Annie (S/N) asked about his bloods – Michael (consultant) said his 
bloods had been checked twice and were normal… Michael said ‘its classic 
delirium isn't it?  He fluctuates in his capacity’.  He said he planned to arrange a 
CT of his head.   Previously he'd been on 42 mg of hydromorphone but was now 
on nothing – almost all of his drugs had been stopped when he became confused. 
[FN 11/09/09 line 371] 
In this situation, several causes of Rick’s delirium were investigated.  In contrast, when 
considering another patient exhibiting similar behaviours, Gillian, one of the registrars, 
said she thought that he had a ‘terminal delirium’.  Charlie was introduced at the start of 
the chapter as a 76 year old patient with a form of lung cancer.  He had become 
‘agitated’ and I observed Gillian and Julia, a senior doctor discussing in the office how 
to treat this.  After deciding to wait to assess his response to an ‘extra’ of 
levomepromazine, Gillian said; 
4:29  she wondered if this was a terminal delirium, she didn’t think it would be 
long. 
[FN 11/02/10 line 61] 
Gillian’s assessment of Charlie was that he was dying, rather than having a potentially 
reversible cause for his delirium.  It appeared that for delirium to be considered 
irreversible required there to be initial recognition of a physical deterioration.   
As patients became more drowsy, staff could be seen to communicate more with the 
family members in the room than the patient.  After trying to communicate with the 
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 Strong opioid  
17
 Sedative drug normally used for insomnia 
18
 ‘Atypical’ antipsychotic drug normally causing less sedation than traditional antipsychotic drugs 
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patient, they would then turn to ask the relatives about what had been happening.  For 
example, as I went on the drug round with Jen, one of the nurses, I observed how she 
tried to communicate with Paula but found she couldn’t.  
4:30  Paula looked up … and followed us with her eyes as we walked in … 
looking blank but she did say hello this time.  Jen asked her how she was and she 
said ‘OK’, staring straight ahead.  Jen then turned to her sister and asked how 
she had been.  Her sister said she hadn’t had such a good night, she had been 
really restless but seemed a little bit better just now.   
       [FN 07/12/09 line 79] 
Establishing a patient’s condition by asking relatives became increasingly more 
frequent as a patient became less aware and able to communicate.  Specifically, asking 
relatives about a patient’s symptoms, or if they were showing any signs of distress, 
became a routine part of consultations.  As patients became less able to communicate, 
relatives who were present were consulted about the patient’s behaviours, or 
appearance.  For example, whether or not a patient had been ‘agitated’ or ‘restless’, or if 
they appeared to be ‘settled.  These behaviours increasingly became the indication for 
treatment, while attempting to identify the underlying cause.  As patients became 
steadily less able to describe symptoms it was these behaviours which were treated; 
their effect was assessed by cessation of the ‘distress-behaviour’.   Staff referred to 
these behaviours as being ‘unsettled’, ‘restless’ or ‘agitated’.  A patient’s inability to 
express their symptoms was most often due to difficulty in communication.  This 
marked a significant change in approach regarding the use of sedation.  Prior to this, a 
patient, describing a symptom, would be given a sedative drug to treat it, with the 
avoidance of a reduction in the patient’s consciousness.  Patients who were ‘heading for 
the LCP ’ had often begun or were beginning a process of becoming more fatigued and 
many had a reduced conscious level; the treatment of a distress-behaviour such as 
‘restlessness’ with sedative drugs, it appeared, could result in a further reduction in 
consciousness.  At this stage causing a reduction in consciousness through the use of 
sedative drugs appeared to be of less concern than it was prior to reaching this stage; it 
was of less concern than treatment of the distress-behaviour.  Indeed, these behaviours 
were described in such a way as to appear to convey a duty to treat and to relieve them.  
In discussions observed in handover meetings and informally between staff in the 
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offices, there appeared to be more of an imperative to eliminate these distress 
behaviours. For example, James was a patient who had deteriorated very quickly and 
become drowsy; he was subsequently reported to have become very agitated and Annie, 
one of the senior nurses, was clear that he ought to be ‘settled’. 
4:31  He was getting really agitated, she said, moving his arm out to the side and 
looked restless.  They really needed a plan to make sure he settled, she said.   
        [FN 24/02/10 line 13] 
Later that day I saw James lying flat on his bed, and Annie told me he had been started 
on 15 milligrams of midazolam which had ‘settled’ him.   
It appeared that in the transition from ‘deteriorating’ to ‘heading for the LCP’, a change 
in the ‘routine’ way in which sedation was used emerged.   It appeared that the 
treatment of distress-behaviours became of more importance than a requirement not to 
reduce consciousness.  The use of sedation to treat distress-behaviours at this stage, with 
an acceptance of a potential reduction in consciousness, was becoming ‘routine’.  Once 
again, this process is seen in Figure 4:4. 
 
Figure 4:4: Heading for the LCP and acceptance of reduction in patient consciousness 
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4.6  ‘On the LCP’ 
Patients who were heading for the LCP differed subtly from those who were considered 
to be ‘on the LCP’.  It appeared that staff attempted to differentiate between those 
patients who were dying soon and those who were dying imminently.  Certainly, there 
was a distinction between those ‘heading for’ and those ‘ready for’ the LCP.  The 
processes of physical and sentient deterioration appeared to progress in those who were 
‘on the LCP’, with more patients having difficulty or an inability to meaningfully 
communicate.  The use of sedation to treat distress-behaviours became more frequent 
and treating a patient’s symptoms, with explicit avoidance of a reduction in 
consciousness was less common.  Indeed, once a patient was recognised as being ‘LCP’ 
the apparent imperative to treat distress-behaviours became more evident.  The 
handovers which took place daily almost invariably contained reference to at least one 
patient who had been ‘unsettled’, or ‘agitated’ overnight and been given one or more 
doses of sedative drugs to ‘treat’ the distress-behaviour.  ‘Treatment’, it appeared, was 
the elimination of the distress-behaviour.  The aim of treatment at this stage, therefore, 
was for a patient to be ‘settled’, or ‘peaceful’.  It appeared to be still important, 
however, to use the lowest dose possible to treat the perceived distress.  For example, in 
their discussion about Charlie which was described earlier, the two doctors, Julia and 
Gillian, decided upon the best way to treat his agitation and discussed which drugs 
might help him to be less agitated.  Their caution in using sedation, at this stage, 
appeared not to arise from a potential reduction in consciousness, but rather from a 
caution about giving more than was needed to treat the distress.  A desire to give a 
proportional amount of sedation, to treat the distress but not more, was evident in this 
extract from the field notes. 
4:32  Julia [senior doctor] then asked what Gillian [registrar] was worried about 
in adding the levomepromazine into the driver now.  Gillian wasn’t sure what she 
meant.  Julia then asked whether part of the reason she was hesitating was that 
she was worried that if the levomepromazine which he had just had worked, and 
made him more relaxed and made him sleep, that in adding 50 mg to the driver, it 
would perhaps be more than he needed.  In other words, was it that she wanted to 
give him the lowest dose possible of a drug which was effective, and not give too 
much and over sedate him?  Gillian agreed that that was what she wanted.  
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        [FN 11/02/10 line 84] 
A clear balance between giving enough sedation to relieve distress and not more than 
was needed was observed in this conversation.  While Julia recognised that the aim of 
the treatment was to make Charlie ‘more relaxed’ and sleep, there appeared to still be a 
distinction between this and giving ‘too much’.  This balance, it appeared, was not 
always met as the following extract from an MDT meeting shows.  At the end of each 
MDT the deaths from the previous week were discussed and any concerns about the 
manner of the death, in particular in relation to relatives’ bereavement, were raised.  
Annie, one of the staff nurses, described what happened to Charlie after Julia and 
Gillian’s discussion above. He had died 3 days after their discussion. 
4:33  Annie said it was awful because she couldn’t get him settled.  She said she 
had asked about changing his drivers but had been told because he hadn’t had 
any extras that she should leave it at present and wait.  She repeated that the 
experience had been ‘awful’, she couldn’t settle him, he’d had his catheter out 
and then in again and then out.  By the following day she ‘got Miranda [registrar] 
to review him’ and she ‘whacked  the driver up’.  He settled at last and she was 
pleased that when she came in the following day he was ‘lovely and settled’.   
        [FN 17/02/10 line 119] 
The caution taken not to give too much sedation, not to ‘over-sedate’ had, from Annie’s 
perspective, meant that he was not ‘settled’.  She used emotive language, describing the 
situation as ‘awful’.  It appeared that the need for patients to be ‘settled’ and not 
distressed or agitated was strong; that to achieve the state of being ‘settled’ was the 
‘right’ state for patients to be in once they reached the stage of being ‘on the LCP’.  
While the doctors in this situation were cautious about using too much sedation, there 
was the ‘risk’ of not achieving the desired ‘settled’ state, through this approach.  In 
contrast, as another MDT discussion showed, there was a sense of comfort, once a 
patient who was on the LCP became settled.   
4:34  Ella was introduced by Nicky [staff nurse] as someone about whom there 
wasn’t much to say.  She had been admitted for end of life care, had lung cancer, 
bone metastases and COPD.  She had been ‘terminally agitated’ when she came 
in, but ‘quite flat’ since then.  She repeated that she was ‘quite flat and unwell’ 
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and had started the LCP.  She reported that she was ‘lovely and settled now’; the 
driver had been ‘tweaked’ yesterday and ‘levo19’ had been added in to the 50 mg 
of midazolam she already had for agitation, as well as hyoscine and diamorphine.  
She once again said she was ‘lovely and settled’ with her driver now.  George 
[consultant] asked if there was anything that needed to be done for her family – 
Nicky didn’t think so – they all knew what was going on and had no particular 
concerns.  George said: ‘hopefully she’ll remain peaceful until she dies’. 
        [FN 16/02/10 line 70] 
The use of sedation in this extract, to treat agitation, appeared to be accepted and 
unproblematic.  Ella was said to be ‘flat’, a term often used in the hospice to describe 
patients who were unrousable or were limited in their responses.  It appeared that by 
this point in the sequence of dying this was acceptable and, occurring as it did on a daily 
basis, could be seen to be an intrinsic part of routine clinical practice.  The changes 
occurring through the process of dying are seen in full in Figure 4:5, the motivations 
and underlying values for such a practice are discussed in the following chapters.      
 
Figure 4:5: Process of dying in the hospice: the routine acceptance of the reduction in patient 
consciousness 
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 Abbreviation for levomepromazine 
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4.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the way in which sedation was used in the hospice setting.  
Through the fieldwork it became apparent that sedation was a routine part of the daily 
work of the hospice inpatient unit.  Sedation was seen to be used in different ways and 
this was bound to an understanding of the expected sequence of dying in the hospice.  
This sequence has been considered to sit within the final status passage described by 
Glaser and Strauss, of ‘certain death at known time’.  An understanding of this was 
formed through an interpretation of significant phrases which announced a change in a 
patient’s condition.  The physical and sentient deterioration which preceded these 
changes appeared to enable an acceptable form of sedation at this stage to include, or 
permit, the reduction of a patient’s consciousness.  This sequence has thus far been 
described in a linear fashion with a shared interpretation of the cues of transition.  In 
practice, however, this process is much more complex, with sometimes different 
interpretations of the physical and sentient cues, leading to differences in approach to 
using sedation amongst staff.   The implicit understanding of where a patient was in the 
sequence of dying enabled staff to use sedation in a particular way, justified, it seemed, 
through an understanding of how a patient ought to be treated and cared for as they die.  
The way in which sedation is given in the hospice has been described in this chapter, the 
reasons and motivations for this are discussed in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 5 Sedation: Restoring Good Dying and Death?  
The previous chapter focused on the sequence through which patients were expected to 
pass when dying in the hospice.  The sequence of transition, from not dying to imminent 
dying was important in developing an understanding of the way in which sedation, with 
a reduction in consciousness, was regarded as routine practice in the hospice.  Crucial to 
this sequence was the recognition of changes in a patient which were interpreted as 
signs of dying.  Physical changes such as a reduced ability to mobilise were prominent, 
as well as the recognition of an increase in drowsiness and fatigue as being part of the 
dying process.  The essential stage of determining the reversibility of such symptoms or 
signs was emphasised, prior to these changes being attributed to the dying process.  
There was a universal understanding that this increase in drowsiness related to the 
natural process of dying and furthermore was an expectation of ‘natural’ dying.  This 
process was seen to inform the interpretations and actions of staff as they recognised the 
dying patient in part through their physical deterioration but also through their 
increasing fatigue and drowsiness.  This expectation of the process of dying was also 
seen to drive a desire to achieve this ‘natural’ way of dying.  The importance of the 
diagnosis of dying was evident when considering the changes in the way in which 
sedation was used through the different sequences of dying, with an increasing 
acceptance of a reduction in patient consciousness as patients came closer to death.  
Indeed, recognition of dying, in the very final stage of being ‘on the LCP’, allowed 
some patients to be sedated by drugs to unconsciousness until they died.  Through 
recognising the sequence of dying it became evident that staff associated increasing 
fatigue and drowsiness of patients as being signs of imminent dying and furthermore 
that patients were expected to become drowsier as they approached death.   
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5.1 Good Dying and Death 
In this chapter I explore the normative underpinnings of the use of sedation and the 
ways in which these are manifest in clinical practice.  Sedation, I will suggest, is used 
with the overall aim of bringing about an aspect of ‘good’ dying and death.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, concepts of good dying and death are broad and originate from a 
variety of sources.  Originally conceived of in contrast to the ‘bad’ deaths in hospitals 
where death was hidden and patients isolated, ‘good’ dying and death has been 
synonymous with hospice care and the original hospice movement.  In recent years, 
conceptions of good dying and death have been focused more on individual preferences 
and choices, than on there being an idealised, shared, version of what this is in practice 
(Hales et al., 2008).  This change has arisen alongside an increase in the availability of 
services and ability to fulfil choices in dying.  Primarily this is achieved through 
ensuring patients have a ‘comfortable’, symptom-free dying process; this is shown in 
turn to influence other features of good dying and death such as enabling family to be 
present in the dying process and even to facilitate patients to be able to die at home.  
While good dying and death are very broad, multidimensional concepts, this chapter 
focuses on the impact of sedation on the hospice construct of good dying and death, 
rather than on the broader issues espoused in the large volume of literature on the 
subject (Aries, 1974, Clark and Seymour, 1999, Dekkers et al., 2002, Hales et al., 2010, 
Kellehear, 1990, McNamara et al., 1994, Payne et al., 1996, Seymour, 2001, 
Steinhauser et al., 2000b).  In this chapter I first consider the importance of the 
attributes of ‘being comfortable’ (Kehl, 2006) and ‘being peaceful’ in dying in the 
hospice.  These key features of dying were important to staff to be able to achieve, and 
contributed to the hospice construct of a good dying process or death.  The 
interpretation of this and impact on family and also on hospice staff concludes the first 
section of this chapter.  The interpretation of dying was seen in Chapter 4 to be a crucial 
step in enabling sedation to be used with the acceptance of a reduction in patient 
consciousness.  That the point at which a patient was interpreted as dying could differ 
between staff is expanded in this chapter through looking at the way in which sedation 
was given; in a regular or p.r.n. manner.  The distinction between the way in which 
sedative drugs were prescribed and given allowed a discrepancy to exist at times 
between what was intended by one member of the clinical team and another.  This is of 
importance in relation to Chapter 6 where the difficulties in decision-making about 
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sedation are explored, and variances in interpretation of dying, if unchecked, could 
indeed have led to differences in outcome for patients.    
5.2 Good dying in the hospice 
5.2.1 Being comfortable 
In the hospice there was a clear sense of how the concept of good dying and death was 
constructed for hospice staff.  This related to the broader attributes of good dying, such 
as awareness and acceptance, as well as what was understood by control of pain or 
suffering at the end of life.  Being ‘comfortable’ was a well-recognised concept in the 
hospice and the motivation to achieve this state was bound to the desire to bring about 
good dying and death.  In the hospice ‘being comfortable’ appeared to take two forms: 
the absence of motor restlessness and the appearance or being peaceful, or serene.  The 
first related to the interpretation of a patient’s physical comfort while the second related 
to an interpretation of their psychoexistential ‘comfort’.  There was a very clear change 
in purpose once a patient was acknowledged to be dying; staff changed their focus away 
from promoting comfort in living, and striving to ensure that treatments could be 
maintained in a patient’s own environment, to ensuring that a patient was ‘comfortable’ 
in dying.  Being comfortable meant not exhibiting any distress-behaviours or 
appearances such as restlessness or agitation. This was recognised in Chapter 4 as 
patients were said to be ‘settled’, ‘comfortable’ and even ‘peaceful’.  As an illustration 
of this, one of the nurses, Judy, even sought me out to tell me of two ‘good deaths’ 
which she felt had been achieved over the previous weekend. 
5:1  I went along the corridor and met Judy (staff nurse) who stopped me to 
chat. She said she’d been on over the weekend and spoke about a really 
‘good death’ – one that they had really got right.  It was Bryan.  She said they'd 
(the nurses) noticed on Saturday he wasn’t so well; something had changed in 
him and they felt he was deteriorating.  They had had time to prepare his family 
for this and the next day he looked awful.  He had had a bad night but they did 
‘what we do’ and then he was lovely and settled.  His family, Judy said, were fine 
- upset but prepared because they'd had the time, spotted his deterioration and got 
drugs in to him in time so he looked comfortable.  They'd got it right this time, she 
said.  And she went on to say that Zoe had also died.  She’d been fine too - she 
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hadn't started vomiting, thank goodness, Judy said, because that would have 
been awful... It was lovely, she said, to get it right.  
[FN 05/07/10, line 8] 
Dying in such a way, to be ‘settled’, was considered as an achievement, a demonstration 
of what staff expected a good dying process to be.  There was an expectation in the 
hospice of being able to achieve this good dying for patients.  Although the patient 
described above was said to have had a ‘bad’ night, the restoration to being ‘lovely and 
settled’ enabled the death to be considered as ‘good’, from Judy’s perspective.  While 
she described other features of good dying such as preparation for dying and family 
involvement, one of the principle attributes was the patient’s physical comfort in dying.  
Having physical symptoms causing distress when dying was considered to challenge 
this comfortable state; bringing them under control was a way of redressing the balance, 
of restoring the patient towards a ‘settled’, ‘good’, dying process.  This ultimate aim of 
bringing about a ‘comfortable’ dying process was seen throughout the fieldwork.   
Some spoke explicitly about what they hoped for patients at the end of their lives.   
5:2I think… you’re just helping [them to] stay calm, to meet their end in a 
dignified and, you know, peaceful manner, rather than be thrashing all over the 
bed 
[Judy, staff nurse, interview line 273] 
Judy described how she felt sedation brought about the ‘dignified’ death so desired, and 
contrasted this with what had been the alternative – a patient ‘thrashing all over the 
bed’.  This description of an agitated patient was considered the antithesis of how a 
patient ought to die in the hospice.  It presented a challenge to staff trying to ensure a 
patient was settled as they died.  An auxiliary nurse, Gwen, described this in her 
interview as she talked about a patient who had become very distressed by vomiting as 
she died.  
5:3  … she was just all over the place and not knowing where to put herself, so 
agitated, like a wild animal at times… we got her... we got her washed and we got 
her comfortable and settled and to me, when I look at it that way…, she was 
alright, she was settled.  She was clean and we got her comfortable and that was 
it.      [Gwen, auxiliary nurse, interview line 186] 
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The physical appearance and behaviours of patients thought to be imminently dying 
were of crucial importance; such agitated behaviour described above was interpreted as 
a sign of distress which had to be treated.  When patients did not look comfortable there 
was an expectation that they should be made so and sedation, for signs of distress at the 
end of life, was the means to this end.  One of the auxiliary nurses, Gail, put this 
particularly strongly in an interview. 
5:4  there’s no need for people to be unsettled because there’s the right drugs are 
there, you’ve just got to make sure that they’re written up because to me, you 
know, it’s not fair to them.  And if people, you know, aren’t on them… you’ve got 
to make sure that they are. 
      [Gail, auxiliary nurse, interview line 25] 
Staff in the hospice felt a duty to facilitate a comfortable, settled, dying process: the 
control of distress-behaviours was part of this concept and was achieved in the final 
stages of dying through the use of sedative drugs. 
5.2.2 Being peaceful 
Distress-behaviours were recognised to be of a physical and of a psychosocial or 
existential nature.  Recognised as a feature of good dying in the literature, acceptance of 
dying was considered important and a source of potential distress when not present.  
This was seen to contribute to distress-behaviours and appearances when patients were 
dying, as one of the senior nurses described in an interview.     
5:5  [Some patients] are not accepting and are in an awful place.  And I think 
there's some who will never be in a good place… And there's some who are in this 
lovely serene place and you just think that's nice and...And I think you always 
want to try and achieve that and you don’t always manage.  And I think 
psychologically is always the hardest you know...  But I think you just want people 
to be peaceful without pain and not being agitated and frightened.  When they 
haven’t accepted it it’s harder and somehow they’re more restless… unsettled… 
[Susan, senior nurse, interview line 505] 
Indeed, a patient’s acceptance of dying was seen to impact on the way in which they 
died; in a ‘peaceful’ state, or in an agitated and distressed state.  Additionally, social and 
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existential issues were thought to contribute to distress-behaviours.  One of the doctors, 
Sally described a patient’s difficult relationships prior to his death, as I recorded in my 
early field notes. 
5:6  [He was] described as having been ‘settled in the end’.  He had been agitated 
prior to death.  There was a discussion about unresolved issues with his family, 
and it was agreed that this may have been partly responsible for him being ‘in 
angst’ as he died.  ‘He just wasn’t peaceful’, Susan [senior nurse] said.  Sally 
[registrar] described having discussed this with a relative and encouraging them 
to say that they forgave him – she felt that this was important to have been said, 
but it wasn’t. 
[FN 12/10/09 line 184] 
This patient was said to have been ‘in angst’, attributed at least in part to his uneasy 
relationship with a relative.  The impact of troubled relationships or of other sources of 
psychological, or existential distress was frequently considered when patients were said 
to be agitated in dying.  Furthermore this was interpreted in their appearance and 
behaviour as they died and different descriptors of distress were used to convey the 
nature of their distress.  Being ‘serene’ or ‘peaceful’ or even ‘calm’ in dying was 
considered positively and appeared to convey more of a patient’s psycho-existential 
wellbeing than simply their physical condition.  Acceptance of dying was considered 
important in achieving this state as Susan alluded to above; further, having a sense of 
completion of life was also seen to drive forward this sense of calm in dying as one of 
the nurses referred to when describing the way a patient, Elliot, had died. 
5:7  Elliot had been ‘very at peace about dying’.  He hadn’t felt there was 
anything he needed to complete, or to get done. 
       [FN 24/11/09, line 171] 
Good dying in the hospice was seen to be a process in which a patient can be said to be 
‘comfortable’ in a physical sense and ‘peaceful’ in a psycho-existential sense.  The 
appearance and behaviours of the patient enables staff in the hospice to determine 
whether a patient is comfortable and peaceful in dying and sedation is considered, in 
these final stages of life, to be the means to the end of a comfortable and peaceful dying 
process.   
135 
 
5.3 Impact of good dying on family 
While a patient’s distress from physical, psychological, social and existential sources 
was afforded great importance in itself, the impact of a patient’s appearance on others 
was also a prominent consideration for staff in the hospice.  This was seen especially in 
the case of Andrew.  Andrew was a 78 year old gentleman who had a colorectal 
carcinoma and had been ‘well known’ to the hospice inpatient team for a number of 
years.  He had previously been an inpatient for respite admissions and was in the 
hospice for this reason when he became more acutely unwell.  In addition to his cancer, 
which had metastasised, he also had a degree of renal impairment.  This deteriorated 
acutely over the course of a weekend and he developed profound myoclonus
1
. This 
myoclonus was due to the accumulation of opioid metabolites which could not be 
excreted by his kidneys because they were failing.  One of the nurses who had looked 
after Andrew described in an interview feeling especially concerned about the impact 
that Andrew’s myoclonus would have on his closest relative, his brother. 
5:8  It was distressing for us to watch, I thought if it’s distressing for us 
who’ve...who are used to seeing lots of different, you know, horrific sights in 
nursing careers then for, you know, a member of the lay public who doesn’t...has 
never seen anything like this and it’s his brother who...they’re extremely close.  I 
didn’t want him to see the jerking cause it looked so horrible and it would 
look...and it didn’t look like he was comfortable and settled and I just didn’t want 
him to think that he was suffering in any way.  We wanted to just...you know, so it 
was for him and...and for Andrew. 
[Carol, staff nurse, interview line 210] 
Similarly, the doctor who had looked after Andrew felt a responsibility towards 
Andrew’s brother.  She described in an interview how Andrew’s symptoms impacted on 
his brother. 
5:9  ...and at this point, he [Andrew] was still really...distressed and jerky and I 
think that was very distressing for his brother.  So I think, that was an added 
                                                 
1
 Myoclonus is the brief, involuntary contraction of a group of muscles, associated with many conditions.  
It is a recognised sign of opioid toxicity.   
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element, that the nurses were feeling that as well, that, you know, we hadn’t got 
him settled to a point that his brother could sit with him ‘cause it was too 
distressing really for his brother to be there, so he didn’t stay very long. 
[Sally, registrar, interview line 347] 
Andrew’s myoclonus was reported to be so distressing for his brother that he was 
unable to spend time with him as he died.  Eventually, however, he ‘settled’ in response 
to the sedative drugs and died in what was described as a ‘peaceful’ way in the hours 
before his death, with his brother able to sit with him.  The importance of controlling 
symptoms for the benefit of family members has strong roots in palliative care; 
bereavement is considered as an essential part of care of the ‘whole’ person, continuing 
to care for relatives after a patient has died (Panke and Ferrell, 2010: 1437, Saunders, 
1965, Saunders, 1993). Recognising the impact of a ‘bad’ death on those surviving a 
patient was seen throughout the fieldwork.  Indeed at each MDT meeting as all of the 
patients who had died the preceding week were discussed, the relatives of those who 
had died were also discussed and any particularly distressing aspect about the manner of 
the patient’s death was described.  Throughout the hospice there was a keen awareness 
of the impact of the manner of a patient’s dying on the bereavement of relatives; this 
was seen as a further motivation to enable a ‘comfortable’ dying process.  As one of the 
auxiliary nurses put it in an interview: 
5:10  because that’s your last memories of them if you’ve got awful thoughts – 
like them thrashing around and things, how will you ever get that out of your 
head? If somebody’s nice and settled then you can say well they were peaceful 
[Gail, auxiliary nurse, interview line 56]   
Similarly, there was an explicit awareness of the dual role of managing both a patient’s 
symptoms and also relatives’ bereavements: 
5:11  although our primary duty of care is to the patient, we are keeping an eye 
on what might happen to the patient in terms of how that might distress and 
impinge on the future bereavement of the family all of the time as well. 
      [Alison, consultant, interview line 507] 
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5.4 Impact of good dying on staff 
In addition to the impact which a ‘bad’ death had upon the relatives of patients in the 
hospice, staff also recognised the impact which it had on them as they cared for and 
developed relationships with patients.  One of the nurses, Carol, described how she felt 
about Andrew’s symptoms and the effect it had on her as a nurse: 
5:12  If he’d died in the condition he was in on Sunday night, I would have just 
felt that was a bad death and I would have felt...I would have personally felt that I 
was failing him, like I did feel, even though I knew I’d given him everything I 
could possibly give him, done everything we could, took every measure we could, 
you know, getting him in comfortable positions and everything and...but I still 
would have felt it.  You know, and I know you can’t always give people the perfect 
death but it just would have been horrible to think he’d gone like that. 
      [Carol, staff nurse, interview line 242] 
 
Carol felt a very personal responsibility to Andrew, to controlling his symptoms and 
ensuring he did not die in the distressing state in which she found him that Sunday 
night.  She described a feeling of failure and throughout her interview there pervaded a 
sense of helplessness, that despite giving Andrew everything she possibly could he was 
still enduring a ‘bad’ dying process.  While acknowledging that they were not always 
able to achieve the ‘ideal’ death, clearly dying in the manner which Andrew was, with 
uncontrolled symptoms, was unacceptable to Carol.  Nurses formed strong bonds with 
patients and some considered themselves to act as advocates for the patients – ensuring 
that they were given what they ‘needed’ in order for dying to be considered as ‘good’.   
‘Good’ dying in the hospice was expressed primarily as a process of being comfortable 
and peaceful in dying.  This was seen as the process of becoming drowsier as death 
approached, before the cessation of breathing, with family members able to be present.  
A discussion of the broader features recognised to be important to good dying and death 
is beyond the scope of this thesis: prominent features in the literature, however, such as 
patient and family awareness and acceptance of dying were evident in the fieldwork. 
Sedative drugs have a crucial role in ensuring a comfortable dying process: first in 
enabling a patient to be comfortable and peaceful and, second, in enabling family 
members to be present through the control of otherwise distressing symptoms.  A 
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further role is shown to be the important role of maintaining staff morale and allowing 
staff to continue their work of caring (McNamara et al., 1995, Kovan and de Vries, 
2010).  This is motivated by the desire to ensure a comfortable and peaceful and 
therefore ‘good’ dying process.  One doctor described this succinctly: 
5:13  a good death is, is that patients are  ...comfortable, a settled patient in a 
place of their choosing, surrounded by people of their choosing. That is a, so to 
speak, good death. ...and I kind of live by that I think. Practice by that.  
[Erin, registrar, interview line 227] 
Bringing about a process of good dying in the hospice required a patient to be both 
comfortable and peaceful.  This was important to staff to achieve not only for the 
patient, but also for the patient’s relatives and indeed for themselves.  Being able to 
bring about this good dying process enabled a sense of achievement, and fulfilled the 
purpose for many, of working in the hospice.  One of the nurses expressed this in an 
interview: 
5:14  I really feel that we're good at… making sure people die comfortable and 
settled like, because we're in such a specialised area for making sure people… 
have a dignified death and this is what we do and this is what we do well… if a 
family walks out of here and they're just grateful for the care and [they sometimes 
say] she was lovely and peaceful and she wasn’t in pain and things like this, this 
is what makes us satisfied that we've done our job right. 
[Jen, staff nurse, interview line 307] 
The risk of not achieving good dying for a patient engendered a feeling of guilt, as 
Carol described in the above quote (5:14).  Thus being able to ensure a patient appeared 
comfortable and peaceful was important to staff in the hospice; the ability to use 
sedation for those who approached dying in a distressed, or restless, state may be 
considered to be of the upmost importance.  For some patients, indeed, the use of 
sedation in this situation could be seen to ‘restore’ a patient to a ‘good’ process of dying 
and death.  This is seen in Chapter 6 as situations in which sedation was used in a ‘non-
routine’ way, in order, I suggest, to preserve or restore good dying, are discussed in 
depth.  Next, however, I explore the need to ensure a good dying process through using 
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sedative drugs and consider the impact of differences arising in the interpretation of the 
dying process.  
5.5 Decision-making in uncertainty 
The use of sedative drugs has been described in two ways; as a regular dose of a drug, 
often given continuously by means of a syringe driver, and on an ‘as required’ basis.  
Patients were prescribed p.r.n. sedation on admission for ‘shortness of breath’, 
‘anxiety’, or ‘agitation’ in the same way that analgesic drugs were prescribed in case a 
patient developed pain.  If a patient was felt to require a sedative drug it could thus be 
given by a nurse, at any time of day or night.   If a patient had required a p.r.n. dose of a 
sedative drug, and was assessed as being likely to continue to require sedative drugs 
regularly, a regular dose of sedation would be prescribed.  In practice this was seen to 
occur after one or more p.r.n. doses had been given and the dose of the regular sedative 
drug was based upon what had been given in the prior 24 hour period.  In the same way, 
changes in the regular dose of sedation were directly based upon what had been required 
as p.r.n. sedation.   Thus p.r.n. decisions to use sedation influenced decision-making 
about the use of regular sedation, especially concerning the dose which would be 
required.  I observed a conversation between one of the junior doctors and a nurse 
discussing the dose of sedation to be added into a syringe driver. 
5:15  Lisa [staff nurse] suggested to Ann [registrar] that she add in 25mg of Levo 
[Levomepromazine] at night and said that they could always use p.r.n.s if they 
were needed – then they could just see what was needed tomorrow again. Ann 
agreed and said she’d feel happier doing it that way rather than risk giving him 
more than he needed.  She said at least she knew if he needed the extras he would 
get them [from the nurses]. 
[FN 11/02/10, line 101] 
Ann was anxious not to give her patient too much sedation and appeared to rely on the 
nurses’ ability to give extra doses if they were needed, feeling a sense of security and 
reduced ‘risk’ in making the decision, because he would be able to have the p.r.n. doses 
if needed.  Nurses recognised the role of p.r.n. drugs in determining what patients 
required as they ‘handed over’ the p.r.n. requirements in morning handover meetings.  
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As I recorded I my field notes, one patient was said to have been very unsettled 
overnight and ‘needed’ their sedation to be increased.  One of the nurses said: 
5:16  She had been unsettled again overnight… [she] had been given diamorphine 
for what may have been pain, then midazolam, then levomepromazine, then she 
finally settled with diamorphine and midazolam together at 0340…  She really 
needed to be reviewed, Annie [staff nurse] said, and needed her midazolam to go 
up – she’d had 20 mg extra overnight as well as 12.5 mg of levomepromazine.   
[FN 13/01/10, line 7] 
The use of drugs on a p.r.n. basis was integral to symptom management in the hospice.  
Doctors made prescribing decisions based on the availability of p.r.n. drugs which could 
be administered by nurses out of hours; similarly nurses expected to be able to give 
patients drugs as they were needed.  Indeed, nurses were so familiar with the drugs and 
doses they expected to be prescribed they became surprised and even indignant when 
they were not.  One of the nurses, Annie epitomised this as I was with her on an evening 
drug round as she read a patient’s drug chart. 
5:17  She looked at the drug chart and said: ‘that’s ridiculous!’ 
I asked what and she said ‘they’ had only prescribed 6.25 mg of levomepromazine 
for agitation – with a range from 3.125 to 6.25 mg.  She said that was a dose for 
nausea, not agitation.  She always liked to check that she had something else to 
try, just in case the midazolam stopped working – but the levomepromazine 
wouldn’t be of any use at that dose.  She went on to say that she liked the doctors 
at the moment but they were cautious prescribers.  She said they’re not here 
dealing with it overnight – then they’d start prescribing more sensible doses for 
agitation.   
       [FN 06/07/10, line 65] 
Annie ‘knew’ what this patient needed, having been on the night shift the previous 
night; she expected to be able to give certain doses of drugs if they were needed 
overnight. For the most part, it seemed that there was a process of decision-making 
about sedation, based upon this p.r.n. administration and subsequently what the doctors 
felt was appropriate to prescribe on a regular basis.  The two types of decisions relied on 
each other for optimal care of the patients.  Communication between the decision-
141 
 
makers, the doctors and nurses, was essential for this to be possible.  This 
communication took place daily in morning handover meetings but, as described above, 
also took place throughout the day as doctors and nurses negotiated the best way to 
manage a patient’s symptoms or distress-behaviours with sedation.  Concerns were 
expressed when there was disparity between the decisions about regular and p.r.n. use of 
sedation.  This arose especially in situations in which there was uncertainty about 
whether or not a patient was dying.  Luke was a 48 year old man with an oesophageal 
carcinoma.  He was transferred to the hospice from hospital for pain control and 
possibly end-of-life care.  He had been treated with chemotherapy and radiotherapy but 
despite this his cancer had progressed.  He had severe pain and even on admission one 
of the registrars, Belinda, felt that there were some unanswered questions about his 
expected prognosis when she first assessed him. 
5:18  Belinda [registrar]… came back in to the MDT office and sighed.  Mollie 
[staff nurse] and Sophie [staff nurse] came in after her and sat down, waiting to 
hear about the man who had just been admitted – as an informal handover.  
Belinda said Luke was 48 years old, had ‘presented’ in 2007 with abdominal 
pain.  It had been thought that it might have been gallstones but on doing some 
more investigations he was found to have a widespread ‘upper GI’ malignancy.  
He had had chemotherapy twice and had responded to this treatment.  More 
recently he had, however, had difficulties swallowing and started vomiting in the 
past few weeks.  A gastroscopy
2
 had revealed thickening of the lining of his 
stomach and almost complete obstruction. He was still vomiting and had been 
transferred to the hospice for end of life care.  Belinda sounded worried as she 
then said ‘I don’t think he’s end of life yet’.  He had pinpoint pupils and was 
twitching a lot.  Ann said he hadn’t had any bloods taken for 5 days, but he hadn’t 
been ‘peeing’ more than a ‘trickle’ for the last few days either.  She said to Mollie 
and Sophie she thought he was opioid-toxic and she was going to reduce his 
opioid and send some urgent bloods.  She was concerned about his renal function 
and that it might be reduced and causing accumulation of the opioid.... She then 
                                                 
2
 A gastroscopy is an investigation in which a fibre-optic instrument is inserted into the stomach to look 
for any ulcers, damage to the lining of the stomach, or tumours. 
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said that maybe he was ‘just dying’, but she wasn’t convinced he was yet.   She 
said there were too many unanswered questions about his drugs and what was 
going on to say he was dying yet.        
        [FN 25/02/10, line 112] 
Belinda seemed to feel that there was too much uncertainty about whether or not Luke 
was dying to treat him as such without doing further tests.  The potential for a reversible 
cause for Luke’s deterioration was to be explored first, she felt.  The following day, 
however, in the morning handover, the nurses felt that he was indeed dying.   
5:19  overnight [he] had really been in pain and agitated.  He had required 3 
extras of fentanyl with midazolam to try to settle him.  He had also had lorazepam 
at 0200.  He was unable to get comfortable in bed, Jane said, he doesn’t know 
where to put himself.  She said he looked like he was dying and needed to be 
settled.  She asked Michael [consultant] to see him first.   
[FN 26/02/10, line 44] 
The consultant, Michael, reviewed Luke with Di, one of the registrars.  He spent a long 
time outlining to Di what had happened and what he expected to do, before going in to 
see him. 
5:20  Michael felt one of the problems was that he was probably dying and yet 
there were some elements of his condition which could possibly still be reversed.  
His renal function was still poor and may improve further, and there was possibly 
that there was still a bit of opiate toxicity…  We then all went in to see him.  He 
looked very pale, with sunken eyes and heavy, audible breathing.  His wife was in 
tears as she talked about how the night had been – she had found it really 
‘frightening’, he had been in so much pain.  The only time he had been 
comfortable was when he was ‘out of it’ and that hadn’t lasted for long.  She said 
he just couldn’t settle because he was in so much pain.  Michael tried to wake 
Luke up to ask him about his pain – he explained to his wife that because it was a 
difficult pain he needed to find out if it had changed in any way, so that he could 
ensure he gave him the right drugs.  Luke was too sleepy, however, to wake for 
more than a few seconds…  Michael said, while still looking at Luke, that it was 
worrying and difficult that he’s fluctuating so much and going down so quickly.  
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His wife murmured quietly and agreed.  Michael said they would start ketamine
3
 
to see if it could help his pain and then he would come back and see him later in 
the day.  On the way up the corridor Di said to Michael that it looks as though 
he’s dying.  Michael said yes, but that he worries that when someone is on 
sedatives they do look as though they are dying and can be mistreated in this way.  
He said that when Luke had come in he had looked as though he was dying but 
then he improved when the drugs had worn out of his system and was quite alert.  
He said that Luke had had quite a lot of midazolam overnight, with the fentanyl, 
and it was hard to know if it was just the effect of this or if he was truly dying.  He 
said they would need to watch and see what happened – and try to avoid 
benzodiazepines if they could so they could get a true picture. 
[FN 26/02/10, line 69] 
 
Michael and Di spent several minutes detailing their plan and spoke to Sophie, one of 
the nurses, to convey their plan that they did not want Luke to be given more sedative 
drugs unless he absolutely needed it, as they felt he may be able to recover a little from 
this.  Michael’s uncertainty was reflected again as he summed up, and said: 
5:21  he didn’t know if he was dying ‘or just drugged from the night before - 
that’s the awful thing about benzos’. 
       [FN 26/02/10, line 113] 
Once again the desire to ensure Luke was settled and comfortable if dying was balanced 
by a desire not to use too much sedation ‘too early’.  The following day I went into the 
nurses’ office as Di (registrar) was talking to Sophie (S/N) about Luke.   
5:22  He had been very distressed and in horrible pain again the night before - 
the ketamine [change in analgesia] hadn't been enough.  They had given him 
fentanyl and that hadn't worked and in the end they had given him 4 extras of 
midazolam and fentanyl which seemed to settle him.  His wife had been distraught 
overnight, too, and they all felt he was dying now.  Di said she had just been down 
to see him and thought they should add 20 mg of midazolam into the syringe 
                                                 
3
 Ketamine is drug used in this context as an analgesic.   
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driver.  She felt cautious because Michael had been so keen to avoid midazolam, 
but the situation had changed, she felt, and it had to be the right thing to do now.  
Sophie agreed, and said 'the girls' overnight had found it very difficult as well - 
when he's dying he just has to be settled, not tortured like this.    
        [FN 27/02/10, line 21] 
While Michael had been unsure about whether or not Luke was dying and unwilling to 
use sedative drugs on a regular basis for his symptoms, the nurses overnight had felt he 
was dying and used them on an ‘as required’ basis, which was enough to ‘settle him’ 
and render him unconscious.  Uncertainty during the process of dying, it seemed, made 
any decision temporary, and open to change, even within a 24 hour period.  Luke was 
clearly thought to be dying by the time of his second review, and indeed died the 
following night.  One of the potential concerns which the consultant Michael had raised 
was that the use of sedation may cause patients to look less well and even to look as 
though dying when not.  The transition into ‘end of life care mode’ was once again 
made earlier for the nurses than for the doctors.  While Michael thought that Luke was 
‘probably’ dying, his uncertainty led him to wish to avoid sedative drugs and not go into 
‘end of life care mode’ quite at that point.  While acknowledging that he may be dying, 
the possibility of him not dying due to his illness was sufficient for Michael to wish to 
avoid drugs which may make him appear to be closer to death than he was.  However 
the nurses caring for him, it seemed, had already begun to go in to ‘end of life care 
mode’, aiming for him to be settled and comfortable while openly saying they felt he 
was dying.  Their priority, from the first extract, could be seen to be to ensure that Luke 
had a good death; Di, the following day, agreed with this after seeing a further 
deterioration in his condition.  The priority and emphasis of care had changed for Di 
over 24 hours, while the nurses had appeared to go into this ‘end of life care mode’ 
before this point.  The use of p.r.n. sedation in this situation was thought with retrospect 
not to have hastened his death: he died due to his underlying illness.  The use of 
sedation in this way, however, does raise questions about the use of p.r.n. sedation in 
situations of uncertainty about dying.  One of the consultants, Michael, was especially 
concerned about this: that the use of sedative drugs could make patients appear as 
though they were dying, resulting in them being treated as they were dying, with a 
change in focus of care towards ensuring they had a comfortable and ‘good’ dying and 
death.  He spoke to me about this concern as we walked along a corridor. 
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5:23  He [Michael] said he did think and worry about using sedation - especially 
when it was used in particular groups of patients like those with dementia.  He 
worried that when they got confused or restless they were sedated and it wasn't 
questioned - people always looked worse when they were sedated. He used an 
example of his own, where a patient had been admitted for symptom control of 
pain but had been agitated and wandered at night.  She had been given 
benzodiazepines to ‘treat’ this and subsequently became drowsy, looked unwell 
and was thought to be dying.  She then died several days later.  He couldn't help 
wondering how much the benzodiazepines had to do with her death and he'd been 
very wary since then.       
       [FN 06/07/10 line 121] 
Once again, getting the diagnosis of dying right was of crucial importance; 
misinterpreting another process, of an iatrogenic deteriorate on due to sedative drugs, 
gives rise to the grave concern that sedative drugs in this situation could hasten a 
patient’s death.  While any iatrogenic error could in theory result in a patient’s death, 
the familiarity of the process of increasing drowsiness in patients at the end of life, 
combined with a compelling duty to bring about a comfortable death, makes this a 
potentially fraught decision-making process.  Making the wrong decision in this 
situation risked either hastening death or failing to achieve comfortable dying and a 
good death.  The obligation to bring about this comfortable dying process was felt so 
intensely that it drove a sense of failure and even guilt when not achieved. One of the 
senior nurses, Susan, described in an interview how she felt when realising that a patient 
whom she felt had been unsettled for several days had not had his sedative medication 
increased in the week before his death.  The interview was interwoven with regret as 
Susan felt that this patient should have been more comfortable in the days before his 
death. 
5:24  ...I thought I should have like made sure that he was more settled...  And it's 
someone’s husband and someone’s father and I think all we want is for people to 
die peacefully and to die comfortable, you know, that's all, with the right amount 
of medication.  Not too much and not not enough, just the right amount to keep 
them comfortable.  And I don't know, I just felt a bit bad at the end of the week 
when I saw he was still...and when I'd looked at all the extras he'd had.  And I just 
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thought oh, this is so...  And I had to bring it up [at the next MDT meeting] 
because I took it away that weekend with me, I felt so bad, I should have done 
something…  I should have like made sure, because I'd been about, do you know 
what I mean, but doing other things... 
      [Susan, senior nurse, interview line 403] 
Recognition that this patient was dying bound Susan to strive for him to be settled as he 
died.  She felt she was his advocate in this situation and was relieved when she found 
out the following week that he had appeared comfortable in the final 24 hours of his 
life, once his medication had been increased.  This compulsion to achieve a comfortable 
dying process was evident throughout the fieldwork and appeared, for the most part, to 
be well balanced with concern not to hasten death; a tension between these obligations 
was only on occasion evident.  An awareness of the potential for sedative drugs to at 
least hasten the appearance of dying was, however, more apparent. The consultants 
interviewed appeared to be particularly aware of this; George described in an interview 
his reasons for feeling able to use sedation for a patient, having considered the effect 
that medication could have on the patient’s appearance. 
5:25  … it was …  just about being clear that actually, we weren’t seeing a 
physical deterioration due to medication… using medication to sedate him at that 
stage wasn’t going to have any impact on how long he had to live because he was 
dying quickly at that stage.   
[George, consultant, interview line 222] 
There was an awareness of the potential for sedative drugs to cause a patient to look as 
though they had physically deteriorated and concern to ensure patients were not then 
treated as such, with the emphasis of their care being to ensure a comfortable 
appearance in dying.  As the drive for this ‘good dying’ was strong, the use of p.r.n. 
medication frequently led to an increase in the regular background dose of sedatives and 
this appeared to be unproblematic in most cases.  The way in which sedation evolved 
was a complex series of decisions which frequently culminated in a decision to begin a 
continuous infusion of sedation.  The importance of recognising a distinction between 
decisions taken to use regular sedation and those taken through the use of p.r.n. sedation 
is evident when considering those few but significant patients who experience 
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overwhelming symptoms for a time and recover.  Claire, for example, was a patient first 
introduced earlier in this Chapter.  She had metastatic breast cancer and significant pain 
related to this.  She was said to be deteriorating and was recognised as someone who 
would stay in the hospice ‘for end of life care’.  On one occasion over a weekend her 
pain became so overwhelming in nature that she could no longer tolerate it.  She was 
given a large dose of midazolam to make her sleep for 12 hours.  The following week 
this was discussed in the MDT meeting as the consultant, George, described what he 
thought was a ‘very difficult stage’. 
5:26  [He] went on to say that her bad days had increased and her symptoms on 
the bad days had gone beyond the stage where she could be treated with drugs 
and maintain her alertness.  She had always wanted to be awake and alert and 
this was no longer possible given the severity of her symptoms.  Over the weekend 
[he] had needed to increase her syringe drivers to sedate her as her symptoms 
were intolerable.  She had later (the following day) gone on to tell him that she 
wanted to be asleep on those bad days.  She was said to be ‘not-distractible’ from 
her pain at the weekend - but ‘yesterday was quite bright’.   
        [FN 10/11/09 line 117] 
I observed one of the senior doctors, Julia, as she spoke to Claire about this the 
following day. 
5:27  Julia reflected back to a few days ago when she’d [Claire] had severe pain 
and she’d had a discussion with George (consultant) about the use of sedatives to 
help her to ‘have a break’ from the pain when it was bad. Claire: ‘yes I want 
that… sometimes I need a break’ 
        [FN 11/11/09 line 109] 
After this episode, Claire still had persistent pain but not such that she was unable to 
participate and enjoy time spent with family 
5:28  Claire said … she felt quite calm in herself and was able to relax and able 
to sleep well now.  She liked being able to speak to her son when she was well 
enough and wanted to be alert for as long as possible to ‘stay with it’ for as long 
as she could.  When the pain was down a bit (like now) she could concentrate on 
speaking to him and this was good.     [FN 11/11/09 line 201] 
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Claire died 10 days after this, becoming drowsier in the days before she died and 
subsequently having a continuous infusion of midazolam to control restlessness in the 
final days of her life.  She was later said to have had a settled and peaceful death.  
Sedation, in the final days of her life, was used in a routine way and she did not require 
further episodes of ‘respite’ sedation.  Following the instance of respite sedation Claire 
recovered and was able to enjoy time with her family.  She valued being able to 
communicate and feel in control for as long as possible; she was someone who wanted 
to be as awake as possible for as long as possible.  She recognised, however, that there 
were times when this was not possible and her symptoms became so severe that she 
wanted to be sedated.  Claire’s pain became intolerable before respite sedation was 
used.  She was unable to cope with her, then overwhelming, symptoms.  In a similar 
way Luke, described earlier, was said to be unable to cope with his pain and was treated 
with analgesia and ultimately p.r.n. sedation.  While Claire was treated decisively 
through the use of short term planned sedation, Luke was, in effect, sedated through the 
p.r.n. use of sedative drugs.  The situations were different, insofar as Claire was 
understood to be dying, but not imminently: Luke was ‘probably’ dying imminently but 
there was doubt about this and hesitancy to commit to sedation, especially continuous 
sedation until he died.  These two examples raise the potential for there to exist a 
situation in which a patient who is not in fact dying imminently to be treated with p.r.n. 
sedation, in a similar manner to Luke, become unconscious and die due to sedation 
rather than their disease.  It should be emphasised that this was not observed during the 
fieldwork; rather the situation in which this could occur was recognised through the 
study of different cases in which sedation was used in a variety of ways.  The p.r.n. use 
of sedation in situations of uncertainty about dying appeared to be the least governed of 
situations, responsive as it was to the fervent desire to bring about good dying for 
patients who were, indeed, dying.   
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the underlying motivations evident for staff in the hospice 
as they used sedation.  A strong desire to bring about a process of good dying and death 
was explicit throughout the observations and interviews.  Indeed, this was such that not 
to achieve this state was considered as failure, so integral was this to the work of 
hospice staff.  Using sedation to treat distress or distress-behaviours is a routine part of 
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practice, underpinned by the desire to ensure a comfortable and peaceful death.  This 
absence of distress-behaviours not only has importance for the perceived comfort of the 
patient, and as such is seen to be desirable in itself, it also enables other features of good 
dying, such as allowing family and friends to be present as a patient dies.  Moreover, 
achieving good dying was seen to be important for morale and a sense of job 
satisfaction for staff in the hospice environment.  The way in which sedation was 
prescribed and administered has allowed further insight into the practice of sedation.  
The ability to give drugs in a p.r.n. manner has been seen to allow patients who are 
distressed and thought to be dying to receive sedative drugs even to the point of 
unconsciousness, even when doctors are not present.  This was important in the hospice 
environment where doctors are on-call but not on site after five ‘o’ clock in the evening.  
Furthermore, the ‘risk’ of not achieving a good death is seen to be abhorrent and 
contrary to the aim of care in the hospice; the use of p.r.n. sedation may be seen to 
mitigate against this risk in the out of hours period.  This also, however, was seen to 
lead to the situation where a patient could be sedated to the point of unconsciousness 
without an assessment by a doctor, or an explicit agreement within the clinical team that 
a patient was indeed dying.  This was unusual, but so familiar were clinical staff with 
the practice of using sedation and so necessary was achieving a good death, that it 
became possible that the step of questioning and reversing the reversible could be 
overlooked.  This was an important situation to observe and understand as the p.r.n. use 
of sedative drugs was so frequent and shaped decision-making so strongly.  
Underpinning all of the practices of sedation, however, was this desire to bring about 
the hospice construct of good dying and death.  Chapter 6 considers three situations in 
which achieving good dying and death could be seen to be threatened; the impact of this 
and influences on decision-making are considered and the ways in which these 
situations were negotiated provides a deeper conceptual understanding of the practice of 
sedation and its integral role in end of life care. 
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Chapter 6 Threats to good dying and death 
The last two chapters have explored the routine, everyday use of sedation in a hospice, 
considering not only what the practice consists of but also the underlying motivations 
for its use.  The different ways in which sedation is used, either in a p.r.n. or continuous 
manner, have also been outlined and differences between healthcare professionals’ 
interpretation of dying explored.  This chapter focuses on situations in which the use of 
sedative drugs is ‘non-routine’, explicit and thoroughly considered.  Distinct ‘threats’ to 
achieving a ‘peaceful’ and ‘comfortable’ dying and death are observed.  These were 
seen through the observation of cases in which sedation was used in a way which was 
out of the norm: this was seen in patients with agitated delirium, uncontrolled symptoms 
and a form of ‘crisis’ sedation for massive haemorrhage.  These states can all be seen to 
threaten good dying and death for patients and challenge staff striving for this 
conception of good dying.  The dying process was the focus of this rather than the event 
of death itself; for this reason the term ‘good dying’ will be used in preference to a 
‘good death’.  The perceived threats to a good dying process are explored in three case 
studies, and the use of sedation to ‘restore’ the process of good dying is discussed.  The 
way in which this was managed through the use of sedative drugs presents an 
opportunity to consider further the motivations and intentions for using sedation, as the 
situations drove more difficult decisions to be made.  These were exemplified through 
the situations of agitated delirium, overwhelming symptoms and the situation of a crisis.    
6.1 Agitated Delirium  
Different symptoms and behaviours appeared to present particular challenges to staff, 
especially in the case of agitation and aggressive behaviour.  These challenges were 
epitomised in the case of one patient called Bob who had severe symptoms, 
compounded by difficulty in determining whether or not he was dying.  Bob was 72 
years old and had been previously very active.  He developed urological symptoms for 
which he had investigations which demonstrated a suspected urological malignancy, 
later confirmed as metastatic.  There was, however, considerable uncertainty in the 
diagnostic process which caused great distress to Bob and his family.  He developed 
significant problems with pain and reacted strongly against several different types of 
analgesic drugs, becoming agitated and confused.  He was eventually admitted to the 
151 
 
hospice to try to establish an effective analgesic regime.  He had episodes of being very 
confused and agitated, at times even threatening in his behaviour and difficult for the 
staff to manage.  He wanted to be at home, however, and, while remaining confused, his 
aggression and agitation settled enough to allow his family to feel able to try to look 
after him at home.  He was discharged, with his bed at the hospice kept open for him to 
return should the discharge be unsuccessful.  Once home he rapidly deteriorated and 
within 48 hours had been commenced on the Liverpool Care Pathway for the dying 
patient (LCP) by a GP in the community.  His daughter, a healthcare professional, 
described his condition at home: 
6:1  Mum rang me about quarter past eleven to say she couldn't wake him up. So I 
went over and he was non-rousable, he was Cheyne-stoking
1… he was 
peripherally shutting down. Got the out-of-hours doctor in, put him on the 
[Liverpool Care] pathway… And then all of a sudden when I had the whole family 
round and I'm sitting there saying to the family it won't be long now, you've 
picked a bad day dad but that's fine. He woke up. Just woke up. Very, very 
aggressive. Abusive, physically violent, and punching, kicking, screaming, 
swearing, he never swore in his life. Don’t know what on earth went, we still 
don’t, we don't know what on earth went on there. Why he was so, why he was 
dying and then woke up…  because he had no medication… Had the most 
horrendous night, took five of us, he was insisting on going to the loo, he was 
falling, he was hitting the walls, he was hitting us.    
      [Joanne, daughter, interview line 157] 
He was readmitted to the hospice and found to be very agitated and confused, as his 
daughter Joanne had described.  Alison, the consultant on call established that he could 
not communicate in any meaningful way.  
6:2  When he was readmitted he was extremely distressed and unable really to 
remember or take in information that was offered to him to help him to 
                                                 
1
Cheyne-stoking: Cheyne Stokes respiration; an abnormal pattern of breathing  in cycles of taking 
increasingly deep or rapid breaths followed by periods of apnoea (not breathing) and subsequently more 
shallow breaths again.  This is recognised to occur due to changes in the respiratory centre in the brain 
and thus in dying patients as well as in other conditions such as heart failure. 
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understand why he was where he was or to make sense of the symptoms that he 
was having.    [Alison, consultant, interview line 14] 
Bob was unable to communicate due to his agitated delirium; his family felt they had 
‘lost him’ in the agitation and aggression which was unlike his usual personality and 
self.   
6:3  We lost him, yeah, completely, it wasn’t my dad. We had, we had lovely 
moments where, we had very rare moments where he would, you could see him 
popping back through, and they would last sometimes split seconds. And we had a 
lovely, my daughter and I had a really, really lovely moment, it was the last words 
my dad ever spoke… and I had spent two hours on my own putting his clothes 
back on after he'd stripped off, putting his bed clothes back on, walking up and 
down corridors when he could hardly walk, you know, he would fall on the floor, 
we would have to pick him up again, and Kerry came in and he just adored his 
grandchildren, and he gave, he put his arm round her and gave her a really big 
cuddle. And I was sitting, thinking God...you know, that's so typical, I'm the one 
that's getting hit, she's getting the cuddles, and he was kind of, kind of you know... 
and I was thinking please dad don’t hit me anymore. And my daughter said to me 
mum, duck, and I ducked and he cuddled me, that's what he was trying to do. And 
he just said I'm very sorry. That was his last words. So that was the, the...the little 
bit of dad coming back through and then of course he went crazy again and 
psychotic again. And aggressive. 
      [Joanne, daughter, interview line 383] 
Bob’s agitation and aggression effectively distanced him from his family to the extent 
that they felt that they had ‘lost’ him before he had died.  The consultant looking after 
him that day, Alison, was clear that Bob’s distress and agitation required management 
with sedative drugs.  His daughter, Joanne, also felt he ought to be sedated, that this was 
the ‘only’ way in which he could appear to be himself again.  I asked her in an interview 
what she felt he needed when he was readmitted; she was very clear in her response. 
6:4  Sedation. Yeah... through the night I was actually begging the nurses to give 
him sedation... I knew my dad and I knew that my dad would have hated to be the 
way he was and that was what the sad thing about it all, you know, and, and that 
was why mum was so distressed, my sister was distressed, you know, because we 
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knew dad, it was complete...he was the complete opposite of the guy that he was. 
He just completely changed. And the decision to use sedation - that was the best 
decision for him.  The only way he could look peaceful and himself again. 
[Joanne, daughter, interview line 275] 
Joanne and her family had accepted that Bob needed to be sedated and that he was 
dying.  Alison, the consultant, however, felt more uncertain about Bob’s diagnosis and 
his proximity to death.  She wanted to be clear about whether or not Bob was dying or 
whether there was any reversible element which could be treated, as she described in 
her interview. 
6:5  …the guy looked as though he was terminally restless but there was no tissue 
diagnosis and my concern was whether in fact to just interpret it as terminal 
restlessness or to ask more questions and have him more fully investigated in 
hospital. So it was just making sure that there wasn’t some other thing, yes it was 
that distinction that it was, it was appropriate to go into end of life care mode and 
we weren’t missing some opportunity for rescuing him from something. 
      [Alison, consultant, interview line 124] 
She spoke to George, a consultant colleague who knew Bob from his previous 
admission, to establish whether there was anything which was likely to be reversible 
and to clarify how robust the diagnosis of his advanced cancer was.  Having been 
assured that his diagnosis was confirmed as advanced and metastatic urological cancer, 
Alison assessed Bob over the course of the next few hours and described how she came 
to form a management plan, as she spoke to Bob’s daughter, Joanne.   
6:6  It was a kind of synthesis as we went through the day. We did talk outside the 
room about the pros and cons of making him be more asleep. And we talked about 
how we would find what would be a safe, but helpful, dose of midazolam by using 
p.r.n. doses until we could work out what the duration of action of individual 
doses would be and the plan then would be to help him to have a better rested 
night by using an infusion and then re-group the following day, when in fact I 
would not have been on call anymore, but George [consultant] would be back in 
the building to be able to see whether, having had a decent rest … he was any 
better, any calmer, any more able to give an account of himself in order to judge 
which way to go next. Or whether, in fact, following a night of rest, it was 
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becoming apparent that despite that he was physically still more exhausted, in 
which case we were probably dealing with dying. And either way it was kind of 
the next 24 hours was going to help us to decide whether what we were doing was 
best supportive care to get him through some unusual episode or whether what we 
were doing was best end of life care. 
      [Alison, consultant, interview line 275] 
Alison detailed her plan to give Bob a ‘decent rest’ and review him the following day.  
She read from her notes in the interview as she recalled how that was to be achieved. 
6:7  ‘allow regular p.r.n. midazolam 5mg sub-cut2 today. Aim for subcutaneous 
infusion to allow full sleep tonight’… And the aims at that point, and these were 
the agreed aims with Joanne [daughter], were ‘to maintain relief of pain, to 
reduce his agitation, give midazolam for an overnight sleep and review with the 
clinical team who knew him after that observation.’ During the afternoon we got a 
phone call, because that was…one o’clock. [At] half past three the SHO3 who was 
on call said he’d needed three lots of 5 mg of midazolam. But the last dose seemed 
to settle him for about an hour. But he was still restless between doses and not 
fully relaxed ... So she was going to go back again at six to see how many doses 
he’d had and so her note at six was that he’d needed six doses since one  o’clock. 
So 30 mg since one o’clock.  Erm ‘still sitting in bed, although sleepy still agitated 
with a respiratory rate of 16’... So we spoke by phone and she put a driver with 
150 mg [of midazolam] over 24 hours.  And we agreed that we would put in some 
bigger p.r.n. doses so between 5 and 10 [mg]. 
[Alison, consultant, interview line 374] 
The aims of giving the sedative drugs were documented in the notes and focused on the 
short term management of Bob’s agitation and distress, with a plan to review the 
situation the following day. The nurses looking after Bob felt similarly, that Bob 
‘needed’ sedative drugs but cited slightly different reasons as Judy (staff nurse) 
explained: 
                                                 
2
 Subcutaneous; under the skin. 
3
 Senior House Officer; junior doctor 
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6:8  … what can you do?  Is he liable to damage himself; is he liable to hurt the 
family? He’s liable to fall ‘cause he had a history of falls in the past and I think as 
an interim measure, the gut instinct’s to say right, we’ll try and get something to 
calm him down… 
[Judy, staff nurse, interview line 41] 
Judy was particularly concerned to prevent further falls due to Bob’s agitation and felt 
an urgency to give him ‘something’ quickly.   
6:9  So eventually erm, I suppose I kind of got a little bit frustrated, which is kind 
of difficult to say with the medical staff, and went back in and said ‘please can I 
give this gentleman something, I’m frightened he’s going to hurt himself and his 
daughter’s really distressed.  So eventually I was allowed to give err, a stat dose 
of 5 [mg] of midazolam…Half an hour, I think it was half an hour later or 40 
minutes later, he was up again so it obviously hadn’t settled him.  Erm, again, I 
went into the medical staff and I said, you know, ‘I’m really upset because this 
gentleman, this isn’t settling him, we need something done fairly quickly’…  I felt 
really, personally, that he was approaching the end stage and that was more 
important than anything right then, to get him settled. I’m not...you know, I’m not 
a medic but obviously….  So anyway erm, it was agreed that I could give him 
another stat but I did, I… asked the SHO would she change the prescription... I 
know he was still agitated and the medical staff said that basically, just to keep 
going with p.r.n.s of 5 [mg] of midazolam until he’s settled and they wanted to 
know basically how much it would take to...I won’t say knock him out but to keep 
him settled… I felt it was my...well it was important to get him settled and 
obviously try and reduce the stress on the family. 
[Judy, staff nurse, interview line 55] 
Judy expressed her own distress at not being able to ‘settle’ Bob and felt that because he 
was ‘approaching the end stage’, it was important to strive towards this goal of getting 
him ‘settled’.   The pressure to achieve this was felt throughout the interview as she 
expressed her frustration at not being able to achieve this goal.  The nurses caring for 
Bob overnight too, felt they were looking after someone who was dying.  Gail, an 
auxiliary nurse, felt particularly strongly that Bob ought to have been sedated. 
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6:10  There was no kind of resting place for him doing – I didn’t, well I didn’t 
think there was and it wasn’t fair…I think if, if people are agitated and they don’t 
know where they want to be or what they want to do, I think...personally, it 
[sedation] should be given because, you know, there’s no need for people to be 
unsettled because there’s the right drugs are there, you’ve just got to make sure 
that they’re written up because to me, you know, it’s not fair to them.  And if 
people, you know, aren’t on them… you’ve got to make sure that they are. I think 
personally ‘cause … especially I think if relatives are here … they should have 
that quality time with them … if somebody’s obviously dying, it would be nice to 
see them settled… 
[Gail, auxiliary nurse, interview line 22] 
It appeared that because Bob was thought to be dying, the nursing staff in particular 
believed he ought to be sedated to control his agitation and apparent distress.  The 
consultant responsible for Bob was more guarded about whether or not he was dying, 
however, and wanted to be clear that there was an option for Bob to recover and wake 
up from the sedation she initiated, planning for a careful review of his drugs and need 
the following day.  While Judy and Gail felt they were treating a man who was dying, 
Alison wanted to keep the option open to reduce the sedation, and stay alert to the 
possibility that Bob might not be dying.  The nurses who were looking after Bob were 
more certain that he was dying at an earlier stage than the doctors involved in his care.  
The consultant, Alison, acknowledged her own uncertainty as she said in her interview 
that she wanted to be sure that it was the right time to go ‘into end of life mode’.  She 
said later on in the interview: 
6:11  I think the thing that was most interesting to me about it … is how anxious I 
was about this one. I was far more anxious about this one than I have been about 
others. And I’m sure it was because of the, the diagnostic uncertainty, as I 
perceived it 
[Alison, consultant, interview line 752] 
Alison admitted to feeling wary of going into ‘end of life mode’ because of this 
uncertainty about whether or not Bob was indeed dying.  Allowing time to assess the 
effect of an intervention such as sedation was a frequent way in which assessments of 
this nature were carried out in the hospice.  Once the reversible causes for a 
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deterioration had been reversed, staff would regularly state that they would just have to 
‘wait and see’ how a patient responded, especially for those patients who had just been 
admitted to the hospice and who were not as yet ‘known’.   Alison recognised that there 
was a change required, a different approach to take, if Bob was dying; this was an 
important and significant decision to make, causing her to feel ‘anxious’ about it.  
While in Chapter 4 this change in approach from not dying to dying appeared to occur 
over a period of time, for Bob this change occurred rapidly and overtly.  There was open 
discussion about whether or not he was dying amongst staff and between the staff and 
family members.  There was a decision to be made, rather than a position at which to 
arrive.  The assessment and subsequent decision was to impact on the way in which Bob 
was treated and specifically, on the way in which sedative drugs were used.  The 
recognition of dying was seen to influence profoundly the way in which patients in this 
acute situation were managed clinically and, once dying was diagnosed, appeared once 
again to enable the acceptance of a reduction in a patient’s consciousness. 
In Bob’s case, the acknowledgement that he was dying was made earlier for the nurses 
involved than for the doctors: the nurses described him as ‘terminally agitated’.  Judy, 
one of the staff nurses, described his behaviour and what she meant by this. 
6:12  He was just so really restless and he was, you know, as I say, he would twist 
around on the bed, get up and lay upside down or he’d go on the day bed. … It’s 
the sort of just constant movement it’s, you know, you can’t...they can’t seem to 
settle, it’s just... they seem as if they just can’t settle, they want to be up, they want 
to be down and they want to be in the bathroom and they want...they just don’t 
know where they want to be.  It’s a... real restlessness, a real, you know, sort of 
agitation restlessness and I think knowing the gentleman’s history, that he had 
been potentially aggressive and a danger to both himself and other people … In 
his lucid moments [he was a] charming, lovely gentleman, really lovely person 
but when he went off like that, it was very difficult...    
      [Judy, staff nurse, interview line 116] 
‘Terminal agitation’, or ‘terminal restlessness’ were phrases frequently used in the 
hospice during the fieldwork and interviews as staff described this form of agitation 
which they saw occurring during dying.  Some were very clear that they knew when a 
patient was ‘terminally agitated’; others were less certain.  There was a distinction 
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between the different groups of staff: auxiliary nurses spoke with most conviction about 
the state of ‘terminal agitation’ and felt that they recognised this state the most readily.  
Gwen described this in her interview: 
6:13  One thing that does get me is people aren’t picking up... well I... to me, I’ll 
turn round and say ‘that man’s got terminal agitation’ and they’ll say ‘well he’s 
just having an off day’ or whatever.  I say ‘no, it’s something else’ ... and then two 
days later, you’ll get a qualified nurse saying ‘I’m sure he’s got terminal 
agitation’.  I think, well I said that two days ago.  One of the qualifieds4 now will 
turn around and say ‘I think you’re right Gwen’…  Well I always say to the 
qualified ‘he’s terminally agitated’ and they’ll either say ‘yeah I know, or, are 
you sure?’ I’ll say ‘well I think I’m right, yeah, yeah’.  And then two days later, 
they’ll say … ‘I’ll watch him’ and then the next day I’ll go in, if I’ve gone off at 
half past three and come in the next morning and … she’s watched him the rest of 
the afternoon and when I’ve come back in she’ll say ‘I think you’re right Gwen’ ... 
and I think the auxiliaries tend to pick up on it more.    
      [Gwen, auxiliary nurse, interview line 321] 
In contrast, the doctors who were interviewed were less certain about the state of 
terminal agitation and were more cautious about acknowledging it.  John, one of the 
junior doctors, described how another patient changed as she approached death and his 
own hesitancy in diagnosing terminal agitation. 
6:14  the reason I…described her as tortured is that she, she didn't seem to be 
able to rest, so she would, she might hold one position for seconds and then have 
to move, sit forward, every time she lay back a little bit in the bed, she became 
very distressed and sat forward and fidgeted and, and you know was moaning and 
it was just, just an unpleasant thing to experience really. And looked like an awful 
thing she was going through.  The nurses said they thought she was terminally 
agitated but until that final day I wasn’t so convinced – that day she went home 
she really was dying, it was awful.  It was so important though to get it right and 
to get her home, because she was so insistent right from the start that that was 
                                                 
4
 Qualified nurses; Gwen drew a distinction between ‘qualified’ staff nurses and ‘unqualified’ auxiliary 
nurses. 
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what she wanted.        
       [John, doctor, interview line 116] 
John acknowledged that the nurses had thought this patient to be ‘terminally agitated’ 
before he was sure that she was imminently dying.  This crucial diagnosis, of dying, he 
considered still to be difficult and one which it was important to ‘get right’.  The 
recognition of this state as being an indicator of imminent death was important, it 
seemed, to ensure that patients were not being misdiagnosed when in fact, they may 
have had weeks of life left to live.  George, a consultant, expressed this concern in an 
interview.   
6:15  … it's not really a term I use much, but people seem to talk about it when 
they perceive that people are right at the end of life and they’re agitated.  To my 
mind the difficulty with the term is that you only really know it either after 
someone’s died, or um, when it's very clear they’re dying soon, and I think I 
sometimes see it being used when people look at though they’ve probably got 
some weeks… or longer to live, and they’re just agitated and we’re still trying to 
work out what the cause of is, and people start to say ‘well maybe it's because 
they’re terminally agitated?’, and so I think there’s some danger in it, sort of that 
it means maybe we exclude looking for reasons why people are agitated… so I…I 
think when people are dying their organs start to shut down and they build up 
waste products, and various blood abnormalities don’t clear their drugs as well, 
and so they can get agitated and confused, and I guess that could be terminal 
agitation, but I'm not sure that it's the most helpful term, because it just seems to 
be, it's almost a lazy label which says that, right, we’ve made a diagnosis without 
trying to look at why are they agitated?  Because even at the end of life, if 
somebody is agitated there may be things that you can do, simple things to reverse 
it. 
      [George, consultant, interview line 277] 
Once again, George’s concern appeared to be to ensure that a patient was imminently 
dying before being called terminally agitated rather than having ‘some weeks’ left to 
live.  The certainty that a patient was indeed dying was important especially to doctors 
and led to a tension between this need for certainty that a patient was imminently dying 
and the need to ‘get it right’, as John said, for a patient who was dying.  To delay a 
diagnosis of dying, it seemed, was to lead to a possibility of not getting it right in dying.  
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This was evident in the words especially of the nurses’ earlier quotes about Bob, but 
also in the doctors’ attitudes, once dying was diagnosed.   
6.2 Overwhelming symptoms 
Patients who experienced intolerable and overwhelming symptoms, like those with an 
agitated delirium, presented a threat to the desired ‘good’ death in the hospice.  A 
patient with overwhelming symptoms while dying was at risk, it seemed of having a 
‘bad death’.  Similarly to those with agitated delirium, the crucial step in the process of 
dying and symptom control for a patient was recognition and acknowledgement that 
they were, indeed, dying.  A change in approach occurred once dying was 
acknowledged, with an associated change identified through the field notes and 
interviews in the motivation and intentions in using sedative drugs.  The need to 
facilitate good dying was balanced by the need to ensure that death was not hastened: 
once death was imminent, it appeared, the use of sedation was not thought to affect the 
speed at which a patient died.  George, one of the consultants believed that once a 
patient was imminently dying, the ‘risk’ of causing death through the use of drugs 
became less likely.  He said of a patient: 
6:16  …using medication to sedate him at that stage wasn’t going to have any 
impact on how long he had to live because he was dying quickly at that stage.   
[George, consultant, interview line 222] 
This was frequently the position held: patients were said to be ‘dying anyway’ or, as Jen 
stated; 
6:17  The person is going to die, you're not going to bring them back, you're not 
going to change anything… inevitably they might even die before the… 
midazolam has time to, time to work.      
[Jen, staff nurse, interview line 249]  
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Having reached a point when death was anticipated imminently, the impact of sedative 
drugs at an increased dose and with more profoundly sedating effects on hastening this 
death was thought to be minimal.  Relief of suffering and achieving a good dying 
process was afforded prime importance when a patient was dying.  
Sandra was a patient for whom these concerns were prominent.  She was a 43 year old 
woman who had a non-small cell lung cancer.  She had been diagnosed only four weeks 
prior to being transferred to the hospice and had just completed radiotherapy treatment 
to try to reduce the tumour size.  She was described as being a very anxious woman and, 
on the first consultant ward round, also appeared to be dying.  One of the nurses, Judy, 
reported that she was very anxious during the night in particular and didn’t sleep, but 
then would be drowsy and tired during the day, especially as she had ‘needed’ several 
doses of midazolam to treat her anxiety through the night.  Judy and the other nurses felt 
that she was dying, that she ‘wasn’t a good colour’.  Judy emphasised that Sandra was 
very breathless and anxious and that she ‘needed’ several extra doses of midazolam to 
treat this.  Sandra was very distressed by her symptoms, especially by breathlessness, 
and this caused difficulty in communicating.  She said that she was not scared of dying, 
but was ‘terrified’ by her breathlessness and felt at times that she was suffocating. Her 
physical appearance conveyed this, as I recorded in field notes: 
6:18  She was very breathless, leaning forward in bed with oxygen on, looked 
pale, dusky and drawn.  Her eyes were wide and she looked very anxious and on 
edge, almost panicky.  She couldn’t speak in sentences and nodded rather than 
spoke, 
[FN 05/07/10, line 35] 
Sandra was very frightened by her symptoms; furthermore she was afraid to go to sleep 
and initially did not want to accept any sedative drugs for fear that they would make her 
go to sleep and then she would not wake up again.  After a few days, however, Sandra 
accepted an ‘extra’ midazolam dose from Mollie, one of the nurses, as my field notes 
recorded: 
6:19  I followed Mollie (S/N) as she came out of the drug room and said she was 
just going to give Sandra ‘an extra’.  She [Sandra] was getting really distressed 
she said, and it was just awful.  As we went in Sandra was leaning forward, 
holding her knees to her chest and breathing rapidly.  She nodded as Mollie said 
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that she had just brought something to make her feel more relaxed.  She wasn’t 
able to speak in more than a whisper but as she nodded said; ‘give me anything, I 
can’t go on like this’.  Mollie nodded and gave her the injection into her arm.  She 
straightened the bed and asked if there was anything else she could do.  Sandra’s 
sister said there wasn’t and she’d call if there was.  As we walked along the 
corridor again Mollie said again that it was just so awful and that Sandra was 
terrified. 
        [FN 05/07/10, line 143] 
As Sandra continued to be distressed and breathless throughout the day, she had several 
‘extras’ of midazolam.  The following morning as I arrived I met one of the doctors, 
Julie, who was going to see her as she had been unwell overnight.   
6:20   I met David [junior doctor] who was just going in to see Sandra - he said 
she had changed markedly. She was even more breathless and David thought she 
was probably dying.  Sandra couldn’t say anything more than a few words at a 
time. She was sitting in bed, knees up, leaning forward, gasping for breath.  She 
felt she was suffocating, she said when David asked her what she was feeling.  
Her brow was furrowed, eyes were wide and staring and she used all the muscles 
in his shoulders and chest to breathe.  David said he would see what he could do 
to help and as we walked back up the corridor he said he felt there wasn't 
anything else he could do except increase the midazolam in the driver.  He said 
Sandra had had ‘loads’ of extras last night so he'd just put in what was needed 
and see how she got on overnight.  It was awful to watch, he said.  Mollie [staff 
nurse] came in to the MDT office at that point and said she had asked Sandra if 
she wanted to be more sleepy, or whether she wanted her [Mollie] to give her 
something to help her feel ‘more relaxed and settled’. Sandra had said yes so 
Mollie felt her views were maybe changing - from not wanting anything, to 
accepting things to help.  She'd said later to Mollie while she was helping her 
have a wash: [give me] ‘anything, just kill me’.     
        [FN 06/07/10, line 3] 
Sandra had initially declined any sedative drugs, fearing their effect; as the intensity of 
her symptoms increased, however, she wished to have anything which might relieve her 
symptoms, including drugs which would reduce her conscious level.  As Sandra’s 
symptoms increased, the staff involved in her care expressed with increasing frequency 
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how ‘awful’ they felt the situation was.  Indeed, one of the nurses, Jane, said after 
giving Sandra an injection of midazolam that she just hoped it ‘didn't go on too long for 
her’.  Others expressed similar views, as one of the junior doctors, John, said in his 
interview: 
6:21  I wanted her to be asleep. I mean I think you can't help but reflect your own, 
you know, put yourself in the position or try and imagine yourself in the position 
of the patient. And she just looked tortured… and I just felt if that was me, I'd just 
want to be asleep and calm and rested and a bit detached 
[John, doctor, interview line 131] 
Some members of staff found it difficult and expressed frustration when symptoms 
were not brought under control quickly.  In the transitional period prior to all members 
of staff recognising that a patient was dying this was especially evident.  Indeed, earlier 
on that day, one of the nurses, Mollie, came into the MDT office and sat down, having 
just come out of Sandra’s room. 
6:22  She'd been terrified, Mollie said, asking her to kill her ‘now’.  She really 
wanted to be at home to die, and thought she was dying now. Mollie said she 
thought they’d see if they could get her settled tonight and then get her home - but 
didn't think they had long to try to settle her - she was going downhill quickly. ‘If 
we get her flattened and settled she might make it home, but she's too up and 
down just now to get there, Mollie said.  She said some people are frightened to 
put midazolam in the driver - they'd only put 5mg in yesterday.  She looked 
sceptical - as though to say it wasn't enough, I thought.  She said that she'd made 
up for it in extras overnight - she ‘needed’ 25 mg overnight so ‘finally’ today she 
was on 40 mg over 24 hours.   
        [FN 06/07/10 line 132] 
Later, on the night shift, Annie also expressed relief that Sandra’s midazolam dose had 
been increased from the previous day, as I recorded in my field notes from the handover 
of day to night staff. 
6:23  Sandra had had her drivers changed and was now on 40 mg of midazolam 
over 24 hours. Annie [staff nurse] said ‘thank God’ and raised her eyebrows.  She 
164 
 
looked at me and said they’d only put in ‘10 or something’ last night and she’d 
needed ‘way more’ than that.   
[FN 06/07/10, line 22] 
Mollie and Annie clearly felt that Sandra needed more sedation in order to appear 
comfortable, Mollie even stating that Sandra needed to be ‘flattened’ in order to 
facilitate her wish to be at home.  Both Mollie and Annie were also aware of the impact 
of Sandra’s symptoms on her family and wanted to minimise the influence that this 
would have on their bereavement.  In the final stages of dying, staff became 
increasingly aware of the impact of a patient’s distress-behaviours on those around 
them, especially family members.  I observed as Sandra’s brother spoke emotively to 
one of the nurses about how he felt: 
6:24  He said it was terrible to see her as she was.  ‘She’s fighting it’ he said, he 
wished she would just ‘let go’.  He couldn’t bear watching her suffer like this, he 
said – ‘you wouldn’t treat an animal like this’.  … At times he said he wanted to 
just push the syringe driver to end the suffering –what was happening was 
inevitable – why should people suffer like this?  He said once again that Sandra 
was ‘fighting it’; Annie [staff nurse] agreed and said that the other night she had 
given her so much midazolam she should have been ‘out of it’  but she’d kept 
fighting sleep and trying to keep her eyes open.  She would say she wanted to be 
asleep but look as though she was fighting against the drugs.  Annie explained to 
him that the syringe driver of midazolam had been increased that day, and they 
did it carefully to incorporate the extras she had had over the previous 24 hours – 
they couldn’t just ‘whack it up’ or start too high.  He nodded and went back into 
the room again.  On the way back up the corridor she said she agreed with him - 
it was so awful being there and watching suffering.   
       [FN 06/07/10, line 142] 
Sandra’s brother clearly felt that she was suffering and, at least on occasion, wanted her 
to die rather than continue as she was, such was the impact of watching her ‘suffer’ on 
them as a family.  While Sandra had initially not wished to have sedative drugs, she 
later accepted and even requested them.  Her brother, watching her ‘suffer’, felt she 
should not have to endure dying in this way, a consistent view in the fieldwork 
considering distress at the end of life.  In this way he seemed to mirror Mollie and 
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Annie’s view that it would be ‘better’ if Sandra was ‘flattened’ by sedative drugs than 
continue in a minimally conscious state but with apparent suffering.  Sandra was much 
drowsier the following day and indeed was discharged to die at home.  She died the day 
afterwards and was said to have been ‘comfortable in the end’.  Her midazolam had 
been further increased and although there was doubt that she would have been aware of 
her surroundings in her final 24 hours, nurses reflected the following day in the hospice 
that ‘at least she was where she wanted to be’.  There appeared to be an appeal to the 
wider sense of good dying in this statement as the importance of being in the place of 
her choice was recognised and balanced against her reduced consciousness which was 
required, it seemed, to facilitate her being able to die at home.  Additionally, she was 
‘comfortable’ in dying through by means of sedation and her suffering, or distress 
behaviours, had been relieved.   
6.3 Crisis sedation  
The management of agitated delirium and overwhelming symptoms at the end of life 
enabled patients to become ‘settled in the end’.  While the decisions leading to them 
becoming settled were more acute, requiring large doses of sedation, in the very final 
hours sedation became ‘routine’ once again.  Once dying was acknowledged as 
imminent and symptoms brought under control, sedative drugs were used with the 
acceptance of a reduction in consciousness, in a ‘routine’, accepted, way.  One situation 
took place during the fieldwork in which this was not possible, however.  Richard was a 
63 year old man with a laryngeal tumour.  He was admitted to the hospice for end of life 
care; he lived alone and had a large tumour in his neck which bled intermittently.  
Although his bleeding initially appeared to come under control within a few days, the 
staff in the hospice felt he was ‘deteriorating’.  The nurses were concerned about his 
tumour and the speed with which it was changing, as well as his general physical 
condition.  They, and the doctors involved in his care, felt he was dying within the next 
few days and it was agreed that he was staying for end of life care.  He changed 
dramatically, however, 2 days later on a Friday evening.  Jen, one of the nurses, had 
been doing a drug round and described what happened in an interview as she went into 
Richard’s room to give him his drugs. 
6:25  I put the medication down, I was very, very quiet in the room, and the lights 
were on and everything and he looked very, very peaceful. And I came out of the 
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room … and within a couple of seconds of being in that room the auxiliary came 
running up and said… he's haemorrhaging… and we, we ran back down and 
basically there was just blood everywhere, coming from his trache
5
 site... And it 
was just pooled, it must have, I must have just left the room and it's happened. He 
was aware of what was going on, he was tapping on the buzzer, obviously he 
couldn't vocally shout out for help or anything but he knew what was happening, 
he was tapping, he had a sensitive buzzer, he was tapping on the buzzer, and there 
was just like pools in the side of the bed and he had…a carrier bag… the bag was 
kind of nearly full of blood, there was blood all over the table, it was just 
absolutely everywhere, it was definitely an arterial bleed… at first I said [to the 
auxiliary nurse] grab his Kardex
6
 because I knew he was prescribed a crisis pack 
of midazolam 10 [mg], so I…  grabbed the midazolam and started drawing it up 
and… I tapped him on the arm to tell him that I was going to give this midazolam, 
and as he turned I've just got absolutely covered in blood and it was awful and 
that's my biggest memory, just being covered in blood. And I just remember it, 
he's kind of, you could see that his breathing was changing, that he was changing 
facially. His kind of neck just started to relax back, this was kind of in the midst of 
me giving the midazolam and kind of as I was giving the midazolam, it certainly 
wasn’t the effects of the midazolam. And literally he just kind of...his breathing 
changed and he just died within ten minutes of it kind of all happening. So I don't 
even think the midazolam maybe had time to work to be honest.  
[Jen, staff nurse, interview line 25] 
Jen described vividly what she witnessed that evening and how she reacted.  She wanted 
to give him the ‘crisis pack’ of midazolam which was prescribed to be given ‘in the case 
of a crisis’.  This situation was anticipated and planned for not infrequently for those 
considered to be at risk of a ‘crisis’ event, most frequently of haemorrhage from a large 
blood vessel.  Indeed, at the MDT meeting earlier in the week, Heather, one of the 
nurses checked that a ‘crisis pack’ had been prescribed. 
                                                 
5
 The ‘trache’ refers to his tracheostomy site; having had a laryngectomy Richard had an incision in his 
neck, into his trachea (windpipe) through which he breathed. 
6
 A file containing the patient’s drug prescription chart. 
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6:26  Heather said she just wanted to check again that there was a crisis pack in 
place and Izzy [staff nurse] confirmed there was, adding that it was the first thing 
she made sure of, when she had come on shift.          
        [FN 02/06/10, line 369] 
In her interview, Jen described what this ‘crisis pack’ was: 
6:27  Basically… if we have a cancer patient who we know is at risk of a bleed 
either internal or external and obviously having a bleed external would not only 
be horrific for the patient but for family and you know I think to see somebody go 
through that it's…, they probably would die quite quickly anyway depending on 
the bleed whether it's vascular or arterial but I think we always kind of prepare to 
make sure that the patient is as comfortable as possible because you're not going 
to change the inevitable I think once somebody, when the cancer eats away and 
they end up having a bleed like that anyway well…  if we think or the doctors 
think that somebody is at high risk of having a bleed we would ask them to 
prescribe midazolam 10 mg that you would give as a stat dose...  and it would 
always be in the room kind of ready. Just because obviously we've got quite a long 
corridor, where the treatment room is… and if you haven’t got the keys at least 
the drug is in the room ready to give.  
[Jen, staff nurse, interview line 117] 
Richard was recognised as having had a ‘crisis bleed’, from which he was expected to 
die very rapidly. Both the staff nurse, Jen, and Erin, the doctor who was in the hospice 
at the time, were clear in what their aim was in treating him at that point.  Erin described 
what she wanted for him at this stage. 
6:28  I wanted him not to be scared. Erm...and I wanted him to know that he 
wasn't alone because that was, his two worst fears. And I think that was the same 
thing I'd wish for any patient who was dying, to not be afraid… to not be agitated. 
And to know that they were not alone. And I wanted the midazolam to sedate him 
properly, to make him unaware of what was happening so that he wasn’t scared 
as he had been before. 
[Erin, registrar, interview line 149] 
Jen, too, described what she wanted for Richard at this point. 
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6:29  Just to...obviously to sedate him very, very quickly because he was fully 
aware of what was going on…  I think if you know that somebody is having a 
bleed like this and you know that they're going to die it's to, to me, [the aim is] to 
get them out cold if you like, sedate them fully, so that they're not aware of exactly 
what's going on, and I think you know that the inevitable is going to happen, you 
know that the person is going to die from this bleed, but you don't want them to be 
aware that this is happening. He had a massive fear that this would happen and 
he knew it was a big possibility and it, it had happened to him before… But I 
think… with a big bleed like that I think you just want to get them out as quickly 
as possible and fully sedate them      
      [Jen, staff nurse, interview line 178] 
In this ‘crisis’ situation, the intention in using the sedation was more overtly to ensure 
that Richard was ‘unaware’ of his surroundings and what was happening by using 
sedation to render him unconscious.  The risk of hastening death was considered to be 
minimal, but still of less importance than enabling him not to be aware of his 
surroundings and the way in which he was dying.  While both Jen and Erin 
acknowledged that they were unsure of the benefit of giving the midazolam in this 
situation, as they were not sure it worked ‘quickly enough’, they felt it was important to 
‘do something’.  They wanted to do what they could to ensure he was ‘unconscious as 
quickly as possible’.  This was clearly a case in which sedation was not routine: Jen’s 
intent was brought into focus and was much more urgently to reduce consciousness 
quickly.  The overriding aim, however, was seen by Jen to be the same as for other 
situations. 
6:30  you know just because somebody is dying slowly and you can manage their 
symptoms and make sure that they have a dignified death, if somebody is at risk of 
having a massive bleed you've got to have something in place to be able to 
manage that kind of scenario as well, you know. Erm, so... it’s about making sure 
they have a dignified and a good death whatever happens at the end.  
      [Jen, staff nurse, interview line 260] 
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Erin, too, described this, in terms of ensuring a patient had a ‘good death’, once being 
clear that a patient was indeed imminently dying; 
6:31  I think ultimately you have to know the trajectory, where you are with this 
patient, if they are on that last few days of life and there is nothing salvageable 
about this situation then your best care would be to ensure a good death and in so 
doing you apply sedation, apply analgesia, all those sort of things to get them as 
comfortable as possible as quick as possible before the end. For both -
emergencies or...people terminally agitated at the end of life.  
      [Erin, registrar, interview line 397] 
Jen marked a distinction between those who die slowly, for whom there was time to 
manage symptoms and get it right, and those for whom that process was accelerated.  
Erin drew a comparison between those terminally agitated and those in the ‘emergency’ 
situation, wanting the same type of ‘good death’ for all. In this extreme situation both 
described their aims to ensure Richard’s ‘comfort’ and ensure he was not alone or 
frightened: in this situation there appeared to be no alternative to sedation to bring this 
about. This was not a remediable situation; good dying was not possible.  As Erin 
described the following week at the MDT meeting;   
6:32  Erin [registrar] said how awful Richard’s death had been.  He had had an 
arterial bleed and by the time anyone went in to answer his buzzer, seconds after 
he pressed it, there was blood all over the walls and skirting boards.  There had 
been a crisis pack in his room but Jen [staff nurse] had felt he was still too aware.  
Erin agreed and said while it had been quick and he was ‘Cheyne-Stoking’ within 
minutes, he had been frowning too, and she felt he was aware of something.  
       [FN 09/07/10, line 179] 
‘Even’ the use of sedation was unable to restore Richard’s dying to an acceptable or 
comfortable process.  One of the senior nurses later arranged a reflective practice 
session for the team; a bad death had such an impact on the staff in the hospice that they 
needed the opportunity to bring some form of meaning to it.  Others have recognised 
this debriefing and reflection to be a process through which palliative care staff, in 
particular, can rationalise events which do not go well, or when bad deaths occur 
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(Kovan and de Vries, 2010, Kristjanson et al., 2001).  In this situation Richard was ‘too 
aware’; he was beyond the reach of even sedation to enable him to be free from distress.    
The values which underlie these events and processes will be considered in the next 
chapter; of note, however, is that while the immediate aims of this acute ‘crisis’ 
situation appear to be different to the less acute and routine sedation, the overarching 
values from which they are derived, may be considered to be similar. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has built on Chapter 5 and developed an understanding of the normative 
foundations of the use of sedation in the hospice context.  Sedation has been shown to 
be linked to the broad concept of good dying and death, primarily through its role in 
bringing about relief from signs of distress in dying.   Staff in the hospice act from a 
desire to bring about good dying and death and experience a sense of satisfaction when 
this is achieved.  Conversely, feelings of regret and guilt are experienced when a patient 
is perceived not to have had a good death. These findings are not new; several authors 
have found and developed the link between achieving a good death and satisfaction 
among palliative care staff, especially among nurses (Hart et al., 1998, Kehl, 2006).  
That sedation is used with this purpose is, however, a new finding of this research.  This 
may seem intuitive; the aim of hospice and palliative care may be considered primarily 
to achieve a good death for a patient (Weisman, 1988) and therefore the aim of the use 
of sedation at the end of life is, naturally, to bring about that good death.  The way in 
which this is constructed in the hospice may equally appear to be uncontroversial; in the 
presence of signs indicating distress, sedation is used to remove those signs of distress 
in the dying patient.  Patients are expected to die in a ‘settled’ and ‘peaceful’ manner; 
those whose behaviours and appearance convey distress appear to challenge this 
expectation and are treated accordingly with sedation.  Good dying and death, even in 
situations which initially threaten the concept, can at times be restored through this 
approach; this was seen in the first two cases presented in this chapter.  The final case, 
of haemorrhage at the end of life, however, was seen to be different.  This death was 
unquestionably a ‘bad’ death, though despite this attempts were made through the use of 
sedation, perhaps to make the death ‘less bad’, when it could not be restored to a ‘good 
death’.  This ‘less bad’ death may be recognised as reflecting McNamara’s ‘good 
enough’ death, discussed in Chapter 1 (McNamara, 2004).  The desire and need to 
171 
 
reflect on this death after the event, to derive meaning and to be certain that all that 
could have been done to restore good dying had been done, suggests, however, that 
there are instances when ‘good enough’ is not enough for staff and perhaps what is 
required is to be able to feel that the death was made ‘less bad’ through their presence 
and treatment.   
As the use of sedation has been shown to be driven by a desire to bring about good 
dying and death in the hospice, the next chapter will identify the values which can be 
seen to underlie these motivations and the clinical practice of sedation in the hospice.  
These values are fundamental to the palliative care approach in the hospice and, in a 
culture where autonomy is prized, will be challenged as the specialty of palliative 
medicine and the palliative care approach is advanced.  
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Chapter 7 Values  
The previous chapters have been concerned with the way in which sedation is given in 
the hospice and the motivations behind this use.  This has shown sedation to be an 
integral and routine part of end of life care in the hospice, while the motivation for 
giving sedation arises from a desire to bring about a good dying process for patients.  
This has been seen both through the use of a routine form of sedation described in 
Chapter 4 as well as in the more complex cases of sedation when this approach to the 
control of symptoms appeared to come under threat.  The hospice and palliative care 
approach to dying and death can be seen to inform this practice of sedation as its core 
values underpin and guide clinical practice.  The more testing cases of using sedation 
found in Chapter 6 demonstrated overtly the values which underpinned the whole 
decision-making process of using sedation at the end of life.  These included the values 
of the patients and their relatives but predominately represented the values of individual 
members of staff, the hospice as an organisation and the palliative care ‘approach’, as it 
is interpreted in the hospice.  This chapter will begin by considering the, predominately 
shared, values of individual staff, and the relationship of these to the wider values of the 
palliative care approach.  These ‘shared’ values support the practice of routine sedation 
and enable staff to carry out an integral part of their daily work.  The values of patients 
and relatives is considered next, before a case study in which values are seen to differ, 
demonstrating a broader range of values and a process of negotiation and acceptance of 
alternative views in decision-making.  The integral role of values to decision-making 
has been considered in several different spheres and applied in clinical practice in 
different ways (Hunink, 2001: 19, Brown et al., 2005).  Values-based practice is one 
approach which seeks to incorporate values into clinical decision-making; alongside 
evidence-based medicine, values-based practice is seen to redress the balance of facts 
and values in clinical decision-making (Fulford, 2004a).  While evidence based 
medicine has advanced a scientific, objective process of assessing evidence and making 
decisions in healthcare, values, too, are inherently seen to form part of decision-making 
in healthcare (Fulford et al., 2002).  ‘Decisions require judgements’ (Calman, 2010: 
277); these judgements are informed and influenced by values.  While evidence-based 
medicine can provide a method of assessing, weighing and deciding about facts, the 
particular preferences and interpretation of facts depends upon values (Straus, 2005).  
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Values-based practice is seen to promote a more balanced alliance of values and facts.  
As healthcare decision-making becomes increasingly complex, the recognition of values 
and development of skills in negotiating different and conflicting values becomes 
increasingly important.  As palliative care progresses and seeks to deliver an ‘ethos’ of 
care in different settings, the values of palliative care and the values of a more diverse 
patient group may come  into conflict.  Values-based practice is considered as a way to 
facilitate decision-making in the context of complex and conflicting values.   
7.1 Values in practice: shared values 
The previous two chapters have delineated the way in which sedation is used in the 
hospice in clinical practice and the motivations behind this.  Chapter 5 developed the 
hospice concept of good dying and death, about which there was seen to be a shared 
understanding; staff knew how they expected and wanted patients to die and in the 
physical sense this was determined by the extent to which patients were ‘comfortable’ 
and ‘peaceful’ as they died.  In practice this was seen when patients died in their sleep, 
either as a natural or a drug-induced process.  The shared understanding of good dying 
allowed staff to work collectively towards a common aim of achieving this for patients 
and their families; sedation was seen as a means of achieving this when symptoms or 
distress-behaviours threatened its ‘natural’ occurrence.  The hospice construct of ‘good’ 
dying can be seen to be underpinned by values. The process of good dying and death 
brought about through sedation can be seen to be motivated, moreover, by shared values 
of how dying should occur.  This was seen at both an individual and collective level.  
Individually, staff expressed how they thought a patient should be treated and frequently 
related this to how they would want to be treated, or how they would want a loved one 
to be treated.  For example, Gail, an auxiliary nurse, after saying that she thought 
patients ought to look comfortable and settled as they were dying, said: 
7:1  I treat these patients how I would like to be looked after… I just think I would 
want my… granddad to be settled and, you know... [I] can only make people as 
comfortable as I can 
 [Gail, auxiliary nurse, interview line 122] 
Similarly, Mollie, one of the staff nurses, considered what she would want if she were 
to be in the situation of one of her patients. 
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7:2  I just thought if that was me, you know, I would kind of put myself in his 
position, I would just say.. I really wouldn’t want to be aware in that state 
[Mollie, staff nurse, interview line 224] 
Mollie felt that this particular patient’s suffering was so great that it was better for him 
to be unaware through the use of sedative drugs.  While the values of individual 
members of staff were conveyed through these terms, staff frequently appeared in 
practice to draw on a collective sense of values, or of the values of ‘palliative care’.  
These shared values were seen in practice as staff talked about their conceptions of what 
they expected as a team to achieve for patients, as well as that which was not considered 
part of their practice, or ‘what we do’.  This was frequently seen in the field notes and in 
interviews as staff talked with a clear perspective about what palliative care is and what 
it does.  In an interview Jen described what she thought one of the key roles of palliative 
care is: 
7:3  I really feel that we're good at… making sure people die comfortable and 
settled like, because we're in such a specialised area for making sure people… 
have a dignified death and this is what we do and this is what we do well… if a 
family walks out of here and they're just grateful for the care and [they sometimes 
say] she was lovely and peaceful and she wasn’t in pain and things like this, this 
is what makes us satisfied that we've done our job right. 
[Jen, staff nurse, interview line 307] 
Central to Jen’s concept of palliative care was ensuring that patients had a good death, 
and this appeared to define the nature of palliative care as Jen said it is ‘what we do’.  
One of the registrars, too, described the central role of the good death in the hospice and 
to the way she practiced.   
7:4  a good death is, is that patients are... comfortable, a settled patient in a place 
of their choosing, surrounded by people of their choosing. That is a so to speak 
‘good death’... and I kind of live by that I think. Practice by that.  
[Erin, registrar, interview line 227] 
As described in the previous chapter, Erin’s motivation for bringing about a comfortable 
death was motivated by her understanding of the ‘good death’ concept; furthermore, in 
stating this as the way in which she chose to practice and ‘live’, she demonstrates her 
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particular value perspective, shared explicitly and implicitly by the majority of staff.  
While staff conveyed emphatically at times what they felt palliative care ‘is’ and ‘does’, 
that which palliative care did not ‘do’ was equally expressed by staff.  For example, 
after several weeks of change in the hospice, the introduction of a shorter and more 
structured MDT meeting caused concern among the nurses about how the hospice was 
changing in approach and structure.  The nurses expressed apprehension that some 
members of the team would not feel comfortable to speak up these meetings as they 
currently did, especially the auxiliary nurses.  As I recorded in my field notes, one of the 
senior nurses, Susan, said: 
7:5  ‘it’s just not palliative care, we’re not like the hospital’. Susan went on to say 
that she was concerned that some voices would not be heard… in particular 
Gail’s [auxiliary nurse] contribution, [she said] how important she thought this 
was and how she doubted Gail would have the confidence in a big meeting to 
speak up.   
[FN 08/11/09 line 243] 
Susan drew a distinction between the hospice and hospital approach, at least in respect 
of MDT meetings and the inclusion and importance of particular members of the team 
such as the auxiliary nurses.  In drawing a distinction between the hospital and hospice 
approaches Susan demonstrates her understanding of a conception of what palliative 
care is, or rather is not.  The use of the collective pronoun ‘we’ was common and 
appeared to convey a shared conception of how those working in the hospice considered 
themselves to act.  For example, Michael, one of the consultants, described in an 
interview his view about the prolonged use of sedation in palliative care; he can be seen 
to consider it from a collective perspective as he said: 
7:6   I guess some people would argue that we may just be sedating people and 
just be… performing euthanasia… in a different fashion just by sedating people to 
death, but…  I don’t really think that’s our intention behind the act in what we’re 
doing anyhow, when we do take that decision to sedate people. 
[Michael, consultant, interview line 311] 
Michael’s understanding of how sedation is used in palliative care may be seen to be 
derived from (what he considers to be) a shared perspective.  In her interview, one of 
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the registrars, Grace, also appeared to take on this understanding of the way in which 
sedation is used, but further, made a distinction between clinical practice within and 
outwith the hospice. 
7:7   And so if we do it [using sedation], it’s not done lightly and it’s the decision 
of the team and even then, it can be a very uncomfortable decision… I suppose 
outwith hospice practice, then it’s difficult to know what’s happening and what’s 
going on. 
[Grace, registrar, interview, line 475] 
There was an understanding of how sedation was used in the hospice but that which 
occurred outside the hospice was considered to be different; furthermore, Grace refers 
to ‘hospice practice’ in a shared sense, affirming her understanding of sedation as a 
shared practice in the hospice.   
In everyday practice, a shared approach and understanding was assumed as staff 
demonstrated an implicit trust they had for one another’s assessment and management 
of distress at the end of life with sedation.  In a simple, everyday sense, Susan described 
this in an interview in relation to ‘trusting’ the assessments and judgements of other 
nurses: 
7:8  if I gave oxycodone and they [the patient] hadn’t really settled but one of the 
nurses handed over that they had given oxycodone and a little bit of midazolam 
and they've really settled well, I would be aware of that so I might go with that the 
next time because the nurse that's told [me] I trust.   
[Susan, staff nurse, interview, line 563] 
The model of a shared understanding of terms and of appearances or behaviours such as 
being ‘settled’ was developed in Chapter 4, however is worth emphasising again here in 
relation to treatment decisions.  Staff acted on the assumption of a shared understanding 
of distress-behaviours and how these should be treated.   As Susan described, a patient 
who had ‘settled’ in response to an intervention to use a sedative drug (midazolam) 
would be likely to be given the same drugs again, based on a shared understanding of 
what the previous effect had been and trust in their understanding of how an ‘unsettled’ 
patient should be treated.  This was implicit every day in handover meetings as nurses 
‘handed over’ information relating to the drugs used and their effect in the same way as 
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Susan described above.  Thus not only the ‘good’ dying process but the means of 
achieving this were constructed through a process of shared understanding and based on 
shared values.  
The values evident in the hospice were demonstrated through both a collective assertion 
of the values of palliative care and through individual statements of the shared value 
perspective.  That there was a shared understanding of the aim and means of achieving 
good dying in the hospice was considered important to many staff.  As one of the social 
workers, Alice, stated in an interview: 
7:9   I do feel the team that I work with we all sing to the same tune. I don't think 
there is...I can't remember working with anybody who didn't have the, the same 
viewpoint [about dying in the hospice]… And I probably would find it very 
difficult to work with anybody who didn't have that viewpoint.  We'd be at 
loggerheads the whole time.  I work with a good team… I think we have to very 
patient centred.  I think we have to...offer holistic systemic care that supports the 
patient at the centre of everything but also recognise the ripples for everybody, 
important people in that, that person's life. And we need to look at whatever we 
can do to support.    
[Alice, social worker, interview line 298] 
Alice describes the values she considers to be central to the care provided by ‘the team’ 
in the hospice.  Underpinning clinical practice, it seemed, were the values of palliative 
care.   
7.2 Patient values 
As discussed in Chapter 4, as patients deteriorated and came closer to dying they 
frequently became drowsier and less able to communicate.  Through the processes 
described in the preceding chapter, this was often a result of a combination of ‘natural’ 
changes associated with dying as well as due to sedative drugs given to treat signs of 
distress in a ‘routine’ fashion.  These processes evolved slowly over time and while for 
some patients, seen in Chapter 4, becoming drowsier was something to be railed 
against; others, in contrast, desired to be drowsier as they approached death.  For some 
this was because their symptoms were such that to be less aware was considered 
desirable in the present; others expressed what they believed they would want in the 
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future.  Barbara, for example, was a patient admitted for a short period of time to treat 
an infection, but who was very anxious to express her wishes about dying as I recorded 
in my field notes during a ward round. 
7:10  [Barbara said] she didn't really want to know much, she felt she just knew 
enough and didn't ask questions. She didn't want to be aware when the time comes 
though.  She said she would like to be ‘drugged up to the eyeballs’ if she could, 
and be totally unaware when the time comes. She didn't want to be in pain or 
suffering and wanted just to go - hopefully a long way off now though... [Later] 
she said again, ‘well, it's really simple, I wouldn’t want to be aware of dying, I 
just want it to happen’. 
[FN 02/06/10 line 127] 
Similarly Claire, a patient introduced in Chapters 4 and 5, had had a previous 
experience of requiring sedation for a short period of time to control overwhelming 
pain.  She recovered from that episode and had ‘tolerable’ pain when she said on a ward 
round: 
7:11  she would want to be sedated, she said that she would not want to be 
‘aware’, that she would want to be ‘out of it’ and… she did not want to suffer.     
[FN11/11/09 line 145] 
The avoidance of pain and suffering at the end of life is of course one of the principle 
aims and values of palliative care.  The explicit desire to be ‘unaware’ in dying, not only 
as the means of ensuring the avoidance of pain or suffering, but also as a desirable state 
and an end in its own right, is important when taking into account the way in which 
sedation is used at the end of life.   Not only does being unaware prevent the experience 
of pain and suffering, it may in itself be considered a desirable state.  The ‘natural’ 
death of dying in sleep, considered by staff in Chapter 4 to be a good death, achieves 
this through ‘natural’ process of becoming ‘more sleepy for more of the time’.  When 
sedation is used to control symptoms or signs of distress in dying, the associated 
reduction in consciousness has been so far considered as a means to the relief of 
distress, rather than the end aim being to reduce consciousness.  Nonetheless, the ‘good’ 
dying and death process is characterised by patients who die in their sleep; this is 
preferable to being ‘too aware’ in dying.  Thus while staff may express their desire to 
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treat the symptoms and signs of distress with minimal effect on consciousness, the 
characterisation of good dying in the hospice suggests that being unaware is an attribute 
which, while present, is not explicitly recognised or acknowledged.   The values 
concerning consciousness in dying of these patients and staff in the previous chapter 
may be considered in this respect to be shared; concerning good dying and death they 
may be seen to hold the same perspective of the ‘ideal’ mode of death.  In addition to 
the preferences expressed by patients, family members too, expressed how they wished 
their loved ones to die, especially in situations when they appeared to be ‘suffering’.  
This was seen in the previous chapter as Sandra’s brother emotively stated his desire for 
her to be ‘out of it’.   
7:12  He said it was terrible to see her as she was.  ‘She’s fighting it’ he said, he 
wished she would just ‘let go’.  He couldn’t bear watching her suffer like this, he 
said –‘you wouldn’t treat an animal like this’.  … At times he said he wanted to 
just push the syringe driver to end the suffering –what was happening was 
inevitable – why should people suffer like this?   
[FN 06/07/10, line 142] 
Another patient’s husband, too, felt that it would be better for her to stay asleep and not 
wake up: 
7:13  He went on to say he hoped that she didn’t suffer.  That he almost wished it 
would be over sooner rather than later, that she wouldn’t want to go on as she is 
now… He imagined… that waking up and realising that you’re still here and 
dying must be frightening.  It would be better he felt if she would just go now in 
her sleep, rather than wake up and be aware of everything all over again. 
[FN 18/11/09, line 197] 
Thus being unaware in dying, as developed in previous chapters, was seen as a way of 
bringing a good dying and death process.  Patients were expected to die in their ‘sleep’, 
whether a natural sleep or one induced by sedative drugs.  It was because this was a 
perspective shared by the vast majority of staff, patients and relatives, that this was 
considered the right way to die, and was rarely questioned or challenged; indeed I saw 
no challenges to this specific concept of the mode of dying during the observations.  In 
interviews, however, rare cases of challenge were easily recalled.  Indeed three 
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members of staff cited the same patient who had caused disquiet amongst the team 
because their relatives had questioned the use of sedation at the end of life.  One of the 
senior nurses, Susan, described the situation where a patient’s partner felt that she was 
being over-sedated by drugs. 
7:14  …her partner… didn't want me to give her certain drugs. I mean she did 
have… a midazolam driver, she had said she wanted that, but then he was fighting 
that, said the midazolam had over sedated her, so wanted it stopped… So...we did 
and she was agitated....and he apologised.  He said he should never have asked 
for that… [When it was stopped] she just became frightened again, agitated, 
unsettled.  Terrible, like crying, just really distressed again. So we put it back up.   
      [Susan, senior nurse, interview line 737] 
In this situation the patient's partner was said to have changed his views about her being 
over-sedated when witnessing the distress of being less sedated.  His apology appeared 
to vindicate the staff for using sedation in the way in which they had done when the 
alternative became evident.  When presented once again with distress, the patient’s 
partner fell into agreement with the staff in the hospice and sedation was able to treat 
the distress, through reducing consciousness.  In this rare situation in which sedation 
was challenged, when reintroduced, sedation allowed the patient to approach death 
without distress-behaviours and enabled her to die in her sleep.  The challenge was 
resolved, it seemed, when the patient was once again ‘settled’.  Some appeared to 
consider this mode of dying as the ‘right’ way to die.  One of the auxiliary nurses, 
Gwen, put it this way in her interview.    
7:15  I think family sometimes are at a loss and they’re trying to tell you what 
they would do but what they do isn’t always right is it?... We had a young woman 
and her daughter was looking after her quite a lot and if they thought something 
wasn’t right, they were on the buzzer and they were constantly, constantly buzzing 
saying she’d had too much of this and that, but eventually they started to calm 
down and they started realising that we were just looking after her mum’s best 
interests… her daughter eventually come around to our way.      
      [Gwen, auxiliary nurse, interview line 219] 
181 
 
Gwen described that patients’ families may not always be ‘right’ in the way they wished 
for their loved ones to be treated, suggesting that there may indeed be a ‘right’ way to 
do things.  Interestingly Gwen then used the same phrase as a nurse in McNamara’s 
study some 15 years earlier as she said that the patient’s daughter ‘come around to our 
way’.  As described in Chapter 1, McNamara conducted an ethnographic study in an 
Australian hospice in the early 1990s which primarily focused on the 
‘institutionalization’ of the ‘good death’.  She found that dying was so routinized in the 
hospice that there was a ‘right’ way to die; those who were not seen to conform were 
considered to have ‘problems’ (McNamara et al., 1994).  Indeed, in her study one nurse 
said she hoped that patients who initially railed against the hospice way of dying and 
against the acceptance of dying would eventually ‘come around to our way of thinking’.  
Gwen shared this perspective in her interview and an understanding of the aims of 
caring for dying patients, and ‘good’ dying has certainly been recognised in practice.  
What has so far been seen in the fieldwork, however, is that patients and their relatives 
appeared to share this desire for patients to be ‘comfortable’, ‘settled’, or even 
unconscious and unaware in dying.  While the data has predominately focused on the 
values of the staff in the hospice (influenced as they are by palliative care values), these 
values may be seen to set the context in which the values of others are considered.  Thus 
a patient’s values were considered from within the hospice context where values were 
shared.  Patients’ wishes appeared to be incorporated into decision-making, or at least 
this was an expressed intention.  For example, Julia, the doctor looking after Barbara, 
following her earlier plea not to be aware in dying, responded as I recorded in my field 
notes.    
7:16  Julia said it was really helpful to know what she thought about these things 
because, while some people are very peaceful and they just became more sleepy, 
some do became agitated or distressed and it is good to have an idea of their 
thoughts about these issues because they always try to make this the most 
important part of the decision of what to do. 
        [FN 02/06/10 line 132] 
As the patients’ values were predominately seen to be in keeping with those of staff, 
few concerns were apparent. While this position may appear to be convenient for staff, 
that these values were predominately shared is not altogether surprising.  In studies 
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concerning good dying and death, to be pain and symptom free is most frequently cited 
as the most highly regarded ‘attribute’ by patients (Hales et al., 2010).  Many would 
consider that dying in one’s sleep would be a ‘good death’ and if this ensures the 
freedom from pain and suffering, it may be quite naturally a ‘desirable’ death.   The 
avoidance of pain and suffering, on a patient’s behalf is also perhaps a ‘natural’ 
response for staff witnessing symptoms or signs of distress.  The important aspect is that 
these values are shared; relief of distress behaviours at the end of life  with sedative 
drugs used to achieve a state of being ‘comfortable’ and ‘peaceful’, was in keeping with 
the values of patients, their relatives and staff in the hospice.  Developing an 
understanding of this enables a greater understanding of situations in which these values 
may be diverse and conflicting.     
Thus the practice of sedation at the end of life was integral to end of life symptom 
management and part of routine practice.  Good dying was the motivation for this and   
was underpinned by the values of staff and the organisation and in practice incorporated 
the values of patients and their relatives. This section has introduced values and 
considered their influence on clinical practice, particularly in relation to the 
organisational values of the palliative care approach, but also in relation to the 
integration of these with individual values. Values have so far been considered to be 
predominately shared and to a large extent derived from the palliative care ‘approach’.  
However, values relating to the use of sedation at the end of life were occasionally seen 
to differ, as one case in particular highlights.  While this case appears to be concerned 
primarily with the reduction of a drug which was thought ostensibly to maintain 
consciousness, large doses of sedative drugs were also given at the same time.  The 
values relating to consciousness in dying are central to this case.  The purpose of this 
case study is to demonstrate the presence of divergent values but further, to explore the 
process of negotiation and acceptance of different values which are apparent through the 
data.  This will permit a greater understanding of the relevance of values to palliative 
care decision-making, particularly concerning the use of sedation, even to 
unconsciousness in dying. 
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7.3 Values diversity  
Harry was a 42 year old man with a glioblastoma multiforme (brain tumour).  He had 
previously been very active, working full time and playing an active part in local sports 
events.  He was married to Jenny who was a healthcare professional and they had a 
young child.  Harry had been diagnosed 3 years previously and had undergone surgery, 
radiotherapy and chemotherapy, before being told by his oncologist 3 months prior to 
admission to the hospice that there were no further treatments available to him.  He was 
admitted to the hospice for a period of respite and assessment as his mobility had been 
deteriorating at home and his wife had been struggling to manage.  Once admitted, 
Harry’s mobility deteriorated significantly and he was quickly unable to weight bear; 
within 2 weeks was predominately bed-bound.  Additionally, Harry’s cognitive skills 
declined and communication became more difficult.  He fluctuated between being able 
to make himself understood reasonably well and not being able to communicate at all.  
He had an expressive dysphasia which meant that at times his ‘yes’ meant a ‘no’ and 
vice versa.  Additionally, Harry’s conscious level fluctuated from being conscious and 
alert one day, to being unconscious for the whole of the following day.  Staff explained 
this fluctuation in consciousness as being related to the dose of steroids he was on 
(higher doses reduced the swelling around his brain and made him more alert), his 
tumour growing, and also his relative degree of dehydration (becoming more alert as he 
became dehydrated and less alert once he started drinking again – related to changes in 
his intracranial pressure).  He had also had several seizures prior to his admission and 
these continued during his admission.  During the times in which he was unable to 
swallow his anticonvulsant (anti-seizure) medication, an alternative drug to control 
seizures was administered.  Midazolam was then given continuously to prevent seizures 
from occurring.  This, often sedative drug, was given with the intention of preventing 
seizures from occurring, according to the doctors and nurses who looked after him.  
After several weeks of Harry’s condition steadily declining, but punctuated with spells 
of improvement and lucidity as well as of deterioration and unconsciousness, Harry was 
bed-bound and had increasing difficulty in communicating.  Several issues arose 
towards the end of Harry’s life.  First, Harry’s seizures became more frequent, despite 
being on a continuous infusion of midazolam; his midazolam dose was therefore 
gradually increased.  Second, there was concern that steroids were artificially keeping 
Harry alive in a situation in which he would not wish to continue to live.  Harry was 
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said to be frustrated and ‘too aware’, unable to communicate for the majority of the 
time.  Steroids were considered a life prolonging treatment but were also thought to be 
maintaining consciousness.  Harry was thought to be too alert and, as will be seen 
through the case, for him to be ‘asleep’ was considered preferable by many members of 
staff, especially the nurses.  This is important when considering changes in his sedative 
drugs as they were increased to treat and prevent seizures but had an additional effect on 
reducing his consciousness; helping his family and staff to ultimately be able to 
consider him ‘peaceful’.  Harry’s frustration was described by one of the nurses, Mollie, 
in an interview.        
7:17  sometimes he would be able to nod, sometimes he’d be able to shake his 
head, sometimes he wouldn’t, and it would just be his eyes and he would just 
shake with frustration sometimes… and when we used to speak to him we used to 
say ‘are you tired Harry?’, and he would just look, and I think it was just, just the 
look, you could just tell that he was just so frustrated, and he just used to shut his 
eyes sometimes and just really dismiss us, which to me I thought was quite 
frustrating.  
[Mollie, staff nurse, interview line 133] 
Mollie felt that Harry was too aware and Linda, too, felt that his sedative drugs should 
be increased as he was too aware, as they both described in a morning handover 
meeting. 
7:18  [Mollie] went on to say he is awake and not asleep… Barbara [Harry’s 
wife] was getting very tearful, Mollie added, and said Harry was on 100mg of 
midazolam.   Linda [senior nurse] said to John [junior doctor] that that was about 
as much midazolam as you give – and he would need to be reviewed to see if he 
needed more of the phenobarbitone, or levomepromazine now.  She said that he 
was just not settled just now, he needs to be asleep.   
[FN 22/06/10, line 55] 
As Mollie said in the handover meeting, Harry’s wife, Barbara, was also becoming 
increasingly distressed by his frustration and felt he would not have wanted to continue 
as he was; she therefore asked that any life-prolonging treatments were withdrawn.  She 
asked whether steroids might be prolonging his life at this stage and it was felt by the 
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doctors and nurses that they probably were. While steroids might have been controlling 
intra-cerebral oedema
1
, thus preventing symptoms such as headaches or seizures, it was 
felt that these could be controlled, at least in theory, through other drugs such as 
analgesics and sedative drugs to control seizure activity.  So while Harry’s sedative 
drugs were said, particularly in interviews, to be used with the intention of reducing 
seizures, he was also thought to be ‘too aware’, and a suggestion made that his sedation 
be increased, with the acknowledged outcome that he would be less aware and less 
frustrated.  Additionally, a reduction in his steroids ostensibly maintaining his 
consciousness and controlling symptoms, was recognised to carry a risk of increased 
seizures and potentially headaches: the proposed response to which was the increase in 
sedation (to treat seizures) and the use of analgesia (to treat headaches).  This was 
clearly a complex decision and one about which both the consultant and registrar 
involved felt uneasy.  One of the registrars looking after Harry recalled in an interview 
the process of discussing the reduction in steroids with Harry’s wife. 
7:19  I suppose one of the hardest things I found was… with his steroids and 
reducing those… well we’d been going through his medications when he’d 
become more unwell, then we discussed the steroids and what effect would it have 
reducing them, and that it might… make him more symptomatic… And we 
discussed the fact that you could consider the steroids a life prolonging treatment 
in his situation, if it were to be keeping any… oedema at a minimum.  And that 
was a really difficult conversation to have with her, I think because I’m so - 
steroids are what people with brain tumours are on and you don’t think about 
reducing them down because they’ll get all these complications… I could see 
where they [the nurses] were coming from and the idea that the dexamethasone
2
 
was a life prolonging measure, rather than a symptomatic benefit for him… we 
were very aware of the consequences but it was just not something I’d seen before 
I suppose… if there had been any oedema, then it would get worse.  As a result, 
he’d become more drowsy and there would be the potential to shorten his life.   
      [Grace, registrar, interview line 72] 
                                                 
1
 Fluid within the brain tissue, produced in response to inflammation, sometimes reduced by steroids. 
2
 A steroid drug. 
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Grace felt concerned about reducing steroids, partly, it seemed, because ‘steroids are 
what people with brain tumours are on’; this was, for Grace, a previously unquestioned 
treatment for patients at the end of life in the hospice. She recognised the consequence 
of this as an increase in Harry’s symptoms and drowsiness and also felt there was a risk 
of ‘hastening death’.  Michael, the consultant, had similar concerns and stated clearly 
that he felt this was not something that collectively they would normally ‘do’.  He went 
on to reason, however, that in this situation reducing steroids may be the best option for 
Harry and his family.   
7:20  [I] felt uneasy about reducing the steroids… because there was a slight 
feeling that we were hastening his death which we don’t do… but on the other 
hand if they didn't feel that the quality was there and it was something which we 
were giving him that was sustaining him that goes along the lines of withdrawing 
and withholding treatments… But again as I said that was quite an uneasy action, 
you know, it’s just not something we usually do… it's not something which we 
found very straightforward because on one hand the feeling is that we shouldn’t, 
really be doing any harm, and was continuing the steroids doing harm? Reducing 
the steroids doing any harm to him in terms of hastening the rate of change 
potentially, potentially giving him more complications and problems of raised 
intracranial pressure? But similarly was it harmful to sustain him in that fashion? 
The family were very, very distressed, also that could affect their bereavement, I 
guess on one hand we should be focussing on him because our duty and focus is 
on him really. But there were just a lot of factors which went into it... it wasn’t 
straightforward. 
[Michael, consultant, interview line 143] 
Michael expressly stated that hastening death was something which ‘we don’t do’: this 
was more than a personal statement, it seemed, and refers to a broader interpretation of 
what is ‘done’, or perhaps to what ought to be ‘done’ in the hospice context.  This is 
also integral to the WHO definition which states that: ‘palliative care intends neither to 
hasten death or [sic] prolong life’.  Michael and Grace explicitly stated their discomfort 
that their actions in reducing steroids might, unintentionally, hasten death.  Conversely, 
one of the senior nurses, Heather, stated in an MDT meeting concerning Harry, that it 
felt as though ‘we’re keeping people alive’.  Implicit in the context of this statement 
187 
 
was that ‘keeping people alive’ was a deliberate act in the manner of prolonging life, 
and this was something, in this case, that they ought not to be doing.  Grace and 
Michael appeared uneasy about hastening death (by the reduction in steroids), while 
Heather was equally concerned, it seemed, about not keeping Harry alive.  Both values 
are conveyed in the WHO definition of palliative care; rather than simply not hastening 
death, however, the WHO definition importantly states an intent not to hasten death.  
Grace and Michael were both clear in their interviews that their intention was to relieve 
Harry’s distress yet were still concerned about the ‘risk’ of hastening death.  In contrast, 
Heather was forceful in her view that to keep Harry alive, against his previously held 
wishes, would have been wrong and was equally not part of ‘what we do in palliative 
care’.  The multi-disciplinary team were in agreement that Barbara appeared to speak 
from a clear understanding of his wishes and his parents, too, were in agreement that 
continuing to live as he was not in keeping with his previous wishes.  While Grace and 
Michael acknowledged their misgivings, they both reasoned that because this was not 
something which Harry would have wanted and reducing steroids was a withdrawal of a 
life-prolonging treatment, although its withdrawal may cause an increase in symptoms, 
the harm of continuing steroids was greater to Harry (in prolonging a life he didn’t or 
wouldn’t have wanted to live) than withdrawing them.   
Ultimately, Harry’s steroids were reduced and initially his condition did not change.  
Grace was relieved that Harry’s condition did not change rapidly after the dose 
reduction and that her actions did not seem to directly correspond with a reduction in 
Harry’s consciousness as she said in an interview:  
7:21  his conscious level didn’t change directly proportionally to how we’d 
reduced the steroids which I think I found a bit easier, rather than if we had 
reduced the steroids and the next day, then he’d become a lot more unwell 
[Grace, registrar, interview line 113] 
Even though Grace had acknowledged the risks of reducing steroids she felt relieved not 
to see a direct response to the reduction.  Over time, however, he did develop more 
seizures and the sedative drug phenobarbital
3
 was increased in response to this.  
                                                 
3
 A barbiturate drug used to treat seizures and also used at the end of life to cause sedation 
188 
 
Additionally the phenobarbital was considered by some of the nurses in particular to be 
necessary to help Harry to be ‘less aware’ as seen in the earlier extract.  In the context 
of a reduced steroid dose and increased seizures however, Michael and Grace did not 
consider the addition of phenobarbital to have had a significant impact on Harry’s 
conscious level.   
7:22  I know it can certainly sedate quite heavily but...hard to know because he 
was already quite sleepy at that stage… so I'm not necessarily sure it added a 
great deal more to the level of sedation anyway… I don't think it was necessary in 
that if he was already sleepy... but certainly the intent there was to try to manage 
the symptoms which is what we were trying to focus on, even though he was 
effectively sedated by a combination of the reduced steroids, his disease and of 
course the midazolam and phenobarb.   
[Michael, consultant interview line 201] 
This statement appears in contrast to the earlier accounts from the nurses, Mollie and 
Linda, as they said that Harry was too aware and ought to be asleep.  Grace, too, felt 
that the sedative drugs contributed little to Harry’s level of consciousness, going further 
as she clearly felt the reduction in steroids was more accountable for his reduced 
consciousness than the sedative drugs. 
7:23  I see it as we didn’t actively sedate him with medications but we withdrew 
medications that meant he would become less conscious.  Um...but that was a 
very...conscious decision for us to do that and it had been thought through and 
discussed with the full team, which I found quite helpful.  And although I felt 
uncomfortable about it, then I think it was the right thing to do. 
[Grace, registrar interview, line 360] 
The nurses looking after Harry felt pleased that he was more ‘settled’ in the final week 
of his life following the reduction in steroids and increase in midazolam and 
phenobarbital: they felt that he was no longer as frustrated as he had been, as Mollie 
described in her interview: 
7:24  In the last week he woke up very little, but if he opened his eyes he looked 
really sleepy, he looked really settled, and not like before we increased the 
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midazolam and phenobarb [phenobarbital], you know, [then] when he opened his 
eyes he looked quite distressed…  In the last week of his life you could go to him 
and he’d be peaceful. Sometimes he wasn’t rousable but the times that he did 
open his eyes he looked totally relaxed, really relaxed and yeah, just really 
peaceful… And his face looked relaxed and kind of prior to that sometimes you 
could see him scrunching up or biting down and again just kind of being over to 
one side and really contracted but with the… midazolam and phenobarb.in the 
driver it really helped just relaxing him, and his wife… said you know ‘he looks 
peaceful’ which is something that he hadn’t had during the admission.  
[Mollie staff nurse, interview, line 314] 
Mollie thought the addition and increase of the sedative drugs enabled him to be 
‘peaceful’ in the last week of life.  Indeed, in contrast to Grace and Michael, Mollie 
concentrated less on the reduction in steroids and more on the contribution of sedation 
to Harry’s care.  Mollie also stressed the importance of making decisions as a team and 
with Harry’s wife Barbara.  Throughout the course of Harry’s stay in the hospice 
Barbara was involved in the decision-making process, and the staff felt satisfied as a 
team that she expressed views consistent with Harry’s previous wishes.  His parents, 
too, were involved in decision-making, although to a lesser extent.  Mollie recalled 
there being frequent conversations with Barbara and other members of Harry’s family 
and also the ‘negotiations’ which took place relating to Harry’s steroids.   
7:25  They [Harry’s family] were actually quite involved, the consultant spoke to 
them, we kind of always spoke to them to say, you know, ‘I'm considering doing 
this you know, I think I need to do it because’ and he would you know, tell them 
the rationale behind it and you know discuss it, I mean and there was kind of a lot 
of negotiating between the team and the family about his steroids. 
[Mollie staff nurse, interview, line 194] 
Similarly Alice, the social worker involved in Harry’s care felt that as far as she was 
aware, from speaking to Barbara, felt strongly that there had been full and open 
discussions about the different treatment options, including withdrawal of treatment and 
likely consequences.  She felt this open discussion to be of crucial importance and in an 
interview said: ‘I put my faith in those conversations’. She went on to describe further 
her view: 
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7:26  I think for me the important thing is consultation, working in partnership.  
It's looking at how best we feel ethically we can support our patient and hopefully 
by supporting our patient we can support the family.  And I think sometimes we 
have a real struggle because the family's needs come to the forefront so much, 
because we see how desperate they are about different, you know, all different 
situations. But the patient's needs at that particular time I feel very strongly have 
to come first. And we will be around to support the family with whatever while the 
patient is alive, but also support them after death as well. So I think that's 
probably my feeling that it needs to be with...everything needs to be done with, 
with full consultation.  
[Alice, social worker, interview line 279] 
While there were clear differences in perspectives and values evident through this case, 
the process of communication and negotiation, it appeared, allowed most staff  to reflect 
on it as a positive experience, having facilitated a process through which, ultimately 
they ‘got it right’.  As a senior nurse, Linda, said in an interview: 
7:27   So from Harry’s point of view I felt that erm it did take us quite a while to 
get to the place where we felt that steroids could come down and midazolam could 
increase but I felt as though that was very well thought through. But also we took 
very much into consideration his wife’s feelings. And I think most of the time we 
get that right and I think that we did on this occasion. 
     [Linda, senior nurse, interview line 47] 
While Grace agreed with this view that ‘in the end’ they had probably reached the right 
decision, Michael appeared to question the decisions which were made, concluding 
however that there were few ‘easy options’.   
 7:28  I think in this case… we weren't genuinely that sure how long he was going 
to live because… prognosticating in patients with brain tumours and the 
fluctuating course of their illness most of the time makes it harder to tell… and 
while sedation was one aspect I think, I think overall the case was… complicated 
because of the social needs, the psychological support for his relatives as well, 
being a young man, having a young wife… having parents who were still alive… I 
191 
 
think some of the decisions which we had to make, like relating to the steroids, 
who, who are we making it for? Was it genuinely in his best interests to reduce 
them? Making capacity judgements. There were lots of different people who had 
different points of view and to try to negotiate through that, was difficult as well. I 
think in terms of… the management of his seizures as I said I don't think there 
were that many easy options so… I think the midazolam and phenobarb. was 
probably a necessary step... but again I think it's something which we need to 
review anyhow because any time we use it we're just conscious, or at least I feel 
quite conscious I don't want to be sedating people, it can make people look a lot 
more ill than they actually are once you take that step… 
     [Michael, consultant, interview line 236] 
Uncertainty about finding a ‘right’ option from a series of difficult options can be seen 
to pervade Michael’s recollection of events.  He recognised the different perspectives 
involved and the need to ‘negotiate’ these views.  In practice, these decisions to reduce 
steroids and later to increase and add in a second sedative drug occurred as a process 
which evolved over the course of Harry’s admission.  There were daily discussions 
about Harry’s condition and reflections on what was happening, as well as decisions 
about the impact of his symptoms, alertness and communication on his family.  Mollie 
and Alice both stressed the importance of the communication and negotiation which 
took place while Michael recognised the different ‘points of view’.  These points of 
view can be seen to arise from different value perspectives, characterised by the 
difference in approach between the doctors and nurses in this situation.   
While Grace and Michael were anxious about the risk of hastening death through a 
reducion in steroids, the nurses appeared more concerned with the ‘risk’ of postponing 
death for a patient who would not have wished to be kept alive, a view shared in this 
case by Harry’s family.  While the WHO definition of palliative care expresses the 
intent not to hasten death nor prolong life, there is an interesting distinction between the 
doctors’ and nurses’ interpretation and emphasis of values.  Randall and Downie would 
assert there to be a tension here, between those influenced by a philosophy which 
discourages prolonging life and a more modern conception of palliative care in which 
prolonging life is increasingly part of practice, in keeping with increasing technological 
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interventions even at the end of life (Randall and Downie, 2006: 102).  An active desire 
to prolong life creates a greater divide between the two perspectives and involves more 
of a conceptual shift: the change from an active desire to prolong life, to accepting the 
potential to hasten death, is greater than the conceptual change from simply not 
prolonging life, to the acceptance of the potential to hasten death.  The discomfort 
experienced by Grace and Michael may be related to a change of this nature; their 
desires not to hasten death perhaps strengthened by an underlying desire to in fact 
prolong life.  Perhaps the perspective of the nurses and Harry’s family is more 
representative of the traditional palliative care values and especially concerned with the 
statement that palliative care does not intend to prolong life.   
While the value differences explored through Harry’s situation have marked particular 
differences between those of the doctors and nurses, through a process of negotiation, 
decisions were made as a team.  The integrity of both sets of values remained intact and 
neither was undermined in the final decisions which were made.  While this case 
demonstrates a relatively rare situation of differences in values in the hospice, because 
of the changing nature of palliative care, the frequency of different and conflicting 
values may indeed increase.  As well as there being diversity of values among staff, this 
may also exist between staff and patients, as well as their relatives in the hospice; as 
access to hospice care increases for patients with different, non-malignant diagnoses at 
different stages in their illness this diversity of values, too, is more likely to increase.  
An emphasis on choice at the end of life may broaden the concepts of end of life care 
and lead to the potential for value conflicts.  As more interventional techniques are 
feasible at the end of life in hospices, and as palliative care integrates more into 
mainstream medicine, conflict may arise between the traditional hospice values-
structure and the more science-based ‘medical model’ perspective of mainstream 
medicine, with one possible example considered above.  This may be particularly 
evident at the end of life as the traditionally accepted hospice model of using sedation to 
facilitate the hospice construct of good dying may be challenged.  In this context, 
approaches to facilitate decision-making in the situation of complex and conflicting 
values, may be considered.  Values-based practice is one such approach which may be 
considered.          
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7.4 Values and values-based practice  
I have shown through the data some of the underpinning values at work when staff were 
making decisions about sedation at the end of life.  These values have been seen to be 
derived from palliative care values as they have evolved since its inception with the 
modern hospice movement.  These values, embedded within the ‘ethos’ or ‘philosophy’ 
of palliative care were discussed in Chapter 1; their relevance to the practice of sedation 
in the hospice becomes evident through the data presented in this chapter.  In particular, 
staff have been seen to draw on these values as they make decisions, frequently 
characterised through the data with reference to ‘what we do’.  When tested, or in 
conflict, these values were expressed more explicitly and related to the accepted and 
known values of palliative care. These values, it seemed, determined the practice of 
sedation, before ethics.  By this I mean that before a concern about how sedation ought 
to be used at the end of life, in practice, staff were motivated by values.  Values 
influenced, often in an implicit and unseen way, the reasoning processes of decision-
making.  For example, in Harry’s case described above, an important distinction 
between the withdrawal of a treatment and the patient’s subsequent death, because of 
his underlying illness, was crucial to the doctors in making decisions: it seemed that the 
hastening of death would have been contrary to their underlying values.   In this way, 
values may be seen to have a dominant effect on the everyday practice of sedation at the 
end of life.    
An approach which recognises the influence of values on clinical practice has been 
developed in recent years.  ‘Values-Based Practice’ (VBP), in providing a framework 
for decision-making in cases of conflicting values, explains the theory of values in 
practice and how values are involved in everyday clinical decision-making.  Though 
values may be unseen they can still wield significant influence.  This holds relevance 
for all areas of clinical practice, and while developed from psychiatry, VBP can usefully 
be considered in relation to my data to explain an area of practice, namely the 
underlying influence of values on the use of sedation at the end of life.  
7.4.1 Values-Based Practice 
Values-based practice (VBP) has been developed by Fulford and is defined as: 
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the theory and practice of effective healthcare decision-making for situations in 
which legitimately different (and hence potentially conflicting) value 
perspectives are in play (Fulford, 2004a: 204). 
The basis for VBP is found in philosophical value theory which is itself concerned with 
the logical properties of value terms (Fulford et al., 2002).  Having developed a 
theoretical argument for an alternative approach to the ‘medical model’ of healthcare, 
Fulford has argued for a: 
more whole or complete view of medicine which incorporates both evaluative 
and descriptive elements of medical practice (Fulford, 1989: 261).   
Fulford suggests that the conventional medical model of healthcare is based 
predominately on facts; he argues, however, that in contrast, its conceptual structure is 
evaluative (Fulford, 1989: 260).  The ‘complete view’ is found in VBP, combining as it 
does facts and values in medical decision-making.  The ten principles of VBP can be 
seen in Table 7:1: rather than summarise all principles I will focus only on those which 
relate directly to and offer an explanation for my data. 
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No. The 10 Principles 
1 All decisions stand on two feet, on values as well as on facts, including decisions about 
diagnosis (the "two feet" principle) 
2 We tend to notice values only when they are diverse or conflicting and hence are likely to be 
problematic (the "squeaky wheel" principle) 
3 Scientific progress, in opening up choices, is increasingly bringing the full diversity of human 
values into play in all areas of healthcare (the "science-driven" principle) 
4 VBP's "first call" for information is the perspective of the patient or patient group concerned 
in a given decision (the "patient perspective" principle) 
5 In VBP, conflicts of values are resolved primarily not by reference to a rule prescribing a 
"right" outcome, but by processes designed to support a balance of legitimately different 
perspectives (the "multi-perspective" principle) 
6 Careful attention to language use in a given context is one of a range of powerful methods for 
raising awareness of values (the "values blindness" principle) 
7 A rich resource of both empirical and philosophical methods is available for improving our 
knowledge of other people’s values (the "values myopia" principle) 
8 Ethical reasoning is employed in VBP primarily to explore differences of values, not, as in 
quasi-legal bioethics, to determine "what is right" (the "space of values" principle) 
9 In VBP communication skills have a substantive rather than (as in quasi-legal ethics) a merely 
executive role in clinical decision making (the "how it’s done" principle) 
10 VBP, although involving a partnership with ethicists and lawyers (equivalent to the 
partnership with scientists and statisticians in EBM), puts decision making back where it 
belongs, with users and providers at the clinical coal-face (the "who decides" principle) 
Table 7:1: The 10 Principles of VBP 
The first principle of VBP is: 
All decisions stand on two feet, on values as well as on facts, including 
decisions about diagnosis (Fulford, 2004a: 208). 
This principle relies on acknowledging a distinction between facts and values and the 
presence of both in all decisions.  The role of values has been seen in the first section of 
this chapter to be fundamental to decision-making about the use of sedation at the end 
of life.  Following an assessment of the ‘facts’ of a case, values have been seen to guide 
the actions of staff in making decisions about using sedation at the end of life.   For 
example, while initially appearing to be relatively straightforward, Harry’s situation 
revealed more complexity of values which became evident as decisions about sedation 
were tested and differing values came to the fore.  In a similar way to the development 
of evidence-based medicine as a response to the increasing complexity of facts, the 
increasing complexity of values has led to the development of values-based practice; to 
196 
 
deal with the increasing complexity of values in decision-making and situations in 
which these values conflict.    
In developing values-based practice Fulford has taken the perspective of Hare in 
considering there to be a logical divide between facts and values, or between 
‘descriptive’ and ‘evaluative’ terms.  He therefore considers it to be impossible to 
‘define a genuinely evaluative notion in purely descriptive terms’ (Fulford et al., 1994: 
201).  Hare’s non-descriptivist approach, suggesting a logical divide between facts and 
values also provides the theoretical basis to explain the relative descriptive or evaluative 
strength of a term.  When there is little variation in understanding of a concept or term, 
i.e. when there is a shared perspective or understanding, it will hold predominately 
descriptive properties: when, however, there is wide variation in understanding and 
perspective, the notion will be considered largely evaluative.  In medical terms, 
decisions about which there is much agreement can be considered relatively value-
neutral; while values are present, they are not considered problematic and indeed may 
be unseen in daily clinical practice.  This was seen throughout the data as the 
predominately shared values regarding the use of sedation at the end of life were 
relatively hidden in clinical practice.  It is only through considering the shared language 
and behaviours of staff in relation to the practice of sedation that their values become 
evident.  The use of sedation was familiar and understood, and raised no questions in 
‘routine’ practice.  The use of ‘routine’ sedation indeed relies on shared values about 
these distress-behaviours and consciousness in dying.  In contrast, when sedation was 
non-routine and decisions concerning its use became explicit, values became more 
evident.  For example, though not expressed overtly as ‘values’, staff used value-laden 
terms to describe how they felt Harry should be treated.  The doctors in Harry’s case 
expressed their discomfort about decision-making and the divergence of values became 
more overt.   Thus while the predominately shared values in the hospice led to there 
being considered a ‘right’ way to die in the hospice, as long as these values were shared 
no problems or concerns became evident.  It was when there was a difference in values 
that values became evident.  This argument forms the second principle of VBP: 
We tend to notice values only when they are diverse or conflicting and hence 
are likely to be problematic (Fulford, 2004a: 209). 
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The third principle of VBP concerns an anticipated increase in values-diversity as 
scientific progress continues.  As scientific progress is made and more choice is 
available in all areas of healthcare, including end of life care, there will be more 
diversity of values and hence the potential for conflicting values is increased.   This has 
been highlighted earlier in this chapter in relation to palliative care; as palliative care 
develops and expands in context as well as in scope to incorporate patients with any life 
limiting illness at any stage in disease, the values which are brought alongside this 
expansion are likely to be more diverse than those contained within the narrow 
conception of hospice care of the 1960s.  Furthermore, as this third principle of VBP 
suggests, the scientific developments likely in the future will also bring further diversity 
of values.  This has been seen in recent years and, VBP would assert, is likely to be the 
case in the future.  In recent years, for example, the use of implantable cardiac 
defibrillators and domiciliary non-invasive ventilation has brought challenges to 
palliative care.  While switching off a life sustaining treatment is a relatively common 
decision in intensive care settings, this decision occurs relatively infrequently in a 
hospice setting (Nambisan and Chao, 2004).  Different values are brought into play 
through this type of intervention, and different approaches to managing decisions have 
been sought (Mueller et al., 2008).  While there is an increasing availability of 
interventional techniques and procedures for patients approaching the end of their lives, 
this brings the potential for a host of different decisions to be required to be made; in 
turn this generates an increased likelihood of divergent values.   Further advances such 
as this can be seen to be likely to present similar challenges, especially of an evaluative 
nature.     
Aside from, or perhaps because of, such medical interventions and developments, 
changing societal attitudes towards death and dying may also generate more values 
diversity: as support for a change in legislation regarding physician assisted dying 
increases, the strength of support in opposition may also increase.  Palliative care has 
traditionally opposed assisted dying and indeed this is held within its WHO definition, 
or ‘philosophy’, as it is described by Randall and Downie.   Conflicts of values are 
likely to become increasingly frequent in end of life decision-making; the recognition of 
this is important if the specialty of palliative care is to be able to support patients, and 
their values, preferences and wishes, as they approach the end of their lives.  If there is 
an assumption of shared values there is a risk of not being able to identify differing 
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values if not clearly expressed.  This, indeed is a risk captured within the 6
th
 and 7
th
 
principles of VBP; the ‘values-blindness’ and ‘values-myopia’ principles.  As seen 
throughout the data, values concerning the way in which patients should be cared for at 
the end of life were overwhelmingly shared by staff in the hospice.  In particular, the 
way in which sedation was used as a patient was imminently dying was accepted to be 
part of normal clinical practice and at times not acknowledged to be sedation, even 
when causing a reduction in patient consciousness.  This implicit understanding of the 
use of routine sedation, and assumption of shared values concerning its use, could lead 
to a failure to acknowledge or recognise the values of others when they do in fact differ.  
Because of its implicit nature there is an, unintentional, risk of suppressing the values of 
patients.  For such a practice to be so implicit as to be unseen is significant in the 
current medical context where there is strenuous promotion of patient choice at the end 
of life.  Studies which have explored patient wishes at the end of life, and conceptions 
of a good death, have indeed found wide variations in preferences and values of what it 
is to have a good death; specifically some have expressed a preference to be aware and 
alert while others believe they would rather be unaware and sedated (Hales et al., 2010, 
Vig and Pearlman, 2004).  Perhaps preferences change as a patient nears death: to 
assume that all patients as they die wish to be treated in the same way with sedation is, 
however, to appear to dismiss the value of an individual in their dying.  VBP recognises 
the risk of the assumption of shared values in causing ‘values-blindness’ and directs 
towards the ‘skills’ of VBP, developed to raise awareness and knowledge of values in 
clinical practice, develop skills through careful attention to language and seeks to raise 
awareness of values in this way.  Furthermore, understanding of different perspectives 
is promoted, to avoid ‘values-myopia’, or a very narrow understanding of patient-
perspectives.  The development of a broader scope for palliative care over the past 
decade, and in the future, requires such an understanding, if hospice palliative care is to 
be able to reach the broadening horizons and perspectives of a palliative care 
population. 
This brief overview of VBP allows an exploration of the ways in which its application 
in an increasingly values-diverse healthcare setting may enhance clinical decision-
making.  Importantly, VBP is not considered to supplant other forms of decision-
making; Fulford rather considers that it will supplement the ‘tools’ of ‘quasi-legal’ 
bioethics (Fulford et al., 2006) and can stand ‘side by side’ with the principles of EBM 
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in clinical decision-making (Fulford, 2004b).  In the field of palliative medicine the 
‘space’ for values-based practice is clear.  Concerned with a patient-centred approach to 
care since its conception (Saunders, 1978a), the theory and practice of an approach 
which promotes respect for diversity of values and which may improve clinical 
decision-making in a complex area is invaluable.  Clearly, however, there are 
challenges.  As the data has suggested, the predominately shared values in the hospice 
regarding end of life care may have led to ‘values-blindness’ in some quarters.  Indeed 
the palliative care ‘approach’, in some respects, may be seen to promote this; it 
advocates a particular version of providing end of life symptom control and care as it 
has moved out of the hospices into other contexts.  This is seen most prominently at a 
national level through the LCP.  In response to initial problems and following reviews 
of its use in clinical practice, however, it has undergone 11 substantial revisions and in 
its 12
th
 version promotes a much broader perspective, focused on the individual 
patient’s needs and facilitating a process of inter-disciplinary assessment and care.  
Hospices, as they care for a more diverse population of patients with different 
perspectives and needs, may also experience more frequent conflicts of values in the 
future.  Increasing integration with mainstream, medicine is likely to continue and this, 
as well as the increasingly diverse hospice population, is likely to generate more 
conflicts of values.   Awareness of the particular values of palliative care and their role 
in clinical practice is likely to become an important part of decision-making in 
situations of value conflicts in the future.  The theory and skills of values-based practice 
applied in palliative care may enhance clinical decision-making in situations of complex 
and conflicting values in the future.      
7.5 Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis values can be seen to have underpinned the practice of using 
sedation. Indeed, rather than complex ethical discussions occurring regarding how 
sedation ought to be used, most frequently an implicit understanding of how sedation 
ought to be used was observed.  This implicit nature was evident when values were 
shared; differences in values were made explicit through the process of decision-making 
and this was seen through the case study in this chapter.  The recognition of the 
underpinning values has important implications. First, if decision-making regarding 
sedation is implicit when values are shared, there is a risk, as explored through VBP 
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above, of there becoming an assumption of shared values, and the potential to override a 
patient’s values, especially when vulnerable at the end of life. 
Second, the values underpinning the practice of sedation in this hospice population may 
be very different to those outwith this environment.  Specialist palliative care in a 
hospice has developed with a clear link to the hospice movement of the 1960s; 
mainstream medicine has developed along a separate path.  The values of staff in 
mainstream medicine may differ from those in a hospice and this may impact on patient 
care.  In the absence of an explicit understanding of values which drive end of life 
practices, conflicts in approaches may exist and this may lead to a smaller, self-selecting 
group of patients choosing hospice care. 
Third, sedation is being debated at an international level.  The development of this 
philosophy and practice of palliative care is unique to the UK.  While other countries 
may have developed palliative care services in a similar way, the underpinning values of 
palliative care have developed independently, influenced by different cultural and 
societal norms.  This is most apparent perhaps in countries where euthanasia and 
physician assisted suicide have been legalised.  If the practice of sedation is 
underpinned and driven by values, the practices in different countries will differ 
accordingly.  While there has been a desire to standardise practice through international 
guidelines, perhaps what is needed first is an explicit understanding of the underpinning 
values of the practice, which may allow for diversity to be more openly tolerated.   
These implications, as well as the wider implications of this study for future practice, 
are discussed in the final chapter.
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Chapter 8 Implications for future practice 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has described the practice of sedation in a UK hospice and generated an 
understanding of its normative basis.  This is bound to an implicit understanding of the 
process of dying, described fully in Chapter 4.  The underlying motivations for this 
practice may be seen to rest in the desire to bring about a comfortable and peaceful 
dying process, fulfilling some of the previously described attributes of good dying and 
death.  This is underscored by the values of staff in the hospice; striving to achieve this 
‘good’ dying process, facilitated through the use of sedative drugs to bring about a 
process of dying which is free from distress.   
This thesis has clear implications for UK and international palliative care practice.  In 
this chapter I first examine the implications of the conceptual model of sedation as it 
relates to the process of dying, and reflect on its contribution to the literature base on 
this subject.  This includes not only the practice of ‘routine’ sedation, occurring when 
there is a clear understanding of a patient’s dying trajectory, but also ‘non-routine’ 
sedation, when the prognosis for a patient is uncertain.  I reconsider the case of the 
controversial ‘continuous deep sedation’, described in Chapter 2, in light of the results 
of my study.  I turn to focus on two particularly difficult areas of practice which have 
been highlighted; prolonged dying and the use of p.r.n. medication.  I then consider the 
importance of understanding the values which underlie the practice of sedation in a 
hospice, especially for patients who lack capacity.  In the last section of this chapter I 
turn to the implications of this research for future clinical practice: I consider the 
changes occurring in hospices, with a move to increase the care for patients with non-
malignant disease and the changes this will mean for decision-making at the end of life.  
Finally, I consider the implications of these changes for palliative care.  Mainstream 
medicine has become more patient-centred, with patient choice and experience at the 
forefront of a changing NHS (DH, 2010, McClimans et al., 2011).  Within this context, 
I suggest that palliative care as a specialty must be aware of its values and influence on 
clinical practice in order to ensure that it continues to offer a ‘patient-centred’ approach 
and not simply a ‘palliative care-centred’ approach.  Values-based practice is one 
framework which supports this and promotes patient-centred care.  Palliative care has 
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already broadened its practice over the past decade to incorporate patients with all life-
limiting illnesses; I suggest re-examination of its underlying values may enhance even 
further the provision of patient centred care.  
8.2 Routine and Proportional Sedation 
8.2.1 Routine 
Sedation has been shown in this study to be a routine and integral part of end of life 
care.  Sedation is routine not only when providing symptom control without a reduction 
in consciousness but also at the end of life when there is acceptance of a reduction in 
consciousness.  This is an important empirical finding when considering the current 
literature regarding sedation, as reflected in Chapter 2.  This study has shown there is a 
continuum of decisions about sedation, which relates to the degree of acceptance of a 
reduction in a patient’s consciousness, depending on how imminent death is thought to 
be.  A conceptual model of this has been developed and is seen in Figure 8:1 
 
Figure 8:1: Conceptual model of sedation at the end of life 
 Decisions to use sedative drugs to control symptoms without acceptance of a reduction 
in patient consciousness for those who are not dying lie at one end of this continuum; at 
the other lie decisions to use sedative drugs to control symptoms or signs of distress 
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with acceptance of a reduction in patient consciousness in an imminently dying patient.  
The interpretation of dying is of the upmost importance and is recognised as a process 
rather than being recognised at one specific point in time.  There is a process of 
interpretation as a patient’s condition deteriorates and the accumulation of ‘cues’ 
culminates in a patient being recognised as dying, often expressed by staff as a patient 
being ‘on the LCP’.  This process has been recognised to occur through ‘sequences of 
dying’ which are without clear dimensions; thus the point at which a patient progresses 
through one point in the sequence and reaches another is indistinct, but reflected at 
some point through a change in the language staff use to describe the patient.  This is a 
recognised, anticipated, sequence of dying which begins with the identification of a 
patient as ‘deteriorating’1.  While at this point a patient may improve and be treated for 
a reversible cause for their deterioration, if they do not improve they continue to be 
described as ‘deteriorating’, before entering a point at which dying is more openly 
acknowledged, in the phrase ‘heading for the LCP’.  This process was recognised 
initially through changes in a patient’s physical condition, such as being less able to 
mobilise, or transfer out of bed; latterly it was recognised through changes in a patient’s 
alertness, or awareness.  This was the expected sequence of dying, while not replicated 
for each patient, it was nonetheless the process which was anticipated, described to 
patients and witnessed to inform daily practice as patients were discussed and 
treatments adjusted.  By the time a patient is ‘on the LCP’ their dying is explicitly 
recognised; even before this point, however, it is often implicitly recognised.    The 
boundaries between the sequences of dying are indistinct and the boundaries between 
acceptance and non-acceptance of a reduction in consciousness due to sedative drugs 
are equally unclear.  So ingrained in the practice of end of life care is the use of sedation 
that this acceptance of a reduction in consciousness, too, is implicitly understood in 
practice.  This transition from not dying to dying, from non-acceptance to acceptance, 
occurs on a daily basis, recognised in relation to the accumulation of cues of transition 
from one status of dying into another.   
In this current study the terms ‘aiming for home’, ‘deteriorating’, ‘heading for the LCP’ 
and ‘on the LCP’ were the terms familiar to staff and used to convey special meaning to 
                                                 
1
 As discussed in Chapter 4 this may be considered within the final status passage recognised by Glaser 
and Strauss as ‘certain death at known time’. 
204 
 
enable decision-making.  These terms may not, however, be the same in other settings 
or regions, particularly in relation to use of the LCP for the dying patient.  For practical 
reasons I suggest more universal terms embodying a similar meaning could be used 
beyond this research study and suggest the following: ‘not dying’, ‘deteriorating’, 
‘probably dying’ and ‘imminently dying’.  These terms are important as they reflect an 
underlying understanding of the process of dying, not bound to a particular period of 
time.  In the past, research and other studies have considered time periods as the 
markers of dying.  These are either used retrospectively, or a patient’s prognosis 
considered prospectively, with a period of two weeks often being considered as 
representing the end of life.  Instead, practice suggests a more dynamic understanding of 
dying, recognised through the use of these significant phrases.   
The conceptual model seen in Figure 8:1 is central to the outcome of the thesis.  
Sedation is a routine practice, intrinsically part of symptom control in the hospice and 
understood tacitly to change as a patient approaches death.  This contributes to a new 
understanding of sedation in palliative care.  Importantly, decisions regarding sedation 
may be implicit, based on a shared understanding of the practice of sedation in relation 
to a patient’s dying trajectory.  Sedation is used to treat distress-behaviours, rather than 
to sedate to reduce consciousness.  This subtle point was recognised in Chapter 4 but 
forms a crucial distinction between different types of sedation described in the 
literature.  The use of sedation is proportional, in relation to distress-behaviours, as well 
as in relation to expected death.  Previous literature regarding sedation at the end of life 
has predominately focused on decisions explicitly made at the end of life, or have used 
retrospective data to consider decisions as occurring at a single point in time 
(Broeckaert et al., 2011, Claessens et al., 2008, de Graeff and Dean, 2007).  Seeing 
sedation as a process, evolving implicitly in relation to dying, is crucial if we are to 
develop an understanding of the underlying motivations in using sedation and the values 
which underpin the whole process.  
8.2.2 Proportional 
Routine sedation relies on the proportional use of sedation in relation to both the 
severity of symptoms and to the patient’s proximity to death.  Dying with uncontrolled 
symptoms or signs of distress may be considered as a ‘threat’: in the presence of 
symptoms or signs of distress, if death is imminent the threat is great and the use of 
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higher doses of medication to achieve a greater depth of sedation is considered, under 
these circumstances, to be proportional to the threat of suffering in dying.  Similarly, 
when a patient is not thought to be dying, the ‘threat’ of dying in this way is small and 
large doses of sedation to reduce levels of consciousness would be disproportionate to 
the threat.  This has been shown in the previous data chapters and is important in its 
contribution to the academic literature surrounding ‘palliative sedation’.  Multiple terms 
and definitions have been used to describe the practice of using sedative drugs at the 
end of life, as detailed in Chapter 2.  These terms have focused largely on technical 
aspects of sedation, concentrating as they do on the depth or duration of sedation, for 
example, continuous deep sedation, intermittent, and mild sedation (Morita et al., 
2002b, Rietjens et al., 2009b).  Some of the broader terms and definitions are still 
frequently used, in particular the term ‘palliative sedation’.  This is usually defined as: 
the use of sedative medications to relieve intolerable and refractory distress by 
the reduction of patient consciousness (Morita et al., 2002b). 
This definition for palliative sedation certainly applies to many of the cases in which 
sedation was observed in the hospice; it does, however, fail to capture the more nuanced 
use of sedative drugs throughout a patient’s life and dying process.  Recently, new 
terms were proposed by Quill et al (Quill et al., 2009, Reid et al., 2010) and were 
adopted by the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine.  These were: 
‘usual’ sedation, ‘proportionate palliative sedation’ and ‘palliative sedation to 
unconsciousness’.  ‘Usual sedation’ is the use of sedation to treat symptoms without a 
reduction in consciousness; this would equate to the use of sedation to treat symptoms 
in a patient not thought to be dying, in the model shown in Figure 8:1.  Quill defines 
‘palliative sedation to unconsciousness’ (PSU) as the use of sedation with the intent of 
making a patient unconscious, while ‘proportionate palliative sedation’ (PPS) involves 
the continuous use of sedation titrated against its effect on a specific symptom.  In PPS, 
unconsciousness is considered as a side effect of treatment rather than intended, in 
contrast to this being the explicit aim in using PSU.  While this terminology has been 
endorsed by the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine (Reid et al., 
2010) its use is questioned by some who consider sedation to be part of a single 
continuum (Cellarius and Henry, 2010, Jansen and Sulmasy, 2002, Reid et al., 2010).  
Cellarius and Henry argue that the suggestion that the decision to sedate to 
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unconsciousness is morally different and somehow not proportional may be confusing 
(Cellarius and Henry, 2010).  In practice, my current study suggests, when sedation was 
considered to be proportional to symptoms and the threat of dying with uncontrolled 
symptoms or in distress, sedation was a routine and accepted (even implicit) practice.   
A different set of decisions were made, not in relation to the depth of sedation, or the 
types of drugs (as these were considered merely the means to the effect), but rather the 
principle distinction about sedation in practice related to whether or not a patient was 
dying.  Decisions followed from this distinction.  Importantly, acceptance of a reduction 
in consciousness occurred implicitly if a patient was thought to be dying: this was not 
an explicit, or a different, form of decision-making from that of using sedative drugs to 
control symptoms without reducing consciousness in those not thought to be dying.  
The difficulty in decision-making arose, rather, when there was uncertainty about 
whether or not a patient was dying.  This current study supports the view of Cellarius 
and Henry that using sedation to induce unconsciousness may still be a proportionate 
response, depending upon the expected imminence of death and the severity of the 
distress, or distress-behaviours.   
While this conceptual model represents the way in which sedation may routinely and 
implicitly be given at the end of life, clearly there were cases in which the status and 
sequence of dying was unclear.  These were the cases about which there was more 
discussion, and in which the use of sedative drugs was recognised and explicit.  
Decision-making was overt and involved a clearer external assessment of reversible 
features of a patient’s condition, alongside the assessment of the risks and benefits of 
other types of investigation and management.  These types of decisions were explored 
in Chapter 5, which also considered the motivation behind giving sedative drugs at the 
end of life.  In this chapter, the use of sedative drugs was initially time-limited, with 
review points discussed.  Staff explicitly expressed their intent to use sedation with a 
reduction in patient consciousness to manage symptoms or distress-behaviours only 
until it became clear that there was not a reversible cause.  There was uncertainty and 
unease about managing such patients, because their dying trajectory was unclear.  There 
was also a heightened awareness of the potential for sedative drugs to cause a patient to 
appear to be dying; the use of time-limited sedation and clear review points was used to 
mitigate this risk and decisions were inherently temporary. 
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The recognition of dying was a process which was recognised by some staff earlier than 
others.  This created tension at times as some staff, who considered a patient to be 
dying, used sedation in a routine way, while others, considering there to be some doubt, 
wished to use sedation in a ‘non-routine’ way.  I will return to this important issue later 
in this chapter.  The ‘need’ for sedation in a patient not previously thought to be dying 
led to a series of explicit decisions relating to: the intention of using sedation, the 
duration of sedation and the desired effect of using sedation, as decisions were 
negotiated and discussed rather than assumed.  Sedation was still used proportionately 
to symptoms, however a more cautious approach was assumed considering the 
acceptability of a reduction in consciousness until death, relying on approaches which 
would limit the duration and depth of sedation.  Thus sedation in situations of 
uncertainty about whether or not a patient was dying (i.e. non-routine sedation) was 
approached differently, with an increased awareness, consultation and a more explicit 
approach to management. 
Based on these research findings I suggest instead of ‘palliative sedation’, ‘sedation at 
the end of life’ is a more appropriate term to encompass a range of  a different practices, 
based on the same underlying process of decision-making and linked to an 
understanding of dying.   Thus I suggest a more accurate definition of the practice of 
using sedation in palliative care is: 
the process of using sedative medications in a proportional manner to relieve 
symptoms or distress-behaviours.  ‘Proportional’ relates to the severity of 
symptoms or distress-behaviours and to the expected imminence of death.  This 
is considered to be a process, as decision-making is dynamic, responding to 
changes in a patient’s condition and the expected imminence of death.   
8.3 Continuous Deep Sedation (CDS) 
The proportional nature of sedation in relation to symptoms has been described in the 
literature (Morita, 1999, Morita et al., 2005c, Sykes and Thorns, 2003a): many 
definitions of sedation in palliative care refer to the proportional use of sedation in 
relation to symptoms, with either an assumption or explicit statement that it is used in 
patients who are close to death (Cherny, 2009, de Graeff and Dean, 2007, Morita et al., 
2005c).  While it has been emphasised by several authors that sedation is a ‘last resort’ 
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for dying patients (Claessens et al., 2008, de Graeff and Dean, 2007, Quill et al., 2000b, 
Quill et al., 2009), the ways in which this is recognised and bound to implicit decisions 
has not been recognised previously in empirical data.  The acceptance of sedation with a 
reduction in consciousness only once a patient was thought to be dying addresses at 
least some of the concerns about the use of sedation at the end of life.  As seen in the 
literature review, the principal concerns about sedation relate to its potential to hasten 
death.  This may be thought to occur through the use of sedation which reduces 
consciousness without giving hydration or nutrition in a patient who would otherwise be 
able to eat and drink. A patient may therefore dehydrate to death.  This study suggests 
that this concern is not a feature of decision-making regarding sedation when a patient is 
thought to be imminently dying.  In this case their ability to drink and eat is considered 
to be ‘naturally’ reduced, as part of the dying process.   Sedation in this circumstance, 
therefore, is not responsible for causing the inability to drink and eat and thus the risk of 
hastening death is minimal and not related to the deprivation of hydration caused by 
sedation.  This is, however, the principal concern in connection with the use of 
continuous deep sedation (CDS), which has been described particularly in the 
Netherlands and Belgium (Chambaere et al., 2010, Rietjens, 2008).  Patients are sedated 
to unconsciousness and maintained in this state until death (Rietjens, 2008).  This 
practice was not seen in this study.   
While patients were unconscious as they died, and many were on sedative drugs, the 
decision-making process prior to that point was not concerned with the depth of 
sedation or level of consciousness, rather was concerned with the titration of sedative 
drugs to achieve the required effect of relieving distress.  This distinction is important.  
While much has been written about the use of CDS in several countries, this data has 
predominately relied on physician recall and individual interpretation (Deliens et al., 
2000, Kuhse, 1997, Mitchell and Owens, 2003, Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., 2003, van 
der Heide et al., 2003).  Indeed in a UK study based on the original Dutch methodology, 
physicians were sent questionnaires and asked to consider the most recently deceased 
patient they cared for.  One of the questions asked concerning sedation read:  
was the patient continuously and deeply sedated or kept in a coma before 
death? (Seale, 2010) 
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While this may lead to important data about how physicians regarded their actions, my 
study challenges what is actually addressed by this question especially in relation to the 
debate about continuous deep sedation.  Many patients were sedated continuously in 
this study; a continuous infusion of a sedative drug was frequently administered while a 
patient was dying to treat symptoms or distress-behaviours.  Many patients were also 
unconscious; this has indeed been seen to be an expectation of ‘normal’ dying.  The 
extent to which drugs cause sedation alongside a ‘natural’ process of becoming more 
sedated while dying is, however, unclear.   The intention to sedate a patient deeply (to 
unconsciousness) until they died was not part of routine practice in this study.  The 
literature regarding CDS, however, suggests this is precisely how this practice is 
understood – that a patient is ‘kept in’ an unconscious state until death.  Thus the intent 
in using CDS is to maintain unconsciousness regardless of changes in distress 
behaviours. This appears to be contrary to what I have observed in practice where 
sedation is, rather, regarded as a proportional response to symptoms and distress-
behaviours.  Depending on the imminence of death, it may even be that CDS with the 
intention of maintaining unconsciousness, regardless of changes in distress-behaviours, 
is not a proportional response to the ‘threat’ of dying in distress.     
Sedation was seen to be given with the explicit intent to cause unconsciousness only 
once in this study.   When Richard, in Chapter 6, was sedated following his massive 
haemorrhage, both the doctor and nurse wanted him to be unaware and unconscious.  
This could be regarded as a form of CDS, or indeed PSU according to Quill’s 
terminology.  He was sedated with the aim of making him unconscious until he died.  
His death was considered to be imminent, in minutes as he was exsanguinating, and the 
threat of dying in distress was great.  Sedation, in this case, could be considered as 
proportional to the severity of symptoms and threat of (imminent) dying in distress.  
While the manner of his death was terrible, the use of sedation in this situation could be 
regarded as routine in its proportional sense.  This research suggests that rather than 
focus on the outcome or depth of sedation, what matters in clinical practice is the 
manner in which sedation is used.  The intention and underlying motivation in using 
sedation hinges on proportionality; this was tested, however, in situations of prolonged 
dying and when drugs were used on a p.r.n basis.    
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8.4 Prolonged Dying 
This study has delineated the decisions which are involved in using sedative drugs at the 
end of life, and the way in which this is justified in the hospice context.  The strength of 
this process of decision-making may be tested particularly when considering the 
possibilities of misdiagnosing dying and the potential problems associated with using 
drugs on a p.r.n. basis.   That dying could be misdiagnosed when a patient is sedated 
was considered by one of the consultants in Chapter 5 as Michael considered the risk 
that sedative drugs could make patients look as though they were dying when in fact 
they were not.  Sedation may be used in the expectation that a patient is imminently 
dying, and used proportionally to treat distress-behaviours, even to unconsciousness.  In 
this situation if a patient did not die quickly there would be an increased concern that 
the sedative drugs could contribute to their dying process.  While initially used 
proportionally, a retrospective view may consider the sedation to be disproportionate, if 
death occurred some weeks after the initial decision to use sedation.   This was a 
situation recognised by staff in the hospice as being particularly difficult.   
Unintentional hastening of death is often justified in the literature through appeal to the 
doctrine of double effect, discussed in Chapter 2.  In this situation, however, the 
doctrine of double effect (DDE) cannot be applied.  If a patient died as a result of the 
use of sedative drugs within a matter of days as an anticipated, or foreseen, side effect, 
it may be possible to consider the DDE as justification for using sedation in such a way.  
In the situation outlined above, however, the prolonged dying with sedation would not 
be foreseen and yet could contribute to the patient’s death.  The fact that this would not 
have been a foreseen side effect would mean the DDE would not be valid.  I would 
suggest, rather, in this situation the two crucial components to decision-making rest on 
the intent in using sedative drugs and the use of drugs in a proportional manner: 
proportional to both the severity of symptoms or distress-behaviours and the expected 
imminence of death. Thus if a patient was reviewed daily and continued to require 
sedative drugs to treat distress-behaviours, and was thought to be imminently dying due 
to a process independent of the effect of the sedative drugs, the use of sedation may still 
be considered proportional.  This relies on decision-making being a process, reviewed 
and adapted according to changes in a patient’s condition.  Critically, it relies on good 
decision-making at the time at which dying is diagnosed.  This decision-making falls 
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into question when the decision to use sedative drugs, even to the point of 
unconsciousness, is made through the use of p.r.n. medication.  
The effect of using p.r.n. sedative drugs was seen most clearly in Chapter 6 as one 
patient, Luke, was given extra sedation overnight by nurses who thought that he was 
dying.  The consultant looking after him, however, felt that there was still some doubt 
about whether or not he was dying, or indeed if he looked more unwell because of the 
use of sedative drugs.  That sedation to unconsciousness can occur through the p.r.n. use 
of sedative drugs, as in this case, and instigated by one member of staff, is concerning.  
The strength of decision-making throughout the data chapters stems from the 
involvement of the multi-disciplinary team.  In this individual decision, the explicit 
request from the consultant not to use sedative drugs (unless absolutely necessary), 
because there was doubt about whether or not he was actually dying, was not adhered to 
because others, overnight, thought that he was in fact dying.  While there may have 
been doubt about how quickly he was dying, the distress of the patient was considered 
to require treatment with sedation, even to unconsciousness.  This flexibility is a feature 
of palliative care decisions: they change regularly depending on an interpretation of a 
patient’s condition.  This is an expected part of practice.  The consultant in this case 
could have stopped all p.r.n. use of sedative drugs, if he had been certain that Luke was 
not dying, but the consultant was not and the same doubt which led to caution about the 
use of sedative drugs led to caution about making them unavailable if he was in fact 
dying.   
While the current study has described a practice of using sedative drugs at the end of 
life to treat distress in a way which is proportional, there remain situations which are 
particularly challenging.  This is seen in the situation in which a patient does not die as 
expected but remains sedated for longer than anticipated, raising the risk of sedative 
drugs in fact hastening death.  This is of most concern if the original decision to use 
sedative drugs, with a reduction in patient consciousness, was made by an individual, or 
through the accumulation of p.r.n. sedation.  The prescription of sedative drugs to be 
used in a p.r.n. way may be justified for those patients recognised to be dying; for those 
not dying, however, I would suggest, such a prescription creates the potential risk of 
causing a patient’s deterioration and misinterpreting their condition as dying.  As a 
result of this study I suggest the routine prescription of sedative drugs to a dose which 
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may reduce consciousness ought to be reserved for those patients ‘probably dying’ and 
‘imminently dying’.  If a patient not previously identified as dying was to require 
sedative drugs with the reduction in consciousness, they ought to be reassessed and the 
prescription of sedative drugs written only if they were indeed thought to be dying.  In 
this way the use of p.r.n. sedative drugs would be restricted to ensure that decision-
making which could lead to a patient becoming unconscious until they die involved 
more than one member of the healthcare team.  While most often routine, these are 
nonetheless significant decisions which impact on a patient’s consciousness and 
therefore on their mental capacity; this will be discussed in the next part of the chapter.   
Routine sedation involves the proportionate response to symptoms (of any origin), 
crucially determined by a patient’s proximity to death.  Non-routine sedation occurs in 
situations in which there is uncertainty about whether or not a patient is dying and the 
‘proportionality’ of the response thus comes into question.  Reasons for acting to use 
sedation proportionately in this way are thoroughly ingrained in hospice practice and are 
underpinned by values, strongly influenced in turn by the values of palliative care.  
These determine the ways in which care is provided and provide the motivation for 
acting.  Before considering the implications of this study for the future, I will consider 
the particular issues concerned with treating patients who lack capacity. 
8.5 Patient values at the end of life: a challenge for decision-making 
While studies have been conducted in palliative care concerning patient involvement in 
decision-making (Bakitas et al., 2011, Bélanger et al., 2011, Frank, 2009), significant 
decisions about sedation are frequently made for patients who lack capacity.  As 
patients approach the end of life, their consciousness is frequently reduced, either 
through the use of sedative drugs or through the ‘natural’ processes of dying.  Treating 
distress at the end of life may require the reduction of a patient’s consciousness to the 
point at which he or she loses capacity.   In this situation there may be a tension 
between the need to reduce suffering and distress, and to preserve a patient’s capacity 
until they die.  A focus on the individual and their wishes, values and beliefs has always 
been central to an understanding of palliative care, especially in dying.  This is captured 
in Saunders’s frequently quoted statement: 
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You matter because you are you and you matter to the last moment of your life.  
We will do all we can, not only to help you die peacefully, but also to live until 
you die. (Saunders, 1976) 
There may, however, be a tension between enabling the ‘peaceful’ death and not 
reducing a patient’s capacity through sedation.  If the use of sedation reduces 
consciousness such that the patient loses capacity, the ability to preserve his or her 
values may be diminished.  Treating patients who lack capacity requires particular 
consideration, in keeping with the principles and guidance set out in the Mental 
Capacity Act (MCA)  as well as in the GMC framework for making decisions about 
patients who lack capacity and are dying (GMC, 2010, 2005).   A summary of the MCA 
‘checklist’ for making a best interests decision is seen in Table 8:1. 
Table 1: Best Interests ‘Checklist’ (Mental Capacity Act 2005) Section 4 (6) &(7) 
(6) He must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable  —  
     (a) the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written 
statement made by him when he had capacity),  
     (b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, and  
     (c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.  
(7) He must take into account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult them, the views of  —  
     (a) anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter in question or on 
matters of that kind,  
     (b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare,  
     (c) any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person, and  
     (d) any deputy appointed for the person by the court,  
as to what would be in the person's best interests and, in particular, as to the matters mentioned in 
subsection (6). 
 
Table 8:1: MCA Best Interests Checklist 
It was not possible to establish in this research the extent to which the decisions to use 
sedative drugs were made explicitly with reference to the MCA.  The phrase ‘best 
interests’ was often used when there was a discussion about patients who lacked 
capacity.  In cases of ‘routine sedation’ however, because this was an accepted and 
implicit practice, most often by definition involving patients who lacked capacity, the 
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decision-making regarding their best interests was unclear.  Best interests decisions are 
rarely straightforward as they require a patient to have lost capacity and not to have an 
advance decision to refuse treatment or an advance statement.  As seen in Table 8:1, 
The MCA checklist for making best interests decisions suggests that the past and 
present wishes of a patient ought to be considered, as well as the ‘likely’ influences of 
beliefs and values as well as any other factors, on decision-making, ‘if he were able to 
do so’.  This requires an approximation of what would influence a patient’s decision-
making, if they were able to be in the same situation, but with capacity.  Hope et al have 
furthered a discussion about the nature of this type of decision-making, suggesting that 
rather than rely on a hypothetical choice (i.e. the decision a patient may have made, and 
what would influence his or her decision in the present situation), valid guidance can 
only come from considering what is known (Hope et al., 2009).  This requires a 
judgement regarding the relative weighting of a patient’s previously held wishes and 
values, and his or her current wishes and values, based also upon an understanding of 
the situation and future impact of any decision made.  Hope et al expand the MCA 
‘checklist’ for best interests decisions, to incorporate more of an understanding of the 
strengths of the previous and present wishes and values of the patient who lacks 
capacity (ibid).   
Even this process, however, of best interests decision-making, is not independent of the 
values of those making the decision, which may also be contextual.  In the hospice 
context, for example, a decision regarding sedation at the end of life may be regarded 
differently to a similar decision in another context, such as in the patient’s own home.  
The values of an organisation and of the healthcare professionals caring for a patient 
who lacks capacity play a role in interpreting what constitutes best interests for an 
individual.  The assumption of shared values in this situation may allow the contextual 
values (e.g. of staff in palliative care) to override the values of the patient, unless 
actively considered.  In this state of incapacity an awareness and understanding of the 
values which may influence decision-making is of heightened importance.  McClimans 
considers this forcefully: 
If we are serious about providing personalized and responsive care, we should 
be serious about engaging with the values that shape what counts as health; 
what counts as harm; what counts as illness and so on. This engagement 
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requires not simply asking patients what they want, but rather considering the 
unspecified and undefended values that underpin our healthcare policies and 
practices (McClimans et al., 2011). 
This study has revealed the influence of values on decision-making about sedation at the 
end of life, and identified the prominent values within the hospice.  The potentially 
vulnerable nature of patients’ values in dying, especially having lost capacity, is 
identified to be of particular significance.  While there are models of decision-making 
which expressly incorporate patient values in the process (e.g. shared decision-making) 
the first step in considering patient values at the end of life lies in the recognition and 
awareness of values in play.  Values-based practice (VBP), introduced in the previous 
chapter, is expressly concerned with raising the awareness of values, in order to be able 
to make decisions which are centred on the patient when values come into conflict 
(Fulford, 2004a).  The ‘practice-skills’ of VBP are concerned with awareness, 
knowledge, ethical reasoning and communication.  The VBP approach was developed 
to support decision-making in situations in which values are in conflict: raising 
awareness of values is the first step in this process (ibid).  Raising awareness of values 
may not only be important when considering individual decisions in a hospice context 
but also when considering the influence of palliative care values on mainstream 
medicine in a variety of contexts.  
8.6 Future for Hospices: Changing Decisions  
This study has shown that decisions about sedation in both the routine and non-routine 
situations are underpinned by values.  This has clear implications for decision-making 
about sedation at the end of life.  If the values of staff in a hospice influence so strongly 
the way in which sedation is used, it must be of importance that these values are made 
explicit and overt, if the values of patients and their relatives are not to be compromised.  
Concern for patients’ values, and those of their relatives, has long been considered 
central to the practice of palliative care: the influence of this and the other values of the 
palliative care approach is important when considering decision-making at the end of 
life.  These values were described in Chapter 1 through the discussion concerning the 
changing ‘philosophy’ or values of palliative care.  A summary of the two principal 
approaches considered in Chapter 1 are seen in Table 8:2.  These are the components of 
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Saunders’s ‘philosophy of terminal care’ (Saunders, 1978a), and the WHO definition of 
palliative care, deemed a ‘philosophy’ by Randall and Downie in 2006 (Randall and 
Downie, 2006).  They appear very different; the former contains a list of the services 
required to run a successful programme for ‘terminal care’, with the values underlying 
this evident only in a few statements; the other is more ideological, containing 
statements of what palliative care ought to do.  While the WHO definition of palliative 
care is more instantly recognisable, it is important to recognise the earlier, broader 
approach.  While Saunders wrote of the ‘philosophy of terminal care’, in a period in 
which the term ‘palliative care’ was not yet well recognised, the statements which 
comprise her philosophy are broad in scope and not discordant with the wider definition 
of palliative care. 
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Saunders (Saunders, 1978a) 
 
WHO (Sepúlveda et al., 2002) 
Terminal Care has: 
 As its primary concern the family and patient as a 
‘unit of care’ 
 An experienced clinical team; with expertise in 
symptom control 
 A holistic approach which embodies the ‘total pain’ 
model of care  
 Skilled and experienced nurses and good inter-
professional team working 
 A home care programme 
 Bereavement follow up 
 A methodical approach to recording and analysis and 
the  development of research 
 A teaching strategy 
 Skilled use of architecture to provide an appropriate 
environment for care of the dying 
 A mixed group of patients in context and diseases 
 An administration sensitive to the needs of staff in an 
emotive environment 
 An understanding of the importance of the search for 
meaning at the end of life 
 
Palliative care: 
 is an approach that improves the quality of life of 
patients and their families facing the problems 
associated with life-threatening illness, through the 
prevention and relief of suffering by means of early 
identification,  impeccable assessment and treatment 
of pain and other problems, physical, psychological 
and spiritual.  
Palliative care: 
 Provides relief from pain and other distressing 
symptoms 
 Affirms life and regards dying as a normal process 
 Intends neither to hasten nor to postpone death 
 Integrates the psychological and spiritual aspects of 
patient care 
 Offers a support system to help patients live as actively 
as possible until death 
 Offers a support system to help the family cope during 
the patient’s illness and in their own bereavement 
 Uses a team approach to address the needs of patients 
and their families, including bereavement counselling, 
if indicated 
 Will enhance quality of life, and may also positively 
influence the course of illness 
 Is applicable early in the course of illness, in 
conjunction with other therapies that are intended to 
prolong life, such as chemotherapy or radiation 
therapy, and includes those investigations needed to 
better understand and manage distressing clinical 
complications. 
Table 8:2: Palliative Care Values 
While values in the hospice concerning the use of sedation were predominately shared, 
situations of non-routine sedation revealed some values-diversity.  This diversity is 
important.  If diversity is present and revealed in situations of non-routine sedation it 
may also be present but not expressed in cases of routine sedation.  When a dying 
patient exhibits distress-behaviours, sedation is so routinely given that only in the 
presence of a clear objection would this be questioned, so integral is it to end of life 
care.   Thus, being so ingrained in practice and in the underlying values of the hospice, 
values may be assumed to be shared.  This follows the principles of VBP, outlined in 
Chapter 7, which state that while values are present in all decisions, it is only when 
values come into conflict that they become evident.  Where values are shared by staff 
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there is a risk that this becomes the only perspective recognised, and the values of 
patients and their relatives are, even unintentionally, diminished in importance.  The 
ability to recognise and understand a practice such as sedation, enables a more open 
process to decision-making but also a more open perspective to consider the values of 
others.  As palliative care changes and develops and there is an increase in patients with 
different conditions at different stages in their illness, their desired approach to care may 
also differ.  The importance of having an overt understanding of practices which are 
routine and embedded is heightened in this context.  The nature of the changes in 
palliative care are discussed next; I suggest the response to change ought to be a more 
overt awareness of the underpinning values which drive clinical practice. 
Palliative care is changing in a number of ways.  Changes in palliative care were 
discussed in Chapter 1 and focused primarily on: (i) extending services to care for 
patients with non-malignant disease; (ii) changes in the contexts in which palliative care 
is provided, extending into community and hospitals; (iii) funding for services and; (iv) 
a move towards (re)integration into mainstream medicine approaches.   
With the publication of the National End of Life Care Strategy (NELCS) has come the 
explicit intention to provide palliative care to those with any life limiting illness; many 
new initiatives have resulted from this drive (DH, 2008, Fallon and O'Leary, 2010).  
Developments in palliative care provision for patients with chronic neurological, 
cardiovascular, respiratory and renal disease have expanded palliative care service 
provision; these services, as well as those for other non-malignant conditions, is set to 
continue to expand (Hanks et al., 2010).   
The last decade has seen a significant increase in the literature concerning palliative 
care for patients with non-malignant disease (Fallon and O'Leary, 2010, Fallon and 
Foley, 2012, Griffin and Conway, 2008, Murtagh et al., 2004).  A number of challenges 
have been identified in attempting to meet the needs of patients with non-malignant 
conditions, including developing an understanding of: (i) when palliative care is needed 
for patients with non-malignant conditions; (ii) how palliative care should be delivered; 
(iii) what is required of palliative care in terms of symptom control and support; (iv) 
who should deliver the care and (v) the impact of differences in the dying trajectories 
for these patients, compared to patients with malignant disease (Murtagh et al., 2004).  
Among these challenges lies the role of hospices in the provision of care for patients 
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with non-malignant disease.  While there has been a significant change in the literature 
and in policy to augment care at the end of life for this group of patients, there remains a 
paucity of published data to show an increase in hospice provision for this group 
(Griffin and Conway, 2008, Fallon and Foley, 2012, Murtagh et al., 2004).  Studies do, 
however, suggest a trend towards an increase in admissions to hospices for patients with 
non-malignant conditions (Eve and Higginson, 2000, Griffin and Conway, 2008).  The 
challenge of recognising dying in this group has been recognised, with a different 
predicted dying trajectory identified, punctuated by acute, sometimes reversible 
episodes of deterioration (Fallon and O'Leary, 2010, Fallon and Foley, 2012, Murtagh et 
al., 2004).  The challenge of recognising the final, irreversible episode has been 
considered one of the most significant challenges for palliative care (Fallon and Foley, 
2012).  Yet if the trend for hospices to care for more patients with non-malignant 
disease continues to rise, hospice staff will need to develop different skills in 
recognising dying in this group of patients.  In the current study only 4% of patients had 
a non-malignant diagnosis; this is similar to that reported elsewhere (Eve and 
Higginson, 2000, Griffin and Conway, 2008).  The recognition of dying in this study 
appeared to be based on an expectation of a dying process which mirrored most strongly 
the trajectory of a patient with cancer.  If the numbers of patients with non-malignant 
illnesses is to significantly increase, the hospice will need to develop skills in the 
recognition of dying in this different patient group.  This has been recognised in the 
literature previously; the results of this study provide empirical evidence to support this 
view of the need for change in approach to meet the different needs of patients with 
conditions other than cancer (Fallon and Foley, 2012, Griffin and Conway, 2008, 
Murtagh et al., 2004).  As the recognition of dying was most often implicitly understood 
rather than being explicit, there is a potential danger that patients with non-malignant 
conditions could, implicitly, be treated according to an understanding of malignant 
conditions rather than, as their trajectory would suggest, patients with the potential to 
have an acute reversible deterioration.   
This is a challenge for palliative care, especially in traditional hospices familiar with 
promoting end of life care for those who have malignant disease and a reasonably 
predictable dying trajectory.  In patients who have chronic illnesses, such as Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) or heart failure, the relapsing-remitting nature 
of their condition is such that their end of life care is much less predictable (Fallon and 
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O'Leary, 2010).  This is likely to change the approach to dying in hospices as those who 
‘relapse’ and recover to discharge may challenge the model of managing symptom 
control in relation to the recognition of a dying trajectory.   
More complex decisions relating to the interpretation of dying will have potentially 
significant impact on the way in which staff interpret and respond to symptoms and 
signs of distress.  A measure of how significant this change has been can be found in a 
quote from Eric Wilkes in 1994.  Responding to Craig’s paper regarding the use of 
sedation for terminally ill patients without hydration or nutrition (Craig, 1994), Wilkes 
stated: 
Accurate diagnosis in hospice patients is usually straightforward… A hospice is 
no place for solving diagnostic problems, but so long as over ninety-five per 
cent of admissions are to do with disseminated and inoperable malignant 
disease, this presents few difficulties. (Wilkes, 1994) 
Hospices are now places in which diagnostic problems are considered and in which 
patients with any life limiting illness may be treated.  The need to solve diagnostic 
problems leads to uncertainty about managing patients’ care at the end of life.  With an 
increase in patients with non-malignant disease is likely to come a change in the 
understanding of the processes of dying with the likely consequence of more 
uncertainty about dying and hence about the use of sedation.  Changes in palliative care 
provision have led to precisely the converse of what Wilkes stated just under 20 years 
ago.   
This research has shown the interpretation of dying to be crucial to decision-making 
regarding sedation at the end of life: patients with non-malignant conditions present a 
challenge to this process of decision-making.  This process of decision-making is 
described in relation to sedation for the first time here; I suggest that this process should 
be explicit and understood by practitioners in order to be able to meet and address the 
challenges of changes in hospice and palliative care provision which will make 
recognition of dying more complex. 
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8.7 Palliative care future  
This study has been concerned with the practices of sedation at the end of life in a 
hospice.  It has recognised a ‘philosophy in practice’, a set of values strongly held and 
shared by staff in this context.  This philosophy is recognised to form the basis of the 
transfer of good practice into other settings, exemplified through documents such as the 
Liverpool Care Pathway for the dying patient (LCP) (DH, 2008, Ellershaw and 
Wilkinson, 2011).  As discussed in the introduction, palliative care has evolved from the 
1960s ‘movement’ into an approach which encompasses a medical specialty, nurse 
practitioners and clinical nurse specialists as well as specialists from a wide range of 
allied healthcare professions (Hanks et al., 2010, Saunders, 2006).  Its original concepts 
centred on the provision of holistic care, or ‘whole person’ care for individuals and their 
families and friends (Doyle, 1992).  It is developing to provide care to patients with any 
life-limiting illness in a variety of contexts and is also developing a more substantial 
research and evidence base (Addington-Hall, 2002, Duke and Bennett, 2010).  Palliative 
care is also incorporated into the undergraduate and postgraduate curricula of the 
majority of medical and surgical specialities and of allied healthcare professions such as 
physiotherapy and occupational therapy.  Saunders stated explicitly in 1981 that: 
We moved out [of the NHS] so that attitudes and knowledge could move back 
in (Saunders et al., 1981: 4). 
Palliative care may be seen to have moved ‘back in’, bringing with it the attitudes and 
knowledge which have developed since its origins.  Just as palliative care has changed, 
so too has mainstream medicine.  From predominately a paternalistic approach to 
providing care in the 1950s, increased choice, a focus on patient autonomy and an 
increasingly consumerist and individualistic society have led to significant changes in 
the provision of care within mainstream medicine.  Multi-disciplinary decision-making 
and patient-centred care have become the dominant forces in decision-making over the 
past 20 years and have marked a move away from the approach which Saunders 
encountered in the 1950s as she began ‘the movement’(McClimans et al., 2011, 
Saunders et al., 1981 :4).  Furthermore, following the rise of evidence-based medicine, 
there have developed models of decision-making which incorporate patient values and 
preferences (Charles et al., 1997, Edwards and Elwyn, 2009).  These changes in both 
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palliative care, as it has evolved from the hospice movement, and modern medicine, as 
it has faced overwhelming societal change and a drive towards autonomy and choice, 
have resulted in a much closer alliance of values between two, previously opposing, 
values approaches.   
Despite these changes and the much closer alliance between palliative care and 
mainstream medicine, certain distinctions still exist.  Throughout the literature those 
who have focused on what palliative care values are, have forged a distinction between 
the problem-solving (Ellershaw, 2011: xix), perhaps Hippocratic (Randall and Downie, 
2006), traditions, most closely aligned with mainstream medicine, and the ‘journeying’ 
(Ellershaw, 2011: xix), Asklepian notions (Randall and Downie, 2006), which focus on 
the importance of being at times a ‘wordless presence’ (Saunders, 2011: xii), available 
to listen to the ‘whole person’.  Kearney, writing in 1994, identified this as a ‘deeper 
level’ of care (Kearney, 1992).  Writing about the creation of the specialty of palliative 
medicine, he expressed concern that it may become ‘just another specialty’.  Kearney, 
like Ellershaw (Ellershaw and Wilkinson, 2011) and Randall and Downie (Randall and 
Downie, 2006), considered this deeper level of care to be the principal feature 
distinguishing palliative care from mainstream medicine specialties.  It seems it is in 
this area of care for the individual that attention to what motivates and gives meaning, is 
found.  This is important when considering the impact of this study as it brings into 
focus the value which palliative care appears to attribute to the patients’ perspective, at 
least in principle; this study suggests a way in which this could be embodied more 
firmly in practice.  In order to understand and interpret values and thus ultimately what 
it is which makes a patient a person, this aspect of care, of ‘journeying’ and being the 
‘wordless presence’, must be retained.  Respect for and attention to the values of the 
person therefore appeals to the heart of the palliative care philosophy.  It is this 
distinctive feature which distinguishes it, Kearney argues, from the ‘superficial’ (but 
equally important) care of other specialties.  Of course, the superficial and deep, 
Hippocratic and Asklepian, journeying and problem-solving approaches are important 
to varying degrees for different patients.  Attendance to the deeper levels of care is 
perhaps more frequently required in specialties such as palliative care given the depths 
of despair, anxiety and fear which facing death may bring.  I would argue, however, that 
rather than consider this to be solely the domain of those working within palliative care, 
boundaries ought to become less distinct.   
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Increased integration of care, of palliative care provision within a mainstream medicine 
context, and more opportunities for interdisciplinary working may present a way in 
which the values approaches of mainstream medicine and palliative care could meet.  
While attendance to the deeper levels of care have been regarded as the domain of 
palliative care, attendance to patients’ values are increasingly considered the domain of 
all healthcare practitioners (DH, 2010, McClimans et al., 2011).  Developing 
interdisciplinary working with values may allow the ‘deeper levels of care’, to be 
recognised in other areas of medicine.  Thus, journeying with a patient may become 
integrated within the problem-solving base of mainstream medicine approaches.  This 
would be in keeping with policies which are directed at incorporating values into 
practice and the extension of palliative care into broader areas of practice.  This is also 
underpinned in the recent Health and Social Care Act (2012) as the quality of healthcare 
services is to be measured in part through patient experience and as well as other 
measures of outcomes.  As palliative care develops, interdisciplinary working will 
become increasingly important in order to provide appropriate care for patients with 
different diseases.  Fundamentally, an understanding of values will be of importance in 
enabling and facilitating interdisciplinary working in the future.  At the very least 
recognition of that which is inherent to the practice of palliative care but not to 
mainstream medicine may allow enhanced interdisciplinary working and understanding.   
The values of palliative care may also need to be re-evaluated.  In Chapter 1 I suggested 
that the original approach, or values, of palliative care had not been significantly 
changed by reintegration into mainstream medicine and the ‘medicalization’ of dying.  
Attention to areas of spiritual and psychological care has not, I argued, been 
significantly diminished by the process of integration.  My research suggests there is a 
strong sense of palliative care values in practice, which underpin and guide decision-
making.  I now suggest that in order to continue to be responsive to change in practice, 
the values which have been asserted as forming a palliative care philosophy in 2002 
need to be reconsidered, while maintaining the original philosophy, more broadly 
expressed by Saunders in 1978 (Saunders, 1978a).  Saunders’s original ‘philosophy’ 
focused on the individual and family and a way of providing care with an emphasis on 
the need to develop a local response to meet local need.  The WHO statement went 
further than this to detail what that care ought to entail and I suggest this needs to be 
reconsidered in view of a change in clinical practice (Sepúlveda et al., 2002).  The 
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conflict of values seen in Chapter 7 was in part related to the value of ‘not postponing 
death’, with nurses concerned to promote this point and doctors more concerned with 
‘not hastening death’.  When dying is uncertain, there is a ‘risk’ of prolonging life in an 
effort not to hasten death.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, the increase in patients 
with non-malignant conditions cared for in hospices or within palliative care is likely to 
create particular tensions in this regard.  In cases of uncertainty about dying, lives may 
indeed be prolonged.  Furthermore, patients are now cared for in hospices throughout 
their illnesses, while having life prolonging or even curative treatments.  I would 
suggest that maintaining this value of ‘not postponing death’ is no longer valid for all 
patients using palliative care services.  Current palliative care practice is disconnected 
from this, embracing as it does, care for individual patients at all stages of their 
illnesses.  This care may be considered to be proportionate to the patient’s prognosis, 
with more interventional management in earlier stages.  More importantly, however, is 
providing care according to the way in which a patient wishes to be treated.  For some 
patients this may include relatively interventional treatments even at the end the end of 
life; for others it may mean not giving potentially life prolonging treatments even if 
relatively early in a patient’s illness.  Not to postpone death enshrines a particular value 
perhaps more appropriate for the provision of what was known as ‘terminal care’, which 
may now be recognised as care for the patients who are ‘imminently dying’.  As 
palliative care has progressed, those who may have appeared to be a homogenous 
group, the ‘terminally ill’, have become more and more defined as different patterns, or 
sequences, of dying have been recognised.  Thus the group ‘imminently dying’ now 
appear to be a more defined group than those who may be considered to be approaching 
the end of their lives.  The recognition of this is important for decision-making at the 
end of life.  If palliative care is to embrace the changes associated with integration and 
expanding to provide care for all patients with a life limiting illness, it must reconsider 
the value of ‘not postponing death.  Importantly, this does not mean that the joining 
statement of not hastening death ought to be reconsidered too; these decisions are 
distinct
2
.  Palliative care, in progressing alongside societal and mainstream medicine 
                                                 
2
 This is not uncontested.  The distinction between the withholding and withdrawing of treatments which 
may hasten death and the deliberate and intentional hastening of death is, however, extensively discussed 
in the literature.  A discussion of this nature is beyond the scope of this thesis; the argument, rather, is 
concerned with the disconnect between clinical practice and the values expressed. 
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changes, I suggest, needs once again to become more patient–centred and broaden its 
values in keeping with its already broadening practice.  Palliative care must adapt if it is 
to maintain its core value of patient-centred care.  
In addition to the specific proposal for a change in what palliative care does, the 
awareness of these underpinning values is important in the changing context described 
above.  The first 3 principles of VBP were outlined in Chapter 7 and provided an 
explanation for what was seen in practice regarding the influence and presence of values 
in decision-making.  The changing context of palliative care service provision described 
above is also relevant when considering how values ought to be considered in the 
future.  If values diversity increases, the ability to recognise this diversity is of 
importance in clinical decision-making.  When values are shared, and there is a 
limitation of scope for contact with alternative values, as it could be argued may occur 
in a hospice, there is a heightened risk of ‘values-blindness’ and ‘values-myopia’.  The 
former relates to a lack of awareness of diversity of values while the latter to a lack of 
knowledge about the breadth of values which may exist.  A hospice may perhaps be 
considered at an increased risk of this given a relatively stable workforce and low levels 
of staff turnover.  In addition to providing a theoretical background for the presence and 
influence of values on medical decision-making, VBP incorporates a skill-set which, 
through developing an understanding of how values are involved in decisions and how 
they may be expressed, supports the process of decision-making when values come into 
conflict.  I would suggest the primary need for hospice palliative care is to develop an 
understanding of its practice and the values which underlie these, in order to avoid 
falling into values-blindness.  One way in which this could be developed is through the 
application of VBP. 
8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the implications of this research for clinical practice.  It has 
addressed the particular concern of the use of sedation in palliative care.  This detailed 
understanding of sedation in practice is important as it is the first empirical study to 
describe the intricate relationship of sedation to an understanding of dying.  The 
acceptance of otherwise undesirable side effects, such as sedation, in proportion to 
symptom severity and to the threat of dying with uncontrolled symptoms or distress is 
an important model to arise from the study.  Furthermore, this research has highlighted 
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the role of values in clinical practice.  In a specialty such as palliative care, which has 
developed its own distinctive ‘philosophy’ within which a patient’s values are promoted 
as centrally important, this has particular impact.  Recognition of the influence of 
‘palliative care values’ on practice, especially concerning potentially vulnerable patients 
lacking capacity, is important in order to be aware of that which could restrict a 
patient’s expression of values.  An assumption of shared values is the norm: explicit 
recognition and awareness of palliative care values in practice may allow the otherwise 
unrecognised values of patients to be expressed.  This would be consistent with the 
‘primary’ value of the palliative care approach (Saunders, 1978a).  Values-based 
practice has been proposed as the way in which skills in recognising and negotiating 
with values may be developed.  Finally, this recognition of values in practice may have 
an impact on the integration of palliative care into mainstream medicine.  As the values 
of patients assume a more central position in healthcare in the UK, this may provide an 
opportunity for enhanced interdisciplinary working with increased palliative care 
integration into mainstream medicine.  This is of fundamental importance in developing 
a more patient-centred model of care.   
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Chapter 9 Conclusion  
This thesis has drawn together the medical, philosophical and sociological literature in a 
study concerning the use of sedation at the end of life.  Primarily concerned with how 
sedation is used and the implications of this for clinical practice in the UK, this study 
extends further to consider the underlying values influencing practice and suggests that 
these ought to become explicit, if palliative care is to maintain its focus on patient-
centred care.  A detailed history of the evolution of palliative care provides the 
background for a commentary on the broader changes affecting palliative care, 
including changes in government policy and funding, which in turn influence the 
direction of palliative care in the future.   
In conclusion I suggest a number of outcomes from this research. 
 I suggest the two crucial components to decision-making about sedation at the 
end of life are: (i) the intent in using sedative drugs and; (ii) the use of drugs in a 
proportional manner: proportional to both the severity of symptoms or distress-
behaviours and the expected imminence of death.      
 I therefore propose that ‘sedation at the end of life’ ought to be defined as: 
The process of using sedative medications in a proportional manner to relieve 
symptoms or distress-behaviours.  ‘Proportional’ relates to the severity of 
symptoms or distress-behaviours and to the expected imminence of death.  
This is a process as decision-making is recognised to be dynamic, responding 
to changes in a patient’s condition and the expected imminence of death.   
 I have identified a sequence of expected dying in a hospice context, implicit and 
recognised through the use of significant words or phrases.  Transition points in 
the sequence may be recognised as: ‘not dying’, ‘deteriorating’, ‘probably 
dying’ and ‘imminently dying’.   These may be used to identify a patient’s 
trajectory and form the basis of decision-making, moving away from a time-
based model which may be more difficult to interpret in daily practice. 
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 I suggest the routine prescription of sedative drugs to a dose which may reduce 
consciousness ought to be reserved for those patients ‘probably dying’ and 
‘imminently dying’; a patient not previously identified as dying, requiring 
sedative drugs to reduce consciousness ought to be reassessed.                 
 I suggest that the process of decision-making about sedation at the end of life 
should be explicit and understood by practitioners in order to be able to meet and 
address the challenges of changes in hospice and palliative care provision which 
will make recognition of dying more complex. 
In addition to the research findings which are specific to palliative care, this thesis 
has wider implications relating to the way in which end of life decisions are made.  
First, decision making has been shown to be implicit, and based upon the values of 
individual healthcare professionals.  While these values are predominately shared, 
values diversity does exist.  If decision making regarding sedation is implicit when 
values are shared, there is a risk of developing a culture in which there is an 
assumption of shared values.  This may lead to ‘values blindness’ (discussed in 
Chapter 7) in which a patient’s values may be overlooked, especially at the end of 
life.  Second, values between organisations may differ; as explored throughout this 
thesis, mainstream medicine and palliative care have developed independently.  
While now becoming more integrated, differences in values between organisations 
are important to acknowledge as they may lead to a differences in patients’ 
experiences of care.  Patients may wish to choose their treatment by an organisation 
based upon its approach to care: organisations must understand their own values in 
order to allow this choice to exist.  Finally, international differences and approaches 
to end of life care exist.  This is of particular importance when considering the 
nature of sedation at the end of life and its association in some countries with 
assisted dying.  It is crucial to acknowledge these differences when considering such 
value-laden subjects as sedation at the end of life in order to avoid the 
misinterpretation of international differences in practice.   
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Chapter 10 Appendices 
10.1 Appendix 1:  Table of Prospective Research studies 
Author(s) and year 
 
Study aim Methods Sample size Definition 
(if provided)  
Prevalence/ 
Incidence of use 
of sedation 
Indications for sedation Drugs used Results/ outcome 
Ventafridda 
 et al 1990 
(Ventafridda V., 
1990) 
To determine 
how long 
before death 
intolerable 
symptoms 
requiring 
sedation 
appeared 
Prospective 
 
N = 120 
 
- 52.5%  Dyspnoea, delirium, 
vomiting 
 52.5% of patients required deep 
sedation before death 
         
Morita et al 1999 
(Morita, 1999) 
Do hospice 
clinicians 
sedate patients 
intending to 
hasten death 
Prospective 
quantitative data 
collected on 
aspects 
designed to 
determine key 
aspects of 
sedation 
N = 71 Sedation “a medical 
procedure to palliate 
patients’ symptoms 
refractory to standard 
treatment by 
intentionally diming 
their consciousness” 
45% Physical restlessness with 
or without delirium (42%) 
Dyspnoea (41%) 
Pain (13%)  
Nausea (1.4%) 
Multifocal myoclonus 
(1.4%0 
Psychological distress 
(1.4%) 
Opioids (37%) 
Midazolam (31%) 
Haloperidol (31%) 
Diazepam (13%) 
Scopolamine 
hydrobromide (9.9%) 
Hydroxyzine (2.8%) 
Chlorpromazine 
Levomepromazine 
Propofol 
Triazolam 
Conclusion that physicians do not 
sedate patients intending to hasten 
death. 
>90% Palliative prognostic index 
of 10 or 20 
Median survival after onset of 
sedation 3 days 
40% artificial hydration before 
sedation  
70% had continued artificial 
hydration once sedation started 
>90% of family members involved 
in decision making 
         
Peruselli et al 1999 
(Peruselli et al., 1999) 
Describe the 
place, 
circumstances 
and “quality” 
of death in 
patients 
admitted to 
Quantitative, 
prospective 
multi centre 
survey of 
patients , 
weekly 
evaluation until 
N = 401 
(eligible 
patients = ≥18 
yrs old, 
referred to 
PCUs for the 
management 
“total pharmacological 
sedation” = “the 
administration of drugs 
to obtain total loss of 
consciousness” 
25% (range in 
different unit 0 – 
60%) 
Pain  
Dyspnoea 
Nausea and vomiting 
 More sedation in hospital than 
home (32% vs 23%) 
Wide variation in use of sedation in 
different centres 
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home palliative 
care units 
(PCU), 
particularly 
focusing on 
symptom 
control and the 
patient’s 
situation at 
death 
death of terminal 
stage cancer 
and living in 
the PCU’s 
catchment 
area)  
         
Fainsinger et al 2000 
(Fainsinger et al., 
2000a) 
To determine 
prevalence of 
symptoms 
requiring 
sedation at the 
end of life in 
acute care, 
tertiary unit 
and hospice 
Prospective, 
quantitative 
daily 
assessment of 
patients, 
collated on data 
collection form  
N = 150 
Patients in 
acute (50), 
tertiary (50) 
and hospice 
care (50) 
 Acute care 6% 
Tertiary care 
10% 
Hospice care 2% 
Delirium 
Dyspnoea 
 80% in all 3 units developed 
delirium before death.  Increased 
prevalence of use of sedation in 
tertiary care.  Survival range 1-5 
days 
         
Morita et al 2001 
(Morita et al., 2001b) 
Compare the 
survival of 
sedated and 
non sedated 
patients 
receiving 
inpatient care 
Reanalysis of 
data from 
another study 
Prospective, 
quantitative data  
Additional data 
from 
retrospective 
chart review 
collected for 
this study 
N = 209 All sedative 
psychotropics available 
in practice included 
60% received 
“some sedative 
medication”  in 
last 48hours 
 Opioids 82% 
Midazolam 23% 
Flunitrazepam 9% 
Bromazepam 7% 
Diazepam 4% 
Haloperidol 43% 
Hydroxyzine 15% 
Chlorpromazine 2.9% 
Levomepromazine 
0.96% 
Propofol 1.4% 
Opioids and sedatives showed no 
significant influence on survival 
Opioids prescribed in 82%  
Mean dose midazolam 26mg/24hrs 
Maximum observed dose 
100mg/24hrs 
         
Chiu et al 2001  (Chiu 
et al., 2001) 
To determine 
frequency of 
use of sedation, 
relationship to 
symptoms, 
satisfaction of 
symptom 
control of 
Prospective, 
quantitative 
daily 
assessment of 
patients 
N = 251 
Patients in 
inpatient 
palliative care 
unit 
 27.9% Agitated delirium (57%), 
dyspnoea (22.8%),      
pain (10%), 
insomnia (7.2%,) 
Haloperidol (50%) 
Midazolam (24.3%) 
Morphine (12.9%) 
Prevalence in keeping with other 
studies.  
52.9% used sedation intermittently, 
37.1% intermittently, 10% evolved 
from intermittent to continuous 
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patients, family 
and health care 
workers 
         
Morita et al  
2002  (Morita et al., 
2002a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To elucidate 
which types of 
palliative 
sedation 
therapy are 
preferred by 
the Japanese 
general 
population, 
which factors 
influence these 
and how they 
think clinicians 
should inform 
patients about 
sedation 
Cross section 
questionnaire 
survey using 
convenience 
sample    
N = 457 
(effective 
response rate 
53.5%) 
 
Palliative sedation 
therapy “the use of 
sedative medication to 
relieve intolerable and 
refractory distress by 
the reduction of patient 
consciousness”  
Also used mild-deep 
and intermittent-
continuous subgroups 
    Intermittent deep sedation was 
chosen as “probably want” or 
“strongly want” for 86% and 76% 
for intractable physical distress and 
psychological distress resp. 
Mild sedation probably want” or 
“strongly want” for 82% and 68% 
for intractable physical distress and 
psychological distress resp. 
Care without sedation probably 
want” or “strongly want” for 25% 
and 32% for intractable physical 
distress and psychological distress 
resp. 
Those not wanting sedation 
significantly younger, more 
educated, more likely to perceive 
importance of dignity and 
preparing for death 
 
 
         
Morita et al 2002 
(Morita et al., 2002a) 
To clarify the 
frequency of 
sedation 
therapy for 
terminally ill 
cancer patients 
and to identify 
physicians’ 
attitudes 
towards 
sedation 
Quantitative 
cross sectional 
questionnaire 
N = 697 
(49.6% 
response rate) 
Palliative sedation 
therapy “the use of 
sedative medication to 
relieve intolerable and 
refractory distress by 
the reduction of patient 
consciousness”  
Also used mild-deep 
and intermittent-
continuous subgroups 
   Mild sedation used by 89% and 
64% for physical and 
psychological distress resp. 
Intermittent-deep sedation used by 
70% and 46% for physical and 
psychological distress resp. 
Continuous-deep sedation used by 
66% and 38% for physical and 
psychological distress resp. 
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Morita et al  2003 
(Morita et al., 2003a)  
To investigate 
the similarities 
and differences 
among 
standard 
medical care, 
palliative 
sedation 
therapy and 
euthanasia 
Secondary 
analysis of 2 
previous 
surveys  on 
attitudes 
towards 
preferred 
treatment for 
refractory 
distress 
 Palliative sedation 
therapy “the use of 
sedative medication to 
relieve intolerable and 
refractory distress by 
the reduction of patient 
consciousness”  
Also used mild-deep 
and intermittent-
continuous subgroups 
   Physicians and general population 
differentiated mild and 
intermittent-deep sedation from 
standard medical care, without 
intentional sedation 
Inconsistency when including or 
excluding mild and intermittent 
sedation is a major cause of 
difficulty in interpreting research 
findings 
Physicians matched continuous 
deep sedation closer to mild and 
intermittent sedation than the 
general population (who mapped it 
closer to euthanasia/PAS) 
         
Cameron et al  2004 
(Cameron, 2004) 
To document 
the use of 
sedation for 
refractory 
symptoms in 
patients 
admitted to an 
independent 
palliative care 
unit 
Prospective, 
quantitative 
descriptive 
study 
N = 20 (out of 
100 
consecutive 
patients 
admitted) 
Included “all patients 
who received sedating 
drugs (apart from 
sleeping tablets)” 
20% Delirium (45%) 
Nausea and vomiting 
(25%) 
Convulsions (15%) 
Dyspnoea (10%) 
Pain (5%) 
Midazolam  
Haloperidol 
Morphine 
Fentanyl 
Survival mean 3.8 days after 
sedation started 
20% had IV or SC fluids when 
sedation started, not discontinued 
in any 
All patients and/or family involved 
in decision making 
         
Müller-Bush et al 
2004 (Muller-Busch et 
al., 2004) 
Evaluate 
attitudes 
towards 
different end of 
life decisions 
among the 
German 
Association for 
Palliative 
Medicine 
Quantitative, 
multiple choice 
questionnaire 
N= 251 (61% 
response) 
“The definitions of 
specific terms used in 
the German literature 
and jurisprudence... 
were included.to ensure 
that the meaning of 
terms was clear to all 
respondents” 
Terminal sedation was 
the term used 
   94.4% supported “so-called TS” 
63.3% supported the withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment in cases 
with poor prognosis without the 
patient’s consent 
Recommend use of a descriptive 
definition 
Support distinction between 
euthanasia and terminal sedation 
outlined by EAPC task force 
         
Kaldjian et al  2004 
(Kaldjian et al., 2004) 
To describe the 
frequency of 
Quantitative, 
prospective, 
N = 677 
Response rate 
Terminal sedation = 
“diminishing 
   96% supported use of analgesics to 
relieve pain accepting risk of 
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support for 
terminal 
sedation among 
internists, 
determine 
whether 
support for 
terminal 
sedation is 
accompanied 
by support for 
physician 
assisted suicide 
(PAS) and 
explore 
characteristics 
of internists 
who support 
terminal 
sedation but 
not assisted 
suicide 
cross sectional 
survey 
47% 
(Connecticut 
members of 
American 
College of 
Physicians  
consciousness to halt 
the experience of pain 
if a terminally ill 
patient has intractable 
pain despite aggressive 
analgesia 
hastening death 
78% supported use of TS 
29% supported use of PAS 
47% supported TS but not PAS-
more likely if more experience in 
providing care to terminally ill or 
more frequent attendance at 
religious services 
         
Morita et al 2005 
(Morita et al., 2005b) 
(i)To determine 
efficacy and 
safety of 
palliative 
sedation 
therapy and (ii) 
identify factors 
contributing to 
inadequate 
symptom relief 
and 
complications 
Multi centre, 
prospective, 
observational 
study. 
Quantitative 
data collection 
on structured 
questionnaires.  
Using validated 
scales, 
physicians 
asked to 
evaluate  
(i) intensity of 
patient 
symptoms, 
(ii)communicati
on 
N = 102 
sedated 
patients from 
7 palliative 
care centres 
Continuous deep 
sedation (CDS) “the 
continuous use of 
sedative 
medications to relieve 
intolerable and 
refractory 
distress by achieving 
almost or complete 
unconsciousness until 
death” 
Sedation was 
part of inclusion 
criteria 
Fatigue 44% 
Dyspnoea 41% 
Delirium 34% 
Psycho-existential distress 
1% 
 
Midazolam (76%) 
Haloperidol (35%) 
Phenobarbital (34%)  
Ketamine (15%) 
Hyoscine hydrobromide 
(7%) Flunitrazepam 
(4%) Chlorpromazine 
(4%)  
Levomepromazine (2%) 
CDS effective in 80% 
Respiratory and/or circulatory 
suppression in 20% - 4% fatal 
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capacity, and 
(iii)respiratory 
rate just before 
sedation, and 4 
and 24 hours 
after sedation 
         
Morita et al  2005 
(Morita et al., 2005c) 
To 
systematically 
explore 
whether 
empirical 
evidence 
supports the 
ethical 
validity of 
palliative 
sedation 
therapy 
Multi centre, 
prospective, 
observational 
study. 
Quantitative 
data collection 
on structured 
questionnaires 
N = 102 
sedated 
patients from 
7 palliative 
care centres 
Continuous deep 
sedation (CDS) “the 
continuous use of 
sedative 
medications to relieve 
intolerable and 
refractory 
distress by achieving 
almost or complete 
unconsciousness until 
death” 
Sedation was 
part of inclusion 
criteria 
 Midazolam (76%) 
Haloperidol (35%) 
Phenobarbital (34%)  
Ketamine (15%) 
Hyoscine hydrobromide 
(7%) Flunitrazepam 
(4%) Chlorpromazine 
(4%)  
Levomepromazine (2%) 
No rapid IV administration of 
drugs.   
ANH administered in 63%. 
94% predicted to die within 3 
weeks. 
67% expressed explicit wish for 
sedation. 
“palliative sedation therapy” 
(defined as CDS) follows 
principles of double effect, 
proportionality and autonomy 
         
Simon et al 2007 
(Simon et al., 2007) 
Determine the 
views of 
medical ethics 
experts on the 
term and moral 
acceptance of  
terminal 
sedation 
Prospective 
questionnaire 
sent to German 
Academy for 
Ethics in 
Medicine 
N = 281 
(59% response 
rate) 
    92% knew the term terminal 
sedation 
73% considered terminal sedation 
to consist only of sedation when 
sedation until death was intended 
45% terminal sedation comprised 
the complete elimination of 
consciousness (significantly more 
of those with a medical 
background favoured the inclusion 
of sedation where consciousness 
clouded but patient still able to 
have conscious perceptions  
         
Seymour et al  2007 
(Seymour et al., 2007) 
 
 
To learn about 
clinicians’ 
(both nurses 
and doctors) 
and academic 
researchers 
understanding 
Qualitative 
interviews, 
telephone or 
face to face with 
“stakeholders” 
in the UK, 
Belgium and the 
N = 33 
11 doctors 
14 nurses 
10 researchers 
    UK: little talk about euthanasia, 
emphasised  
palliative sedation as a 
practice of last resort used in rare 
situations 
 
Belgium; the practice of palliative 
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and experience 
of palliative 
sedation for 
managing 
suffering at the 
end of life, and 
their views 
regarding its 
clinical, ethical 
and social 
implications. 
Netherlands – 
purposively 
chosen by the 
authors 
sedation appeared more acceptable 
than euthanasia.  
 
The Netherlands; palliative 
sedation was assuming the status of 
an ‘equal partner’ with euthanasia. 
         
Douglas 2008 
(Douglas, 2008) 
 
To address the 
question of 
intentionality 
in the context 
of analgesic 
and/or sedative 
infusions 
in the 
terminally ill 
Qualitative semi 
structured  
interviews with 
general 
physicians 
N = 8      2 dominant themes 
(i)Uncertainty about intentions 
with regard to analgesic and 
sedative infusions 
(ii) Greater acceptability of 
analgesic and sedative infusions 
than using a bolus injection  to 
hasten death 
 
 
 
         
Rietjens et al 2009 
(Rietjens et al., 2009a) 
 
To gain more 
insight in the 
arguments for 
and against the 
use of 
continuous 
deep sedation 
(CDS) in 
several clinical 
situations 
Focus group 
study of 
physicians – 3 
focus groups 
held (as part of 
a larger study 
aiming to 
evaluate the 
Euthanasia Act 
Semi structured 
questioning 
Hypothetical 
cases 
N = 24 (In vignette) 
“it is decided to 
alleviate the patient’s 
suffering as much as 
possible by 
administering 
midazolam until death.  
Artificial nutrition or 
hydration is not 
administered because 
this would only prolong 
the patient’s suffering” 
   Most participants referred to CDS 
as “palliative sedation” 
 
All agreed CDS was acceptable 
 
Difficulties were found in 
assessing life expectancy 
 
Physicians’ decision making about 
CDS was characterized by 
balancing their own feelings with 
the best interests of the patients. 
         
Claessens et al 2011 
(Claessens et al., 
2011) 
To describe the 
characteristics 
of patients who 
Prospective, 
longitudinal and 
descriptive 
N = 266 Broeckaert’s definition 
of palliative sedation 
was used with a 
7.5% (symptoms present in 
patients receiving 
sedation) 
 Low incidence of PS may be due to 
increasing awareness and palliative 
care services developing 
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are being 
sedated 
for refractory 
symptoms in 
palliative 
care units 
(PCUs) from 
the time of 
admission 
until the day of 
death. 
study. 8 
Palliative care 
units in 
Flanders. 
Staff in each 
PCU were 
trained and 
researcher 
participated in 
some data 
collection.  
Consciousness 
was assessed 3 
times weekly 
and the time at 
which PS 
initiated was 
documented 
descriptive level of 
sedation identified, all 
of which were 
considered in the 
analysis as ‘palliative 
sedation’.  These were: 
mild-intermittent, mild-
continuous, deep-
intermittent in non-
acute 
situations, deep-
intermittent in acute 
situations, deep 
continuous 
in non-acute situations, 
and deep-continuous in 
acute 
situations. 
Pain 
Loss of well being 
Anxiety 
Fatigue 
Nausea 
Depression 
Drowsiness 
Reduced appetite 
Shortness of breath 
Constipation 
Dry mouth 
Disturbed sleep 
High symptom distress scores 
associated with a symptom being 
regarded as refractory 
No clear distinction between 
physical and existential suffering 
In majority of patients palliative 
sedation starts as a mild sedation 
and evolves over time to a deep 
and/or continuous form of 
sedation. The  principle of 
proportionality is the essential 
factor in the 
decision-making process.  
There is a clear distinction between 
PS and euthanasia  
         
Claessens et al  2012  
(Claessens et al., 
2012) 
To 
describe in 
detail the 
evolution of 
the level of 
consciousness 
of 
patients 
residing in 
palliative care 
units (PCUs) 
from admission 
until their day 
of death 
Prospective, 
longitudinal and 
descriptive 
study. 8 
Palliative care 
units in 
Flanders. 
Staff in each 
PCU were 
trained and 
researcher 
participated in 
some data 
collection.  
Consciousness 
was assessed 3 
times weekly 
and the time at 
which PS 
initiated was 
documented 
N = 266  Broeckaert’s definition 
of palliative sedation 
was used with a 
descriptive level of 
sedation identified, all 
of which were 
considered in the 
analysis as ‘palliative 
sedation’.  These were: 
mild-intermittent, mild-
continuous, deep-
intermittent in non-
acute 
situations, deep-
intermittent in acute 
situations, deep 
continuous 
in non-acute situations, 
and deep-continuous in 
acute 
situations. 
7.5% of patients 
received 
‘palliative 
sedation’ 
  40% of sedated patients started on 
‘mild-continuous’ sedation 
40% of sedated patients started on 
‘deep-continuous’ sedation 
 Conscious level dropped to 
‘comatose’ following ‘deep 
continuous’ sedation 
Conscious level dropped only to 
‘stuporous’ with mild-continuous’ 
sedation 
 
>45% of patient changed from 
mild continuous to deep continuous 
sedation over time 
 
PS is recognised to be  a process 
which evolves according to 
symptoms rather than as an 
intervention which is intended to 
hasten death 
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Jaspers 2012 (Jaspers 
et al., 2012) 
 
To present 
data on 
sedation-
related issues 
in the 
framework of a 
greater 
prospective 
survey on 
ethical matters 
in palliative 
care settings 
undertaken in 
the years 2005 
and 2006 
Online 
databases were 
amended to 
include data 
regarding 
ethical decisions 
related to 
sedation on 2 
occasions 
during a 
patient’s 
inpatient stay in 
a hospice or 
palliative care 
unit (PCU).  
Data was then 
sampled from 
this database at 
a census in 2005 
and 2006. 
No of patients 
in a PCU with 
data entered 
onto the 
database: 
 
PCU 
2005: 537  
2006:1018 
 
Hospice: 
2005: 102 
2006: 287 
 
 
`EAPC definition: 
“Palliative sedation 
is the monitored use of 
medications intended to 
induce a 
state of decreased or 
absent awareness 
(unconsciousness) in 
order to relieve the 
burden of otherwise 
intractable suffering 
in a manner that is 
ethically acceptable to 
the patient, 
Family and health care 
providers. 
PCU 
2005: 13% 
2006: 11% 
 
Hospice 
2005: 34% 
2006: 30% 
Fear/anxiety 
Restlessness 
Suffering 
Pain 
Dyspnoea 
 
Midazolam 
Diazepam 
Lorazepam 
Haloperidol 
Promethazine 
Levomepromazine 
Propofol 
Morphine 
Ketamine 
Higher prevalence of PS in 
hospices likely to be reflected by 
the differences in the populations 
in terms of disease extent and 
complexity of symptoms. 
 
Majority of patients were sedated 
to somnolence but not coma 
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10.2 Appendix 2:  Table of Retrospective Research Studies 
Author(s) and year Study aim Methods Sample size Definition 
(if provided)  
Prevalence/ 
Incidence of 
use of sedation 
Indications for sedation Drugs used Results/ outcome 
Greene and 
 Davis 1991 (Greene 
and Davis, 1991) 
To review 
deaths requiring 
deep sedation in 
17 patients over  
14 years   
Retrospectiv
e review of 
notes 
 
N = 17 
Community 
urology unit  
- All 17 patients 
had required 
sedation (this 
was integral to 
study design) 
Pain, prolonged vomiting, 
seizures, restlessness 
Barbiturates Descriptive review of 17 
cases requiring sedation, 
recommend monotherapy 
with barbiturates 
         
Fainsinger et al 1991 
(Fainsinger R, 1991) 
To evaluate the 
finding that 50% 
of terminal 
cancer patients 
have suffering 
that requires 
sedation in the 
last days of life 
Quantitative 
retrospective 
case note review 
of those 
admitted 6 days 
or more 
N = 100  16% Delirium 39% 
Pain 6% 
 2 patients noted to have died 
with poor pain control 
without having been sedated,  
         
Van der Maas 
 1991 (van der Maas 
et al., 1991) 
To provide 
information about 
medical end of 
life decisions in 
the Netherlands 
to inform the 
debate about 
euthanasia  
 
Commissioned 
by the Dutch 
government 
Detailed 
interviews with 
physicians 
 
Questionnaires 
to physicians 
identified 
through random 
sampling of 
death certificates  
 
Prospective 
survey of deaths 
following 
respondents to 
the interviews 
Interviews 
n = 
405 
 
 
 
Questionnai
res n = 
5197 
(76% 
response) 
 
 
Prospective 
survey n = 
2257 
(described 
by 322 
physicians 
= 80% of 
    1.8% of death due to 
euthanasia 
 
54% of physicians had 
practice voluntary euthanasia 
 
99% of euthanasia had taken 
place with consent 
 
 
17.5% of deaths were related 
to the administration of 
drugs in such doses to 
alleviate pain and suffering 
that death might be hastened 
 
17.5% of deaths were related 
to non-treatment decisions 
(e.g. withholding or 
withdrawal of ANH) 
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interview 
sample)  
         
Morita et al  1996 
(Morita et al., 1996) 
Report the 
present 
circumstances 
surrounding the 
use of sedation 
for symptom 
control in Japan 
Quantitative 
retrospective 
case note review 
N = 143 Sedation “a medical 
procedure to palliate 
patients’ symptoms by 
intentionally making their 
consciousness unclear.  It 
included an increase in 
morphine dose resulting 
in secondary somnolence 
and the use of sedative 
drugs” 
 
48.3% Dyspnoea 49% 
Pain 39% 
General malaise 38% 
Agitation 23% 
Nausea 10% 
 
 
 
Midazolam 55% 
Morphine 55% 
Haloperidol 33% 
Diazepam 15% 
Scopolamine 13% 
Bromazepam 6% 
Chlorpromazine 4% 
Barbiturates 4%  
90%  of those sedated -death 
was expected in days 
 
Mean survival 3.9 days 
 
44% intermittent sedation 
27% intermittent then 
continuous 
14% continuous 
15% died after single use of 
sedation 
 
7% patient and family fully 
informed 
45% family fully informed 
and patients partly informed 
4% neither informed  
         
Van der Maas 1996 
(van der Maas et al., 
1996) 
To evaluate the 
reported use of 
euthanasia and 
other medical 
decision at the 
end of life in the 
Netherlands 
following the 
introduction of a 
new reporting 
system in 1991 
Interviews with 
physicians 
 
Questionnaires 
to physicians 
attending deaths 
identified 
through death 
certificates 
Interviews  
N = 405 
(89% 
response 
rate) 
 
Questionnai
res n= 6060 
(77% 
response 
rate) 
    Interview  and questionnaire 
produced similar results – 
euthanasia frequency 2.3% 
in interviews and 2.4% in 
questionnaires 
 
In 42% of all deaths were 
preceded by a medical 
decision at the end of life 
 
 
 
         
Stone et al 1997 
(Stone, 1997) 
Determine the 
frequency, 
indications and 
doses of 
sedatives used in 
hospital and 
hospice and 
Retrospective 
quantitative case 
note review 
N = 61 Sedation “the prescription 
of sedative drugs where 
reducing the level of 
consciousness was part of 
a treatment strategy with 
the aim of relieving 
distress 
43%for 
symptom control 
26% for sedation 
12% for both  
Symptom control 
Anxiety 37% 
Nausea and/or vomiting 
35% 
Other – unsettled 22% 
Mild confusion 10% 
Myoclonic jerks10% 
Midazolam 40% symptom 
control/80% sedation 
Methotrimeprazine 12%/ 
33% 
Haloperidol 46%/37% 
Other benzodiazepine 
26%/0% 
No difference between 
sedated/non sedated patients 
 
Sedative drugs for symptom 
control given to 67% in the 
hospice vs 21% in the 
hospital (p0.001) 
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determine how 
long patients 
survived after 
being sedated  
Fitting or risk of fitting 6% 
Muscle spasm 2% 
 
Sedation 
Agitated delirium 60% 
Mental anguish 27% 
Pain 20% 
Dyspnoea 20% 
Chlorpromazine 6%/0% 
Phenobarbitone 0%/3% 
 
No significant differences in 
frequency or doses of drugs 
used between hospital or 
hospice 
         
Fainsinger et al  
1998 (Fainsinger et 
al., 1998) 
To develop an 
understanding of 
the local 
experience and 
assess the 
potential for 
improved patient 
management 
Quantitative 
retrospective 
chart review 
N = 76 No formal definition 30% (n=23)  Pain 96% 
Nausea 43% 
Dyspnoea 39% 
Delirium 95% 
Midazolam 
Other “benzodiazepines” 
Chlorpromazine 
Lorazepam 
Haloperidol 
 
Mean midazolam dose 
29mg/24hrs 
 
Sedation duration average 
2.5 days before death 
 
Mean equivalent daily dose 
of morphine significantly 
higher in sedated vs non 
sedated group (87mg vs 
39mg) 
         
Chater et al 1998 
(Chater et al., 1998) 
To agree 
definition and 
terms for 
terminal sedation 
 
International 
survey of 
palliative care 
experts – 
retrospective 
questionnaire 
N = 61 
Experts in 
palliative 
care 
Terminal sedation – “the 
intention of deliberately 
inducing and maintaining 
deep sleep, but not 
deliberately causing death 
in very specific 
circumstances” 
77% of experts 
had used 
terminal 
sedation in 
previous 12 
months, 
prevalence 
amongst patients 
not determined 
(background 
population not 
known) 
(From recall) 
Pain (32%), anguish (22%), 
respiratory distress (19%), 
agitation, delirium, 
confusion, hallucinations 
(19%) 
(96 patient) 
Midazolam (63%) 
Methotrimeprazine (31%) 
Lorazepam (17%) 
Phenobarbitone (8%) 
Haloperidol (7%) 
Chlormethiazole (5%) 
Diazepam (5%) 
Chlorpromazine (4%) 
Clonazepam (2%) 
Flunitrazepam (1%) 
Propofol (1%) 
Diamorphine (1%) 
40% agreed with proposed 
definition  
 
Proposed the term “sedation 
for intractable distress in the 
dying” 
         
Deliens et al  2000 
(Deliens et al., 2000) 
To estimate the 
frequency of 
euthanasia (the 
administration of 
lethal drugs with 
the explicit 
Questionnaire: 
20% sample of 
deaths where 
physicians were 
identified from 
death certificates 
N = 1355 
(52% 
response 
rate) 
    Prevalence of euthanasia 
1.1% 
High dose opioids were used 
to alleviate pain and other 
symptoms with a potential 
life threatening effect 
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intention of 
shortening the 
patient’s life at 
the patient’s 
explicit 
request), 
physician-
assisted suicide 
(PAS), and other 
ELDs 
in medical 
practice in 
Flanders, 
Belgium 
preceded death in 18.5%  
 
Non treatment decisions 
preceded death in 16.5% of 
all deaths; 5.8% were taken 
with the explicit intent of 
hastening death 
 
Medical decisions at the end 
of life were taken in 39.3% 
of all deaths (vs 64.8% in 
Australia, 42.6% in the 
Netherlands  
         
 Fainsinger et al 
2000 (Fainsinger et 
al., 2000b) 
Determine the 
prevalence of 
sedation, improve 
on previous 
methods of data 
collection and 
broaden 
understanding of 
circumstances 
leading to 
decisions to use 
sedation 
Quantitative 
retrospective 
data collection 
on proforma in 4 
centres (3 
different 
countries) 
N = 100 in 
Israel 
94 in 
Durban 
93 in Cape 
Town 
100 in 
Madrid 
Sedation “to decrease the 
patient to an unresponsive 
condition” 
 
 
Israel 15% 
Durban 29% 
Cape Town 36% 
Madrid 22% 
(Israel/ Durban/ Cape Town/ 
Madrid) 
Pain (1%/ 4%/1%/ 1%) 
Nausea and vomiting (0%/ 
6%/3%/ 0%) 
Dyspnoea (0%/ 
12%/11%/2%) 
Delirium (14%/ 8%/21%/ 
16%)  
Psycho-existential distress 
(0%/ 1%/ 1%/11%) 
(Israel/ Durban/ Cape 
Town/ Madrid) 
Midazolam 
(80%/88%/51%/82%) 
Chlorpromazine 
Diazepam 
Haloperidol 
Lorazepam 
Methotrimeprazine 
Morphine 
Oxazepam 
Phenobarbitone 
>90% required medical 
management for a major 
symptom issue in last week 
of life 
 
Duration of sedation 1 -6 
days 
 
Sedation for existential 
distress significantly higher 
in Madrid 
 
 
         
Morita et al  2002  
(Morita et al., 2002a) 
To clarify the 
frequency of 
sedation therapy 
for terminally ill 
cancer patients 
and to identify 
physicians’ 
attitudes toward 
sedation 
Quantitative, 
questionnaire 
based study 
Use of vignettes 
to indicate 
possibilities 
(unthinkable—
strong 
possibility) of 
treatments with 
sedation 
N = 697 
(49.6% 
response 
rate) 
“palliative sedation 
therapy” the use of 
sedative medication to 
relieve intolerable and 
refractory distress by the 
reduction of patient 
consciousness”  
Also used mild-deep and 
intermittent-continuous 
subgroups 
   67% of respondents worked 
in hospices/palliative care 
units: 43% at cancer centres 
and general hospitals 
89% used mild, intermittent-
deep or continuous deep 
sedation 
83% believed patients had 
the right to receive palliative 
sedation therapy 
Refractory physical or 
psychological distress – 14% 
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and 15% resp. chose 
continuous deep sedation as 
a “strong possibility 
Depression or delirium – 
39% and 31%  chose 
psychiatric treatment without 
intentional sedation as a 
strong “possibility” (42 and 
50% resp. also chose 
continuous deep sedation as 
a “possibility” or “strong 
possibility” 
Those choosing psychiatric 
care for delirium and 
depression had significantly 
more end of life care 
experience, specialized in 
palliative care and greater 
confidence in symptoms 
control 
Independent determinants 
for decision to choose 
continuous deep sedation: 
less confident in 
psychological care, greater 
preference for symptomatic 
care, higher levels emotional 
exhaustion and 
depersonalization. 
         
Muller-Bush et al 
2003 (Muller-Busch 
et al., 2003) 
Critical analysis 
of 7 years of 
experience of the 
use of sedation in 
the final phase of 
life in a German 
palliative care 
unit 
Quantitative 
retrospective 
case note review 
of the last 48 
hours of life 
N = 548 “Sedation in the final 
stages of life... defined as 
the use of sedative drugs 
(usually benzodiazepines 
with or without 
complementary opioids 
given by the intravenous 
or by the subcutaneous 
route) to reduce the 
consciousness sufficiently 
deep to provide comfort 
14.6% (n=80) Pain 29.1% Gastrointestinal 
(nausea, vomiting, 
constipation, bowel 
obstruction) 17.4% 
Dyspnoea 14.6% 
Psychological distress 
(anxiety, depression) 2.4% 
Cachexia/fatigue 9.3% 
Cognitive disorder/delirium 
(drowsiness, agitation) 8.5% 
Bleeding 2.4% 
Midazolam Tendency over more recent 3 
year period for sedation for 
psychological distress to 
increase 
 
60% continuous sedation 
40% intermittent 
 
33.8% had no oral fluid or 
nutritional supply after 
sedation, infusions continued 
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for the patient until death 
occurs” 
Skin (ulceration/oedema) 
5.3% 
Neurological 8.9% 
in all patients 
 
Ability to communicate 
reported in 50% 
         
Sykes and Thorns 
2003 (Sykes and 
Thorns, 2003a) 
 
To determine 
how sedative 
doses change at 
the end of life 
and how often the 
doctrine of 
double effect 
might be relevant  
Quantitative, 
retrospective 
case note review 
N = 237 “a judgment was made of 
the dose threshold for 
each drug beyond which 
significant sedation was 
likely to have occurred” 
48%  Midazolam 82% 
Methotrimeprazine 22% 
Haloperidol 35% (but not 
above threshold for 
sedation – only in 
antiemetic doses) 
No difference in survival 
from admission between 
group receiving sedation in 
last 48 hrs and those not 
 
Those receiving sedation 
throughout last week of life 
had significantly longer 
survival than those not 
sedated  
 
Conclusion that sedatives do 
not hasten death, are safe to 
use and requirement to 
invoke the doctrine of 
double effect is uncommon 
         
Onwuteaka-Philipsen 
et al 2003 
(Onwuteaka-
Philipsen et al., 2003) 
To present new 
data on the rate in 
2001 of 
euthanasia, 
physician-
assisted suicide, 
and other end-of-
life decisions 
in the 
Netherlands, and 
a longitudinal 
analysis of 
decision-making 
practices since 
1990. Also, to 
examine 
physicians’ 
attitudes towards 
end-of-life 
Detailed 
interviews with 
physicians 
 
Questionnaires 
to physicians 
identified 
through random 
sampling of 
death certificates  
 
Interviews 
n = 410 
(85%respon
se rate) 
 
 
 
Questionnai
re n= 5617 
(76% 
response 
rate) 
    Rates of euthanasia rose 
from 1990-1995-2001 by 
1.7%-2.4%-2.6% 
respectively 
 
Deaths without explicit 
request to hasten death had 
fallen 
 
Results in keeping with rise 
in euthanasia and a fall in 
other end of life decisions 
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decision 
making during 
the period 1990–
2001. 
         
Mitchell and Owens 
2003 (Mitchell and 
Owens, 2003) 
To investigate 
the prevalence of 
physician assisted 
death in 
New Zealand 
within the 
context of 
availability of 
palliative 
care services. 
Questionnaire 
(English 
translation of 
Dutch 
questionnaire) 
sent to 2602 
general 
practitioners.  
Commercially 
available 
database used to 
identify these 
GPs, 
representing 
87% of GPs in 
New Zealand in 
2000  
N = 1302 
(50% 
response 
rate) 
    63% had made a medical end 
of life decision that could 
hasten death 
 
5.6% attributable to PAS or 
euthanasia  
44% of these involved no 
discussion with patient 
87% had palliative care 
services available  
 
13.6% were decisions taken 
partly with intent of 
hastening death, 53% not 
discussed with patients 
 
19% withheld or withdrew 
treatment with explicit intent 
to hasten death, 48% without 
discussion with patient 
 
85% had palliative care 
services available – 
conclusion that availability 
of these services does not 
seem to affect medical end 
of life decisions 
 
         
Pomerantz et al 2004 
(Pomerantz et al., 
2004)  
(i) To describe 
attitudes of 
physicians 
regarding 
terminal sedation 
(TS) (ii) to 
explore 
Quantitative 
retrospective 
questionnaire 
N = 135 
(mailed to 
580 = 23% 
response 
rate) 
    73% had used TS  
93% felt there were 
circumstances in which they 
would use sedation 
“Primary deciding factor” 
was pain in 75% 
7% cited this as dyspnoea 
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demographic 
characteristics 
that might be 
related to the use 
of TS and (iii) to 
compare those 
who have and 
have not used TS 
and their views 
on its morality 
 
Those with capacity would 
be the principle decision-
maker in 78% of cases 
Family would be principle 
in17% 
Physician in 1% 
 
In 69% the principle 
intention was to achieve 
symptom control 
Treating intractable 
symptoms in 27% 
Hastening death in 4% 
 
8% expected TS would 
hasten death 
 
Regarding views about TS: 
55% of those who had used 
TS and 35% who hadn’t 
disagreed with statements 
that: TS would be 
“immoral”, “would violate 
my religious beliefs”, 
“would violate my 
professional ethics”, “is 
inconsistent with the 
physician’s role of 
preserving life” 
 
         
Rietjens et al 2004 
(Rietjens et al., 
2004b) 
 
 
Rietjens et al 2006 
(Rietjens et al., 
2006a)  
Describe the 
practice of 
terminal sedation 
in the 
Netherlands  
Comparison of 
clinical 
differences and 
similarities 
Face to face 
interviews about 
the most recent 
use of terminal 
sedation in 
previous 12 
months 
N = 410 
(stratified 
sample of 
clinical 
specialists, 
GPs, 
nursing 
home 
physicians) 
Terminal sedation = the 
administration of drugs to 
keep the patient 
in deep sedation or coma 
until death, without 
giving artificial 
nutrition or hydration 
52% reported 
having used 
terminal 
sedation in the 
past 
Reports in previous 12 
months  of: 
Pain 51% 
Agitation 38% 
Dyspnoea 38%  
Benzodiazepines 21% 
Benzodiazepines and 
morphine 35% 
Benzodiazepines with 
another drug (other than 
morphine) 4% Morphine 
only 31% 
Morphine with another 
drug (other than 
59% of cases in which 
terminal sedation used had 
been discussed with patient 
79% discussed with other 
caregivers 
17% not discussed 
 
47% partly used with 
intention to hasten death 
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between terminal 
sedation and 
euthanasia 
benzodiazepine) 5% 
 
 
17% with explicit intention 
to hasten death 
 
Comparison of TS and 
euthanasia: 
Compared to euthanasia, 
those receiving TS were 
more likely to suffer with: 
anxiety(37%vs16%, 
p<0.001) 
Confusion (24%vs2%, 
p<0.001) 
Requests for euthanasia 
more often related to loss of 
dignity and sense of 
suffering without improving: 
TS more often related to 
severe pain 
 
 
         
Morita et al  2004 
(Morita, 2004a) 
 
Morita et al 2004 
(Morita, 2004b) 
 
Clarify the 
physician 
reported sedation 
practices and the 
factors 
influencing the 
sedation rates 
Quantitative 
retrospective 
questionnaire to 
all palliative 
care units in 
Japan 
N = 81  
80% 
response 
rate) 
Intermittent-deep and 
continuous-deep sedation 
investigated. 
Intermittent-deep = “the 
intermittent use of 
sedative medications to 
relieve intolerable and 
refractory distress by 
achieving almost or 
complete 
unconsciousness”. 
Continuous-deep = “the 
continuous use of 
sedative medications to 
relieve intolerable and 
refractory distress by 
achieving almost or 
complete 
unconsciousness until 
death” 
CDS for 
physical 
symptoms <10% 
in 41% of 
institutions 
10-50% in 54% 
of institutions 
>50% in 6.2% of 
institutions 
 
CDS for psycho-
existential 
suffering 
0% in 64% of 
institutions 
0.5-5% in 32% 
of institutions  
>10% in 3.6% of 
institutions 
Psycho-existential 
symptoms causing suffering 
which required sedation 
Meaningless/ worthlessness 
61% 
Burden on others/ 
dependency 48% 
Death anxiety/fear/ panic 
33% 
Wish to control time of 
death 24% 
Isolation/ lack of support 
22% 
 36% of physicians reported 
experience of CDS for 
psycho - existential suffering 
 
All competent patients 
explicitly requested sedation 
 
All family members gave 
consent “where available”  
 
CDS more frequently 
performed by physicians 
who did not believe clear 
consciousness necessary for 
a good death, did not believe 
CDS shortened life, worked 
with nurses specializing in 
cancer or palliative care, 
judged symptoms as 
refractory without treatment 
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trials, who used CDS 
without using intermittent 
sedation first 
         
Kohara et al 2005 
(Kohara et al., 2005) 
Investigate the 
influence of 
sedative drugs on 
consciousness in 
a Japanese 
hospice 
Quantitative 
retrospective 
case note review 
Level of 
consciousness 
measured on 
communication 
capacity scale 
N = 124 
(consecutiv
e patients 
Jan to Dec 
1999) 
Sedation =    “medical 
procedure to decrease the 
level of consciousness in 
order to relieve severe 
physical distress 
refractory to standard 
interventions. 
Excluded drugs like 
morphine which may 
have had secondary effect 
on somnolence 
51% Dyspnoea 63% 
General malaise/restlessness 
40% 
Pain 25% 
Agitation 21% 
Nausea and/or vomiting 6% 
 
54% .1 uncontrollable 
symptom 
Midazolam 98% 
Haloperidol 84% 
Scopolamine 
hydrobromide 10% 
Chlorpromazine 5% 
Flunitrazepam 2% 
Ketamine 2% 
Palliative performance scales 
poor in majority of patients 
prior to sedation 
 
Duration of admission 28.9 
days and 39.5 for sedated 
and non-sedated patients, 
resp. (no significant 
difference) 
 
Mean midazolam dose in last 
7 days 51-66.7mg/ 24 hours 
 
69% continuous sedation 
30% intermittent sedation 
(80% of these went on to 
have continuous sedation) 
 
Patients receiving sedation 
more likely to receive higher 
doses of opioids 
         
Rietjens et al 2005  
(Rietjens et al., 2005) 
  
 
 
Rietjens et al 2006 
(Rietjens et al., 
2006b) 
 
To gain insight 
into the 
characteristics of 
a good death for 
the Dutch 
population and 
subsequently to 
compare this with 
those of 
physicians 
Questionnaires 
to sample frame 
of 1777 
members of the 
Dutch general 
public 
 
Face to face 
interviews with 
Dutch 
physicians 
1388 
(78% 
response 
rate) 
members of 
the general 
public 
 
391 
physician 
interviews 
(response 
rate 81%) 
In questionnaire sedation 
referred to in vignette:  
“bring the patient in a 
condition of 
unconsciousness, being 
unaware of pain and 
dying within one week” 
   Items frequently considered 
important:  
Possibility of being able to 
say goodbye to loved ones 
94% 
Dying with dignity 92% 
Deciding on treatments at 
the end of life 88% 
Dying free of pain 87% 
 
Acceptance of euthanasia, 
terminal sedation and 
increasing morphine was 
related to wish to have 
dignified death and concerns 
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about becoming a burden 
 
Acceptance of euthanasia 
lower among physicians than 
general public (64% vs 85%) 
 
Further differences seen in 
accepting euthanasia for 
incompetent adult (36% vs 
63%), patients without 
serious disease 11% vs 
37%), dementia 6% vs 62%) 
 
No differences between the 
groups considering the 
acceptance of terminal 
sedation  
         
Miccinesi et al  2006 
(Miccinesi et al., 
2006) 
To estimate the 
frequency and 
characteristics of 
continuous deep 
sedation in six 
European 
countries: 
Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, 
The Netherlands, 
Sweden, and 
Switzerland 
Quantitative, 
retrospective 
questionnaire 
about medical 
decisions at the 
end of life, part 
of EURELD 
consortium, 
results for CDS 
presented 
separately here 
N = 20,480 
total from 
all 
countries 
Response 
rate 
reported: 
Belgium 
59% 
Denmark 
62% 
Italy 44% 
The 
Netherlands 
75% 
Sweden 
61% 
Switzerland 
67% 
“Continuous deep 
sedation (CDS) with or 
without artificial nutrition 
or hydration (ANH) 
 
Question of continuous 
deep sedation: “did the 
patient receive drugs such 
as barbiturates or 
benzodiazepines, to keep 
him/her continuously in 
deep sedation or coma 
until death?” Further 
question was asked about 
whether artificial 
nutrition or hydration 
were given 
Belgium 8.2% 
Denmark 2.5% 
Italy 8.5% 
The Netherlands 
5.7% 
Sweden 3.2% 
Switzerland 
4.2% 
  Use of CDS without ANH 
Belgium 3.2% 
Denmark 1.6% 
Italy 3.0% 
The Netherlands 3.7% 
Sweden 1.8% 
Switzerland 2.9%  
         
Seale 2006 (Seale, 
2006b) 
 
To assess the 
extent to which 
UK doctors 
Postal survey 
using 
questionnaire 
N = 857 
(response 
rate 53%) 
    Rate of voluntary euthanasia 
0.16% 
PAS 0% 
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Seale 2006 (Seale, 
2006a) 
 
discuss end-of-
life decisions 
(ELDs) with 
patients, relatives 
and colleagues, 
and to assess the 
degree to which 
patients’ 
lives are 
shortened by 
ELDs 
and 
to estimate the 
frequency of 
different end-of-
life decisions 
(ELDs) in 
medical practice 
in the UK, 
compare these 
with other 
countries and 
assess doctors’ 
views on the 
adequacy of 
current UK law 
translated from 
Dutch into 
English (same as 
Australian and 
New Zealand 
studies) 
Physicians 
identified from 
commercially 
available 
database 
Alleviation of symptoms 
with potentially life 
shortening effect 32.8% 
Decisions not to treat (in 
case of potentially life 
prolonging treatments) 
30.3% 
Comparison of data with 
other countries allowed 
grouping into “permissive” 
(Netherlands, Belgium, 
Switzerland) and “non 
permissive” (Denmark, 
Sweden, and Italy)countries 
 
UK considered non 
permissive but differed from 
other non-permissive 
countries in willingness to 
discuss end of life decision 
making with patients and 
relatives 
         
Van der Heide et al 
2007 (van der Heide 
et al., 2007) 
 
To assess the 
effects of the 
2002 Dutch law 
and changes in 
end of life care.  
To assess the 
reporting rates 
for euthanasia 
and PAS and 
physicians’ 
reasons for non-
reporting  
Retrospective, 
quantitative 
questionnaire 
based on death 
certificate 
sampling to 
identify 
(anonymous)pati
ents cared for by 
physicians who 
were then 
contacted to 
provide details 
relating to this 
N = 6860 
questionnai
re 
responses  
(77.8% 
response 
rate) 
“was the patient 
continuously sedated 
before death” 
8.2% reported 
use of CDS prior 
to death 
7.1% with a 
decision which 
may have 
hastened death 
(such as the 
withholding or 
withdrawal of 
artificial 
nutrition or 
hydration) 
  Significant fall in reported 
rates of euthanasia and rise 
in use of CDS 
Sedation most common in 
subgroups in which 
euthanasia and PAS most 
common: patient ,80yrs, 
men, patients with cancer, 
attended by GPs 
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death. 
Stratified for 
type of death   
         
Rietjens et al  2007 
(Rietjens et al., 2007) 
 
To explore 
nurses’ 
experience with 
and attitudes 
towards palliative 
sedation (PS), 
focusing on the 
reasons why 
palliative 
sedation 
was used, the 
nurses’ 
perceptions about 
palliative 
sedation 
and their ideas 
about how 
palliative 
sedation affects 
the 
dying process.  
Qualitative, 
semi structured 
interviews, 
analysed using 
constant 
comparative 
methods 
N= 16 
nurses from 
(i) 
palliative 
care 
inpatient 
unit and  
(ii) medical 
admissions 
unit in a 
tertiary 
hospital 
“The use of continuous 
I.V. benzodiazepines, 
barbiturates, 
or other medications to 
bring an imminently 
dying patient 
into a state of 
unresponsiveness to 
alleviate suffering from 
symptoms that cannot be 
controlled with 
conventional 
therapies.” 
   Described the most 
memorable patient who had 
received palliative sedation 
 
All involved PS for a 
physical symptom +/- 
Nonphysical symptom 
Patient wish 
Family distress about 
patient’s suffering 
 
8/16 included the use of PS 
for existential distress 
 
Nurses found it harder to 
understand use for existential 
suffering and this was 
thought to be out of their 
range of expertise, but still 
felt to be necessary 
 
Different perceptions on 
whether PS hastened death 
         
Rietjens et al 2008 
(Rietjens et al., 2008) 
 
Describe the 
practice of 
palliative 
sedation and 
compare patients 
who were sedated 
prior to death 
with those not 
sedated 
Systematic 
retrospective 
analysis of case 
notes of patients 
who had died 
(medical and 
nursing) 
between 2001 
and 2005 
N = 157 Patients considered to 
have received PS when 
there was an annotation in 
the notes of the use of 
“continuous deep 
sedation” 
43% Terminal restlessness 62% 
Dyspnoea 47% 
Pain 26% 
Anxiety 6% 
“Midazolam, sometimes 
combined with propofol, 
was the most commonly 
used drug to induce 
sedation” 
68% PS started on last day 
before death 
 
91% of cases PS was 
discussed with either patient 
or family – non competency 
primary reason not to discuss 
with the patient 
 
No differences in survival 
after admission between 
sedated and non-sedated 
groups 
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Sedated patients were 
younger than non-sedated 
(55yrs vs 59yrs, p=0.04) 
 
         
Reuzel et al 2008 
(Reuzel et al., 2008) 
 
To examine the 
practice of end 
stage palliative 
sedation in the 
Netherlands 
Questionnaire 
and interview 
studies 
Questionnaire 
piloted initially 
Interviews 
qualitative semi 
structured 
Questionnai
re 
N = 515  
(response 
rate 35%) 
Interview N 
= 28  
(20 in first 
round, 22 in 
second 
round;14 of 
those 
initially 
interviewed 
were 
included in 
this) 
End stage palliative 
sedation “the continuous 
reduction of a patient’s 
consciousness by use of 
drugs when death is 
imminent” 
 (Questionnaires) 
Pain 57% 
Dyspnoea 51% 
Anxiety 43% 
Exhaustion 34% 
Delirium 20% 
Loss of dignity 20% 
Existential suffering 17% 
Vomiting 7% 
Nausea 7% 
Midazolam 48% 
Diazepam 19% 
Clonazepam 1% 
Opioids 74% 
Chlorpromazine 1% 
Haloperidol 20% 
Levomepromazine 5% 
Promethazine 3% 
Ketamine 1% 
 
Opioids alone 22% 
More experienced, GPs and 
physicians who consulted 
palliative care experts 
administered opioids alone 
significantly less often 
 
All of those interviewed 
stated preference for use of 
midazolam and non could 
explain the numbers using 
opioids alone 
 
         
Curlin  2008 (Curlin 
et al., 2008) 
To estimate 
the proportion of 
physicians who 
currently object 
to physician-
assisted suicide 
(PAS), terminal 
sedation 
(TS), and 
withdrawal of 
artificial life 
support (WLS), 
and to examine 
associations 
between such 
objections 
and physician 
ethnicity, 
Quantitative 
survey data as 
part of a national 
survey 
N = 1144 
(1820 sent 
out, 63% 
response 
rate) 
TS defined as “sedation 
to unconsciousness in 
dying patients” 
   69% of physicians objected 
to PAS 
18% of physicians objected 
to TS 
%% of physicians objected 
to WLS) 
Highly religious physicians 
more likely to object than 
those with low religiosity 
 
Asian ethnicity or being of  
Hindu religion and having 
more experience of dying 
patients increased likelihood 
of objecting to PAS and TS 
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religious 
characteristics, 
and 
experience caring 
for dying patients 
         
Rietjens et al 2008 
(Rietjens, 2008) 
To study the 
practice of 
continuous deep 
sedation in 2005 
in the 
Netherlands and 
compare it with 
findings from 
2001. 
Retrospective, 
quantitative 
questionnaire 
based on death 
certificate 
sampling to 
identify 
(anonymous)pati
ents cared for by 
physicians who 
were then 
contacted to 
provide details 
relating to this 
death. 
Stratified for 
type of death   
N = 6860 
questionnai
re 
responses  
(77.8% 
response 
rate) 
2001 questionnaire: 
“Did the patient receive 
drugs, such as 
barbiturates or 
benzodiazepines, to keep 
him/her continuously in 
deep sedation or coma 
until 
death?” 
 
2005 questionnaire: 
“Was the patient 
continuously and deeply 
sedated or kept in coma 
until 
death?” 
2001 5.6%  
 
2005 7.1% 
Fatigue 55% 
Dyspnoea 48% 
Unclear consciousness 47% 
Pain 42% 
Confusion 23% 
Anxiety 21% 
Vomiting 5% 
Depression 3% 
 
Benzodiazepines 83% 
Benzodiazepines and 
morphine  
Benzodiazepines and other 
Drugs 
Morphine alone 15%  
Morphine and other drugs 
Use of CDS increased from 
2001 to 2005, preceding  
5.6% to 7.1% of all deaths, 
respectively  
 
For 47% of those receiving 
CDS it was started in last 24 
hours of life 
 
94% sedated for <1 week 
 
Almost all GPs and nursing 
home physicians withheld 
fluids 
 
9% had previously requested 
euthanasia but request not 
granted 
 
9% had sought palliative 
care consultation 
         
Seale 2009 (Seale, 
2009a) 
 
Seale  2009 (Seale, 
2009c) 
(i)To estimate the 
frequency of 
different medical 
end-of-life 
decisions (ELDs) 
made in the UK 
in 2007–2008, 
comparing these 
with 2004 
and 
(ii) to report UK 
doctors’ opinions 
about legalisation 
 Postal survey 
using 
questionnaire 
translated from 
Dutch into 
English, with 
modifications to 
wording to 
adjust for the 
potential to 
overestimate 
ELDs.  
Additional 
N = 8857 
questionnai
res sent out 
42.1% 
response 
rate 
(67% 
palliative 
medicine 
specialists, 
care of the 
elderly 
specialists 
Questionnaire asked  
“Was the patient 
continuously and deeply 
sedated or kept in a coma 
before death?” 
16.5%   Non treatment decisions in 
21.8% of deaths 
“double effect measures” 
(where drugs were given 
with intent of alleviating 
pain or suffering with 
possibility of death as a 
foreseen but unintended side 
effect) 17.1% 
 
CDS more common in UK 
than other countries, esp. in 
hospitals, home care settings 
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of medically 
assisted dying 
(euthanasia and 
physician-
assisted suicide), 
comparing this 
with the UK 
general 
public. 
question about 
continuous deep 
sedation added 
from the 2006 
survey. 
Physicians 
identified from 
commercially 
available 
database 
48.1%, 
neurologist
s 42.9%, 
“other” 
hospital 
specialists 
40.1%, GPs 
39.3%) 
and in younger patients 
 
Low proportion of doctors in 
favour of life shortening 
treatments cf general public 
(agreement that a doctor 
should be allowed to end a 
patient’s life if the patient 
requested it in 8.6% of 
physicians and 51.3% of the 
general public)  
 
Palliative medicine 
specialists particularly 
opposed (73.4% strongly 
oppose a doctor being 
allowed to end the life of 
someone dying from cancer, 
who explicitly requests the 
ending of life vs 32.2% of 
“other” hospital specialists) 
         
Rosengarten 2009 
(Rosengarten et al., 
2009) 
To provide a 
description of the 
use of PS as 
experienced 
within the 
Jerusalem Home 
Hospital Unit 
Retrospective 
review of 
medical records 
of the Home 
Hospital Unit 
from December 
2005 to March 
2006 
36 patients 
received 
sedation, no 
total no. 
provided 
but this 
represented 
<5% of all 
patients  
“the use of sedative 
medications to relieve 
intolerable and refractory 
distress by the reduction 
in patient consciousness.” 
<5% Intractable pain 
Agitation 
Delirium 
Vomiting and nausea 
Existential suffering  
Morphine 
Midazolam 
Haloperidol 
Fentanyl 
Promethazine 
Prevalence of sedation is 
lower than that reported in 
the literature concerning 
hospices and hospitals, likely 
to be a reflection of a 
different patient population 
Morphine used as 
monotherapy ‘with due 
consideration of, and careful 
adherence to, the limit of the 
therapeutic window’. 
         
Pautex 2009 
(Pautex et al., 2009) 
 
To determine 
whether recent 
changes in opioid 
management for 
pain has affected 
the proportion of 
patient retaining 
Retrospective 
review of 
medical notes of 
consecutive 
hospitalized 
patients who 
died in  
n = 141   2%  Midazolam 34% of patients retained 
consciousness until death 
 
2% were intentionally 
sedated because of refractory 
symptoms, using midazolam 
at a mean 
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consciousness 
until death 
palliative care 
wards in 
2005, with the 
calculation of 
the number of 
unconscious 
days before 
death arising 
from a series of 
validated tools 
dose of 30 mg/day  
 
An impaired level of 
consciousness in the last 
days of life  is more likely to 
be due to progression of the 
underlying 
disease, leading to metabolic 
abnormalities, 
the primary or secondary 
effect of drugs 
used for symptomatic 
treatments 
 
         
Van der Heide 2010 
(van der Heide et al., 
2010) 
1. To investigate 
physicians’ and 
bereaved 
relatives’ 
perspectives on 
end-of-life 
decision-making 
practices during 
the last three 
months 
and the last three 
days of life of 
cancer patients 
 
 
2. To assess the 
impact of the 
LCP in hospital, 
home and nursing 
home settings.  
Questionnaire 
and review of 
medical notes.  
Questionnaire 
completed by 
the patient’s 
physician within 
a week of death; 
relatives were 
contacted 2 
months after the 
patient’s death 
 
Patient data 
gathered before 
and after the 
introduction of 
the LCP in each 
setting 
N = 311 
patients 
with cancer 
“The parenteral 
administration of 
benzodiazepines or 
barbiturates” 
 
27%  of hospital 
Patients 
33% of nursing 
home patients, 
11% of patients 
who died at 
home 
  Introduction of the LCP 
reduced the use of 
drugs that were estimated to 
have a potentially life-
shortening effect, from 46% 
to 28%. 
 
In last 3 months of life, 
patients who died in hospital 
received anticancer therapy 
and medication to relieve 
symptoms more often than 
those in nursing homes or at 
home. 
In the last 3 days of life, 
patients who died in the 
hospital or nursing home 
received more medication 
than those who died at home.  
The LCP reduced the extent 
to which physicians used 
medication that might have 
hastened death.  
Relatives of patients who 
died in the hospital tended to 
be least positive about the 
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patient’s and their own 
participation in the decision-
making. 
         
Chambaere 2010 
(Chambaere et al., 
2010) 
To determine the 
prevalence of 
continuous 
deep sedation 
until death in 
Flanders, 
Belgium, 
between 2001 
and 2007 and 
consider the 
ethical debate 
surrounding the 
practice. 
Quantitative, 
retrospective 
questionnaire 
about medical 
decisions at the 
end of life, 
including CDS  
n = 3623 
(58.4% 
response 
rate) 
“Continuous deep 
sedation (CDS) with or 
without artificial nutrition 
or hydration (ANH) 
 
Question of continuous 
deep sedation: “did the 
patient receive drugs such 
as barbiturates or 
benzodiazepines, to keep 
him/her continuously in 
deep sedation or coma 
until death?” Further 
question was asked about 
whether artificial 
nutrition or hydration 
were given 
14.5%  Benzodiazepines alone  
Opioids alone 
Benzodiazepines and 
opioids  
There was a significant rise 
in the prevalence of CDS 
from 2001 to 2007, from 
8.3% to 14.5% 
Opioids were used alone to 
sedate patients, contrary to 
international guidelines 
CDS was used to hasten 
death as a “co-intention” in 
17% of cases 
There is a need for a national 
guideline for CDS 
There is a need for more 
qualitative research 
 
         
Babarro 2010 
(Alonso-Babarro et 
al., 2010) 
To determine the 
incidence and 
efficacy of PS for 
patients with 
cancer and 
intractable 
symptoms 
Retrospective 
review of 
medical notes of 
patients under 
care of 
community 
palliative care 
team 
N = 370 
patients 
under care 
of palliative 
care team: 
245 died 
“Palliative sedation is the 
use of specific sedatives 
to relieve intolerable 
suffering from refractory 
symptoms by reducing a 
patient’s level of 
consciousness.” 
12% of patients 
received 
palliative 
sedation 
Delirium 62% 
Dyspnoea 14% 
Nausea/vomiting 7% 
Seizures 7% 
Anxiety/psychoexistential 
suffering 7% 
Pain 3% 
Midazolam  
Levomepromazine 
 
Using a decision-making and 
treatment checklist to 
facilitate palliative sedation 
at home, patients were 
sedated using midazolam 
and levomepromazine.  PS 
may be used safely and 
efficaciously to treat 
intractable symptoms at 
home  
         
Oosten 2011 (Oosten 
et al., 2011) 
Determine 
whether the 
patient 
characteristics in 
terms of their 
underlying pain 
problem and its 
treatment is 
Systematic 
retrospective 
analysis of case 
notes of patients 
who had died 
(medical and 
nursing) 
between 2001 
N = 157 PS is the monitored use of 
medication intended to 
induce varying states of 
unconsciousness, but not 
death, in order to relieve 
refractory and 
unendurable symptoms in 
patients in whom death is 
43% Terminal restlessness 62% 
Dyspnoea 47% 
Pain 26% 
Anxiety 6% 
“Midazolam, sometimes 
combined with propofol, 
was the most commonly 
used drug to induce 
sedation” 
Prior to the onset of sedation 
the opioid dose was higher, 
more frequently rotated to an 
alternative opioid and 
ketamine and spinal 
medication was used more 
frequently. 
‘findings suggest 
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related to the 
need for sedation 
and 2005 imminent. that…sedated patients had 
more difficult pain 
problems’ 
         
Buiting 2011 
(Buiting et al., 2011) 
To investigate:  
1. whether and 
how palliative 
treatment 
alternatives 
come up during 
or preceding 
euthanasia 
consultations and 
2. how the 
availability 
of possible 
palliative 
treatment 
alternatives are 
assessed by the 
independent 
consultant 
Qualitative 
interviews with 
euthanasia 
consultants and 
physicians  
n = 26 (14 
euthanasia 
consultants
&12 
physicians) 
    Sedation was considered a 
different decision to the 
decision to use  euthanasia 
 
Physicians did not consider 
sedation to be an alternative 
for euthanasia 
         
Anquinet 2011 
(Anquinet et al., 
2011) 
To study 
The 
characteristics of 
continuous deep 
sedation until 
death ’ , for 
patients dying at 
home in Belgium 
Qualitative 
interviews with 
GPs regarding 
patients 
previously 
identified to 
have received 
CDS prior to 
death 
n = 28   Pain 
Agitation 
Dyspnoea 
Fear 
Restlessness 
Epilepsy  
Hopelessness 
 
Benzodiazepines only  
32% 
Benzodiazepines in 
combination with 
opioids and/or other drugs 
43% 
Opioids only 14% 
Opioids and other drugs 
(excluding 
benzodiazepines)11% 
 
Patients were still receiving 
opioids alone for sedation, 
contrary to international 
recommendations 
 
In 46% of cases GPs used 
CDS with at least a partial 
intent to hasten death 
 
This study provides evidence 
of the need for a guideline in 
Belgium, similar to that in 
the Netherlands 
         
Swart 2012 
(Swart et al., 2012) 
 
To study the 
practice of 
continuous 
Structured 
questionnaire 
sent to 1580 
n = 606 
(38% 
response 
  Cancer and non-cancer 
patients: 
Pain 
Midazolam (used 
significantly less 
frequently for non-cancer 
Practice of CDS is different 
in patients with cancer and 
those with a non-cancer 
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 palliative 
sedation for both 
cancer and non-
cancer patients. 
physicians 
regarding their 
last patient 
receiving 
continuous 
sedation until 
death 
rate) Physical exhaustion 
Dyspnoea 
Delirium 
Existential suffering, 
Psychological exhaustion 
Non-cancer >cancer 
patients 
Dyspnoea 
Muscular 
Confusion 
Depression 
Cancer patient > non-
cancer patients 
Nausea and vomiting  
patients  diagnosis. 
This is likely to be due to the 
less predictable course of 
illness with non-cancer 
patients, and less certainty of 
the imminence of death 
         
Onwuteaka-Philipsen 
2012  
(Onwuteaka-
Philipsen et al., 2012) 
To assess the 
frequency and 
characteristics of 
euthanasia, 
physician-
assisted suicide, 
and other end-of-
life practices in 
2010, and assess 
trends since 1990 
Retrospective, 
quantitative 
questionnaire 
based on death 
certificate 
sampling to 
identify 
(anonymous)pati
ents cared for by 
physicians who 
were then 
contacted to 
provide details 
relating to this 
death. 
Stratified for 
type of death   
n = 6263 
(74% 
response 
rate) 
“was the patient 
continuously sedated 
before death” 
Use of sedation: 
As a euthanasia 
or PAS decision: 
18.1% 
To end life 
without explicit 
request:52.2% 
As an intensified 
alleviation of 
symptoms 
decision: 20.3% 
 Benzodiazepines 
Opioids 
 
The frequency of the use of 
intensified alleviation of 
symptoms has increased 
since 2005 
The frequency of use of CDS 
has increased. 
This may be a result of 
increasing access to 
palliative care, as was 
experienced in Belgium  
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